

Threat Talks

Breaking the bank

Financial sector cybersecurity threats



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The financial sector faces a significant cybersecurity challenge, with nearly one-fifth of reported cyber incidents in the past two decades targeting financial institutions. This exposure is concerning, especially considering the sheer volume of attacks. Take JPMorgan Chase, the largest U.S. bank, for example. Despite a robust security posture, they experience a staggering **45 billion cyber events daily** – a number that highlights the constant barrage these institutions face.

But what exactly is the impact of this reality on the business of the bank? Are humans the weakest link when it comes to financial cybersecurity? And how do you stop modern day bank robbers from targeting your financial institution?

In this **'Breaking the bank'** episode of Threat Talks we explore why the financial industry is such a popular target and what financial institutions can do to face this reality head-on. After all, surely robbing a bank shouldn't be as easy as the movies make it seem.

In this episode of Threat Talks we will discuss the following threats:

- Swift Gateway vulnerabilities
- Android Banking Malware (Vulture)
- Binance Hack


Nearly one-fifth of reported cyber incidents in the past two decades targeted financial institutions.

Source: Advisen Cyber Loss Data: CISMM: International Telecommunication Union publication

The financial sector has suffered more than 20,000 cyberattacks, causing 12 billion in losses over the past 20 years.

Source: Advisen Cyber Loss Data and IMF staff calculations

74% of all breaches include the human element.




The human element risk cannot be understated.

74% of all breaches include the human element, with people being involved either via Error, Privilege Misuse, Use of stolen credentials or Social Engineering.

83% of breaches involved External actors, and the primary motivation for attacks continues to be overwhelmingly financially driven, at 95% of breaches.

Timeline of attempted and successful heists on SWIFT



Bangladesh Bank SWIFT attack


On February 4, 2016, the Bangladesh Bank cyber heist resulted in the loss of \$81 million from the bank's account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Hackers initially aimed to steal \$951 million using fraudulent SWIFT transfer requests. They used spear phishing, custom malware, and a secure file wiper to breach the bank's systems and launder money through Philippine casinos.

mSOC confidence score: Confirmed Threat category: Cyber Attacks - Heist Severity: Critical

ATT&CK Technique	Attack Strategy	Evasion	Complexity	Target Type
T1071 - Application Layer Protocol	Exploit SWIFT messaging system	Use of legitimate credentials	High	Financial Institution

ATT&CK Mitigation	Attack vector	Detection	Threat level	Threat Actor Type
M1037 - Filter Network Traffic M1031 - Network Intrusion Prevention	Malware Infection	Network traffic Monitoring	High	Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)

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Spear phishing

1. The attacker used spear phishing emails themed around job applications, which contained malicious zipped attachments. The initial foothold was gained in March 2015, almost a year before the attacker acted on their objectives.

M Implementing email filtering systems to detect and block malicious attachments before they reach the user can help mitigate these attacks. Additionally, employee training programs focused on phishing awareness can significantly reduce the likelihood of successful attacks. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) can add an extra layer of security, making it more difficult for attackers to gain access even if they obtain credentials. EDR solutions can monitor and respond to suspicious activities on endpoints and prevent malware executions. Some firewalls can prevent leaking credentials on phishing websites through 'Credential Phishing Prevention.'

Patient 0

2. After infecting the initial victim, the attacker began harvesting credentials and moving laterally within the bank's network. They infected new systems by installing additional backdoors, eventually gaining a foothold on SWIFT-connected systems. Command and control (C2) communications were camouflaged using a fake TLS protocol to evade detection.

M Network segmentation and a zero Trust architecture can limit lateral movement and reduce the blast radius of an attack. Implementing strong password policies and monitoring for unusual login activities can help detect and mitigate credential harvesting attempts. The use of firewalls and network traffic monitoring can assist in detecting suspicious traffic activities.

Heist

5. The attackers were able to issue a total of 35 SWIFT transactions worth \$951,000,000. Only \$81,000,000 of this amount was successfully exfiltrated into the US Federal Reserve to fake bank accounts in the Philippines. The funds were then laundered through multiple private baccarat junkets in various casinos and ultimately extracted and transported to Macau, where the trail was lost.

Vultur Android Malware

On March 28, 2024, NCC Group reported on the expansion of the Android malware Vultur, which has increased its capabilities and targets. Initially focused on keylogging, Vultur now employs screen recording and accessibility services to capture sensitive user data from banking and financial apps, posing significant risks to users' financial information.

mSOC confidence score: Verified Threat category: Malware - Spyware Information-stealing Severity: High

ATT&CK Technique	Attack Strategy	Evasion	Complexity	Target Type
T1060 - Mobile Phishing	Install malicious app disguised as a legitimate application	Encryption and Tunneling	Medium	Individuals

ATT&CK Mitigation	Attack vector	Detection	Threat level	Threat Actor Type
M1058 - Antivirus / Antimalware	Malware infection	Network traffic	High	Cyber criminals

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Communication and functionalities

4. The malware communicates with the 222 compromised devices, evading detection. At this point, the attacker can begin harvesting credentials and moving laterally within the victim's network.

M Implementing real-time monitoring and automated alerts for unusual malicious activities can help detect and mitigate these threats. Some EDR solutions can automatically detect and respond to suspicious behaviors on endpoints.

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Binance Chain exploit

On October 6, 2022, BNB Chain, the blockchain of crypto exchange Binance, was temporarily paused due to a cross-chain bridge exploit. Attackers stole an estimated \$10 million worth of crypto currency by exploiting a vulnerability in the BSC Token Hub.

mSOC confidence score: Verified Threat category: Misconfigured - Insecure implementation Severity: High

ATT&CK Technique	Attack Strategy	Evasion	Complexity	Target Type
not applicable	Cross-chain bridge exploit	Use of multi-chain routers and burner wallets	High	Enterprises

ATT&CK Mitigation	Attack vector	Detection	Threat level	Threat Actor Type
M1047 - Audit	Cross-chain bridge vulnerability	Monitoring crosschain transaction	High	Cybercriminal

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OTHER CRYPTOCURRENCIES

1. The attacker registers and exploits the BNB Token Hub to gain a foothold. At this point, the attacker can begin harvesting credentials and moving laterally within the victim's network.

M Implementing real-time monitoring and automated alerts for unusual malicious activities can help detect and mitigate these threats. Some EDR solutions can automatically detect and respond to suspicious behaviors on endpoints.

Taxonomy

ATT&CK framework techniques of the threat actor:

ATT&CK mitigation can be applied. Threat actor can exploit known vulnerabilities.

Attack vector can be exploited by the threat actor to exploit known vulnerabilities.

What is the primary method of attack:

How severe the threat is:

mSOC score explanation:

We assign a score to both our sources and the reliable items. Scores are the scores on a numeric scale and the from 1 (most reliable) to 5 (least reliable). When items are classified as reliable, we use them to calculate the overall intelligence score. This score is based on the threat intelligence team's confidence in the source and the reliability of the information.

The overall intelligence score is the average of the scores of all reliable items. This score is used to calculate the overall threat intelligence score.

The threat intelligence team would be categorized to confirm whether our procedure is correct or not. If not, then we have to recheck our procedure.

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