Ford Pinto Case
Ford Pinto Case
10 aug 1978: tragic accident rutier pe Highway 33, lng Goshen, Indiana. Surorile Judy i
Lynn Ulrich (18, 16 ani) i verioara lor Donna Ulrich (18 ani) staionau pe osea n Fordul
lor Pinto, model 1973. Au fost izbite din spate de ctre un van, care circula cu min 50 mile
pe or. Rezervorul de benzin, aflat n spatele mainii, s-a spart, maina a explodat i cele
trei fete au ars de vii.
Pentru prima oar, compania Ford a fost acuzat de ucidere din culp (reckless homicide).
Procesul a durat 20 de sptmni i judge Harold Staffeldt a explicat juriului c Ford poate
fi condamnat numai dac se poate dovedi c Ford se face vinovat de nesocotirea clar,
contient i nejustificabil a suferinei ce poate s rezulte (din aciunile sale), aceast
nesocotire implicnd o abatere substanial de la standardele de conduit acceptabile.
Juriul a respins acuzaia. Fraza cheie asupra creia s-a purtat btlia dintre acuzare i
aprare a fost standarde acceptabile. Se poate spune c Ford a ales n mod deliberat i
cinic profitul n dauna siguranei n proiectarea i plasamentul rezervorului? n timp ce
Elkhart County prosecutor Michael Cosentino i chief Ford attorney James Neal se luptau
dramatic asupra acestei chestiuni, tot mediul american de afaceri atepta cu sufletul la
gur verdictul, care putea s aib urmri foarte drastice asupra corporate responsibility
and product liability.
Antecedentele procesului sunt semnificative. Controversele privind Pinto au nceput un
an mai devreme. n 1977, Mark Dowie, general manager al revistei Mother Jones
publicase un articol, intitulat Pinto Madness, n care acuza Ford de faptul c pusese n
circulaie o main nesigur, n care sute de oameni suferiser n mod inutil arsuri mortale
sau foarte grave, cu urmri ireparabile. n articol se afirma c:
sub presiunea concurenei VW, Ford lansase modelul Pinto n mare grab
inginerii de la Ford constataser n timpul testelor premergtoare produciei de serie c
rezervorul, plasat n spate, era extrem de vulnerabil, explodnd foarte uor n urma unor
ciocniri din spate
deoarece linia de asamblare era deja pus la punct n momentul descoperirii acestui
neajuns, oficialii de la Ford au decis ca maina s intre n producie cu acest defect, dei
Ford deinea patentul unui tip de rezervor mult mai sigur, folosit la modelul Capri
n urmtorii 8 ani, Ford fcuse un lobby extrem de eficient pentru amnarea unor
reglementri guvernamentale mai severe, care ar fi obligat compania s nlocuiasc
rezervorul vulnerabil
ntr-o estimare prudent, accidentele Pinto cauzaser 500 de mori din cauza arsurilor,
oameni care nu ar fi murit dac mainile lor nu ar fi luat foc; cifra ar fi putut atinge ns i
valoarea 900.
chestiunea devenise att de penibil pt Ford, nct agenia sa de publicitate, Walter
Thomson, eliminase ultima fraz dintr-o reclam radio, care suna astfel: Pinto leaves you
with that warm feeling
Ford tie c Pinto este a fire trap, i totui a pltit milioane pentru a rezolva litigiile n
afara tribunalelor i este gata s plteasc alte milioane pentru lobby mpotriva unor
reglementri de securitate mai stricte
cu 0.5 milioane de maini scoase de pe band anual, Pinto este cel mai vndut
subcompact din America, iar profiturile companiei sunt imense
finalmente, n 1977 Ford a introdus cteva modificri, puin costisitoare, pt a satisface
noile reglementri, pe care a reuit s le amne vreme de 8 ani, datorit unei cost-benefit
analysis, care fixeaz un pre n dolari pe o via de om.
$132.000
41.300
Hospital
Other
Property damage
Insurance Administration
Legal and court
Employer losses
Victim's pain and suffering
Funeral
Assets (lost consumtion)
Miscellaneous
TOTAL PER FATALITY
700
425
1500
4700
3000
1000
10.000
900
5000
200
$200.000
Dowie: nu a reuit s afle cum s-a stabilit suma de $10.000 pt pain and suffering. n
realitate, nu Ford, ci guvernul federal stabilise aceast cifr, iar analiza cost-beneficii
realizat de Ford s-a bazat pe ea.
n plus, Dowie obiecteaz c nu au fost luate n calcul dect decesel, dar persoanele cu
arsuri grave, rmase n via, sunt excluse din calcul, acestea fiind de 9 ori mai
numeroase dect decesele.
Dowie pretinde c este n posesia unor informaii confideniale din interiorul Ford, care
atest c, n realitate, costurile introducerii unei cmi de cauciuc n rezervor ar fi fost cu
mult mai mici, de numai $5.8 pe vehicul.
Concluzie Dowie: n loc s fac o mbuntire de $11, ori s instaleze o cma de
cauciuc de $5, ori s dea mcar posibilitatea cumprtorului de a suporta costul
suplimentar n cunotin de cauz, Ford a preferat s amne reglementarea timp de 8
ani. n acest timp, mii de oameni au ars de vii, zeci de mii au suferit arsuri grave i
milioane de vehicule nesigure, produse pn la reglementare, vor continua s circule i s
omoare oameni.
Nu este o strategie specific numai companiei Ford, ci tuturor productorilor de
vehicule, inclusiv pe cile ferate sau avioane.
Ford a pltit milioane de dolari daune n urma unor decizii judectoreti sau a unor
aranjamente n afara tribunalului. n cele din urm, Ford a decis s nu mai ajung la
tribunal cu nici un caz de incendiu, pt c juraii sunt prea sentimentali i se nmoaie cnd
vd fotografiile cu trupuri carbonizate. Ford a preferat s aranjeze lucrurile i s plteasc
sume considerabile, numai pt c acestea erau oricum mai mici dect modificarea liniei de
asamblare.
13 martie 1980: Elkhart County jury found Ford not guilty of criminal homicide in the Ulrich
case.
n pledoaria final, Ford attorney Neal precizeaz:
Ford putea s stea deoparte de piaa automobilelor mici, obinnd profituri mai mari din
vnzarea de auto mari. Ford s-a aventurat pe piaa auto mici pt a contracare importurile, pt
a crea locuri de munc n America i pt a-i satisface acionarii.
Pinto corespundea tuturor standardelor federale, fiind comparabil cu toate
subcompactele din 1973
Inginerii Ford au considerat c este o main bun, sigur, cumprnd-o pt ei i
familiile lor
Ford a fcut tot ceea ce era posibil i necesar pt a retrage Pinto dup ce i s-a ordonat
de ctre NHTSA
Highway 33 era greit proiectat, iar fetele staionau n momentul n care au fost lovite
din spate de ctre un van de peste 1 ton, cu cel puin 50 mph, condiii n care orice alt
main ar fi pit exact acelai lucru.
Prosecutor Cosentino i-a slbit cazul din momentul n care judge Staffeldt nu a admis ca
probe n proces o serie de documente ale Ford, anterioare anului 1873, care dovedeau c
inginerii de la Ford erau contieni la vremea respectiv de riscurile rezervorului adoptat pt
a ctiga spaiu n portbagaj i pt a economisi bani, precum i de faptul c rezervorul Capri
era mult mai sigur.
Richard Epstein, professor of law at the University of Chicago arat c un proces penal nu
avea nici o ans de ctig din partea acuzrii, deoarece acuzarea ar fi trebuit s probeze
o intenie criminal din partea Ford. Mai mult succes ar fi avut un proces civil. Analogie:
cineva trage cu puca ntr-o cprioar, dar nimerete un alt vntor, neintenionat; nu
poate fi acuzat penal, dar este dator s plteasc daune, stabilite de un proces civil. Or, pe
lng faptul c e greu de atribuit o intenionalitate unei corporaii, n cazul de fa nu se
poate spune c Ford a procedat cu intenii criminale. n orice industrie se fac compromisuri
ntre costuri i securitatea produsului. Ford putea s construiasc un tanc, dar cine l-ar fi
cumprat?
Iar acuzarea i penalizarea unor oficiali de la Ford nu se putea face, din lips de probe.
Proiectantul ef a declarat c preocuparea sa a fost s dispun rezervorul ct mai departe
de pasageri, ceea ce a i fcut. Pe de alt parte, muli dintre salariaii de la Ford au
cumprat i folosit Pinto.
Nici un proces civil nu ar fi avut anse mari de ctig, deoarece calculele fcute de Ford
erau standard i erau aplicate aceleai formule n ntreaga industrie.
VELASQUEZ, 6th edn, p.60-61
Fighting strong competition from VW for the lucrative small-car market, the Ford Motor
Company rushed the Pinto into production in much less than the usual time.
Ford engineers discovered in pre-production crash tests that rear-end collisions would
rupture the Pinto's fuel system extremely easily. Because assembly-line machinery
was already tooled when engineers found this defect, top Ford officials decided to
manufacture the car anyway exploding gas tank and all even though Ford owned
the patent on a much safer gas tank.
For more than eight years afterwards, Ford successfully lobbied, with extraordinary
vigor and some blatant lies, against a key government safety standard that would have
forced the company to change the Pinto's fire-prone gas tank.
By conservative estimates Pinto crashes have caused 500 burn deaths to people who
would not have been seriously injured if the car had not burst into flames. The figure
could be as high as 900. Burning Pintos have become such an embarrassment to Ford
that its advertising agency, J. Walter Thomson, dropped a line from the ending of a
radio spot that read Pinto leaves you with that warm feeling.
Ford knows that the Pinto is a firetrap, yet it has paid out millions to settle damage
suits out of court, and it is prepared to spen millions more lobbying against safety
standards. With a half million cars rolling off the assembly lines each year, Pinto is the
biggest-selling subcompact in America, and the company's operating profit on the car
is fantastic. Finally, in 1977, new Pinto models have incorporated a few minor
alterations necessary to meet that federal standard Ford managed to hold off for eight
years. Why did the company delay so long making these minimal, inexpensive
improvements?
Ford waited eight years because its internal cost-benefit analysis, which places a
dollar value on human life, said it wasn't profitable to make the changes sooner.
When the standard was proposed, Ford engineers pulled their crash-test results out of
their files. The front ends of most cars were no problem with minor alterations they
could stand the impact without losing fuel. We were already working on the front end,
Ford engineer Dick Kimble admitted. We knew we could meet the test on the front
end. But with the Pinto particularly, a 20 mph rear-end standard meant redesihning
the entire rear end of the car. With the Pinto scheduled for production in August 1970,
and with $200 million worth of tools in place, adoption of this standard would have
created a minor financial disaster. So Standard 301 was targeted for delay, and with
some assistance from its industry associates, Ford succeeded beyond its wildest
expectations: the standard was not adopted until the 1977 model year.
Ford's tactics were successful, according to Dowie, not only due to their extremely clever
lobbying, which became the envy of lobbysts all over Washington, but also because of the
pro-industry stance of NHTSA itself.
Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the Pinto was as safe as other comparable cars with
regard to the positioning of its gas tank. Unlike the gas tank in the Capri which rode over
the rear axle, a saddle-type fuel tank on which Ford owned the patent, the Pinto tank was
placed just behind the rear bumper.
Dr. Leslie Ball, the retired safety chief for the NASA manned space program and a
founder of the International Society of Reliability Engineers: The release to production
of the Pinto was the most reprehensible decision in the history of American
engineering. Ball can name more than 40 European and Japanese models in the
Pinto price and weight range with safer gas-tank positioning.
Los Angeles auto safety expert Byron Bloch: It's a catastrophic blunder. Ford made an
extremely irresponsible decision when they placed such a weak tank in such a
ridiculous location in such a soft rear end. It's almost designed to blow up
premeditated.
Costs
Sales:
Unit Cost:
Total Cost:
The most controversial aspect proved to be the way Ford's accountants determined the
total cost of a human life as about $200,000.
Component
Future Productivity Losses
Direct
Indirect
Medical Costs
Hospital
Other
Property Damage
Insurance Administration
Legal and Court
Employer Losses
Victim's Pain and Suffering
Funeral
Assets (Lost Consumption)
Miscellaneous
TOTAL PER FATALITY
1971 Costs
$132,000
41,300
700
425
1,500
4,700
3,000
1,000
10,000
900
5,000
200
$200,725
Mother Jones reports it could not find anYbody whou could explain how the $10,000 figure
for pain and sufferin had been arrived at.
Although Ford does not mention this point in its News Release defense, it might have
replied that it was the federal government, not Ford, that set the figure for a burn death.
Ford simply carried out a cost-benefit analysis based on that figure. Mother Jones,
however, in addition to insinuating that there was industry-agency (NHTSA) collusion,
argues taht the $200,000 figure was arrived at under intense pressure from the auto
industry to use cost-benefit analysis in determining regulations.
Mother Jones also questions Ford's estimate of burn injuries: All independent experts
estimate that for each person who dies by an auto fire, many more are left with charred
hands, faces and limbs. The true ratio obviously throws the company's calculations
way off.
Finally, Mother Jones claims to have obtained confidential Ford documents which
Ford did not send to Washington, showing that crash fires could be largely prevented
by installing a rubber bladder inside the gas tank for only $5.08 per car, considerably
less than the $11 per car Ford originally claimed was required to improve crashworthiness.
Ford has paid millions of dollars in Pinto jury trials and out-of-court settlements,
especially the latter. Mother Jones quotes Al Schlechter in Ford's Washington office as
saying: We'll never go to a jury again. Not in a fire case. Juries are just too
sentimental. They see those charred remains and forget the evidence. No sir, we'll
settle.
Instead of making the $11 improvement, installing the $5.08 bladder, or even giving the
consumer the right to choose the additional cost for added safety, Ford continued to delay
the federal government for eight years in establishing mandatory rear-impact standards. In
the meantime thousands of people were burning to death and tens of thousands more
were being badly burned and disfigured for life, tragedies many of which could have been
prevented for only a slight cost per vehicle. Furthermore, the delay also meant that millions
of new unsafe vehicles went on the road, vehicles that will be crashing, leaking fuel and
incinerating people well into the 1980s.
Unfortunately, Dowie claims, the Pinto is not an isolated case of corporate malpractice in
the auto industry. Neither is Ford a lone sinner. There probably isn't a car on the road
without a safety hazard known to its manufacturer. Furthermore, cost-valuing human life is
not used by Ford alone. Ford was just the only company careless enough to let such an
embarrassing calculation slip into public records. The process of willfully trading lives for
profits is built into corporate capitalism.