Copyright © 2014 by Peter Thiel

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Thiel, Peter A.
  Zero to one: notes on startups, or how to build the future / Peter Thiel with Blake Masters.
        pages   cm
1. New business enterprises. 2. New products. 3. Entrepreneurship. 4. Diffusion of innovations. I. Title.
HD62.5.T525 2014
685.11—dc23                                                  2014006653

Hardcover ISBN: 978-0-8041-3929-8

eBook ISBN: 978-0-8041-3930-4

Book design by Ralph Fowler / rlfdesign

Graphics by Rodrigo Corral Design
Illustrations by Matt Buck
Cover design by Michael Nagin

Additional credits appear on this page, which constitutes a continuation of this copyright page.

v3.1
 Contents

Preface: Zero to One

  1   The Challenge of the Future
  2   Party Like It’s 1999
  3   All Happy Companies Are Different
  4   The Ideology of Competition
  5   Last Mover Advantage
  6   You Are Not a Lottery Ticket
  7   Follow the Money
  8   Secrets
  9   Foundations
10   The Mechanics of Mafia
11   If You Build It, Will They Come?
12   Man and Machine
13   Seeing Green
14   The Founder’s Paradox
Conclusion: Stagnation or Singularity?

Acknowledgments
Illustration Credits
Index
About the Authors
 Preface

ZERO TO ONE

E VERY MOMENT IN BUSINESS happens only once. The next Bill Gates will not
build an operating system. The next Larry Page or Sergey Brin won’t
make a search engine. And the next Mark Zuckerberg won’t create a social
network. If you are copying these guys, you aren’t learning from them.
Of course, it’s easier to copy a model than to make something new. Doing
what we already know how to do takes the world from 1 to n, adding more of
something familiar. But every time we create something new, we go from 0 to
1. The act of creation is singular, as is the moment of creation, and the result is
something fresh and strange.
Unless they invest in the difficult task of creating new things, American
companies will fail in the future no matter how big their profits remain today.
What happens when we’ve gained everything to be had from fine-tuning the
old lines of business that we’ve inherited? Unlikely as it sounds, the answer
threatens to be far worse than the crisis of 2008. Today’s “best practices” lead to
dead ends; the best paths are new and untried.
In a world of gigantic administrative bureaucracies both public and private,
searching for a new path might seem like hoping for a miracle. Actually, if
American business is going to succeed, we are going to need hundreds, or even
thousands, of miracles. This would be depressing but for one crucial fact:
humans are distinguished from other species by our ability to work miracles.
We call these miracles technology.
Technology is miraculous because it allows us to do more with less, ratcheting
up our fundamental capabilities to a higher level. Other animals are
instinctively driven to build things like dams or honeycombs, but we are the
only ones that can invent new things and better ways of making them. Humans
don’t decide what to build by making choices from some cosmic catalog of
options given in advance; instead, by creating new technologies, we rewrite the
plan of the world. These are the kind of elementary truths we teach to second
graders, but they are easy to forget in a world where so much of what we do is
repeat what has been done before.
Zero to One is about how to build companies that create new things. It draws
on everything I’ve learned directly as a co-founder of PayPal and Palantir and
then an investor in hundreds of startups, including Facebook and SpaceX. But
while I have noticed many patterns, and I relate them here, this book offers no
formula for success. The paradox of teaching entrepreneurship is that such a
formula necessarily cannot exist; because every innovation is new and unique,
no authority can prescribe in concrete terms how to be innovative. Indeed, the
single most powerful pattern I have noticed is that successful people find value
in unexpected places, and they do this by thinking about business from first
principles instead of formulas.
This book stems from a course about startups that I taught at Stanford in
2012. College students can become extremely skilled at a few specialties, but
many never learn what to do with those skills in the wider world. My primary
goal in teaching the class was to help my students see beyond the tracks laid
down by academic specialties to the broader future that is theirs to create. One
of those students, Blake Masters, took detailed class notes, which circulated far
beyond the campus, and in Zero to One I have worked with him to revise the
notes for a wider audience. There’s no reason why the future should happen
only at Stanford, or in college, or in Silicon Valley.
 THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE

W HENEVER I INTERVIEW someone for a job, I like to ask this question:

“What important truth do very few people agree with you on?”
This question sounds easy because it’s straightforward. Actually, it’s very hard
to answer. It’s intellectually difficult because the knowledge that everyone is
taught in school is by definition agreed upon. And it’s psychologically difficult
because anyone trying to answer must say something she knows to be
unpopular. Brilliant thinking is rare, but courage is in even shorter supply than
genius.
Most commonly, I hear answers like the following:

“Our educational system is broken and urgently needs to be fixed.”

“America is exceptional.”

“There is no God.”

Those are bad answers. The first and the second statements might be true,
but many people already agree with them. The third statement simply takes
one side in a familiar debate. A good answer takes the following form: “Most
people believe in x, but the truth is the opposite of x.” I’ll give my own answer
later in this chapter.
What does this contrarian question have to do with the future? In the most
minimal sense, the future is simply the set of all moments yet to come. But
what makes the future distinctive and important isn’t that it hasn’t happened
yet, but rather that it will be a time when the world looks different from today.
In this sense, if nothing about our society changes for the next 100 years, then
the future is over 100 years away. If things change radically in the next decade,
then the future is nearly at hand. No one can predict the future exactly, but we
know two things: it’s going to be different, and it must be rooted in today’s
world. Most answers to the contrarian question are different ways of seeing the
present; good answers are as close as we can come to looking into the future.
 ZERO TO ONE: THE FUTURE OF PROGRESS
When we think about the future, we hope for a future of progress. That
progress can take one of two forms. Horizontal or extensive progress means
copying things that work—going from 1 to n. Horizontal progress is easy to
imagine because we already know what it looks like. Vertical or intensive
progress means doing new things—going from 0 to 1. Vertical progress is
harder to imagine because it requires doing something nobody else has ever
done. If you take one typewriter and build 100, you have made horizontal
progress. If you have a typewriter and build a word processor, you have made
vertical progress.

At the macro level, the single word for horizontal progress is globalization—
taking things that work somewhere and making them work everywhere. China
is the paradigmatic example of globalization; its 20-year plan is to become like
the United States is today. The Chinese have been straightforwardly copying
everything that has worked in the developed world: 19th-century railroads,
20th-century air conditioning, and even entire cities. They might skip a few
steps along the way—going straight to wireless without installing landlines, for
instance—but they’re copying all the same.
The single word for vertical, 0 to 1 progress is technology. The rapid progress
of information technology in recent decades has made Silicon Valley the capital
of “technology” in general. But there is no reason why technology should be
limited to computers. Properly understood, any new and better way of doing
things is technology.

Because globalization and technology are different modes of progress, it’s

possible to have both, either, or neither at the same time. For example, 1815 to
1914 was a period of both rapid technological development and rapid
globalization. Between the First World War and Kissinger’s trip to reopen
relations with China in 1971, there was rapid technological development but
not much globalization. Since 1971, we have seen rapid globalization along with
limited technological development, mostly confined to IT.
This age of globalization has made it easy to imagine that the decades ahead
will bring more convergence and more sameness. Even our everyday language
suggests we believe in a kind of technological end of history: the division of the
world into the so-called developed and developing nations implies that the
“developed” world has already achieved the achievable, and that poorer nations
just need to catch up.
But I don’t think that’s true. My own answer to the contrarian question is
that most people think the future of the world will be defined by globalization,
but the truth is that technology matters more. Without technological change, if
China doubles its energy production over the next two decades, it will also
double its air pollution. If every one of India’s hundreds of millions of
households were to live the way Americans already do—using only today’s tools
—the result would be environmentally catastrophic. Spreading old ways to
create wealth around the world will result in devastation, not riches. In a world
of scarce resources, globalization without new technology is unsustainable.
New technology has never been an automatic feature of history. Our
ancestors lived in static, zero-sum societies where success meant seizing things
from others. They created new sources of wealth only rarely, and in the long
run they could never create enough to save the average person from an
extremely hard life. Then, after 10,000 years of fitful advance from primitive
agriculture to medieval windmills and 16th-century astrolabes, the modern
world suddenly experienced relentless technological progress from the advent of
the steam engine in the 1760s all the way up to about 1970. As a result, we have
inherited a richer society than any previous generation would have been able to
imagine.
Any generation excepting our parents’ and grandparents’, that is: in the late
1960s, they expected this progress to continue. They looked forward to a four-
day workweek, energy too cheap to meter, and vacations on the moon. But it
didn’t happen. The smartphones that distract us from our surroundings also
distract us from the fact that our surroundings are strangely old: only computers
and communications have improved dramatically since midcentury. That
doesn’t mean our parents were wrong to imagine a better future—they were
only wrong to expect it as something automatic. Today our challenge is to both
imagine and create the new technologies that can make the 21st century more
peaceful and prosperous than the 20th.
 STARTUP THINKING
New technology tends to come from new ventures—startups. From the
Founding Fathers in politics to the Royal Society in science to Fairchild
Semiconductor’s “traitorous eight” in business, small groups of people bound
together by a sense of mission have changed the world for the better. The
easiest explanation for this is negative: it’s hard to develop new things in big
organizations, and it’s even harder to do it by yourself. Bureaucratic hierarchies
move slowly, and entrenched interests shy away from risk. In the most
dysfunctional organizations, signaling that work is being done becomes a better
strategy for career advancement than actually doing work (if this describes your
company, you should quit now). At the other extreme, a lone genius might
create a classic work of art or literature, but he could never create an entire
industry. Startups operate on the principle that you need to work with other
people to get stuff done, but you also need to stay small enough so that you
actually can.
Positively defined, a startup is the largest group of people you can convince of
a plan to build a different future. A new company’s most important strength is
new thinking: even more important than nimbleness, small size affords space to
think. This book is about the questions you must ask and answer to succeed in
the business of doing new things: what follows is not a manual or a record of
knowledge but an exercise in thinking. Because that is what a startup has to do:
question received ideas and rethink business from scratch.
 PARTY LIKE IT’S 1999

O UR CONTRARIAN QUESTION—What important truth do very few people agree

with you on?—is difficult to answer directly. It may be easier to start with
a preliminary: what does everybody agree on? “Madness is rare in individuals
—but in groups, parties, nations, and ages it is the rule,” Nietzsche wrote
(before he went mad). If you can identify a delusional popular belief, you can
find what lies hidden behind it: the contrarian truth.
Consider an elementary proposition: companies exist to make money, not to
lose it. This should be obvious to any thinking person. But it wasn’t so obvious
to many in the late 1990s, when no loss was too big to be described as an
investment in an even bigger, brighter future. The conventional wisdom of the
“New Economy” accepted page views as a more authoritative, forward-looking
financial metric than something as pedestrian as profit.
Conventional beliefs only ever come to appear arbitrary and wrong in
retrospect; whenever one collapses, we call the old belief a bubble. But the
distortions caused by bubbles don’t disappear when they pop. The internet craze
of the ’90s was the biggest bubble since the crash of 1929, and the lessons
learned afterward define and distort almost all thinking about technology today.
The first step to thinking clearly is to question what we think we know about
the past.
 A QUICK HISTORY OF THE ’90S
The 1990s have a good image. We tend to remember them as a prosperous,
optimistic decade that happened to end with the internet boom and bust. But
many of those years were not as cheerful as our nostalgia holds. We’ve long
since forgotten the global context for the 18 months of dot-com mania at
decade’s end.
The ’90s started with a burst of euphoria when the Berlin Wall came down
in November ’89. It was short-lived. By mid-1990, the United States was in
recession. Technically the downturn ended in March ’91, but recovery was slow
and unemployment continued to rise until July ’92. Manufacturing never fully
rebounded. The shift to a service economy was protracted and painful.
1992 through the end of 1994 was a time of general malaise. Images of dead
American soldiers in Mogadishu looped on cable news. Anxiety about
globalization and U.S. competitiveness intensified as jobs flowed to Mexico. This
pessimistic undercurrent drove then-president Bush 41 out of office and won
Ross Perot nearly 20% of the popular vote in ’92—the best showing for a third-
party candidate since Theodore Roosevelt in 1912. And whatever the cultural
fascination with Nirvana, grunge, and heroin reflected, it wasn’t hope or
confidence.
Silicon Valley felt sluggish, too. Japan seemed to be winning the
semiconductor war. The internet had yet to take off, partly because its
commercial use was restricted until late 1992 and partly due to the lack of user-
friendly web browsers. It’s telling that when I arrived at Stanford in 1985,
economics, not computer science, was the most popular major. To most people
on campus, the tech sector seemed idiosyncratic or even provincial.
The internet changed all this. The Mosaic browser was officially released in
November 1993, giving regular people a way to get online. Mosaic became
Netscape, which released its Navigator browser in late 1994. Navigator’s
adoption grew so quickly—from about 20% of the browser market in January
1995 to almost 80% less than 12 months later—that Netscape was able to IPO
in August ’95 even though it wasn’t yet profitable. Within five months, Netscape
stock had shot up from $28 to $174 per share. Other tech companies were
booming, too. Yahoo! went public in April ’96 with an $848 million valuation.
Amazon followed suit in May ’97 at $438 million. By spring of ’98, each
company’s stock had more than quadrupled. Skeptics questioned earnings and
revenue multiples higher than those for any non-internet company. It was easy
to conclude that the market had gone crazy.
This conclusion was understandable but misplaced. In December ’96—more
than three years before the bubble actually burst—Fed chairman Alan
Greenspan warned that “irrational exuberance” might have “unduly escalated
asset values.” Tech investors were exuberant, but it’s not clear that they were so
irrational. It is too easy to forget that things weren’t going very well in the rest
of the world at the time.
The East Asian financial crises hit in July 1997. Crony capitalism and massive
foreign debt brought the Thai, Indonesian, and South Korean economies to
their knees. The ruble crisis followed in August ’98 when Russia, hamstrung by
chronic fiscal deficits, devalued its currency and defaulted on its debt. American
investors grew nervous about a nation with 10,000 nukes and no money; the
Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged more than 10% in a matter of days.
People were right to worry. The ruble crisis set off a chain reaction that
brought down Long-Term Capital Management, a highly leveraged U.S. hedge
fund. LTCM managed to lose $4.6 billion in the latter half of 1998, and still had
over $100 billion in liabilities when the Fed intervened with a massive bailout
and slashed interest rates in order to prevent systemic disaster. Europe wasn’t
doing that much better. The euro launched in January 1999 to great skepticism
and apathy. It rose to $1.19 on its first day of trading but sank to $0.83 within
two years. In mid-2000, G7 central bankers had to prop it up with a
multibillion-dollar intervention.
So the backdrop for the short-lived dot-com mania that started in September
1998 was a world in which nothing else seemed to be working. The Old
Economy couldn’t handle the challenges of globalization. Something needed to
work—and work in a big way—if the future was going to be better at all. By
indirect proof, the New Economy of the internet was the only way forward.
 MANIA: SEPTEMBER 1998–MARCH 2000
Dot-com mania was intense but short—18 months of insanity from September
1998 to March 2000. It was a Silicon Valley gold rush: there was money
everywhere, and no shortage of exuberant, often sketchy people to chase it.
Every week, dozens of new startups competed to throw the most lavish launch
party. (Landing parties were much more rare.) Paper millionaires would rack
up thousand-dollar dinner bills and try to pay with shares of their startup’s
stock—sometimes it even worked. Legions of people decamped from their well-
paying jobs to found or join startups. One 40-something grad student that I
knew was running six different companies in 1999. (Usually, it’s considered
weird to be a 40-year-old graduate student. Usually, it’s considered insane to
start a half-dozen companies at once. But in the late ’90s, people could believe
that was a winning combination.) Everybody should have known that the
mania was unsustainable; the most “successful” companies seemed to embrace
a sort of anti-business model where they lost money as they grew. But it’s hard
to blame people for dancing when the music was playing; irrationality was
rational given that appending “.com” to your name could double your value
overnight.
 PAYPAL MANIA
When I was running PayPal in late 1999, I was scared out of my wits—not
because I didn’t believe in our company, but because it seemed like everyone
else in the Valley was ready to believe anything at all. Everywhere I looked,
people were starting and flipping companies with alarming casualness. One
acquaintance told me how he had planned an IPO from his living room before
he’d even incorporated his company—and he didn’t think that was weird. In
this kind of environment, acting sanely began to seem eccentric.
At least PayPal had a suitably grand mission—the kind that post-bubble
skeptics would later describe as grandiose: we wanted to create a new internet
currency to replace the U.S. dollar. Our first product let people beam money
from one PalmPilot to another. However, nobody had any use for that product
except the journalists who voted it one of the 10 worst business ideas of 1999.
PalmPilots were still too exotic then, but email was already commonplace, so
we decided to create a way to send and receive payments over email.
By the fall of ’99, our email payment product worked well—anyone could log
in to our website and easily transfer money. But we didn’t have enough
customers, growth was slow, and expenses mounted. For PayPal to work, we
needed to attract a critical mass of at least a million users. Advertising was too
ineffective to justify the cost. Prospective deals with big banks kept falling
through. So we decided to pay people to sign up.
We gave new customers $10 for joining, and we gave them $10 more every
time they referred a friend. This got us hundreds of thousands of new
customers and an exponential growth rate. Of course, this customer acquisition
strategy was unsustainable on its own—when you pay people to be your
customers, exponential growth means an exponentially growing cost structure.
Crazy costs were typical at that time in the Valley. But we thought our huge
costs were sane: given a large user base, PayPal had a clear path to profitability
by taking a small fee on customers’ transactions.
We knew we’d need more funding to reach that goal. We also knew that the
boom was going to end. Since we didn’t expect investors’ faith in our mission to
survive the coming crash, we moved fast to raise funds while we could. On
February 16, 2000, the Wall Street Journal ran a story lauding our viral growth
and suggesting that PayPal was worth $500 million. When we raised $100
million the next month, our lead investor took the Journal’s back-of-the-
envelope valuation as authoritative. (Other investors were in even more of a
hurry. A South Korean firm wired us $5 million without first negotiating a deal
or signing any documents. When I tried to return the money, they wouldn’t tell
me where to send it.) That March 2000 financing round bought us the time we
needed to make PayPal a success. Just as we closed the deal, the bubble popped.
 LESSONS LEARNED
’Cause they say 2,000 zero zero party over, oops! Out of time!
So tonight I’m gonna party like it’s 1999!
—PRINCE

The NASDAQ reached 5,048 at its peak in the middle of March 2000 and then
crashed to 3,321 in the middle of April. By the time it bottomed out at 1,114 in
October 2002, the country had long since interpreted the market’s collapse as a
kind of divine judgment against the technological optimism of the ’90s. The era
of cornucopian hope was relabeled as an era of crazed greed and declared to be
definitely over.
Everyone learned to treat the future as fundamentally indefinite, and to
dismiss as an extremist anyone with plans big enough to be measured in years
instead of quarters. Globalization replaced technology as the hope for the
future. Since the ’90s migration “from bricks to clicks” didn’t work as hoped,
investors went back to bricks (housing) and BRICs (globalization). The result
was another bubble, this time in real estate.
 The entrepreneurs who stuck with Silicon Valley learned four big lessons
from the dot-com crash that still guide business thinking today:

1. Make incremental advances

Grand visions inflated the bubble, so they should not be indulged. Anyone
who claims to be able to do something great is suspect, and anyone who
wants to change the world should be more humble. Small, incremental
steps are the only safe path forward.

2. Stay lean and flexible

All companies must be “lean,” which is code for “unplanned.” You should
not know what your business will do; planning is arrogant and inflexible.
 Instead you should try things out, “iterate,” and treat entrepreneurship as
agnostic experimentation.

3. Improve on the competition

Don’t try to create a new market prematurely. The only way to know you
have a real business is to start with an already existing customer, so you
should build your company by improving on recognizable products already
offered by successful competitors.

4. Focus on product, not sales

If your product requires advertising or salespeople to sell it, it’s not good
enough: technology is primarily about product development, not
distribution. Bubble-era advertising was obviously wasteful, so the only
sustainable growth is viral growth.

These lessons have become dogma in the startup world; those who would
ignore them are presumed to invite the justified doom visited upon technology
in the great crash of 2000. And yet the opposite principles are probably more
correct:

1. It is better to risk boldness than triviality.

2. A bad plan is better than no plan.

3. Competitive markets destroy profits.

4. Sales matters just as much as product.

It’s true that there was a bubble in technology. The late ’90s was a time of
hubris: people believed in going from 0 to 1. Too few startups were actually
getting there, and many never went beyond talking about it. But people
understood that we had no choice but to find ways to do more with less. The
market high of March 2000 was obviously a peak of insanity; less obvious but
more important, it was also a peak of clarity. People looked far into the future,
saw how much valuable new technology we would need to get there safely, and
judged themselves capable of creating it.
 We still need new technology, and we may even need some 1999-style hubris
and exuberance to get it. To build the next generation of companies, we must
abandon the dogmas created after the crash. That doesn’t mean the opposite
ideas are automatically true: you can’t escape the madness of crowds by
dogmatically rejecting them. Instead ask yourself: how much of what you know
about business is shaped by mistaken reactions to past mistakes? The most
contrarian thing of all is not to oppose the crowd but to think for yourself.
 ALL HAPPY COMPANIES ARE DIFFERENT

T HE BUSINESS VERSION of our contrarian question is: what valuable company

is nobody building? This question is harder than it looks, because your
company could create a lot of value without becoming very valuable itself.
Creating value is not enough—you also need to capture some of the value you
create.
This means that even very big businesses can be bad businesses. For example,
U.S. airline companies serve millions of passengers and create hundreds of
billions of dollars of value each year. But in 2012, when the average airfare each
way was $178, the airlines made only 37 cents per passenger trip. Compare
them to Google, which creates less value but captures far more. Google brought
in $50 billion in 2012 (versus $160 billion for the airlines), but it kept 21% of
those revenues as profits—more than 100 times the airline industry’s profit
margin that year. Google makes so much money that it’s now worth three times
more than every U.S. airline combined.
The airlines compete with each other, but Google stands alone. Economists
use two simplified models to explain the difference: perfect competition and
monopoly.
“Perfect competition” is considered both the ideal and the default state in
Economics 101. So-called perfectly competitive markets achieve equilibrium
when producer supply meets consumer demand. Every firm in a competitive
market is undifferentiated and sells the same homogeneous products. Since no
firm has any market power, they must all sell at whatever price the market
determines. If there is money to be made, new firms will enter the market,
increase supply, drive prices down, and thereby eliminate the profits that
attracted them in the first place. If too many firms enter the market, they’ll
suffer losses, some will fold, and prices will rise back to sustainable levels. Under
perfect competition, in the long run no company makes an economic profit.
The opposite of perfect competition is monopoly. Whereas a competitive firm
must sell at the market price, a monopoly owns its market, so it can set its own
prices. Since it has no competition, it produces at the quantity and price
combination that maximizes its profits.
To an economist, every monopoly looks the same, whether it deviously
eliminates rivals, secures a license from the state, or innovates its way to the top.
In this book, we’re not interested in illegal bullies or government favorites: by
“monopoly,” we mean the kind of company that’s so good at what it does that
no other firm can offer a close substitute. Google is a good example of a
company that went from 0 to 1: it hasn’t competed in search since the early
2000s, when it definitively distanced itself from Microsoft and Yahoo!
Americans mythologize competition and credit it with saving us from
socialist bread lines. Actually, capitalism and competition are opposites.
Capitalism is premised on the accumulation of capital, but under perfect
competition all profits get competed away. The lesson for entrepreneurs is clear:
if you want to create and capture lasting value, don’t build an undifferentiated
commodity business.
 LIES PEOPLE TELL
How much of the world is actually monopolistic? How much is truly
competitive? It’s hard to say, because our common conversation about these
matters is so confused. To the outside observer, all businesses can seem
reasonably alike, so it’s easy to perceive only small differences between them.

But the reality is much more binary than that. There’s an enormous
difference between perfect competition and monopoly, and most businesses are
much closer to one extreme than we commonly realize.

The confusion comes from a universal bias for describing market conditions
in self-serving ways: both monopolists and competitors are incentivized to bend
the truth.

Monopoly Lies
Monopolists lie to protect themselves. They know that bragging about their
great monopoly invites being audited, scrutinized, and attacked. Since they very
much want their monopoly profits to continue unmolested, they tend to do
whatever they can to conceal their monopoly—usually by exaggerating the
power of their (nonexistent) competition.
Think about how Google talks about its business. It certainly doesn’t claim to
be a monopoly. But is it one? Well, it depends: a monopoly in what? Let’s say
that Google is primarily a search engine. As of May 2014, it owns about 68% of
the search market. (Its closest competitors, Microsoft and Yahoo!, have about
19% and 10%, respectively.) If that doesn’t seem dominant enough, consider the
fact that the word “google” is now an official entry in the Oxford English
Dictionary—as a verb. Don’t hold your breath waiting for that to happen to
Bing.
But suppose we say that Google is primarily an advertising company. That
changes things. The U.S. search engine advertising market is $17 billion
annually. Online advertising is $37 billion annually. The entire U.S. advertising
market is $150 billion. And global advertising is a $495 billion market. So even
if Google completely monopolized U.S. search engine advertising, it would own
just 3.4% of the global advertising market. From this angle, Google looks like a
small player in a competitive world.

What if we frame Google as a multifaceted technology company instead?

This seems reasonable enough; in addition to its search engine, Google makes
dozens of other software products, not to mention robotic cars, Android phones,
and wearable computers. But 95% of Google’s revenue comes from search
advertising; its other products generated just $2.35 billion in 2012, and its
consumer tech products a mere fraction of that. Since consumer tech is a $964
billion market globally, Google owns less than 0.24% of it—a far cry from
relevance, let alone monopoly. Framing itself as just another tech company
allows Google to escape all sorts of unwanted attention.

Competitive Lies
Non-monopolists tell the opposite lie: “we’re in a league of our own.”
Entrepreneurs are always biased to understate the scale of competition, but that
is the biggest mistake a startup can make. The fatal temptation is to describe
your market extremely narrowly so that you dominate it by definition.
Suppose you want to start a restaurant that serves British food in Palo Alto.
“No one else is doing it,” you might reason. “We’ll own the entire market.” But
that’s only true if the relevant market is the market for British food specifically.
What if the actual market is the Palo Alto restaurant market in general? And
what if all the restaurants in nearby towns are part of the relevant market as
well?
These are hard questions, but the bigger problem is that you have an
incentive not to ask them at all. When you hear that most new restaurants fail
within one or two years, your instinct will be to come up with a story about how
yours is different. You’ll spend time trying to convince people that you are
exceptional instead of seriously considering whether that’s true. It would be
better to pause and consider whether there are people in Palo Alto who would
rather eat British food above all else. It’s very possible they don’t exist.
In 2001, my co-workers at PayPal and I would often get lunch on Castro
Street in Mountain View. We had our pick of restaurants, starting with obvious
categories like Indian, sushi, and burgers. There were more options once we
settled on a type: North Indian or South Indian, cheaper or fancier, and so on.
In contrast to the competitive local restaurant market, PayPal was at that time
the only email-based payments company in the world. We employed fewer
people than the restaurants on Castro Street did, but our business was much
more valuable than all of those restaurants combined. Starting a new South
Indian restaurant is a really hard way to make money. If you lose sight of
competitive reality and focus on trivial differentiating factors—maybe you
think your naan is superior because of your great-grandmother’s recipe—your
business is unlikely to survive.
Creative industries work this way, too. No screenwriter wants to admit that
her new movie script simply rehashes what has already been done before.
Rather, the pitch is: “This film will combine various exciting elements in
entirely new ways.” It could even be true. Suppose her idea is to have Jay-Z star
in a cross between Hackers and Jaws: rap star joins elite group of hackers to
catch the shark that killed his friend. That has definitely never been done
before. But, like the lack of British restaurants in Palo Alto, maybe that’s a good
thing.

Non-monopolists exaggerate their distinction by defining their market as the

intersection of various smaller markets:

British food ∩ restaurant ∩ Palo Alto

Rap star ∩ hackers ∩ sharks

 Monopolists, by contrast, disguise their monopoly by framing their market as
the union of several large markets:

search engine ∪ mobile phones ∪ wearable computers ∪ self-driving

cars

What does a monopolist’s union story look like in practice? Consider a

statement from Google chairman Eric Schmidt’s testimony at a 2011
congressional hearing:

We face an extremely competitive landscape in which consumers

have a multitude of options to access information.

Or, translated from PR-speak to plain English:

Google is a small fish in a big pond. We could be swallowed whole at

any time. We are not the monopoly that the government is looking
for.
 RUTHLESS PEOPLE
The problem with a competitive business goes beyond lack of profits. Imagine
you’re running one of those restaurants in Mountain View. You’re not that
different from dozens of your competitors, so you’ve got to fight hard to survive.
If you offer affordable food with low margins, you can probably pay employees
only minimum wage. And you’ll need to squeeze out every efficiency: that’s
why small restaurants put Grandma to work at the register and make the kids
wash dishes in the back. Restaurants aren’t much better even at the very
highest rungs, where reviews and ratings like Michelin’s star system enforce a
culture of intense competition that can drive chefs crazy. (French chef and
winner of three Michelin stars Bernard Loiseau was quoted as saying, “If I lose
a star, I will commit suicide.” Michelin maintained his rating, but Loiseau
killed himself anyway in 2003 when a competing French dining guide
downgraded his restaurant.) The competitive ecosystem pushes people toward
ruthlessness or death.
A monopoly like Google is different. Since it doesn’t have to worry about
competing with anyone, it has wider latitude to care about its workers, its
products, and its impact on the wider world. Google’s motto—“Don’t be evil”—
is in part a branding ploy, but it’s also characteristic of a kind of business that’s
successful enough to take ethics seriously without jeopardizing its own
existence. In business, money is either an important thing or it is everything.
Monopolists can afford to think about things other than making money; non-
monopolists can’t. In perfect competition, a business is so focused on today’s
margins that it can’t possibly plan for a long-term future. Only one thing can
allow a business to transcend the daily brute struggle for survival: monopoly
profits.
 MONOPOLY CAPITALISM
So, a monopoly is good for everyone on the inside, but what about everyone on
the outside? Do outsized profits come at the expense of the rest of society?
Actually, yes: profits come out of customers’ wallets, and monopolies deserve
their bad reputation—but only in a world where nothing changes.
In a static world, a monopolist is just a rent collector. If you corner the
market for something, you can jack up the price; others will have no choice but
to buy from you. Think of the famous board game: deeds are shuffled around
from player to player, but the board never changes. There’s no way to win by
inventing a better kind of real estate development. The relative values of the
properties are fixed for all time, so all you can do is try to buy them up.
But the world we live in is dynamic: it’s possible to invent new and better
things. Creative monopolists give customers more choices by adding entirely
new categories of abundance to the world. Creative monopolies aren’t just good
for the rest of society; they’re powerful engines for making it better.
Even the government knows this: that’s why one of its departments works
hard to create monopolies (by granting patents to new inventions) even though
another part hunts them down (by prosecuting antitrust cases). It’s possible to
question whether anyone should really be awarded a legally enforceable
monopoly simply for having been the first to think of something like a mobile
software design. But it’s clear that something like Apple’s monopoly profits
from designing, producing, and marketing the iPhone were the reward for
creating greater abundance, not artificial scarcity: customers were happy to
finally have the choice of paying high prices to get a smartphone that actually
works.
The dynamism of new monopolies itself explains why old monopolies don’t
strangle innovation. With Apple’s iOS at the forefront, the rise of mobile
computing has dramatically reduced Microsoft’s decades-long operating system
dominance. Before that, IBM’s hardware monopoly of the ’60s and ’70s was
overtaken by Microsoft’s software monopoly. AT&T had a monopoly on
telephone service for most of the 20th century, but now anyone can get a cheap
cell phone plan from any number of providers. If the tendency of monopoly
businesses were to hold back progress, they would be dangerous and we’d be
right to oppose them. But the history of progress is a history of better monopoly
businesses replacing incumbents.
Monopolies drive progress because the promise of years or even decades of
monopoly profits provides a powerful incentive to innovate. Then monopolies
can keep innovating because profits enable them to make the long-term plans
and to finance the ambitious research projects that firms locked in competition
can’t dream of.
So why are economists obsessed with competition as an ideal state? It’s a relic
of history. Economists copied their mathematics from the work of 19th-century
physicists: they see individuals and businesses as interchangeable atoms, not as
unique creators. Their theories describe an equilibrium state of perfect
competition because that’s what’s easy to model, not because it represents the
best of business. But it’s worth recalling that the long-run equilibrium predicted
by 19th-century physics was a state in which all energy is evenly distributed
and everything comes to rest—also known as the heat death of the universe.
Whatever your views on thermodynamics, it’s a powerful metaphor: in business,
equilibrium means stasis, and stasis means death. If your industry is in a
competitive equilibrium, the death of your business won’t matter to the world;
some other undifferentiated competitor will always be ready to take your place.
Perfect equilibrium may describe the void that is most of the universe. It
may even characterize many businesses. But every new creation takes place far
from equilibrium. In the real world outside economic theory, every business is
successful exactly to the extent that it does something others cannot. Monopoly
is therefore not a pathology or an exception. Monopoly is the condition of every
successful business.
Tolstoy opens Anna Karenina by observing: “All happy families are alike;
each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” Business is the opposite. All
happy companies are different: each one earns a monopoly by solving a unique
problem. All failed companies are the same: they failed to escape competition.
 THE IDEOLOGY OF COMPETITION

C REATIVE MONOPOLY means new products that benefit everybody and

sustainable profits for the creator. Competition means no profits for
anybody, no meaningful differentiation, and a struggle for survival. So why do
people believe that competition is healthy? The answer is that competition is
not just an economic concept or a simple inconvenience that individuals and
companies must deal with in the marketplace. More than anything else,
competition is an ideology—the ideology—that pervades our society and
distorts our thinking. We preach competition, internalize its necessity, and enact
its commandments; and as a result, we trap ourselves within it—even though
the more we compete, the less we gain.
This is a simple truth, but we’ve all been trained to ignore it. Our
educational system both drives and reflects our obsession with competition.
Grades themselves allow precise measurement of each student’s
competitiveness; pupils with the highest marks receive status and credentials.
We teach every young person the same subjects in mostly the same ways,
irrespective of individual talents and preferences. Students who don’t learn best
by sitting still at a desk are made to feel somehow inferior, while children who
excel on conventional measures like tests and assignments end up defining their
identities in terms of this weirdly contrived academic parallel reality.
And it gets worse as students ascend to higher levels of the tournament. Elite
students climb confidently until they reach a level of competition sufficiently
intense to beat their dreams out of them. Higher education is the place where
people who had big plans in high school get stuck in fierce rivalries with
equally smart peers over conventional careers like management consulting and
investment banking. For the privilege of being turned into conformists, students
(or their families) pay hundreds of thousands of dollars in skyrocketing tuition
that continues to outpace inflation. Why are we doing this to ourselves?
I wish I had asked myself when I was younger. My path was so tracked that
in my 8th-grade yearbook, one of my friends predicted—accurately—that four
years later I would enter Stanford as a sophomore. And after a conventionally
successful undergraduate career, I enrolled at Stanford Law School, where I
competed even harder for the standard badges of success.
The highest prize in a law student’s world is unambiguous: out of tens of
thousands of graduates each year, only a few dozen get a Supreme Court
clerkship. After clerking on a federal appeals court for a year, I was invited to
interview for clerkships with Justices Kennedy and Scalia. My meetings with
the Justices went well. I was so close to winning this last competition. If only I
got the clerkship, I thought, I would be set for life. But I didn’t. At the time, I
was devastated.
In 2004, after I had built and sold PayPal, I ran into an old friend from law
school who had helped me prepare my failed clerkship applications. We hadn’t
spoken in nearly a decade. His first question wasn’t “How are you doing?” or
“Can you believe it’s been so long?” Instead, he grinned and asked: “So, Peter,
aren’t you glad you didn’t get that clerkship?” With the benefit of hindsight, we
both knew that winning that ultimate competition would have changed my life
for the worse. Had I actually clerked on the Supreme Court, I probably would
have spent my entire career taking depositions or drafting other people’s
business deals instead of creating anything new. It’s hard to say how much
would be different, but the opportunity costs were enormous. All Rhodes
Scholars had a great future in their past.
 WAR AND PEACE
Professors downplay the cutthroat culture of academia, but managers never tire
of comparing business to war. MBA students carry around copies of Clausewitz
and Sun Tzu. War metaphors invade our everyday business language: we use
headhunters to build up a sales force that will enable us to take a captive market
and make a killing. But really it’s competition, not business, that is like war:
allegedly necessary, supposedly valiant, but ultimately destructive.
Why do people compete with each other? Marx and Shakespeare provide two
models for understanding almost every kind of conflict.
According to Marx, people fight because they are different. The proletariat
fights the bourgeoisie because they have completely different ideas and goals
(generated, for Marx, by their very different material circumstances). The
greater the differences, the greater the conflict.
To Shakespeare, by contrast, all combatants look more or less alike. It’s not at
all clear why they should be fighting, since they have nothing to fight about.
Consider the opening line from Romeo and Juliet: “Two households, both alike
in dignity.” The two houses are alike, yet they hate each other. They grow even
more similar as the feud escalates. Eventually, they lose sight of why they
started fighting in the first place.
In the world of business, at least, Shakespeare proves the superior guide.
Inside a firm, people become obsessed with their competitors for career
advancement. Then the firms themselves become obsessed with their
competitors in the marketplace. Amid all the human drama, people lose sight of
what matters and focus on their rivals instead.
Let’s test the Shakespearean model in the real world. Imagine a production
called Gates and Schmidt, based on Romeo and Juliet. Montague is Microsoft.
Capulet is Google. Two great families, run by alpha nerds, sure to clash on
account of their sameness.
As with all good tragedy, the conflict seems inevitable only in retrospect. In
fact it was entirely avoidable. These families came from very different places.
The House of Montague built operating systems and office applications. The
House of Capulet wrote a search engine. What was there to fight about?
Lots, apparently. As a startup, each clan had been content to leave the other
alone and prosper independently. But as they grew, they began to focus on each
other. Montagues obsessed about Capulets obsessed about Montagues. The
result? Windows vs. Chrome OS, Bing vs. Google Search, Explorer vs. Chrome,
Office vs. Docs, and Surface vs. Nexus.
Just as war cost the Montagues and Capulets their children, it cost Microsoft
and Google their dominance: Apple came along and overtook them all. In
January 2013, Apple’s market capitalization was $500 billion, while Google and
Microsoft combined were worth $467 billion. Just three years before, Microsoft
and Google were each more valuable than Apple. War is costly business.
Rivalry causes us to overemphasize old opportunities and slavishly copy what
has worked in the past. Consider the recent proliferation of mobile credit card
readers. In October 2010, a startup called Square released a small, white,
square-shaped product that let anyone with an iPhone swipe and accept credit
cards. It was the first good payment processing solution for mobile handsets.
Imitators promptly sprang into action. A Canadian company called NetSecure
launched its own card reader in a half-moon shape. Intuit brought a cylindrical
reader to the geometric battle. In March 2012, eBay’s PayPal unit launched its
own copycat card reader. It was shaped like a triangle—a clear jab at Square, as
three sides are simpler than four. One gets the sense that this Shakespearean
saga won’t end until the apes run out of shapes.
 The hazards of imitative competition may partially explain why individuals
with an Asperger’s-like social ineptitude seem to be at an advantage in Silicon
Valley today. If you’re less sensitive to social cues, you’re less likely to do the
same things as everyone else around you. If you’re interested in making things
or programming computers, you’ll be less afraid to pursue those activities
single-mindedly and thereby become incredibly good at them. Then when you
apply your skills, you’re a little less likely than others to give up your own
convictions: this can save you from getting caught up in crowds competing for
obvious prizes.
Competition can make people hallucinate opportunities where none exist.
The crazy ’90s version of this was the fierce battle for the online pet store
market. It was Pets.com vs. PetStore.com vs. Petopia.com vs. what seemed like
dozens of others. Each company was obsessed with defeating its rivals, precisely
because there were no substantive differences to focus on. Amid all the tactical
questions—Who could price chewy dog toys most aggressively? Who could
create the best Super Bowl ads?—these companies totally lost sight of the wider
question of whether the online pet supply market was the right space to be in.
Winning is better than losing, but everybody loses when the war isn’t one worth
fighting. When Pets.com folded after the dot-com crash, $300 million of
investment capital disappeared with it.
Other times, rivalry is just weird and distracting. Consider the Shakespearean
conflict between Larry Ellison, co-founder and CEO of Oracle, and Tom Siebel,
a top salesman at Oracle and Ellison’s protégé before he went on to found Siebel
Systems in 1993. Ellison was livid at what he thought was Siebel’s betrayal.
Siebel hated being in the shadow of his former boss. The two men were
basically identical—hard-charging Chicagoans who loved to sell and hated to
lose—so their hatred ran deep. Ellison and Siebel spent the second half of the
’90s trying to sabotage each other. At one point, Ellison sent truckloads of ice
cream sandwiches to Siebel’s headquarters to try to convince Siebel employees
to jump ship. The copy on the wrappers? “Summer is near. Oracle is here. To
brighten your day and your career.”
Strangely, Oracle intentionally accumulated enemies. Ellison’s theory was
that it’s always good to have an enemy, so long as it was large enough to appear
threatening (and thus motivational to employees) but not so large as to actually
threaten the company. So Ellison was probably thrilled when in 1996 a small
database company called Informix put up a billboard near Oracle’s Redwood
Shores headquarters that read: CAUTION: DINOSAUR CROSSING. Another Informix
billboard on northbound Highway 101 read: YOU’VE JUST PASSED REDWOOD
SHORES. SO DID WE.
Oracle shot back with a billboard that implied that Informix’s software was
slower than snails. Then Informix CEO Phil White decided to make things
personal. When White learned that Larry Ellison enjoyed Japanese samurai
culture, he commissioned a new billboard depicting the Oracle logo along with
a broken samurai sword. The ad wasn’t even really aimed at Oracle as an entity,
let alone the consuming public; it was a personal attack on Ellison. But perhaps
White spent a little too much time worrying about the competition: while he
was busy creating billboards, Informix imploded in a massive accounting
scandal and White soon found himself in federal prison for securities fraud.
If you can’t beat a rival, it may be better to merge. I started Confinity with
my co-founder Max Levchin in 1998. When we released the PayPal product in
late 1999, Elon Musk’s X.com was right on our heels: our companies’ offices
were four blocks apart on University Avenue in Palo Alto, and X’s product
mirrored ours feature-for-feature. By late 1999, we were in all-out war. Many of
us at PayPal logged 100-hour workweeks. No doubt that was counterproductive,
but the focus wasn’t on objective productivity; the focus was defeating X.com.
One of our engineers actually designed a bomb for this purpose; when he
presented the schematic at a team meeting, calmer heads prevailed and the
proposal was attributed to extreme sleep deprivation.
But in February 2000, Elon and I were more scared about the rapidly
inflating tech bubble than we were about each other: a financial crash would
ruin us both before we could finish our fight. So in early March we met on
neutral ground—a café almost exactly equidistant to our offices—and
negotiated a 50-50 merger. De-escalating the rivalry post-merger wasn’t easy,
but as far as problems go, it was a good one to have. As a unified team, we were
able to ride out the dot-com crash and then build a successful business.
Sometimes you do have to fight. Where that’s true, you should fight and win.
There is no middle ground: either don’t throw any punches, or strike hard and
end it quickly.
This advice can be hard to follow because pride and honor can get in the way.
Hence Hamlet:

Exposing what is mortal and unsure

 To all that fortune, death, and danger dare,
Even for an eggshell. Rightly to be great
Is not to stir without great argument,
But greatly to find quarrel in a straw
When honor’s at the stake.

For Hamlet, greatness means willingness to fight for reasons as thin as an

eggshell: anyone would fight for things that matter; true heroes take their
personal honor so seriously they will fight for things that don’t matter. This
twisted logic is part of human nature, but it’s disastrous in business. If you can
recognize competition as a destructive force instead of a sign of value, you’re
already more sane than most. The next chapter is about how to use a clear head
to build a monopoly business.
 LAST MOVER ADVANTAGE

E SCAPING COMPETITION will give you a monopoly, but even a monopoly is

only a great business if it can endure in the future. Compare the value of
the New York Times Company with Twitter. Each employs a few thousand
people, and each gives millions of people a way to get news. But when Twitter
went public in 2013, it was valued at $24 billion—more than 12 times the
Times’s market capitalization—even though the Times earned $133 million in
2012 while Twitter lost money. What explains the huge premium for Twitter?
The answer is cash flow. This sounds bizarre at first, since the Times was
profitable while Twitter wasn’t. But a great business is defined by its ability to
generate cash flows in the future. Investors expect Twitter will be able to capture
monopoly profits over the next decade, while newspapers’ monopoly days are
over.
Simply stated, the value of a business today is the sum of all the money it
will make in the future. (To properly value a business, you also have to discount
those future cash flows to their present worth, since a given amount of money
today is worth more than the same amount in the future.)
Comparing discounted cash flows shows the difference between low-growth
businesses and high-growth startups at its starkest. Most of the value of low-
growth businesses is in the near term. An Old Economy business (like a
newspaper) might hold its value if it can maintain its current cash flows for five
or six years. However, any firm with close substitutes will see its profits
competed away. Nightclubs or restaurants are extreme examples: successful
ones might collect healthy amounts today, but their cash flows will probably
dwindle over the next few years when customers move on to newer and trendier
alternatives.
Technology companies follow the opposite trajectory. They often lose money
for the first few years: it takes time to build valuable things, and that means
delayed revenue. Most of a tech company’s value will come at least 10 to 15
years in the future.
 In March 2001, PayPal had yet to make a profit but our revenues were
growing 100% year-over-year. When I projected our future cash flows, I found
that 75% of the company’s present value would come from profits generated in
2011 and beyond—hard to believe for a company that had been in business for
only 27 months. But even that turned out to be an underestimation. Today,
PayPal continues to grow at about 15% annually, and the discount rate is lower
than a decade ago. It now appears that most of the company’s value will come
from 2020 and beyond.
LinkedIn is another good example of a company whose value exists in the far
future. As of early 2014, its market capitalization was $24.5 billion—very high
for a company with less than $1 billion in revenue and only $21.6 million in net
income for 2012. You might look at these numbers and conclude that investors
have gone insane. But this valuation makes sense when you consider LinkedIn’s
projected future cash flows.
 The overwhelming importance of future profits is counterintuitive even in
Silicon Valley. For a company to be valuable it must grow and endure, but many
entrepreneurs focus only on short-term growth. They have an excuse: growth is
easy to measure, but durability isn’t. Those who succumb to measurement
mania obsess about weekly active user statistics, monthly revenue targets, and
quarterly earnings reports. However, you can hit those numbers and still
overlook deeper, harder-to-measure problems that threaten the durability of
your business.
For example, rapid short-term growth at both Zynga and Groupon distracted
managers and investors from long-term challenges. Zynga scored early wins
with games like Farmville and claimed to have a “psychometric engine” to
rigorously gauge the appeal of new releases. But they ended up with the same
problem as every Hollywood studio: how can you reliably produce a constant
stream of popular entertainment for a fickle audience? (Nobody knows.)
Groupon posted fast growth as hundreds of thousands of local businesses tried
their product. But persuading those businesses to become repeat customers was
harder than they thought.
If you focus on near-term growth above all else, you miss the most important
question you should be asking: will this business still be around a decade from
now? Numbers alone won’t tell you the answer; instead you must think critically
about the qualitative characteristics of your business.
 CHARACTERISTICS OF MONOPOLY
What does a company with large cash flows far into the future look like? Every
monopoly is unique, but they usually share some combination of the following
characteristics: proprietary technology, network effects, economies of scale, and
branding.
This isn’t a list of boxes to check as you build your business—there’s no
shortcut to monopoly. However, analyzing your business according to these
characteristics can help you think about how to make it durable.

1. Proprietary Technology
Proprietary technology is the most substantive advantage a company can have
because it makes your product difficult or impossible to replicate. Google’s
search algorithms, for example, return results better than anyone else’s.
Proprietary technologies for extremely short page load times and highly
accurate query autocompletion add to the core search product’s robustness and
defensibility. It would be very hard for anyone to do to Google what Google did
to all the other search engine companies in the early 2000s.
As a good rule of thumb, proprietary technology must be at least 10 times
better than its closest substitute in some important dimension to lead to a real
monopolistic advantage. Anything less than an order of magnitude better will
probably be perceived as a marginal improvement and will be hard to sell,
especially in an already crowded market.
The clearest way to make a 10x improvement is to invent something
completely new. If you build something valuable where there was nothing
before, the increase in value is theoretically infinite. A drug to safely eliminate
the need for sleep, or a cure for baldness, for example, would certainly support a
monopoly business.
Or you can radically improve an existing solution: once you’re 10x better, you
escape competition. PayPal, for instance, made buying and selling on eBay at
least 10 times better. Instead of mailing a check that would take 7 to 10 days to
arrive, PayPal let buyers pay as soon as an auction ended. Sellers received their
proceeds right away, and unlike with a check, they knew the funds were good.
Amazon made its first 10x improvement in a particularly visible way: they
offered at least 10 times as many books as any other bookstore. When it
launched in 1995, Amazon could claim to be “Earth’s largest bookstore”
because, unlike a retail bookstore that might stock 100,000 books, Amazon
didn’t need to physically store any inventory—it simply requested the title from
its supplier whenever a customer made an order. This quantum improvement
was so effective that a very unhappy Barnes & Noble filed a lawsuit three days
before Amazon’s IPO, claiming that Amazon was unfairly calling itself a
“bookstore” when really it was a “book broker.”
You can also make a 10x improvement through superior integrated design.
Before 2010, tablet computing was so poor that for all practical purposes the
market didn’t even exist. “Microsoft Windows XP Tablet PC Edition” products
first shipped in 2002, and Nokia released its own “Internet Tablet” in 2005, but
they were a pain to use. Then Apple released the iPad. Design improvements
are hard to measure, but it seems clear that Apple improved on anything that
had come before by at least an order of magnitude: tablets went from unusable
to useful.

2. Network Effects
Network effects make a product more useful as more people use it. For example,
if all your friends are on Facebook, it makes sense for you to join Facebook, too.
Unilaterally choosing a different social network would only make you an
eccentric.
Network effects can be powerful, but you’ll never reap them unless your
product is valuable to its very first users when the network is necessarily small.
For example, in 1960 a quixotic company called Xanadu set out to build a two-
way communication network between all computers—a sort of early,
synchronous version of the World Wide Web. After more than three decades of
futile effort, Xanadu folded just as the web was becoming commonplace. Their
technology probably would have worked at scale, but it could have worked only
at scale: it required every computer to join the network at the same time, and
that was never going to happen.
 Paradoxically, then, network effects businesses must start with especially
small markets. Facebook started with just Harvard students—Mark
Zuckerberg’s first product was designed to get all his classmates signed up, not
to attract all people of Earth. This is why successful network businesses rarely
get started by MBA types: the initial markets are so small that they often don’t
even appear to be business opportunities at all.

3. Economies of Scale
A monopoly business gets stronger as it gets bigger: the fixed costs of creating a
product (engineering, management, office space) can be spread out over ever
greater quantities of sales. Software startups can enjoy especially dramatic
economies of scale because the marginal cost of producing another copy of the
product is close to zero.
Many businesses gain only limited advantages as they grow to large scale.
Service businesses especially are difficult to make monopolies. If you own a
yoga studio, for example, you’ll only be able to serve a certain number of
customers. You can hire more instructors and expand to more locations, but
your margins will remain fairly low and you’ll never reach a point where a core
group of talented people can provide something of value to millions of separate
clients, as software engineers are able to do.
A good startup should have the potential for great scale built into its first
design. Twitter already has more than 250 million users today. It doesn’t need to
add too many customized features in order to acquire more, and there’s no
inherent reason why it should ever stop growing.

4. Branding
A company has a monopoly on its own brand by definition, so creating a strong
brand is a powerful way to claim a monopoly. Today’s strongest tech brand is
Apple: the attractive looks and carefully chosen materials of products like the
iPhone and MacBook, the Apple Stores’ sleek minimalist design and close
control over the consumer experience, the omnipresent advertising campaigns,
the price positioning as a maker of premium goods, and the lingering nimbus of
Steve Jobs’s personal charisma all contribute to a perception that Apple offers
products so good as to constitute a category of their own.
Many have tried to learn from Apple’s success: paid advertising, branded
stores, luxurious materials, playful keynote speeches, high prices, and even
minimalist design are all susceptible to imitation. But these techniques for
polishing the surface don’t work without a strong underlying substance. Apple
has a complex suite of proprietary technologies, both in hardware (like superior
touchscreen materials) and software (like touchscreen interfaces purpose-
designed for specific materials). It manufactures products at a scale large
enough to dominate pricing for the materials it buys. And it enjoys strong
network effects from its content ecosystem: thousands of developers write
software for Apple devices because that’s where hundreds of millions of users
are, and those users stay on the platform because it’s where the apps are. These
other monopolistic advantages are less obvious than Apple’s sparkling brand,
but they are the fundamentals that let the branding effectively reinforce
Apple’s monopoly.
Beginning with brand rather than substance is dangerous. Ever since Marissa
Mayer became CEO of Yahoo! in mid-2012, she has worked to revive the once-
popular internet giant by making it cool again. In a single tweet, Yahoo!
summarized Mayer’s plan as a chain reaction of “people then products then
traffic then revenue.” The people are supposed to come for the coolness: Yahoo!
demonstrated design awareness by overhauling its logo, it asserted youthful
relevance by acquiring hot startups like Tumblr, and it has gained media
attention for Mayer’s own star power. But the big question is what products
Yahoo! will actually create. When Steve Jobs returned to Apple, he didn’t just
make Apple a cool place to work; he slashed product lines to focus on the
handful of opportunities for 10x improvements. No technology company can be
built on branding alone.
 BUILDING A MONOPOLY
Brand, scale, network effects, and technology in some combination define a
monopoly; but to get them to work, you need to choose your market carefully
and expand deliberately.

Start Small and Monopolize

Every startup is small at the start. Every monopoly dominates a large share of
its market. Therefore, every startup should start with a very small market.
Always err on the side of starting too small. The reason is simple: it’s easier to
dominate a small market than a large one. If you think your initial market
might be too big, it almost certainly is.
Small doesn’t mean nonexistent. We made this mistake early on at PayPal.
Our first product let people beam money to each other via PalmPilots. It was
interesting technology and no one else was doing it. However, the world’s
millions of PalmPilot users weren’t concentrated in a particular place, they had
little in common, and they used their devices only episodically. Nobody needed
our product, so we had no customers.
With that lesson learned, we set our sights on eBay auctions, where we found
our first success. In late 1999, eBay had a few thousand high-volume
“PowerSellers,” and after only three months of dedicated effort, we were
serving 25% of them. It was much easier to reach a few thousand people who
really needed our product than to try to compete for the attention of millions of
scattered individuals.
The perfect target market for a startup is a small group of particular people
concentrated together and served by few or no competitors. Any big market is a
bad choice, and a big market already served by competing companies is even
worse. This is why it’s always a red flag when entrepreneurs talk about getting
1% of a $100 billion market. In practice, a large market will either lack a good
starting point or it will be open to competition, so it’s hard to ever reach that
1%. And even if you do succeed in gaining a small foothold, you’ll have to be
satisfied with keeping the lights on: cutthroat competition means your profits
will be zero.

Scaling Up
Once you create and dominate a niche market, then you should gradually
expand into related and slightly broader markets. Amazon shows how it can be
done. Jeff Bezos’s founding vision was to dominate all of online retail, but he
very deliberately started with books. There were millions of books to catalog,
but they all had roughly the same shape, they were easy to ship, and some of
the most rarely sold books—those least profitable for any retail store to keep in
stock—also drew the most enthusiastic customers. Amazon became the
dominant solution for anyone located far from a bookstore or seeking something
unusual. Amazon then had two options: expand the number of people who read
books, or expand to adjacent markets. They chose the latter, starting with the
most similar markets: CDs, videos, and software. Amazon continued to add
categories gradually until it had become the world’s general store. The name
itself brilliantly encapsulated the company’s scaling strategy. The biodiversity of
the Amazon rain forest reflected Amazon’s first goal of cataloging every book in
the world, and now it stands for every kind of thing in the world, period.
eBay also started by dominating small niche markets. When it launched its
auction marketplace in 1995, it didn’t need the whole world to adopt it at once;
the product worked well for intense interest groups, like Beanie Baby obsessives.
Once it monopolized the Beanie Baby trade, eBay didn’t jump straight to listing
sports cars or industrial surplus: it continued to cater to small-time hobbyists
until it became the most reliable marketplace for people trading online no
matter what the item.
Sometimes there are hidden obstacles to scaling—a lesson that eBay has
learned in recent years. Like all marketplaces, the auction marketplace lent
itself to natural monopoly because buyers go where the sellers are and vice
versa. But eBay found that the auction model works best for individually
distinctive products like coins and stamps. It works less well for commodity
products: people don’t want to bid on pencils or Kleenex, so it’s more convenient
just to buy them from Amazon. eBay is still a valuable monopoly; it’s just
smaller than people in 2004 expected it to be.
 Sequencing markets correctly is underrated, and it takes discipline to expand
gradually. The most successful companies make the core progression—to first
dominate a specific niche and then scale to adjacent markets—a part of their
founding narrative.

Don’t Disrupt
Silicon Valley has become obsessed with “disruption.” Originally, “disruption”
was a term of art to describe how a firm can use new technology to introduce a
low-end product at low prices, improve the product over time, and eventually
overtake even the premium products offered by incumbent companies using
older technology. This is roughly what happened when the advent of PCs
disrupted the market for mainframe computers: at first PCs seemed irrelevant,
then they became dominant. Today mobile devices may be doing the same
thing to PCs.
However, disruption has recently transmogrified into a self-congratulatory
buzzword for anything posing as trendy and new. This seemingly trivial fad
matters because it distorts an entrepreneur’s self-understanding in an
inherently competitive way. The concept was coined to describe threats to
incumbent companies, so startups’ obsession with disruption means they see
themselves through older firms’ eyes. If you think of yourself as an insurgent
battling dark forces, it’s easy to become unduly fixated on the obstacles in your
path. But if you truly want to make something new, the act of creation is far
more important than the old industries that might not like what you create.
Indeed, if your company can be summed up by its opposition to already existing
firms, it can’t be completely new and it’s probably not going to become a
monopoly.
Disruption also attracts attention: disruptors are people who look for trouble
and find it. Disruptive kids get sent to the principal’s office. Disruptive
companies often pick fights they can’t win. Think of Napster: the name itself
meant trouble. What kinds of things can one “nap”? Music  …  Kids  …  and
perhaps not much else. Shawn Fanning and Sean Parker, Napster’s then-teenage
founders, credibly threatened to disrupt the powerful music recording industry
in 1999. The next year, they made the cover of Time magazine. A year and a
half after that, they ended up in bankruptcy court.
 PayPal could be seen as disruptive, but we didn’t try to directly challenge any
large competitor. It’s true that we took some business away from Visa when we
popularized internet payments: you might use PayPal to buy something online
instead of using your Visa card to buy it in a store. But since we expanded the
market for payments overall, we gave Visa far more business than we took. The
overall dynamic was net positive, unlike Napster’s negative-sum struggle with
the U.S. recording industry. As you craft a plan to expand to adjacent markets,
don’t disrupt: avoid competition as much as possible.
 THE LAST WILL BE FIRST
You’ve probably heard about “first mover advantage”: if you’re the first entrant
into a market, you can capture significant market share while competitors
scramble to get started. But moving first is a tactic, not a goal. What really
matters is generating cash flows in the future, so being the first mover doesn’t
do you any good if someone else comes along and unseats you. It’s much better
to be the last mover—that is, to make the last great development in a specific
market and enjoy years or even decades of monopoly profits. The way to do that
is to dominate a small niche and scale up from there, toward your ambitious
long-term vision. In this one particular at least, business is like chess.
Grandmaster José Raúl Capablanca put it well: to succeed, “you must study the
endgame before everything else.”
 YOU ARE NOT A LOTTERY TICKET

T HE MOST CONTENTIOUS
luck or skill.
question in business is whether success comes from

What do successful people say? Malcolm Gladwell, a successful author who

writes about successful people, declares in Outliers that success results from a
“patchwork of lucky breaks and arbitrary advantages.” Warren Buffett
famously considers himself a “member of the lucky sperm club” and a winner
of the “ovarian lottery.” Jeff Bezos attributes Amazon’s success to an “incredible
planetary alignment” and jokes that it was “half luck, half good timing, and the
rest brains.” Bill Gates even goes so far as to claim that he “was lucky to be
born with certain skills,” though it’s not clear whether that’s actually possible.
Perhaps these guys are being strategically humble. However, the
phenomenon of serial entrepreneurship would seem to call into question our
tendency to explain success as the product of chance. Hundreds of people have
started multiple multimillion-dollar businesses. A few, like Steve Jobs, Jack
Dorsey, and Elon Musk, have created several multibillion-dollar companies. If
success were mostly a matter of luck, these kinds of serial entrepreneurs
probably wouldn’t exist.
In January 2013, Jack Dorsey, founder of Twitter and Square, tweeted to his 2
million followers: “Success is never accidental.”
Most of the replies were unambiguously negative. Referencing the tweet in
The Atlantic, reporter Alexis Madrigal wrote that his instinct was to reply:
“  ‘Success is never accidental,’ said all multimillionaire white men.” It’s true
that already successful people have an easier time doing new things, whether
due to their networks, wealth, or experience. But perhaps we’ve become too
quick to dismiss anyone who claims to have succeeded according to plan.
Is there a way to settle this debate objectively? Unfortunately not, because
companies are not experiments. To get a scientific answer about Facebook, for
example, we’d have to rewind to 2004, create 1,000 copies of the world, and
start Facebook in each copy to see how many times it would succeed. But that
experiment is impossible. Every company starts in unique circumstances, and
every company starts only once. Statistics doesn’t work when the sample size is
one.
From the Renaissance and the Enlightenment to the mid-20th century, luck
was something to be mastered, dominated, and controlled; everyone agreed that
you should do what you could, not focus on what you couldn’t. Ralph Waldo
Emerson captured this ethos when he wrote: “Shallow men believe in luck,
believe in circumstances.… Strong men believe in cause and effect.” In 1912,
after he became the first explorer to reach the South Pole, Roald Amundsen
wrote: “Victory awaits him who has everything in order—luck, people call it.”
No one pretended that misfortune didn’t exist, but prior generations believed in
making their own luck by working hard.
If you believe your life is mainly a matter of chance, why read this book?
Learning about startups is worthless if you’re just reading stories about people
who won the lottery. Slot Machines for Dummies can purport to tell you which
kind of rabbit’s foot to rub or how to tell which machines are “hot,” but it can’t
tell you how to win.
Did Bill Gates simply win the intelligence lottery? Was Sheryl Sandberg
born with a silver spoon, or did she “lean in”? When we debate historical
questions like these, luck is in the past tense. Far more important are questions
about the future: is it a matter of chance or design?
 CAN YOU CONTROL YOUR FUTURE?
You can expect the future to take a definite form or you can treat it as hazily
uncertain. If you treat the future as something definite, it makes sense to
understand it in advance and to work to shape it. But if you expect an indefinite
future ruled by randomness, you’ll give up on trying to master it.
Indefinite attitudes to the future explain what’s most dysfunctional in our
world today. Process trumps substance: when people lack concrete plans to carry
out, they use formal rules to assemble a portfolio of various options. This
describes Americans today. In middle school, we’re encouraged to start hoarding
“extracurricular activities.” In high school, ambitious students compete even
harder to appear omnicompetent. By the time a student gets to college, he’s
spent a decade curating a bewilderingly diverse résumé to prepare for a
completely unknowable future. Come what may, he’s ready—for nothing in
particular.
A definite view, by contrast, favors firm convictions. Instead of pursuing
many-sided mediocrity and calling it “well-roundedness,” a definite person
determines the one best thing to do and then does it. Instead of working
tirelessly to make herself indistinguishable, she strives to be great at something
substantive—to be a monopoly of one. This is not what young people do today,
because everyone around them has long since lost faith in a definite world. No
one gets into Stanford by excelling at just one thing, unless that thing happens
to involve throwing or catching a leather ball.
 You can also expect the future to be either better or worse than the present.
Optimists welcome the future; pessimists fear it. Combining these possibilities
yields four views:

Indefinite Pessimism
Every culture has a myth of decline from some golden age, and almost all
peoples throughout history have been pessimists. Even today pessimism still
dominates huge parts of the world. An indefinite pessimist looks out onto a bleak
future, but he has no idea what to do about it. This describes Europe since the
early 1970s, when the continent succumbed to undirected bureaucratic drift.
Today the whole Eurozone is in slow-motion crisis, and nobody is in charge.
The European Central Bank doesn’t stand for anything but improvisation: the
U.S. Treasury prints “In God We Trust” on the dollar; the ECB might as well
print “Kick the Can Down the Road” on the euro. Europeans just react to
events as they happen and hope things don’t get worse. The indefinite pessimist
can’t know whether the inevitable decline will be fast or slow, catastrophic or
gradual. All he can do is wait for it to happen, so he might as well eat, drink,
and be merry in the meantime: hence Europe’s famous vacation mania.

Definite Pessimism
A definite pessimist believes the future can be known, but since it will be bleak,
he must prepare for it. Perhaps surprisingly, China is probably the most
definitely pessimistic place in the world today. When Americans see the Chinese
economy grow ferociously fast (10% per year since 2000), we imagine a
confident country mastering its future. But that’s because Americans are still
optimists, and we project our optimism onto China. From China’s viewpoint,
economic growth cannot come fast enough. Every other country is afraid that
China is going to take over the world; China is the only country afraid that it
won’t.
China can grow so fast only because its starting base is so low. The easiest
way for China to grow is to relentlessly copy what has already worked in the
West. And that’s exactly what it’s doing: executing definite plans by burning
ever more coal to build ever more factories and skyscrapers. But with a huge
population pushing resource prices higher, there’s no way Chinese living
standards can ever actually catch up to those of the richest countries, and the
Chinese know it.
This is why the Chinese leadership is obsessed with the way in which things
threaten to get worse. Every senior Chinese leader experienced famine as a
child, so when the Politburo looks to the future, disaster is not an abstraction.
The Chinese public, too, knows that winter is coming. Outsiders are fascinated
by the great fortunes being made inside China, but they pay less attention to
the wealthy Chinese trying hard to get their money out of the country. Poorer
Chinese just save everything they can and hope it will be enough. Every class of
people in China takes the future deadly seriously.

Definite Optimism
To a definite optimist, the future will be better than the present if he plans and
works to make it better. From the 17th century through the 1950s and ’60s,
definite optimists led the Western world. Scientists, engineers, doctors, and
businessmen made the world richer, healthier, and more long-lived than
previously imaginable. As Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels saw clearly, the
19th-century business class

created more massive and more colossal productive forces than all
preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature’s forces to man,
machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture,
steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole
continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations
conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had even a
presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of
social labor?

Each generation’s inventors and visionaries surpassed their predecessors. In

1843, the London public was invited to make its first crossing underneath the
River Thames by a newly dug tunnel. In 1869, the Suez Canal saved Eurasian
shipping traffic from rounding the Cape of Good Hope. In 1914 the Panama
Canal cut short the route from Atlantic to Pacific. Even the Great Depression
failed to impede relentless progress in the United States, which has always been
home to the world’s most far-seeing definite optimists. The Empire State
Building was started in 1929 and finished in 1931. The Golden Gate Bridge was
started in 1933 and completed in 1937. The Manhattan Project was started in
1941 and had already produced the world’s first nuclear bomb by 1945.
Americans continued to remake the face of the world in peacetime: the
Interstate Highway System began construction in 1956, and the first 20,000
miles of road were open for driving by 1965. Definite planning even went
beyond the surface of this planet: NASA’s Apollo Program began in 1961 and
put 12 men on the moon before it finished in 1972.
Bold plans were not reserved just for political leaders or government
scientists. In the late 1940s, a Californian named John Reber set out to reinvent
the physical geography of the whole San Francisco Bay Area. Reber was a
schoolteacher, an amateur theater producer, and a self-taught engineer.
Undaunted by his lack of credentials, he publicly proposed to build two huge
dams in the Bay, construct massive freshwater lakes for drinking water and
irrigation, and reclaim 20,000 acres of land for development. Even though he
had no personal authority, people took the Reber Plan seriously. It was endorsed
by newspaper editorial boards across California. The U.S. Congress held
hearings on its feasibility. The Army Corps of Engineers even constructed a 1.5-
acre scale model of the Bay in a cavernous Sausalito warehouse to simulate it.
These tests revealed technical shortcomings, so the plan wasn’t executed.
But would anybody today take such a vision seriously in the first place? In
the 1950s, people welcomed big plans and asked whether they would work.
Today a grand plan coming from a schoolteacher would be dismissed as
crankery, and a long-range vision coming from anyone more powerful would be
derided as hubris. You can still visit the Bay Model in that Sausalito warehouse,
but today it’s just a tourist attraction: big plans for the future have become
archaic curiosities.
 In the 1950s, Americans thought big plans for the future were too important to be left to experts.

Indefinite Optimism
After a brief pessimistic phase in the 1970s, indefinite optimism has dominated
American thinking ever since 1982, when a long bull market began and finance
eclipsed engineering as the way to approach the future. To an indefinite optimist,
the future will be better, but he doesn’t know how exactly, so he won’t make any
specific plans. He expects to profit from the future but sees no reason to design
it concretely.
Instead of working for years to build a new product, indefinite optimists
rearrange already-invented ones. Bankers make money by rearranging the
capital structures of already existing companies. Lawyers resolve disputes over
old things or help other people structure their affairs. And private equity
investors and management consultants don’t start new businesses; they squeeze
extra efficiency from old ones with incessant procedural optimizations. It’s no
surprise that these fields all attract disproportionate numbers of high-achieving
Ivy League optionality chasers; what could be a more appropriate reward for
two decades of résumé-building than a seemingly elite, process-oriented career
that promises to “keep options open”?
Recent graduates’ parents often cheer them on the established path. The
strange history of the Baby Boom produced a generation of indefinite optimists
so used to effortless progress that they feel entitled to it. Whether you were
born in 1945 or 1950 or 1955, things got better every year for the first 18 years
of your life, and it had nothing to do with you. Technological advance seemed to
accelerate automatically, so the Boomers grew up with great expectations but
few specific plans for how to fulfill them. Then, when technological progress
stalled in the 1970s, increasing income inequality came to the rescue of the
most elite Boomers. Every year of adulthood continued to get automatically
better and better for the rich and successful. The rest of their generation was
left behind, but the wealthy Boomers who shape public opinion today see little
reason to question their naïve optimism. Since tracked careers worked for them,
they can’t imagine that they won’t work for their kids, too.
Malcolm Gladwell says you can’t understand Bill Gates’s success without
understanding his fortunate personal context: he grew up in a good family,
went to a private school equipped with a computer lab, and counted Paul Allen
as a childhood friend. But perhaps you can’t understand Malcolm Gladwell
without understanding his historical context as a Boomer (born in 1963). When
Baby Boomers grow up and write books to explain why one or another
individual is successful, they point to the power of a particular individual’s
context as determined by chance. But they miss the even bigger social context
for their own preferred explanations: a whole generation learned from
childhood to overrate the power of chance and underrate the importance of
planning. Gladwell at first appears to be making a contrarian critique of the
myth of the self-made businessman, but actually his own account encapsulates
the conventional view of a generation.
 OUR INDEFINITELY OPTIMISTIC WORLD
Indefinite Finance
While a definitely optimistic future would need engineers to design underwater
cities and settlements in space, an indefinitely optimistic future calls for more
bankers and lawyers. Finance epitomizes indefinite thinking because it’s the
only way to make money when you have no idea how to create wealth. If they
don’t go to law school, bright college graduates head to Wall Street precisely
because they have no real plan for their careers. And once they arrive at
Goldman, they find that even inside finance, everything is indefinite. It’s still
optimistic—you wouldn’t play in the markets if you expected to lose—but the
fundamental tenet is that the market is random; you can’t know anything
specific or substantive; diversification becomes supremely important.
The indefiniteness of finance can be bizarre. Think about what happens
when successful entrepreneurs sell their company. What do they do with the
money? In a financialized world, it unfolds like this:

• The founders don’t know what to do with it, so they give it to a large bank.
• The bankers don’t know what to do with it, so they diversify by spreading it
across a portfolio of institutional investors.
• Institutional investors don’t know what to do with their managed capital, so
they diversify by amassing a portfolio of stocks.
• Companies try to increase their share price by generating free cash flows. If
they do, they issue dividends or buy back shares and the cycle repeats.

At no point does anyone in the chain know what to do with money in the
real economy. But in an indefinite world, people actually prefer unlimited
optionality; money is more valuable than anything you could possibly do with
it. Only in a definite future is money a means to an end, not the end itself.
 Indefinite Politics
Politicians have always been officially accountable to the public at election time,
but today they are attuned to what the public thinks at every moment. Modern
polling enables politicians to tailor their image to match preexisting public
opinion exactly, so for the most part, they do. Nate Silver’s election predictions
are remarkably accurate, but even more remarkable is how big a story they
become every four years. We are more fascinated today by statistical predictions
of what the country will be thinking in a few weeks’ time than by visionary
predictions of what the country will look like 10 or 20 years from now.
And it’s not just the electoral process—the very character of government has
become indefinite, too. The government used to be able to coordinate complex
solutions to problems like atomic weaponry and lunar exploration. But today,
after 40 years of indefinite creep, the government mainly just provides
insurance; our solutions to big problems are Medicare, Social Security, and a
dizzying array of other transfer payment programs. It’s no surprise that
entitlement spending has eclipsed discretionary spending every year since 1975.
To increase discretionary spending we’d need definite plans to solve specific
problems. But according to the indefinite logic of entitlement spending, we can
make things better just by sending out more checks.

Indefinite Philosophy
You can see the shift to an indefinite attitude not just in politics but in the
political philosophers whose ideas underpin both left and right.
The philosophy of the ancient world was pessimistic: Plato, Aristotle,
Epicurus, and Lucretius all accepted strict limits on human potential. The only
question was how best to cope with our tragic fate. Modern philosophers have
been mostly optimistic. From Herbert Spencer on the right and Hegel in the
center to Marx on the left, the 19th century shared a belief in progress.
(Remember Marx and Engels’s encomium to the technological triumphs of
capitalism from this page.) These thinkers expected material advances to
fundamentally change human life for the better: they were definite optimists.
In the late 20th century, indefinite philosophies came to the fore. The two
dominant political thinkers, John Rawls and Robert Nozick, are usually seen as
stark opposites: on the egalitarian left, Rawls was concerned with questions of
fairness and distribution; on the libertarian right, Nozick focused on
maximizing individual freedom. They both believed that people could get
along with each other peacefully, so unlike the ancients, they were optimistic.
But unlike Spencer or Marx, Rawls and Nozick were indefinite optimists: they
didn’t have any specific vision of the future.

Their indefiniteness took different forms. Rawls begins A Theory of Justice

with the famous “veil of ignorance”: fair political reasoning is supposed to be
impossible for anyone with knowledge of the world as it concretely exists.
Instead of trying to change our actual world of unique people and real
technologies, Rawls fantasized about an “inherently stable” society with lots of
fairness but little dynamism. Nozick opposed Rawls’s “patterned” concept of
justice. To Nozick, any voluntary exchange must be allowed, and no social
pattern could be noble enough to justify maintenance by coercion. He didn’t
have any more concrete ideas about the good society than Rawls: both of them
focused on process. Today, we exaggerate the differences between left-liberal
egalitarianism and libertarian individualism because almost everyone shares
their common indefinite attitude. In philosophy, politics, and business, too,
arguing over process has become a way to endlessly defer making concrete plans
for a better future.

Indefinite Life
Our ancestors sought to understand and extend the human lifespan. In the 16th
century, conquistadors searched the jungles of Florida for a Fountain of Youth.
Francis Bacon wrote that “the prolongation of life” should be considered its
own branch of medicine—and the noblest. In the 1660s, Robert Boyle placed
life extension (along with “the Recovery of Youth”) atop his famous wish list
for the future of science. Whether through geographic exploration or laboratory
research, the best minds of the Renaissance thought of death as something to
defeat. (Some resisters were killed in action: Bacon caught pneumonia and died
in 1626 while experimenting to see if he could extend a chicken’s life by
freezing it in the snow.)
We haven’t yet uncovered the secrets of life, but insurers and statisticians in
the 19th century successfully revealed a secret about death that still governs our
thinking today: they discovered how to reduce it to a mathematical probability.
“Life tables” tell us our chances of dying in any given year, something previous
generations didn’t know. However, in exchange for better insurance contracts,
we seem to have given up the search for secrets about longevity. Systematic
knowledge of the current range of human lifespans has made that range seem
natural. Today our society is permeated by the twin ideas that death is both
inevitable and random.
Meanwhile, probabilistic attitudes have come to shape the agenda of biology
itself. In 1928, Scottish scientist Alexander Fleming found that a mysterious
antibacterial fungus had grown on a petri dish he’d forgotten to cover in his
laboratory: he discovered penicillin by accident. Scientists have sought to
harness the power of chance ever since. Modern drug discovery aims to amplify
Fleming’s serendipitous circumstances a millionfold: pharmaceutical companies
search through combinations of molecular compounds at random, hoping to
find a hit.
But it’s not working as well as it used to. Despite dramatic advances over the
past two centuries, in recent decades biotechnology hasn’t met the expectations
of investors—or patients. Eroom’s law—that’s Moore’s law backward—observes
that the number of new drugs approved per billion dollars spent on R&D has
halved every nine years since 1950. Since information technology accelerated
faster than ever during those same years, the big question for biotech today is
whether it will ever see similar progress. Compare biotech startups to their
counterparts in computer software:

Biotech startups are an extreme example of indefinite thinking. Researchers

experiment with things that just might work instead of refining definite
theories about how the body’s systems operate. Biologists say they need to work
this way because the underlying biology is hard. According to them, IT startups
work because we created computers ourselves and designed them to reliably
obey our commands. Biotech is difficult because we didn’t design our bodies,
and the more we learn about them, the more complex they turn out to be.
But today it’s possible to wonder whether the genuine difficulty of biology
has become an excuse for biotech startups’ indefinite approach to business in
general. Most of the people involved expect some things to work eventually, but
few want to commit to a specific company with the level of intensity necessary
for success. It starts with the professors who often become part-time consultants
instead of full-time employees—even for the biotech startups that begin from
their own research. Then everyone else imitates the professors’ indefinite
attitude. It’s easy for libertarians to claim that heavy regulation holds biotech
back—and it does—but indefinite optimism may pose an even greater
challenge for the future of biotech.
 IS INDEFINITE OPTIMISM EVEN POSSIBLE?
What kind of future will our indefinitely optimistic decisions bring about? If
American households were saving, at least they could expect to have money to
spend later. And if American companies were investing, they could expect to
reap the rewards of new wealth in the future. But U.S. households are saving
almost nothing. And U.S. companies are letting cash pile up on their balance
sheets without investing in new projects because they don’t have any concrete
plans for the future.

The other three views of the future can work. Definite optimism works when
you build the future you envision. Definite pessimism works by building what
can be copied without expecting anything new. Indefinite pessimism works
because it’s self-fulfilling: if you’re a slacker with low expectations, they’ll
probably be met. But indefinite optimism seems inherently unsustainable: how
can the future get better if no one plans for it?
 Actually, most everybody in the modern world has already heard an answer
to this question: progress without planning is what we call “evolution.” Darwin
himself wrote that life tends to “progress” without anybody intending it. Every
living thing is just a random iteration on some other organism, and the best
iterations win.
Darwin’s theory explains the origin of trilobites and dinosaurs, but can it be
extended to domains that are far removed? Just as Newtonian physics can’t
explain black holes or the Big Bang, it’s not clear that Darwinian biology
should explain how to build a better society or how to create a new business out
of nothing. Yet in recent years Darwinian (or pseudo-Darwinian) metaphors
have become common in business. Journalists analogize literal survival in
competitive ecosystems to corporate survival in competitive markets. Hence all
the headlines like “Digital Darwinism,” “Dot-com Darwinism,” and “Survival
of the Clickiest.”
Even in engineering-driven Silicon Valley, the buzzwords of the moment call
for building a “lean startup” that can “adapt” and “evolve” to an ever-changing
environment. Would-be entrepreneurs are told that nothing can be known in
advance: we’re supposed to listen to what customers say they want, make
nothing more than a “minimum viable product,” and iterate our way to success.
But leanness is a methodology, not a goal. Making small changes to things
that already exist might lead you to a local maximum, but it won’t help you
find the global maximum. You could build the best version of an app that lets
people order toilet paper from their iPhone. But iteration without a bold plan
won’t take you from 0 to 1. A company is the strangest place of all for an
indefinite optimist: why should you expect your own business to succeed
without a plan to make it happen? Darwinism may be a fine theory in other
contexts, but in startups, intelligent design works best.
 THE RETURN OF DESIGN
What would it mean to prioritize design over chance? Today, “good design” is
an aesthetic imperative, and everybody from slackers to yuppies carefully
“curates” their outward appearance. It’s true that every great entrepreneur is
first and foremost a designer. Anyone who has held an iDevice or a smoothly
machined MacBook has felt the result of Steve Jobs’s obsession with visual and
experiential perfection. But the most important lesson to learn from Jobs has
nothing to do with aesthetics. The greatest thing Jobs designed was his business.
Apple imagined and executed definite multi-year plans to create new products
and distribute them effectively. Forget “minimum viable products”—ever since
he started Apple in 1976, Jobs saw that you can change the world through
careful planning, not by listening to focus group feedback or copying others’
successes.
Long-term planning is often undervalued by our indefinite short-term
world. When the first iPod was released in October 2001, industry analysts
couldn’t see much more than “a nice feature for Macintosh users” that “doesn’t
make any difference” to the rest of the world. Jobs planned the iPod to be the
first of a new generation of portable post-PC devices, but that secret was
invisible to most people. One look at the company’s stock chart shows the
harvest of this multi-year plan:
 The power of planning explains the difficulty of valuing private companies.
When a big company makes an offer to acquire a successful startup, it almost
always offers too much or too little: founders only sell when they have no more
concrete visions for the company, in which case the acquirer probably overpaid;
definite founders with robust plans don’t sell, which means the offer wasn’t
high enough. When Yahoo! offered to buy Facebook for $1 billion in July 2006,
I thought we should at least consider it. But Mark Zuckerberg walked into the
board meeting and announced: “Okay, guys, this is just a formality, it shouldn’t
take more than 10 minutes. We’re obviously not going to sell here.” Mark saw
where he could take the company, and Yahoo! didn’t. A business with a good
definite plan will always be underrated in a world where people see the future
as random.
 YOU ARE NOT A LOTTERY TICKET
We have to find our way back to a definite future, and the Western world needs
nothing short of a cultural revolution to do it.
Where to start? John Rawls will need to be displaced in philosophy
departments. Malcolm Gladwell must be persuaded to change his theories. And
pollsters have to be driven from politics. But the philosophy professors and the
Gladwells of the world are set in their ways, to say nothing of our politicians.
It’s extremely hard to make changes in those crowded fields, even with brains
and good intentions.
A startup is the largest endeavor over which you can have definite mastery.
You can have agency not just over your own life, but over a small and important
part of the world. It begins by rejecting the unjust tyranny of Chance. You are
not a lottery ticket.
 FOLLOW THE MONEY

M ONEY MAKES MONEY. “For whoever has will be given more, and they will
have an abundance. Whoever does not have, even what they have will be
taken from them” (Matthew 25:29). Albert Einstein made the same observation
when he stated that compound interest was “the eighth wonder of the world,”
“the greatest mathematical discovery of all time,” or even “the most powerful
force in the universe.” Whichever version you prefer, you can’t miss his
message: never underestimate exponential growth. Actually, there’s no evidence
that Einstein ever said any of those things—the quotations are all apocryphal.
But this very misattribution reinforces the message: having invested the
principal of a lifetime’s brilliance, Einstein continues to earn interest on it from
beyond the grave by receiving credit for things he never said.
Most sayings are forgotten. At the other extreme, a select few people like
Einstein and Shakespeare are constantly quoted and ventriloquized. We
shouldn’t be surprised, since small minorities often achieve disproportionate
results. In 1906, economist Vilfredo Pareto discovered what became the “Pareto
principle,” or the 80-20 rule, when he noticed that 20% of the people owned
80% of the land in Italy—a phenomenon that he found just as natural as the
fact that 20% of the peapods in his garden produced 80% of the peas. This
extraordinarily stark pattern, in which a small few radically outstrip all rivals,
surrounds us everywhere in the natural and social world. The most destructive
earthquakes are many times more powerful than all smaller earthquakes
combined. The biggest cities dwarf all mere towns put together. And monopoly
businesses capture more value than millions of undifferentiated competitors.
Whatever Einstein did or didn’t say, the power law—so named because
exponential equations describe severely unequal distributions—is the law of the
universe. It defines our surroundings so completely that we usually don’t even
see it.
This chapter shows how the power law becomes visible when you follow the
money: in venture capital, where investors try to profit from exponential
growth in early-stage companies, a few companies attain exponentially greater
value than all others. Most businesses never need to deal with venture capital,
but everyone needs to know exactly one thing that even venture capitalists
struggle to understand: we don’t live in a normal world; we live under a power
law.
 THE POWER LAW OF VENTURE CAPITAL
Venture capitalists aim to identify, fund, and profit from promising early-stage
companies. They raise money from institutions and wealthy people, pool it into
a fund, and invest in technology companies that they believe will become more
valuable. If they turn out to be right, they take a cut of the returns—usually
20%. A venture fund makes money when the companies in its portfolio become
more valuable and either go public or get bought by larger companies. Venture
funds usually have a 10-year lifespan since it takes time for successful
companies to grow and “exit.”
But most venture-backed companies don’t IPO or get acquired; most fail,
usually soon after they start. Due to these early failures, a venture fund
typically loses money at first. VCs hope the value of the fund will increase
dramatically in a few years’ time, to break-even and beyond, when the
successful portfolio companies hit their exponential growth spurts and start to
scale.
The big question is when this takeoff will happen. For most funds, the
answer is never. Most startups fail, and most funds fail with them. Every VC
knows that his task is to find the companies that will succeed. However, even
seasoned investors understand this phenomenon only superficially. They know
companies are different, but they underestimate the degree of difference.
 The error lies in expecting that venture returns will be normally distributed:
that is, bad companies will fail, mediocre ones will stay flat, and good ones will
return 2x or even 4x. Assuming this bland pattern, investors assemble a
diversified portfolio and hope that winners counterbalance losers.
But this “spray and pray” approach usually produces an entire portfolio of
flops, with no hits at all. This is because venture returns don’t follow a normal
distribution overall. Rather, they follow a power law: a small handful of
companies radically outperform all others. If you focus on diversification
instead of single-minded pursuit of the very few companies that can become
overwhelmingly valuable, you’ll miss those rare companies in the first place.
This graph shows the stark reality versus the perceived relative homogeneity:
 Our results at Founders Fund illustrate this skewed pattern: Facebook, the
best investment in our 2005 fund, returned more than all the others combined.
Palantir, the second-best investment, is set to return more than the sum of
every other investment aside from Facebook. This highly uneven pattern is not
unusual: we see it in all our other funds as well. The biggest secret in venture
capital is that the best investment in a successful fund equals or outperforms the
entire rest of the fund combined.
This implies two very strange rules for VCs. First, only invest in companies
that have the potential to return the value of the entire fund. This is a scary
rule, because it eliminates the vast majority of possible investments. (Even quite
successful companies usually succeed on a more humble scale.) This leads to
rule number two: because rule number one is so restrictive, there can’t be any
other rules.
Consider what happens when you break the first rule. Andreessen Horowitz
invested $250,000 in Instagram in 2010. When Facebook bought Instagram just
two years later for $1 billion, Andreessen netted $78 million—a 312x return in
less than two years. That’s a phenomenal return, befitting the firm’s reputation
as one of the Valley’s best. But in a weird way it’s not nearly enough, because
Andreessen Horowitz has a $1.5 billion fund: if they only wrote $250,000
checks, they would need to find 19 Instagrams just to break even. This is why
investors typically put a lot more money into any company worth funding. (And
to be fair, Andreessen would have invested more in Instagram’s later rounds had
it not been conflicted out by a previous investment.) VCs must find the handful
of companies that will successfully go from 0 to 1 and then back them with
every resource.
Of course, no one can know with certainty ex ante which companies will
succeed, so even the best VC firms have a “portfolio.” However, every single
company in a good venture portfolio must have the potential to succeed at vast
scale. At Founders Fund, we focus on five to seven companies in a fund, each of
which we think could become a multibillion-dollar business based on its unique
fundamentals. Whenever you shift from the substance of a business to the
financial question of whether or not it fits into a diversified hedging strategy,
venture investing starts to look a lot like buying lottery tickets. And once you
think that you’re playing the lottery, you’ve already psychologically prepared
yourself to lose.
 WHY PEOPLE DON’T SEE THE POWER LAW
Why would professional VCs, of all people, fail to see the power law? For one
thing, it only becomes clear over time, and even technology investors too often
live in the present. Imagine a firm invests in 10 companies with the potential to
become monopolies—already an unusually disciplined portfolio. Those
companies will look very similar in the early stages before exponential growth.

Over the next few years, some companies will fail while others begin to
succeed; valuations will diverge, but the difference between exponential growth
and linear growth will be unclear.
 After 10 years, however, the portfolio won’t be divided between winners and
losers; it will be split between one dominant investment and everything else.
But no matter how unambiguous the end result of the power law, it doesn’t
reflect daily experience. Since investors spend most of their time making new
investments and attending to companies in their early stages, most of the
companies they work with are by definition average. Most of the differences
that investors and entrepreneurs perceive every day are between relative levels
of success, not between exponential dominance and failure. And since nobody
wants to give up on an investment, VCs usually spend even more time on the
most problematic companies than they do on the most obviously successful.
 If even investors specializing in exponentially growing startups miss the
power law, it’s not surprising that most everyone else misses it, too. Power law
distributions are so big that they hide in plain sight. For example, when most
people outside Silicon Valley think of venture capital, they might picture a
small and quirky coterie—like ABC’s Shark Tank, only without commercials.
After all, less than 1% of new businesses started each year in the U.S. receive
venture funding, and total VC investment accounts for less than 0.2% of GDP.
But the results of those investments disproportionately propel the entire
economy. Venture-backed companies create 11% of all private sector jobs. They
generate annual revenues equivalent to an astounding 21% of GDP. Indeed, the
dozen largest tech companies were all venture-backed. Together those 12
companies are worth more than $2 trillion, more than all other tech companies
combined.
 WHAT TO DO WITH THE POWER LAW
The power law is not just important to investors; rather, it’s important to
everybody because everybody is an investor. An entrepreneur makes a major
investment just by spending her time working on a startup. Therefore every
entrepreneur must think about whether her company is going to succeed and
become valuable. Every individual is unavoidably an investor, too. When you
choose a career, you act on your belief that the kind of work you do will be
valuable decades from now.
The most common answer to the question of future value is a diversified
portfolio: “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket,” everyone has been told. As we
said, even the best venture investors have a portfolio, but investors who
understand the power law make as few investments as possible. The kind of
portfolio thinking embraced by both folk wisdom and financial convention, by
contrast, regards diversified betting as a source of strength. The more you
dabble, the more you are supposed to have hedged against the uncertainty of
the future.
But life is not a portfolio: not for a startup founder, and not for any
individual. An entrepreneur cannot “diversify” herself: you cannot run dozens
of companies at the same time and then hope that one of them works out well.
Less obvious but just as important, an individual cannot diversify his own life
by keeping dozens of equally possible careers in ready reserve.
Our schools teach the opposite: institutionalized education traffics in a kind
of homogenized, generic knowledge. Everybody who passes through the
American school system learns not to think in power law terms. Every high
school course period lasts 45 minutes whatever the subject. Every student
proceeds at a similar pace. At college, model students obsessively hedge their
futures by assembling a suite of exotic and minor skills. Every university
believes in “excellence,” and hundred-page course catalogs arranged
alphabetically according to arbitrary departments of knowledge seem designed
to reassure you that “it doesn’t matter what you do, as long as you do it well.”
That is completely false. It does matter what you do. You should focus
relentlessly on something you’re good at doing, but before that you must think
hard about whether it will be valuable in the future.
For the startup world, this means you should not necessarily start your own
company, even if you are extraordinarily talented. If anything, too many people
are starting their own companies today. People who understand the power law
will hesitate more than others when it comes to founding a new venture: they
know how tremendously successful they could become by joining the very best
company while it’s growing fast. The power law means that differences between
companies will dwarf the differences in roles inside companies. You could have
100% of the equity if you fully fund your own venture, but if it fails you’ll have
100% of nothing. Owning just 0.01% of Google, by contrast, is incredibly
valuable (more than $35 million as of this writing).
If you do start your own company, you must remember the power law to
operate it well. The most important things are singular: One market will
probably be better than all others, as we discussed in Chapter 5. One
distribution strategy usually dominates all others, too—for that see Chapter 11.
Time and decision-making themselves follow a power law, and some moments
matter far more than others—see Chapter 9. However, you can’t trust a world
that denies the power law to accurately frame your decisions for you, so what’s
most important is rarely obvious. It might even be secret. But in a power law
world, you can’t afford not to think hard about where your actions will fall on
the curve.
 SECRETS

E VERY ONE OF TODAY’S most famous and familiar ideas was once unknown
and unsuspected. The mathematical relationship between a triangle’s
sides, for example, was secret for millennia. Pythagoras had to think hard to
discover it. If you wanted in on Pythagoras’s new discovery, joining his strange
vegetarian cult was the best way to learn about it. Today, his geometry has
become a convention—a simple truth we teach to grade schoolers. A
conventional truth can be important—it’s essential to learn elementary
mathematics, for example—but it won’t give you an edge. It’s not a secret.
Remember our contrarian question: what important truth do very few people
agree with you on? If we already understand as much of the natural world as we
ever will—if all of today’s conventional ideas are already enlightened, and if
everything has already been done—then there are no good answers. Contrarian
thinking doesn’t make any sense unless the world still has secrets left to give up.

Of course, there are many things we don’t yet understand, but some of those
things may be impossible to figure out—mysteries rather than secrets. For
example, string theory describes the physics of the universe in terms of
vibrating one-dimensional objects called “strings.” Is string theory true? You
can’t really design experiments to test it. Very few people, if any, could ever
understand all its implications. But is that just because it’s difficult? Or is it an
impossible mystery? The difference matters. You can achieve difficult things,
but you can’t achieve the impossible.
Recall the business version of our contrarian question: what valuable
company is nobody building? Every correct answer is necessarily a secret:
something important and unknown, something hard to do but doable. If there
are many secrets left in the world, there are probably many world-changing
companies yet to be started. This chapter will help you think about secrets and
how to find them.
 WHY AREN’T PEOPLE LOOKING FOR SECRETS?
Most people act as if there were no secrets left to find. An extreme
representative of this view is Ted Kaczynski, infamously known as the
Unabomber. Kaczynski was a child prodigy who enrolled at Harvard at 16. He
went on to get a PhD in math and become a professor at UC Berkeley. But
you’ve only ever heard of him because of the 17-year terror campaign he waged
with pipe bombs against professors, technologists, and businesspeople.
In late 1995, the authorities didn’t know who or where the Unabomber was.
The biggest clue was a 35,000-word manifesto that Kaczynski had written and
anonymously mailed to the press. The FBI asked some prominent newspapers
to publish it, hoping for a break in the case. It worked: Kaczynski’s brother
recognized his writing style and turned him in.
You might expect that writing style to have shown obvious signs of insanity,
but the manifesto is eerily cogent. Kaczynski claimed that in order to be happy,
every individual “needs to have goals whose attainment requires effort, and
needs to succeed in attaining at least some of his goals.” He divided human
goals into three groups:

1. Goals that can be satisfied with minimal effort;

2. Goals that can be satisfied with serious effort; and

3. Goals that cannot be satisfied, no matter how much effort one makes.

This is the classic trichotomy of the easy, the hard, and the impossible.
Kaczynski argued that modern people are depressed because all the world’s hard
problems have already been solved. What’s left to do is either easy or
impossible, and pursuing those tasks is deeply unsatisfying. What you can do,
even a child can do; what you can’t do, even Einstein couldn’t have done. So
Kaczynski’s idea was to destroy existing institutions, get rid of all technology,
and let people start over and work on hard problems anew.
 Kaczynski’s methods were crazy, but his loss of faith in the technological
frontier is all around us. Consider the trivial but revealing hallmarks of urban
hipsterdom: faux vintage photography, the handlebar mustache, and vinyl
record players all hark back to an earlier time when people were still optimistic
about the future. If everything worth doing has already been done, you may as
well feign an allergy to achievement and become a barista.

Hipster or Unabomber?

All fundamentalists think this way, not just terrorists and hipsters. Religious
fundamentalism, for example, allows no middle ground for hard questions:
there are easy truths that children are expected to rattle off, and then there are
the mysteries of God, which can’t be explained. In between—the zone of hard
truths—lies heresy. In the modern religion of environmentalism, the easy truth
is that we must protect the environment. Beyond that, Mother Nature knows
best, and she cannot be questioned. Free marketeers worship a similar logic.
The value of things is set by the market. Even a child can look up stock quotes.
But whether those prices make sense is not to be second-guessed; the market
knows far more than you ever could.
Why has so much of our society come to believe that there are no hard secrets
left? It might start with geography. There are no blank spaces left on the map
anymore. If you grew up in the 18th century, there were still new places to go.
After hearing tales of foreign adventure, you could become an explorer yourself.
This was probably true up through the 19th and early 20th centuries; after that
point photography from National Geographic showed every Westerner what
even the most exotic, underexplored places on earth look like. Today, explorers
are found mostly in history books and children’s tales. Parents don’t expect their
kids to become explorers any more than they expect them to become pirates or
sultans. Perhaps there are a few dozen uncontacted tribes somewhere deep in
the Amazon, and we know there remains one last earthly frontier in the depths
of the oceans. But the unknown seems less accessible than ever.
Along with the natural fact that physical frontiers have receded, four social
trends have conspired to root out belief in secrets. First is incrementalism. From
an early age, we are taught that the right way to do things is to proceed one
very small step at a time, day by day, grade by grade. If you overachieve and
end up learning something that’s not on the test, you won’t receive credit for it.
But in exchange for doing exactly what’s asked of you (and for doing it just a bit
better than your peers), you’ll get an A. This process extends all the way up
through the tenure track, which is why academics usually chase large numbers
of trivial publications instead of new frontiers.
Second is risk aversion. People are scared of secrets because they are scared of
being wrong. By definition, a secret hasn’t been vetted by the mainstream. If
your goal is to never make a mistake in your life, you shouldn’t look for secrets.
The prospect of being lonely but right—dedicating your life to something that
no one else believes in—is already hard. The prospect of being lonely and
wrong can be unbearable.
Third is complacency. Social elites have the most freedom and ability to
explore new thinking, but they seem to believe in secrets the least. Why search
for a new secret if you can comfortably collect rents on everything that has
already been done? Every fall, the deans at top law schools and business schools
welcome the incoming class with the same implicit message: “You got into this
elite institution. Your worries are over. You’re set for life.” But that’s probably
the kind of thing that’s true only if you don’t believe it.
Fourth is “flatness.” As globalization advances, people perceive the world as
one homogeneous, highly competitive marketplace: the world is “flat.” Given
that assumption, anyone who might have had the ambition to look for a secret
will first ask himself: if it were possible to discover something new, wouldn’t
someone from the faceless global talent pool of smarter and more creative
people have found it already? This voice of doubt can dissuade people from even
starting to look for secrets in a world that seems too big a place for any
individual to contribute something unique.
There’s an optimistic way to describe the result of these trends: today, you
can’t start a cult. Forty years ago, people were more open to the idea that not all
knowledge was widely known. From the Communist Party to the Hare
Krishnas, large numbers of people thought they could join some enlightened
vanguard that would show them the Way. Very few people take unorthodox
ideas seriously today, and the mainstream sees that as a sign of progress. We can
be glad that there are fewer crazy cults now, yet that gain has come at great
cost: we have given up our sense of wonder at secrets left to be discovered.
 THE WORLD ACCORDING TO CONVENTION
How must you see the world if you don’t believe in secrets? You’d have to
believe we’ve already solved all great questions. If today’s conventions are
correct, we can afford to be smug and complacent: “God’s in His heaven, All’s
right with the world.”
For example, a world without secrets would enjoy a perfect understanding of
justice. Every injustice necessarily involves a moral truth that very few people
recognize early on: in a democratic society, a wrongful practice persists only
when most people don’t perceive it to be unjust. At first, only a small minority
of abolitionists knew that slavery was evil; that view has rightly become
conventional, but it was still a secret in the early 19th century. To say that there
are no secrets left today would mean that we live in a society with no hidden
injustices.
In economics, disbelief in secrets leads to faith in efficient markets. But the
existence of financial bubbles shows that markets can have extraordinary
inefficiencies. (And the more people believe in efficiency, the bigger the bubbles
get.) In 1999, nobody wanted to believe that the internet was irrationally
overvalued. The same was true of housing in 2005: Fed chairman Alan
Greenspan had to acknowledge some “signs of froth in local markets” but
stated that “a bubble in home prices for the nation as a whole does not appear
likely.” The market reflected all knowable information and couldn’t be
questioned. Then home prices fell across the country, and the financial crisis of
2008 wiped out trillions. The future turned out to hold many secrets that
economists could not make vanish simply by ignoring them.
What happens when a company stops believing in secrets? The sad decline of
Hewlett-Packard provides a cautionary tale. In 1990, the company was worth
$9 billion. Then came a decade of invention. In 1991, HP released the DeskJet
500C, the world’s first affordable color printer. In 1993, it launched the
OmniBook, one of the first “superportable” laptops. The next year, HP released
the OfficeJet, the world’s first all-in-one printer/fax/copier. This relentless
product expansion paid off: by mid-2000, HP was worth $135 billion.
 But starting in late 1999, when HP introduced a new branding campaign
around the imperative to “invent,” it stopped inventing things. In 2001, the
company launched HP Services, a glorified consulting and support shop. In
2002, HP merged with Compaq, presumably because it didn’t know what else to
do. By 2005, the company’s market cap had plunged to $70 billion—roughly
half of what it had been just five years earlier.
HP’s board was a microcosm of the dysfunction: it split into two factions,
only one of which cared about new technology. That faction was led by Tom
Perkins, an engineer who first came to HP in 1963 to run the company’s
research division at the personal request of Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard. At
73 years old in 2005, Perkins may as well have been a time-traveling visitor
from a bygone age of optimism: he thought the board should identify the most
promising new technologies and then have HP build them. But Perkins’s
faction lost out to its rival, led by chairwoman Patricia Dunn. A banker by
trade, Dunn argued that charting a plan for future technology was beyond the
board’s competence. She thought the board should restrict itself to a night
watchman’s role: Was everything proper in the accounting department? Were
people following all the rules?
Amid this infighting, someone on the board started leaking information to
the press. When it was exposed that Dunn arranged a series of illegal wiretaps
to identify the source, the backlash was worse than the original dissension, and
the board was disgraced. Having abandoned the search for technological secrets,
HP obsessed over gossip. As a result, by late 2012 HP was worth just $23 billion
—not much more than it was worth in 1990, adjusting for inflation.
 THE CASE FOR SECRETS
You can’t find secrets without looking for them. Andrew Wiles demonstrated
this when he proved Fermat’s Last Theorem after 358 years of fruitless inquiry
by other mathematicians—the kind of sustained failure that might have
suggested an inherently impossible task. Pierre de Fermat had conjectured in
1637 that no integers a, b, and c could satisfy the equation an + bn = cn for any
integer n greater than 2. He claimed to have a proof, but he died without
writing it down, so his conjecture long remained a major unsolved problem in
mathematics. Wiles started working on it in 1986, but he kept it a secret until
1993, when he knew he was nearing a solution. After nine years of hard work,
Wiles proved the conjecture in 1995. He needed brilliance to succeed, but he
also needed a faith in secrets. If you think something hard is impossible, you’ll
never even start trying to achieve it. Belief in secrets is an effective truth.
The actual truth is that there are many more secrets left to find, but they
will yield only to relentless searchers. There is more to do in science, medicine,
engineering, and in technology of all kinds. We are within reach not just of
marginal goals set at the competitive edge of today’s conventional disciplines,
but of ambitions so great that even the boldest minds of the Scientific
Revolution hesitated to announce them directly. We could cure cancer,
dementia, and all the diseases of age and metabolic decay. We can find new
ways to generate energy that free the world from conflict over fossil fuels. We
can invent faster ways to travel from place to place over the surface of the
planet; we can even learn how to escape it entirely and settle new frontiers. But
we will never learn any of these secrets unless we demand to know them and
force ourselves to look.
The same is true of business. Great companies can be built on open but
unsuspected secrets about how the world works. Consider the Silicon Valley
startups that have harnessed the spare capacity that is all around us but often
ignored. Before Airbnb, travelers had little choice but to pay high prices for a
hotel room, and property owners couldn’t easily and reliably rent out their
unoccupied space. Airbnb saw untapped supply and unaddressed demand where
others saw nothing at all. The same is true of private car services Lyft and Uber.
Few people imagined that it was possible to build a billion-dollar business by
simply connecting people who want to go places with people willing to drive
them there. We already had state-licensed taxicabs and private limousines; only
by believing in and looking for secrets could you see beyond the convention to
an opportunity hidden in plain sight. The same reason that so many internet
companies, including Facebook, are often underestimated—their very
simplicity—is itself an argument for secrets. If insights that look so elementary
in retrospect can support important and valuable businesses, there must remain
many great companies still to start.
 HOW TO FIND SECRETS
There are two kinds of secrets: secrets of nature and secrets about people.
Natural secrets exist all around us; to find them, one must study some
undiscovered aspect of the physical world. Secrets about people are different:
they are things that people don’t know about themselves or things they hide
because they don’t want others to know. So when thinking about what kind of
company to build, there are two distinct questions to ask: What secrets is nature
not telling you? What secrets are people not telling you?
It’s easy to assume that natural secrets are the most important: the people
who look for them can sound intimidatingly authoritative. This is why physics
PhDs are notoriously difficult to work with—because they know the most
fundamental truths, they think they know all truths. But does understanding
electromagnetic theory automatically make you a great marriage counselor?
Does a gravity theorist know more about your business than you do? At PayPal,
I once interviewed a physics PhD for an engineering job. Halfway through my
first question, he shouted, “Stop! I already know what you’re going to ask!” But
he was wrong. It was the easiest no-hire decision I’ve ever made.
Secrets about people are relatively underappreciated. Maybe that’s because
you don’t need a dozen years of higher education to ask the questions that
uncover them: What are people not allowed to talk about? What is forbidden or
taboo?
Sometimes looking for natural secrets and looking for human secrets lead to
the same truth. Consider the monopoly secret again: competition and capitalism
are opposites. If you didn’t already know it, you could discover it the natural,
empirical way: do a quantitative study of corporate profits and you’ll see they’re
eliminated by competition. But you could also take the human approach and
ask: what are people running companies not allowed to say? You would notice
that monopolists downplay their monopoly status to avoid scrutiny, while
competitive firms strategically exaggerate their uniqueness. The differences
between firms only seem small on the surface; in fact, they are enormous.
 The best place to look for secrets is where no one else is looking. Most people
think only in terms of what they’ve been taught; schooling itself aims to impart
conventional wisdom. So you might ask: are there any fields that matter but
haven’t been standardized and institutionalized? Physics, for example, is a real
major at all major universities, and it’s set in its ways. The opposite of physics
might be astrology, but astrology doesn’t matter. What about something like
nutrition? Nutrition matters for everybody, but you can’t major in it at Harvard.
Most top scientists go into other fields. Most of the big studies were done 30 or
40 years ago, and most are seriously flawed. The food pyramid that told us to eat
low fat and enormous amounts of grains was probably more a product of
lobbying by Big Food than real science; its chief impact has been to aggravate
our obesity epidemic. There’s plenty more to learn: we know more about the
physics of faraway stars than we know about human nutrition. It won’t be easy,
but it’s not obviously impossible: exactly the kind of field that could yield
secrets.
 WHAT TO DO WITH SECRETS
If you find a secret, you face a choice: Do you tell anyone? Or do you keep it to
yourself?
It depends on the secret: some are more dangerous than others. As Faust tells
Wagner:

The few who knew what might be learned,

Foolish enough to put their whole heart on show,
And reveal their feelings to the crowd below,
Mankind has always crucified and burned.

Unless you have perfectly conventional beliefs, it’s rarely a good idea to tell
everybody everything that you know.
So who do you tell? Whoever you need to, and no more. In practice, there’s
always a golden mean between telling nobody and telling everybody—and
that’s a company. The best entrepreneurs know this: every great business is
built around a secret that’s hidden from the outside. A great company is a
conspiracy to change the world; when you share your secret, the recipient
becomes a fellow conspirator.
As Tolkien wrote in The Lord of the Rings:

The Road goes ever on and on

Down from the door where it began.

Life is a long journey; the road marked out by the steps of previous travelers
has no end in sight. But later on in the tale, another verse appears:

Still round the corner there may wait

A new road or a secret gate,
And though we pass them by today,
 Tomorrow we may come this way
And take the hidden paths that run
Towards the Moon or to the Sun.

The road doesn’t have to be infinite after all. Take the hidden paths.
 FOUNDATIONS

E VERY GREAT COMPANY is unique, but there are a few things that every
business must get right at the beginning. I stress this so often that friends
have teasingly nicknamed it “Thiel’s law”: a startup messed up at its foundation
cannot be fixed.
Beginnings are special. They are qualitatively different from all that comes
afterward. This was true 13.8 billion years ago, at the founding of our cosmos:
in the earliest microseconds of its existence, the universe expanded by a factor
of 1030—a million trillion trillion. As cosmogonic epochs came and went in
those first few moments, the very laws of physics were different from those we
know today.
It was also true 227 years ago at the founding of our country: fundamental
questions were open for debate by the Framers during the few months they
spent together at the Constitutional Convention. How much power should the
central government have? How should representation in Congress be
apportioned? Whatever your views on the compromises reached that summer in
Philadelphia, they’ve been hard to change ever since: after ratifying the Bill of
Rights in 1791, we’ve amended the Constitution only 17 times. Today,
California has the same representation in the Senate as Alaska, even though it
has more than 50 times as many people. Maybe that’s a feature, not a bug. But
we’re probably stuck with it as long as the United States exists. Another
constitutional convention is unlikely; today we debate only smaller questions.
Companies are like countries in this way. Bad decisions made early on—if
you choose the wrong partners or hire the wrong people, for example—are very
hard to correct after they are made. It may take a crisis on the order of
bankruptcy before anybody will even try to correct them. As a founder, your
first job is to get the first things right, because you cannot build a great
company on a flawed foundation.
 FOUNDING MATRIMONY
When you start something, the first and most crucial decision you make is
whom to start it with. Choosing a co-founder is like getting married, and
founder conflict is just as ugly as divorce. Optimism abounds at the start of
every relationship. It’s unromantic to think soberly about what could go wrong,
so people don’t. But if the founders develop irreconcilable differences, the
company becomes the victim.
In 1999, Luke Nosek was one of my co-founders at PayPal, and I still work
with him today at Founders Fund. But a year before PayPal, I invested in a
company Luke started with someone else. It was his first startup; it was one of
my first investments. Neither of us realized it then, but the venture was doomed
to fail from the beginning because Luke and his co-founder were a terrible
match. Luke is a brilliant and eccentric thinker; his co-founder was an MBA
type who didn’t want to miss out on the ’90s gold rush. They met at a
networking event, talked for a while, and decided to start a company together.
That’s no better than marrying the first person you meet at the slot machines in
Vegas: you might hit the jackpot, but it probably won’t work. Their company
blew up and I lost my money.
Now when I consider investing in a startup, I study the founding teams.
Technical abilities and complementary skill sets matter, but how well the
founders know each other and how well they work together matter just as
much. Founders should share a prehistory before they start a company together
—otherwise they’re just rolling dice.
 OWNERSHIP, POSSESSION, AND CONTROL
It’s not just founders who need to get along. Everyone in your company needs to
work well together. A Silicon Valley libertarian might say you could solve this
problem by restricting yourself to a sole proprietorship. Freud, Jung, and every
other psychologist has a theory about how every individual mind is divided
against itself, but in business at least, working for yourself guarantees
alignment. Unfortunately, it also limits what kind of company you can build.
It’s very hard to go from 0 to 1 without a team.
A Silicon Valley anarchist might say you could achieve perfect alignment as
long as you hire just the right people, who will flourish peacefully without any
guiding structure. Serendipity and even free-form chaos at the workplace are
supposed to help “disrupt” all the old rules made and obeyed by the rest of the
world. And indeed, “if men were angels, no government would be necessary.”
But anarchic companies miss what James Madison saw: men aren’t angels.
That’s why executives who manage companies and directors who govern them
have separate roles to play; it’s also why founders’ and investors’ claims on a
company are formally defined. You need good people who get along, but you
also need a structure to help keep everyone aligned for the long term.
To anticipate likely sources of misalignment in any company, it’s useful to
distinguish between three concepts:
• Ownership: who legally owns a company’s equity?
• Possession: who actually runs the company on a day-to-day basis?
• Control: who formally governs the company’s affairs?
A typical startup allocates ownership among founders, employees, and
investors. The managers and employees who operate the company enjoy
possession. And a board of directors, usually comprising founders and investors,
exercises control.
In theory, this division works smoothly. Financial upside from part ownership
attracts and rewards investors and workers. Effective possession motivates and
empowers founders and employees—it means they can get stuff done.
Oversight from the board places managers’ plans in a broader perspective. In
practice, distributing these functions among different people makes sense, but it
also multiplies opportunities for misalignment.
To see misalignment at its most extreme, just visit the DMV. Suppose you
need a new driver’s license. Theoretically, it should be easy to get one. The
DMV is a government agency, and we live in a democratic republic. All power
resides in “the people,” who elect representatives to serve them in government.
If you’re a citizen, you’re a part owner of the DMV and your representatives
control it, so you should be able to walk in and get what you need.
Of course, it doesn’t work like that. We the people may “own” the DMV’s
resources, but that ownership is merely fictional. The clerks and petty tyrants
who operate the DMV, however, enjoy very real possession of their small-time
powers. Even the governor and the legislature charged with nominal control
over the DMV can’t change anything. The bureaucracy lurches ever sideways of
its own inertia no matter what actions elected officials take. Accountable to
nobody, the DMV is misaligned with everybody. Bureaucrats can make your
licensing experience pleasurable or nightmarish at their sole discretion. You can
try to bring up political theory and remind them that you are the boss, but
that’s unlikely to get you better service.
Big corporations do better than the DMV, but they’re still prone to
misalignment, especially between ownership and possession. The CEO of a
huge company like General Motors, for example, will own some of the
company’s stock, but only a trivial portion of the total. Therefore he’s
incentivized to reward himself through the power of possession rather than the
value of ownership. Posting good quarterly results will be enough for him to
keep his high salary and corporate jet. Misalignment can creep in even if he
receives stock compensation in the name of “shareholder value.” If that stock
comes as a reward for short-term performance, he will find it more lucrative
and much easier to cut costs instead of investing in a plan that might create
more value for all shareholders far in the future.
Unlike corporate giants, early-stage startups are small enough that founders
usually have both ownership and possession. Most conflicts in a startup erupt
between ownership and control—that is, between founders and investors on the
board. The potential for conflict increases over time as interests diverge: a board
member might want to take a company public as soon as possible to score a win
for his venture firm, while the founders would prefer to stay private and grow
the business.
In the boardroom, less is more. The smaller the board, the easier it is for the
directors to communicate, to reach consensus, and to exercise effective
oversight. However, that very effectiveness means that a small board can
forcefully oppose management in any conflict. This is why it’s crucial to choose
wisely: every single member of your board matters. Even one problem director
will cause you pain, and may even jeopardize your company’s future.
A board of three is ideal. Your board should never exceed five people, unless
your company is publicly held. (Government regulations effectively mandate
that public companies have larger boards—the average is nine members.) By
far the worst you can do is to make your board extra large. When unsavvy
observers see a nonprofit organization with dozens of people on its board, they
think: “Look how many great people are committed to this organization! It
must be extremely well run.” Actually, a huge board will exercise no effective
oversight at all; it merely provides cover for whatever microdictator actually
runs the organization. If you want that kind of free rein from your board, blow
it up to giant size. If you want an effective board, keep it small.
 ON THE BUS OR OFF THE BUS
As a general rule, everyone you involve with your company should be involved
full-time. Sometimes you’ll have to break this rule; it usually makes sense to
hire outside lawyers and accountants, for example. However, anyone who
doesn’t own stock options or draw a regular salary from your company is
fundamentally misaligned. At the margin, they’ll be biased to claim value in
the near term, not help you create more in the future. That’s why hiring
consultants doesn’t work. Part-time employees don’t work. Even working
remotely should be avoided, because misalignment can creep in whenever
colleagues aren’t together full-time, in the same place, every day. If you’re
deciding whether to bring someone on board, the decision is binary. Ken Kesey
was right: you’re either on the bus or off the bus.
 CASH IS NOT KING
For people to be fully committed, they should be properly compensated.
Whenever an entrepreneur asks me to invest in his company, I ask him how
much he intends to pay himself. A company does better the less it pays the CEO
—that’s one of the single clearest patterns I’ve noticed from investing in
hundreds of startups. In no case should a CEO of an early-stage, venture-backed
startup receive more than $150,000 per year in salary. It doesn’t matter if he got
used to making much more than that at Google or if he has a large mortgage
and hefty private school tuition bills. If a CEO collects $300,000 per year, he
risks becoming more like a politician than a founder. High pay incentivizes him
to defend the status quo along with his salary, not to work with everyone else to
surface problems and fix them aggressively. A cash-poor executive, by contrast,
will focus on increasing the value of the company as a whole.
Low CEO pay also sets the standard for everyone else. Aaron Levie, the CEO
of Box, was always careful to pay himself less than everyone else in the
company—four years after he started Box, he was still living two blocks away
from HQ in a one-bedroom apartment with no furniture except a mattress.
Every employee noticed his obvious commitment to the company’s mission and
emulated it. If a CEO doesn’t set an example by taking the lowest salary in the
company, he can do the same thing by drawing the highest salary. So long as
that figure is still modest, it sets an effective ceiling on cash compensation.
Cash is attractive. It offers pure optionality: once you get your paycheck, you
can do anything you want with it. However, high cash compensation teaches
workers to claim value from the company as it already exists instead of
investing their time to create new value in the future. A cash bonus is slightly
better than a cash salary—at least it’s contingent on a job well done. But even
so-called incentive pay encourages short-term thinking and value grabbing. Any
kind of cash is more about the present than the future.
 VESTED INTERESTS
Startups don’t need to pay high salaries because they can offer something better:
part ownership of the company itself. Equity is the one form of compensation
that can effectively orient people toward creating value in the future.
However, for equity to create commitment rather than conflict, you must
allocate it very carefully. Giving everyone equal shares is usually a mistake:
every individual has different talents and responsibilities as well as different
opportunity costs, so equal amounts will seem arbitrary and unfair from the
start. On the other hand, granting different amounts up front is just as sure to
seem unfair. Resentment at this stage can kill a company, but there’s no
ownership formula to perfectly avoid it.
This problem becomes even more acute over time as more people join the
company. Early employees usually get the most equity because they take more
risk, but some later employees might be even more crucial to a venture’s
success. A secretary who joined eBay in 1996 might have made 200 times more
than her industry-veteran boss who joined in 1999. The graffiti artist who
painted Facebook’s office walls in 2005 got stock that turned out to be worth
$200 million, while a talented engineer who joined in 2010 might have made
only $2 million. Since it’s impossible to achieve perfect fairness when
distributing ownership, founders would do well to keep the details secret.
Sending out a company-wide email that lists everyone’s ownership stake would
be like dropping a nuclear bomb on your office.
Most people don’t want equity at all. At PayPal, we once hired a consultant
who promised to help us negotiate lucrative business development deals. The
only thing he ever successfully negotiated was a $5,000 daily cash salary; he
refused to accept stock options as payment. Stories of startup chefs becoming
millionaires notwithstanding, people often find equity unattractive. It’s not
liquid like cash. It’s tied to one specific company. And if that company doesn’t
succeed, it’s worthless.
Equity is a powerful tool precisely because of these limitations. Anyone who
prefers owning a part of your company to being paid in cash reveals a
preference for the long term and a commitment to increasing your company’s
value in the future. Equity can’t create perfect incentives, but it’s the best way
for a founder to keep everyone in the company broadly aligned.
 EXTENDING THE FOUNDING
Bob Dylan has said that he who is not busy being born is busy dying. If he’s
right, being born doesn’t happen at just one moment—you might even continue
to do it somehow, poetically at least. The founding moment of a company,
however, really does happen just once: only at the very start do you have the
opportunity to set the rules that will align people toward the creation of value
in the future.
The most valuable kind of company maintains an openness to invention that
is most characteristic of beginnings. This leads to a second, less obvious
understanding of the founding: it lasts as long as a company is creating new
things, and it ends when creation stops. If you get the founding moment right,
you can do more than create a valuable company: you can steer its distant future
toward the creation of new things instead of the stewardship of inherited
success. You might even extend its founding indefinitely.
10
 THE MECHANICS OF MAFIA

S TART WITH A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: what would the ideal company culture
look like? Employees should love their work. They should enjoy going to
the office so much that formal business hours become obsolete and nobody
watches the clock. The workspace should be open, not cubicled, and workers
should feel at home: beanbag chairs and Ping-Pong tables might outnumber
file cabinets. Free massages, on-site sushi chefs, and maybe even yoga classes
would sweeten the scene. Pets should be welcome, too: perhaps employees’ dogs
and cats could come and join the office’s tankful of tropical fish as unofficial
company mascots.
What’s wrong with this picture? It includes some of the absurd perks Silicon
Valley has made famous, but none of the substance—and without substance
perks don’t work. You can’t accomplish anything meaningful by hiring an
interior decorator to beautify your office, a “human resources” consultant to fix
your policies, or a branding specialist to hone your buzzwords. “Company
culture” doesn’t exist apart from the company itself: no company has a culture;
every company is a culture. A startup is a team of people on a mission, and a
good culture is just what that looks like on the inside.
 BEYOND PROFESSIONALISM
The first team that I built has become known in Silicon Valley as the “PayPal
Mafia” because so many of my former colleagues have gone on to help each
other start and invest in successful tech companies. We sold PayPal to eBay for
$1.5 billion in 2002. Since then, Elon Musk has founded SpaceX and co-founded
Tesla Motors; Reid Hoffman co-founded LinkedIn; Steve Chen, Chad Hurley,
and Jawed Karim together founded YouTube; Jeremy Stoppelman and Russel
Simmons founded Yelp; David Sacks co-founded Yammer; and I co-founded
Palantir. Today all seven of those companies are worth more than $1 billion
each. PayPal’s office amenities never got much press, but the team has done
extraordinarily well, both together and individually: the culture was strong
enough to transcend the original company.
We didn’t assemble a mafia by sorting through résumés and simply hiring
the most talented people. I had seen the mixed results of that approach
firsthand when I worked at a New York law firm. The lawyers I worked with
ran a valuable business, and they were impressive individuals one by one. But
the relationships between them were oddly thin. They spent all day together,
but few of them seemed to have much to say to each other outside the office.
Why work with a group of people who don’t even like each other? Many seem
to think it’s a sacrifice necessary for making money. But taking a merely
professional view of the workplace, in which free agents check in and out on a
transactional basis, is worse than cold: it’s not even rational. Since time is your
most valuable asset, it’s odd to spend it working with people who don’t envision
any long-term future together. If you can’t count durable relationships among
the fruits of your time at work, you haven’t invested your time well—even in
purely financial terms.
From the start, I wanted PayPal to be tightly knit instead of transactional. I
thought stronger relationships would make us not just happier and better at
work but also more successful in our careers even beyond PayPal. So we set out
to hire people who would actually enjoy working together. They had to be
talented, but even more than that they had to be excited about working
specifically with us. That was the start of the PayPal Mafia.
 RECRUITING CONSPIRATORS
Recruiting is a core competency for any company. It should never be
outsourced. You need people who are not just skilled on paper but who will
work together cohesively after they’re hired. The first four or five might be
attracted by large equity stakes or high-profile responsibilities. More important
than those obvious offerings is your answer to this question: Why should the
20th employee join your company?
Talented people don’t need to work for you; they have plenty of options. You
should ask yourself a more pointed version of the question: Why would someone
join your company as its 20th engineer when she could go work at Google for more
money and more prestige?
Here are some bad answers: “Your stock options will be worth more here
than elsewhere.” “You’ll get to work with the smartest people in the world.”
“You can help solve the world’s most challenging problems.” What’s wrong
with valuable stock, smart people, or pressing problems? Nothing—but every
company makes these same claims, so they won’t help you stand out. General
and undifferentiated pitches don’t say anything about why a recruit should join
your company instead of many others.
The only good answers are specific to your company, so you won’t find them
in this book. But there are two general kinds of good answers: answers about
your mission and answers about your team. You’ll attract the employees you
need if you can explain why your mission is compelling: not why it’s important
in general, but why you’re doing something important that no one else is going
to get done. That’s the only thing that can make its importance unique. At
PayPal, if you were excited by the idea of creating a new digital currency to
replace the U.S. dollar, we wanted to talk to you; if not, you weren’t the right fit.
However, even a great mission is not enough. The kind of recruit who would
be most engaged as an employee will also wonder: “Are these the kind of people
I want to work with?” You should be able to explain why your company is a
unique match for him personally. And if you can’t do that, he’s probably not the
right match.
 Above all, don’t fight the perk war. Anybody who would be more powerfully
swayed by free laundry pickup or pet day care would be a bad addition to your
team. Just cover the basics like health insurance and then promise what no
others can: the opportunity to do irreplaceable work on a unique problem
alongside great people. You probably can’t be the Google of 2014 in terms of
compensation or perks, but you can be like the Google of 1999 if you already
have good answers about your mission and team.
 WHAT’S UNDER SILICON VALLEY’S HOODIES
From the outside, everyone in your company should be different in the same way.
Unlike people on the East Coast, who all wear the same skinny jeans or
pinstripe suits depending on their industry, young people in Mountain View
and Palo Alto go to work wearing T-shirts. It’s a cliché that tech workers don’t
care about what they wear, but if you look closely at those T-shirts, you’ll see
the logos of the wearers’ companies—and tech workers care about those very
much. What makes a startup employee instantly distinguishable to outsiders is
the branded T-shirt or hoodie that makes him look the same as his co-workers.
The startup uniform encapsulates a simple but essential principle: everyone at
your company should be different in the same way—a tribe of like-minded
people fiercely devoted to the company’s mission.
Max Levchin, my co-founder at PayPal, says that startups should make their
early staff as personally similar as possible. Startups have limited resources and
small teams. They must work quickly and efficiently in order to survive, and
that’s easier to do when everyone shares an understanding of the world. The
early PayPal team worked well together because we were all the same kind of
nerd. We all loved science fiction: Cryptonomicon was required reading, and we
preferred the capitalist Star Wars to the communist Star Trek. Most important,
we were all obsessed with creating a digital currency that would be controlled
by individuals instead of governments. For the company to work, it didn’t
matter what people looked like or which country they came from, but we
needed every new hire to be equally obsessed.
 DO ONE THING
On the inside, every individual should be sharply distinguished by her work.
When assigning responsibilities to employees in a startup, you could start by
treating it as a simple optimization problem to efficiently match talents with
tasks. But even if you could somehow get this perfectly right, any given solution
would quickly break down. Partly that’s because startups have to move fast, so
individual roles can’t remain static for long. But it’s also because job
assignments aren’t just about the relationships between workers and tasks;
they’re also about relationships between employees.
The best thing I did as a manager at PayPal was to make every person in the
company responsible for doing just one thing. Every employee’s one thing was
unique, and everyone knew I would evaluate him only on that one thing. I had
started doing this just to simplify the task of managing people. But then I
noticed a deeper result: defining roles reduced conflict. Most fights inside a
company happen when colleagues compete for the same responsibilities.
Startups face an especially high risk of this since job roles are fluid at the early
stages. Eliminating competition makes it easier for everyone to build the kinds
of long-term relationships that transcend mere professionalism. More than that,
internal peace is what enables a startup to survive at all. When a startup fails,
we often imagine it succumbing to predatory rivals in a competitive ecosystem.
But every company is also its own ecosystem, and factional strife makes it
vulnerable to outside threats. Internal conflict is like an autoimmune disease:
the technical cause of death may be pneumonia, but the real cause remains
hidden from plain view.
 OF CULTS AND CONSULTANTS
In the most intense kind of organization, members hang out only with other
members. They ignore their families and abandon the outside world. In
exchange, they experience strong feelings of belonging, and maybe get access to
esoteric “truths” denied to ordinary people. We have a word for such
organizations: cults. Cultures of total dedication look crazy from the outside,
partly because the most notorious cults were homicidal: Jim Jones and Charles
Manson did not make good exits.
But entrepreneurs should take cultures of extreme dedication seriously. Is a
lukewarm attitude to one’s work a sign of mental health? Is a merely
professional attitude the only sane approach? The extreme opposite of a cult is a
consulting firm like Accenture: not only does it lack a distinctive mission of its
own, but individual consultants are regularly dropping in and out of companies
to which they have no long-term connection whatsoever.
Every company culture can be plotted on a linear spectrum:

The best startups might be considered slightly less extreme kinds of cults.
The biggest difference is that cults tend to be fanatically wrong about
something important. People at a successful startup are fanatically right about
something those outside it have missed. You’re not going to learn those kinds of
secrets from consultants, and you don’t need to worry if your company doesn’t
make sense to conventional professionals. Better to be called a cult—or even a
mafia.
11
 IF YOU BUILD IT, WILL THEY COME?

E VEN THOUGH SALES is everywhere, most people underrate its importance.

Silicon Valley underrates it more than most. The geek classic The
Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy even explains the founding of our planet as a
reaction against salesmen. When an imminent catastrophe requires the
evacuation of humanity’s original home, the population escapes on three giant
ships. The thinkers, leaders, and achievers take the A Ship; the salespeople and
consultants get the B Ship; and the workers and artisans take the C Ship. The B
Ship leaves first, and all its passengers rejoice vainly. But the salespeople don’t
realize they are caught in a ruse: the A Ship and C Ship people had always
thought that the B Ship people were useless, so they conspired to get rid of
them. And it was the B Ship that landed on Earth.
Distribution may not matter in fictional worlds, but it matters in ours. We
underestimate the importance of distribution—a catchall term for everything it
takes to sell a product—because we share the same bias the A Ship and C Ship
people had: salespeople and other “middlemen” supposedly get in the way, and
distribution should flow magically from the creation of a good product. The
Field of Dreams conceit is especially popular in Silicon Valley, where engineers
are biased toward building cool stuff rather than selling it. But customers will
not come just because you build it. You have to make that happen, and it’s
harder than it looks.
 NERDS VS. SALESMEN
The U.S. advertising industry collects annual revenues of $150 billion and
employs more than 600,000 people. At $450 billion annually, the U.S. sales
industry is even bigger. When they hear that 3.2 million Americans work in
sales, seasoned executives will suspect the number is low, but engineers may
sigh in bewilderment. What could that many salespeople possibly be doing?
In Silicon Valley, nerds are skeptical of advertising, marketing, and sales
because they seem superficial and irrational. But advertising matters because it
works. It works on nerds, and it works on you. You may think that you’re an
exception; that your preferences are authentic, and advertising only works on
other people. It’s easy to resist the most obvious sales pitches, so we entertain a
false confidence in our own independence of mind. But advertising doesn’t exist
to make you buy a product right away; it exists to embed subtle impressions that
will drive sales later. Anyone who can’t acknowledge its likely effect on himself
is doubly deceived.
Nerds are used to transparency. They add value by becoming expert at a
technical skill like computer programming. In engineering disciplines, a
solution either works or it fails. You can evaluate someone else’s work with
relative ease, as surface appearances don’t matter much. Sales is the opposite: an
orchestrated campaign to change surface appearances without changing the
underlying reality. This strikes engineers as trivial if not fundamentally
dishonest. They know their own jobs are hard, so when they look at salespeople
laughing on the phone with a customer or going to two-hour lunches, they
suspect that no real work is being done. If anything, people overestimate the
relative difficulty of science and engineering, because the challenges of those
fields are obvious. What nerds miss is that it takes hard work to make sales look
easy.
 SALES IS HIDDEN
All salesmen are actors: their priority is persuasion, not sincerity. That’s why the
word “salesman” can be a slur and the used car dealer is our archetype of
shadiness. But we only react negatively to awkward, obvious salesmen—that is,
the bad ones. There’s a wide range of sales ability: there are many gradations
between novices, experts, and masters. There are even sales grandmasters. If
you don’t know any grandmasters, it’s not because you haven’t encountered
them, but rather because their art is hidden in plain sight. Tom Sawyer
managed to persuade his neighborhood friends to whitewash the fence for him
—a masterful move. But convincing them to actually pay him for the privilege
of doing his chores was the move of a grandmaster, and his friends were none
the wiser. Not much has changed since Twain wrote in 1876.
Like acting, sales works best when hidden. This explains why almost
everyone whose job involves distribution—whether they’re in sales, marketing,
or advertising—has a job title that has nothing to do with those things. People
who sell advertising are called “account executives.” People who sell customers
work in “business development.” People who sell companies are “investment
bankers.” And people who sell themselves are called “politicians.” There’s a
reason for these redescriptions: none of us wants to be reminded when we’re
being sold.
Whatever the career, sales ability distinguishes superstars from also-rans. On
Wall Street, a new hire starts as an “analyst” wielding technical expertise, but
his goal is to become a dealmaker. A lawyer prides himself on professional
credentials, but law firms are led by the rainmakers who bring in big clients.
Even university professors, who claim authority from scholarly achievement,
are envious of the self-promoters who define their fields. Academic ideas about
history or English don’t just sell themselves on their intellectual merits. Even
the agenda of fundamental physics and the future path of cancer research are
results of persuasion. The most fundamental reason that even businesspeople
underestimate the importance of sales is the systematic effort to hide it at every
level of every field in a world secretly driven by it.
 The engineer’s grail is a product great enough that “it sells itself.” But
anyone who would actually say this about a real product must be lying: either
he’s delusional (lying to himself) or he’s selling something (and thereby
contradicting himself). The polar opposite business cliché warns that “the best
product doesn’t always win.” Economists attribute this to “path dependence”:
specific historical circumstances independent of objective quality can determine
which products enjoy widespread adoption. That’s true, but it doesn’t mean the
operating systems we use today and the keyboard layouts on which we type
were imposed by mere chance. It’s better to think of distribution as something
essential to the design of your product. If you’ve invented something new but
you haven’t invented an effective way to sell it, you have a bad business—no
matter how good the product.
 HOW TO SELL A PRODUCT
Superior sales and distribution by itself can create a monopoly, even with no
product differentiation. The converse is not true. No matter how strong your
product—even if it easily fits into already established habits and anybody who
tries it likes it immediately—you must still support it with a strong distribution
plan.
Two metrics set the limits for effective distribution. The total net profit that
you earn on average over the course of your relationship with a customer
(Customer Lifetime Value, or CLV) must exceed the amount you spend on
average to acquire a new customer (Customer Acquisition Cost, or CAC). In
general, the higher the price of your product, the more you have to spend to
make a sale—and the more it makes sense to spend it. Distribution methods
can be plotted on a continuum:

Complex Sales
If your average sale is seven figures or more, every detail of every deal requires
close personal attention. It might take months to develop the right
relationships. You might make a sale only once every year or two. Then you’ll
usually have to follow up during installation and service the product long after
the deal is done. It’s hard to do, but this kind of “complex sales” is the only way
to sell some of the most valuable products.
 SpaceX shows that it can be done. Within just a few years of launching his
rocket startup, Elon Musk persuaded NASA to sign billion-dollar contracts to
replace the decommissioned space shuttle with a newly designed vessel from
SpaceX. Politics matters in big deals just as much as technological ingenuity, so
this wasn’t easy. SpaceX employs more than 3,000 people, mostly in California.
The traditional U.S. aerospace industry employs more than 500,000 people,
spread throughout all 50 states. Unsurprisingly, members of Congress don’t
want to give up federal funds going to their home districts. But since complex
sales requires making just a few deals each year, a sales grandmaster like Elon
Musk can use that time to focus on the most crucial people—and even to
overcome political inertia.
Complex sales works best when you don’t have “salesmen” at all. Palantir,
the data analytics company I co-founded with my law school classmate Alex
Karp, doesn’t employ anyone separately tasked with selling its product. Instead,
Alex, who is Palantir’s CEO, spends 25 days a month on the road, meeting with
clients and potential clients. Our deal sizes range from $1 million to $100
million. At that price point, buyers want to talk to the CEO, not the VP of Sales.
Businesses with complex sales models succeed if they achieve 50% to 100%
year-over-year growth over the course of a decade. This will seem slow to any
entrepreneur dreaming of viral growth. You might expect revenue to increase
10x as soon as customers learn about an obviously superior product, but that
almost never happens. Good enterprise sales strategy starts small, as it must: a
new customer might agree to become your biggest customer, but they’ll rarely
be comfortable signing a deal completely out of scale with what you’ve sold
before. Once you have a pool of reference customers who are successfully using
your product, then you can begin the long and methodical work of hustling
toward ever bigger deals.

Personal Sales
Most sales are not particularly complex: average deal sizes might range between
$10,000 and $100,000, and usually the CEO won’t have to do all the selling
himself. The challenge here isn’t about how to make any particular sale, but
how to establish a process by which a sales team of modest size can move the
product to a wide audience.
 In 2008, Box had a good way for companies to store their data safely and
accessibly in the cloud. But people didn’t know they needed such a thing—
cloud computing hadn’t caught on yet. That summer, Blake was hired as Box’s
third salesperson to help change that. Starting with small groups of users who
had the most acute file sharing problems, Box’s sales reps built relationships
with more and more users in each client company. In 2009, Blake sold a small
Box account to the Stanford Sleep Clinic, where researchers needed an easy,
secure way to store experimental data logs. Today the university offers a
Stanford-branded Box account to every one of its students and faculty members,
and Stanford Hospital runs on Box. If it had started off by trying to sell the
president of the university on an enterprise-wide solution, Box would have sold
nothing. A complex sales approach would have made Box a forgotten startup
failure; instead, personal sales made it a multibillion-dollar business.
Sometimes the product itself is a kind of distribution. ZocDoc is a Founders
Fund portfolio company that helps people find and book medical appointments
online. The company charges doctors a few hundred dollars per month to be
included in its network. With an average deal size of just a few thousand
dollars, ZocDoc needs lots of salespeople—so many that they have an internal
recruiting team to do nothing but hire more. But making personal sales to
doctors doesn’t just bring in revenue; by adding doctors to the network,
salespeople make the product more valuable to consumers (and more consumer
users increases its appeal to doctors). More than 5 million people already use
the service each month, and if it can continue to scale its network to include a
majority of practitioners, it will become a fundamental utility for the U.S.
health care industry.

Distribution Doldrums
In between personal sales (salespeople obviously required) and traditional
advertising (no salespeople required) there is a dead zone. Suppose you create a
software service that helps convenience store owners track their inventory and
manage ordering. For a product priced around $1,000, there might be no good
distribution channel to reach the small businesses that might buy it. Even if
you have a clear value proposition, how do you get people to hear it? Advertising
would either be too broad (there’s no TV channel that only convenience store
owners watch) or too inefficient (on its own, an ad in Convenience Store News
probably won’t convince any owner to part with $1,000 a year). The product
needs a personal sales effort, but at that price point, you simply don’t have the
resources to send an actual person to talk to every prospective customer. This is
why so many small and medium-sized businesses don’t use tools that bigger
firms take for granted. It’s not that small business proprietors are unusually
backward or that good tools don’t exist: distribution is the hidden bottleneck.

Marketing and Advertising

Marketing and advertising work for relatively low-priced products that have
mass appeal but lack any method of viral distribution. Procter & Gamble can’t
afford to pay salespeople to go door-to-door selling laundry detergent. (P&G
does employ salespeople to talk to grocery chains and large retail outlets, since
one detergent sale made to these buyers might mean 100,000 one-gallon
bottles.) To reach its end user, a packaged goods company has to produce
television commercials, print coupons in newspapers, and design its product
boxes to attract attention.
Advertising can work for startups, too, but only when your customer
acquisition costs and customer lifetime value make every other distribution
channel uneconomical. Consider e-commerce startup Warby Parker, which
designs and sells fashionable prescription eyeglasses online instead of
contracting sales out to retail eyewear distributors. Each pair starts at around
$100, so assuming the average customer buys a few pairs in her lifetime, the
company’s CLV is a few hundred dollars. That’s too little to justify personal
attention on every transaction, but at the other extreme, hundred-dollar
physical products don’t exactly go viral. By running advertisements and
creating quirky TV commercials, Warby is able to get its better, less expensive
offerings in front of millions of eyeglass-wearing customers. The company
states plainly on its website that “TV is a great big megaphone,” and when you
can only afford to spend dozens of dollars acquiring a new customer, you need
the biggest megaphone you can find.
Every entrepreneur envies a recognizable ad campaign, but startups should
resist the temptation to compete with bigger companies in the endless contest
to put on the most memorable TV spots or the most elaborate PR stunts. I know
this from experience. At PayPal we hired James Doohan, who played Scotty on
Star Trek, to be our official spokesman. When we released our first software for
the PalmPilot, we invited journalists to an event where they could hear James
recite this immortal line: “I’ve been beaming people up my whole career, but
this is the first time I’ve ever been able to beam money!” It flopped—the few
who actually came to cover the event weren’t impressed. We were all nerds, so
we had thought Scotty the Chief Engineer could speak with more authority
than, say, Captain Kirk. (Just like a salesman, Kirk was always showboating out
in some exotic locale and leaving it up to the engineers to bail him out of his
own mistakes.) We were wrong: when Priceline.com cast William Shatner (the
actor who played Kirk) in a famous series of TV spots, it worked for them. But
by then Priceline was a major player. No early-stage startup can match big
companies’ advertising budgets. Captain Kirk truly is in a league of his own.

Viral Marketing
A product is viral if its core functionality encourages users to invite their friends
to become users too. This is how Facebook and PayPal both grew quickly: every
time someone shares with a friend or makes a payment, they naturally invite
more and more people into the network. This isn’t just cheap—it’s fast, too. If
every new user leads to more than one additional user, you can achieve a chain
reaction of exponential growth. The ideal viral loop should be as quick and
frictionless as possible. Funny YouTube videos or internet memes get millions
of views very quickly because they have extremely short cycle times: people see
the kitten, feel warm inside, and forward it to their friends in a matter of
seconds.
At PayPal, our initial user base was 24 people, all of whom worked at PayPal.
Acquiring customers through banner advertising proved too expensive.
However, by directly paying people to sign up and then paying them more to
refer friends, we achieved extraordinary growth. This strategy cost us $20 per
customer, but it also led to 7% daily growth, which meant that our user base
nearly doubled every 10 days. After four or five months, we had hundreds of
thousands of users and a viable opportunity to build a great company by
servicing money transfers for small fees that ended up greatly exceeding our
customer acquisition cost.
 Whoever is first to dominate the most important segment of a market with
viral potential will be the last mover in the whole market. At PayPal we didn’t
want to acquire more users at random; we wanted to get the most valuable
users first. The most obvious market segment in email-based payments was the
millions of emigrants still using Western Union to wire money to their families
back home. Our product made that effortless, but the transactions were too
infrequent. We needed a smaller niche market segment with a higher velocity
of money—a segment we found in eBay “PowerSellers,” the professional
vendors who sold goods online through eBay’s auction marketplace. There were
20,000 of them. Most had multiple auctions ending each day, and they bought
almost as much as they sold, which meant a constant stream of payments. And
because eBay’s own solution to the payment problem was terrible, these
merchants were extremely enthusiastic early adopters. Once PayPal dominated
this segment and became the payments platform for eBay, there was no catching
up—on eBay or anywhere else.

The Power Law of Distribution

One of these methods is likely to be far more powerful than every other for any
given business: distribution follows a power law of its own. This is
counterintuitive for most entrepreneurs, who assume that more is more. But the
kitchen sink approach—employ a few salespeople, place some magazine ads,
and try to add some kind of viral functionality to the product as an afterthought
—doesn’t work. Most businesses get zero distribution channels to work: poor
sales rather than bad product is the most common cause of failure. If you can
get just one distribution channel to work, you have a great business. If you try
for several but don’t nail one, you’re finished.

Selling to Non-Customers
Your company needs to sell more than its product. You must also sell your
company to employees and investors. There is a “human resources” version of
the lie that great products sell themselves: “This company is so good that people
will be clamoring to join it.” And there’s a fundraising version too: “This
company is so great that investors will be banging down our door to invest.”
Clamor and frenzy are very real, but they rarely happen without calculated
recruiting and pitching beneath the surface.
Selling your company to the media is a necessary part of selling it to
everyone else. Nerds who instinctively mistrust the media often make the
mistake of trying to ignore it. But just as you can never expect people to buy a
superior product merely on its obvious merits without any distribution strategy,
you should never assume that people will admire your company without a
public relations strategy. Even if your particular product doesn’t need media
exposure to acquire customers because you have a viral distribution strategy, the
press can help attract investors and employees. Any prospective employee worth
hiring will do his own diligence; what he finds or doesn’t find when he googles
you will be critical to the success of your company.
 EVERYBODY SELLS
Nerds might wish that distribution could be ignored and salesmen banished to
another planet. All of us want to believe that we make up our own minds, that
sales doesn’t work on us. But it’s not true. Everybody has a product to sell—no
matter whether you’re an employee, a founder, or an investor. It’s true even if
your company consists of just you and your computer. Look around. If you don’t
see any salespeople, you’re the salesperson.
12
 MAN AND MACHINE

A S MATURE INDUSTRIES stagnate, information technology has advanced so

rapidly that it has now become synonymous with “technology” itself.
Today, more than 1.5 billion people enjoy instant access to the world’s
knowledge using pocket-sized devices. Every one of today’s smartphones has
thousands of times more processing power than the computers that guided
astronauts to the moon. And if Moore’s law continues apace, tomorrow’s
computers will be even more powerful.
Computers already have enough power to outperform people in activities we
used to think of as distinctively human. In 1997, IBM’s Deep Blue defeated
world chess champion Garry Kasparov. Jeopardy!’s best-ever contestant, Ken
Jennings, succumbed to IBM’s Watson in 2011. And Google’s self-driving cars
are already on California roads today. Dale Earnhardt Jr. needn’t feel
threatened by them, but the Guardian worries (on behalf of the millions of
chauffeurs and cabbies in the world) that self-driving cars “could drive the next
wave of unemployment.”
Everyone expects computers to do more in the future—so much more that
some wonder: 30 years from now, will there be anything left for people to do?
“Software is eating the world,” venture capitalist Marc Andreessen has
announced with a tone of inevitability. VC Andy Kessler sounds almost gleeful
when he explains that the best way to create productivity is “to get rid of
people.” Forbes captured a more anxious attitude when it asked readers: Will a
machine replace you?
Futurists can seem like they hope the answer is yes. Luddites are so worried
about being replaced that they would rather we stop building new technology
altogether. Neither side questions the premise that better computers will
necessarily replace human workers. But that premise is wrong: computers are
complements for humans, not substitutes. The most valuable businesses of
coming decades will be built by entrepreneurs who seek to empower people
rather than try to make them obsolete.
 SUBSTITUTION VS. COMPLEMENTARITY
Fifteen years ago, American workers were worried about competition from
cheaper Mexican substitutes. And that made sense, because humans really can
substitute for each other. Today people think they can hear Ross Perot’s “giant
sucking sound” once more, but they trace it back to server farms somewhere in
Texas instead of cut-rate factories in Tijuana. Americans fear technology in the
near future because they see it as a replay of the globalization of the near past.
But the situations are very different: people compete for jobs and for resources;
computers compete for neither.

Globalization Means Substitution

When Perot warned about foreign competition, both George H. W. Bush and
Bill Clinton preached the gospel of free trade: since every person has a relative
strength at some particular job, in theory the economy maximizes wealth when
people specialize according to their advantages and then trade with each other.
In practice, it’s not unambiguously clear how well free trade has worked, for
many workers at least. Gains from trade are greatest when there’s a big
discrepancy in comparative advantage, but the global supply of workers willing
to do repetitive tasks for an extremely small wage is extremely large.
People don’t just compete to supply labor; they also demand the same
resources. While American consumers have benefited from access to cheap toys
and textiles from China, they’ve had to pay higher prices for the gasoline newly
desired by millions of Chinese motorists. Whether people eat shark fins in
Shanghai or fish tacos in San Diego, they all need food and they all need
shelter. And desire doesn’t stop at subsistence—people will demand ever more
as globalization continues. Now that millions of Chinese peasants can finally
enjoy a secure supply of basic calories, they want more of them to come from
pork instead of just grain. The convergence of desire is even more obvious at the
top: all oligarchs have the same taste in Cristal, from Petersburg to Pyongyang.
 Technology Means Complementarity
Now think about the prospect of competition from computers instead of
competition from human workers. On the supply side, computers are far more
different from people than any two people are different from each other: men
and machines are good at fundamentally different things. People have
intentionality—we form plans and make decisions in complicated situations.
We’re less good at making sense of enormous amounts of data. Computers are
exactly the opposite: they excel at efficient data processing, but they struggle to
make basic judgments that would be simple for any human.
To understand the scale of this variance, consider another of Google’s
computer-for-human substitution projects. In 2012, one of their supercomputers
made headlines when, after scanning 10 million thumbnails of YouTube videos,
it learned to identify a cat with 75% accuracy. That seems impressive—until
you remember that an average four-year-old can do it flawlessly. When a cheap
laptop beats the smartest mathematicians at some tasks but even a
supercomputer with 16,000 CPUs can’t beat a child at others, you can tell that
humans and computers are not just more or less powerful than each other—
they’re categorically different.
 The stark differences between man and machine mean that gains from
working with computers are much higher than gains from trade with other
people. We don’t trade with computers any more than we trade with livestock
or lamps. And that’s the point: computers are tools, not rivals.
The differences are even deeper on the demand side. Unlike people in
industrializing countries, computers don’t yearn for more luxurious foods or
beachfront villas in Cap Ferrat; all they require is a nominal amount of
electricity, which they’re not even smart enough to want. When we design new
computer technology to help solve problems, we get all the efficiency gains of a
hyperspecialized trading partner without having to compete with it for
resources. Properly understood, technology is the one way for us to escape
competition in a globalizing world. As computers become more and more
powerful, they won’t be substitutes for humans: they’ll be complements.
 COMPLEMENTARY BUSINESSES
Complementarity between computers and humans isn’t just a macro-scale fact.
It’s also the path to building a great business. I came to understand this from
my experience at PayPal. In mid-2000, we had survived the dot-com crash and
we were growing fast, but we faced one huge problem: we were losing upwards
of $10 million to credit card fraud every month. Since we were processing
hundreds or even thousands of transactions per minute, we couldn’t possibly
review each one—no human quality control team could work that fast.
So we did what any group of engineers would do: we tried to automate a
solution. First, Max Levchin assembled an elite team of mathematicians to
study the fraudulent transfers in detail. Then we took what we learned and
wrote software to automatically identify and cancel bogus transactions in real
time. But it quickly became clear that this approach wouldn’t work either: after
an hour or two, the thieves would catch on and change their tactics. We were
dealing with an adaptive enemy, and our software couldn’t adapt in response.
The fraudsters’ adaptive evasions fooled our automatic detection algorithms,
but we found that they didn’t fool our human analysts as easily. So Max and his
engineers rewrote the software to take a hybrid approach: the computer would
flag the most suspicious transactions on a well-designed user interface, and
human operators would make the final judgment as to their legitimacy. Thanks
to this hybrid system—we named it “Igor,” after the Russian fraudster who
bragged that we’d never be able to stop him—we turned our first quarterly
profit in the first quarter of 2002 (as opposed to a quarterly loss of $29.3 million
one year before). The FBI asked us if we’d let them use Igor to help detect
financial crime. And Max was able to boast, grandiosely but truthfully, that he
was “the Sherlock Holmes of the Internet Underground.”
This kind of man-machine symbiosis enabled PayPal to stay in business,
which in turn enabled hundreds of thousands of small businesses to accept the
payments they needed to thrive on the internet. None of it would have been
possible without the man-machine solution—even though most people would
never see it or even hear about it.
 I continued to think about this after we sold PayPal in 2002: if humans and
computers together could achieve dramatically better results than either could
attain alone, what other valuable businesses could be built on this core
principle? The next year, I pitched Alex Karp, an old Stanford classmate, and
Stephen Cohen, a software engineer, on a new startup idea: we would use the
human-computer hybrid approach from PayPal’s security system to identify
terrorist networks and financial fraud. We already knew the FBI was interested,
and in 2004 we founded Palantir, a software company that helps people extract
insight from divergent sources of information. The company is on track to book
sales of $1 billion in 2014, and Forbes has called Palantir’s software the “killer
app” for its rumored role in helping the government locate Osama bin Laden.
We have no details to share from that operation, but we can say that neither
human intelligence by itself nor computers alone will be able to make us safe.
America’s two biggest spy agencies take opposite approaches: The Central
Intelligence Agency is run by spies who privilege humans. The National
Security Agency is run by generals who prioritize computers. CIA analysts have
to wade through so much noise that it’s very difficult to identify the most
serious threats. NSA computers can process huge quantities of data, but
machines alone cannot authoritatively determine whether someone is plotting a
terrorist act. Palantir aims to transcend these opposing biases: its software
analyzes the data the government feeds it—phone records of radical clerics in
Yemen or bank accounts linked to terror cell activity, for instance—and flags
suspicious activities for a trained analyst to review.
In addition to helping find terrorists, analysts using Palantir’s software have
been able to predict where insurgents plant IEDs in Afghanistan; prosecute
high-profile insider trading cases; take down the largest child pornography ring
in the world; support the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in
fighting foodborne disease outbreaks; and save both commercial banks and the
government hundreds of millions of dollars annually through advanced fraud
detection.
Advanced software made this possible, but even more important were the
human analysts, prosecutors, scientists, and financial professionals without
whose active engagement the software would have been useless.
Think of what professionals do in their jobs today. Lawyers must be able to
articulate solutions to thorny problems in several different ways—the pitch
changes depending on whether you’re talking to a client, opposing counsel, or a
judge. Doctors need to marry clinical understanding with an ability to
communicate it to non-expert patients. And good teachers aren’t just experts in
their disciplines: they must also understand how to tailor their instruction to
different individuals’ interests and learning styles. Computers might be able to
do some of these tasks, but they can’t combine them effectively. Better
technology in law, medicine, and education won’t replace professionals; it will
allow them to do even more.
LinkedIn has done exactly this for recruiters. When LinkedIn was founded in
2003, they didn’t poll recruiters to find discrete pain points in need of relief.
And they didn’t try to write software that would replace recruiters outright.
Recruiting is part detective work and part sales: you have to scrutinize
applicants’ history, assess their motives and compatibility, and persuade the
most promising ones to join you. Effectively replacing all those functions with a
computer would be impossible. Instead, LinkedIn set out to transform how
recruiters did their jobs. Today, more than 97% of recruiters use LinkedIn and
its powerful search and filtering functionality to source job candidates, and the
network also creates value for the hundreds of millions of professionals who use
it to manage their personal brands. If LinkedIn had tried to simply replace
recruiters with technology, they wouldn’t have a business today.

The Ideology of Computer Science

Why do so many people miss the power of complementarity? It starts in school.
Software engineers tend to work on projects that replace human efforts because
that’s what they’re trained to do. Academics make their reputations through
specialized research; their primary goal is to publish papers, and publication
means respecting the limits of a particular discipline. For computer scientists,
that means reducing human capabilities into specialized tasks that computers
can be trained to conquer one by one.
Just look at the trendiest fields in computer science today. The very term
“machine learning” evokes imagery of replacement, and its boosters seem to
believe that computers can be taught to perform almost any task, so long as we
feed them enough training data. Any user of Netflix or Amazon has
experienced the results of machine learning firsthand: both companies use
algorithms to recommend products based on your viewing and purchase history.
Feed them more data and the recommendations get ever better. Google
Translate works the same way, providing rough but serviceable translations into
any of the 80 languages it supports—not because the software understands
human language, but because it has extracted patterns through statistical
analysis of a huge corpus of text.
The other buzzword that epitomizes a bias toward substitution is “big data.”
Today’s companies have an insatiable appetite for data, mistakenly believing
that more data always creates more value. But big data is usually dumb data.
Computers can find patterns that elude humans, but they don’t know how to
compare patterns from different sources or how to interpret complex behaviors.
Actionable insights can only come from a human analyst (or the kind of
generalized artificial intelligence that exists only in science fiction).
We have let ourselves become enchanted by big data only because we
exoticize technology. We’re impressed with small feats accomplished by
computers alone, but we ignore big achievements from complementarity
because the human contribution makes them less uncanny. Watson, Deep Blue,
and ever-better machine learning algorithms are cool. But the most valuable
companies in the future won’t ask what problems can be solved with computers
alone. Instead, they’ll ask: how can computers help humans solve hard problems?
 EVER-SMARTER COMPUTERS: FRIEND OR FOE?
The future of computing is necessarily full of unknowns. It’s become
conventional to see ever-smarter anthropomorphized robot intelligences like
Siri and Watson as harbingers of things to come; once computers can answer all
our questions, perhaps they’ll ask why they should remain subservient to us at
all.
The logical endpoint to this substitutionist thinking is called “strong AI”:
computers that eclipse humans on every important dimension. Of course, the
Luddites are terrified by the possibility. It even makes the futurists a little
uneasy; it’s not clear whether strong AI would save humanity or doom it.
Technology is supposed to increase our mastery over nature and reduce the role
of chance in our lives; building smarter-than-human computers could actually
bring chance back with a vengeance. Strong AI is like a cosmic lottery ticket: if
we win, we get utopia; if we lose, Skynet substitutes us out of existence.
But even if strong AI is a real possibility rather than an imponderable
mystery, it won’t happen anytime soon: replacement by computers is a worry for
the 22nd century. Indefinite fears about the far future shouldn’t stop us from
making definite plans today. Luddites claim that we shouldn’t build the
computers that might replace people someday; crazed futurists argue that we
should. These two positions are mutually exclusive but they are not exhaustive:
there is room in between for sane people to build a vastly better world in the
decades ahead. As we find new ways to use computers, they won’t just get better
at the kinds of things people already do; they’ll help us to do what was
previously unimaginable.
13
 SEEING GREEN

A T THE START of the 21st century, everyone agreed that the next big thing
was clean technology. It had to be: in Beijing, the smog had gotten so bad
that people couldn’t see from building to building—even breathing was a
health risk. Bangladesh, with its arsenic-laden water wells, was suffering what
the New York Times called “the biggest mass poisoning in history.” In the U.S.,
Hurricanes Ivan and Katrina were said to be harbingers of the coming
devastation from global warming. Al Gore implored us to attack these problems
“with the urgency and resolve that has previously been seen only when nations
mobilized for war.” People got busy: entrepreneurs started thousands of
cleantech companies, and investors poured more than $50 billion into them. So
began the quest to cleanse the world.
It didn’t work. Instead of a healthier planet, we got a massive cleantech
bubble. Solyndra is the most famous green ghost, but most cleantech companies
met similarly disastrous ends—more than 40 solar manufacturers went out of
business or filed for bankruptcy in 2012 alone. The leading index of alternative
energy companies shows the bubble’s dramatic deflation:
 Why did cleantech fail? Conservatives think they already know the answer:
as soon as green energy became a priority for the government, it was poisoned.
But there really were (and there still are) good reasons for making energy a
priority. And the truth about cleantech is more complex and more important
than government failure. Most cleantech companies crashed because they
neglected one or more of the seven questions that every business must answer:

1. The Engineering Question

Can you create breakthrough technology instead of incremental
improvements?

2. The Timing Question

Is now the right time to start your particular business?

3. The Monopoly Question

Are you starting with a big share of a small market?

4. The People Question

Do you have the right team?
 5. The Distribution Question
Do you have a way to not just create but deliver your product?

6. The Durability Question

Will your market position be defensible 10 and 20 years into the future?

7. The Secret Question

Have you identified a unique opportunity that others don’t see?

We’ve discussed these elements before. Whatever your industry, any great
business plan must address every one of them. If you don’t have good answers to
these questions, you’ll run into lots of “bad luck” and your business will fail. If
you nail all seven, you’ll master fortune and succeed. Even getting five or six
correct might work. But the striking thing about the cleantech bubble was that
people were starting companies with zero good answers—and that meant
hoping for a miracle.
It’s hard to know exactly why any particular cleantech company failed, since
almost all of them made several serious mistakes. But since any one of those
mistakes is enough to doom your company, it’s worth reviewing cleantech’s
losing scorecard in more detail.
 THE ENGINEERING QUESTION
A great technology company should have proprietary technology an order of
magnitude better than its nearest substitute. But cleantech companies rarely
produced 2x, let alone 10x, improvements. Sometimes their offerings were
actually worse than the products they sought to replace. Solyndra developed
novel, cylindrical solar cells, but to a first approximation, cylindrical cells are
only 1/π as efficient as flat ones—they simply don’t receive as much direct
sunlight. The company tried to correct for this deficiency by using mirrors to
reflect more sunlight to hit the bottoms of the panels, but it’s hard to recover
from a radically inferior starting point.
Companies must strive for 10x better because merely incremental
improvements often end up meaning no improvement at all for the end user.
Suppose you develop a new wind turbine that’s 20% more efficient than any
existing technology—when you test it in the laboratory. That sounds good at
first, but the lab result won’t begin to compensate for the expenses and risks
faced by any new product in the real world. And even if your system really is
20% better on net for the customer who buys it, people are so used to
exaggerated claims that you’ll be met with skepticism when you try to sell it.
Only when your product is 10x better can you offer the customer transparent
superiority.
 THE TIMING QUESTION
Cleantech entrepreneurs worked hard to convince themselves that their
appointed hour had arrived. When he announced his new company in 2008,
SpectraWatt CEO Andrew Wilson stated that “[t]he solar industry is akin to
where the microprocessor industry was in the late 1970s. There is a lot to be
figured out and improved.” The second part was right, but the microprocessor
analogy was way off. Ever since the first microprocessor was built in 1970,
computing advanced not just rapidly but exponentially. Look at Intel’s early
product release history:

The first silicon solar cell, by contrast, was created by Bell Labs in 1954—
more than a half century before Wilson’s press release. Photovoltaic efficiency
improved in the intervening decades, but slowly and linearly: Bell’s first solar
cell had about 6% efficiency; neither today’s crystalline silicon cells nor modern
thin-film cells have exceeded 25% efficiency in the field. There were few
engineering developments in the mid-2000s to suggest impending liftoff.
Entering a slow-moving market can be a good strategy, but only if you have a
definite and realistic plan to take it over. The failed cleantech companies had
none.
 THE MONOPOLY QUESTION
In 2006, billionaire technology investor John Doerr announced that “green is
the new red, white and blue.” He could have stopped at “red.” As Doerr himself
said, “Internet-sized markets are in the billions of dollars; the energy markets
are in the trillions.” What he didn’t say is that huge, trillion-dollar markets
mean ruthless, bloody competition. Others echoed Doerr over and over: in the
2000s, I listened to dozens of cleantech entrepreneurs begin fantastically rosy
PowerPoint presentations with all-too-true tales of trillion-dollar markets—as
if that were a good thing.
Cleantech executives emphasized the bounty of an energy market big
enough for all comers, but each one typically believed that his own company
had an edge. In 2006, Dave Pearce, CEO of solar manufacturer MiaSolé,
admitted to a congressional panel that his company was just one of several
“very strong” startups working on one particular kind of thin-film solar cell
development. Minutes later, Pearce predicted that MiaSolé would become “the
largest producer of thin-film solar cells in the world” within a year’s time. That
didn’t happen, but it might not have helped them anyway: thin-film is just one
of more than a dozen kinds of solar cells. Customers won’t care about any
particular technology unless it solves a particular problem in a superior way.
And if you can’t monopolize a unique solution for a small market, you’ll be
stuck with vicious competition. That’s what happened to MiaSolé, which was
acquired in 2013 for hundreds of millions of dollars less than its investors had
put into the company.
Exaggerating your own uniqueness is an easy way to botch the monopoly
question. Suppose you’re running a solar company that’s successfully installed
hundreds of solar panel systems with a combined power generation capacity of
100 megawatts. Since total U.S. solar energy production capacity is 950
megawatts, you own 10.53% of the market. Congratulations, you tell yourself:
you’re a player.
 But what if the U.S. solar energy market isn’t the relevant market? What if
the relevant market is the global solar market, with a production capacity of 18
gigawatts? Your 100 megawatts now makes you a very small fish indeed:
suddenly you own less than 1% of the market.

And what if the appropriate measure isn’t global solar, but rather renewable
energy in general? Annual production capacity from renewables is 420 gigawatts
globally; you just shrank to 0.02% of the market. And compared to the total
global power generation capacity of 15,000 gigawatts, your 100 megawatts is
just a drop in the ocean.
 Cleantech entrepreneurs’ thinking about markets was hopelessly confused.
They would rhetorically shrink their market in order to seem differentiated,
only to turn around and ask to be valued based on huge, supposedly lucrative
markets. But you can’t dominate a submarket if it’s fictional, and huge markets
are highly competitive, not highly attainable. Most cleantech founders would
have been better off opening a new British restaurant in downtown Palo Alto.
 THE PEOPLE QUESTION
Energy problems are engineering problems, so you would expect to find nerds
running cleantech companies. You’d be wrong: the ones that failed were run by
shockingly nontechnical teams. These salesman-executives were good at raising
capital and securing government subsidies, but they were less good at building
products that customers wanted to buy.
At Founders Fund, we saw this coming. The most obvious clue was sartorial:
cleantech executives were running around wearing suits and ties. This was a
huge red flag, because real technologists wear T-shirts and jeans. So we
instituted a blanket rule: pass on any company whose founders dressed up for
pitch meetings. Maybe we still would have avoided these bad investments if we
had taken the time to evaluate each company’s technology in detail. But the
team insight—never invest in a tech CEO that wears a suit—got us to the truth
a lot faster. The best sales is hidden. There’s nothing wrong with a CEO who
can sell, but if he actually looks like a salesman, he’s probably bad at sales and
worse at tech.

Solyndra CEO Brian Harrison; Tesla Motors CEO Elon Musk

 THE DISTRIBUTION QUESTION
Cleantech companies effectively courted government and investors, but they
often forgot about customers. They learned the hard way that the world is not a
laboratory: selling and delivering a product is at least as important as the
product itself.
Just ask Israeli electric vehicle startup Better Place, which from 2007 to 2012
raised and spent more than $800 million to build swappable battery packs and
charging stations for electric cars. The company sought to “create a green
alternative that would lessen our dependence on highly polluting transportation
technologies.” And it did just that—at least by 1,000 cars, the number it sold
before filing for bankruptcy. Even selling that many was an achievement,
because each of those cars was very hard for customers to buy.
For starters, it was never clear what you were actually buying. Better Place
bought sedans from Renault and refitted them with electric batteries and
electric motors. So, were you buying an electric Renault, or were you buying a
Better Place? In any case, if you decided to buy one, you had to jump through a
series of hoops. First, you needed to seek approval from Better Place. To get
that, you had to prove that you lived close enough to a Better Place battery
swapping station and promise to follow predictable routes. If you passed that
test, you had to sign up for a fueling subscription in order to recharge your car.
Only then could you get started learning the new behavior of stopping to swap
out battery packs on the road.
Better Place thought its technology spoke for itself, so they didn’t bother to
market it clearly. Reflecting on the company’s failure, one frustrated customer
asked, “Why wasn’t there a billboard in Tel Aviv showing a picture of a Toyota
Prius for 160,000 shekels and a picture of this car, for 160,000 plus fuel for four
years?” He still bought one of the cars, but unlike most people, he was a
hobbyist who “would do anything to keep driving it.” Unfortunately, he can’t: as
the Better Place board of directors stated upon selling the company’s assets for a
meager $12 million in 2013, “The technical challenges we overcame
successfully, but the other obstacles we were not able to overcome.”
 THE DURABILITY QUESTION
Every entrepreneur should plan to be the last mover in her particular market.
That starts with asking yourself: what will the world look like 10 and 20 years
from now, and how will my business fit in?
Few cleantech companies had a good answer. As a result, all their obituaries
resemble each other. A few months before it filed for bankruptcy in 2011,
Evergreen Solar explained its decision to close one of its U.S. factories:

Solar manufacturers in China have received considerable government

and financial support.… Although [our] production costs … are now
below originally planned levels and lower than most western
manufacturers, they are still much higher than those of our low cost
competitors in China.

But it wasn’t until 2012 that the “blame China” chorus really exploded.
Discussing its bankruptcy filing, U.S. Department of Energy–backed Abound
Solar blamed “aggressive pricing actions from Chinese solar panel companies”
that “made it very difficult for an early stage startup company  …  to scale in
current market conditions.” When solar panel maker Energy Conversion
Devices failed in February 2012, it went beyond blaming China in a press
release and filed a $950 million lawsuit against three prominent Chinese solar
manufacturers—the same companies that Solyndra’s trustees in bankruptcy
sued later that year on the grounds of attempted monopolization, conspiracy,
and predatory pricing. But was competition from Chinese manufacturers really
impossible to predict? Cleantech entrepreneurs would have done well to
rephrase the durability question and ask: what will stop China from wiping out
my business? Without an answer, the result shouldn’t have come as a surprise.
Beyond the failure to anticipate competition in manufacturing the same
green products, cleantech embraced misguided assumptions about the energy
market as a whole. An industry premised on the supposed twilight of fossil fuels
was blindsided by the rise of fracking. In 2000, just 1.7% of America’s natural
gas came from fracked shale. Five years later, that figure had climbed to 4.1%.
Nevertheless, nobody in cleantech took this trend seriously: renewables were
the only way forward; fossil fuels couldn’t possibly get cheaper or cleaner in the
future. But they did. By 2013, shale gas accounted for 34% of America’s natural
gas, and gas prices had fallen more than 70% since 2008, devastating most
renewable energy business models. Fracking may not be a durable energy
solution, either, but it was enough to doom cleantech companies that didn’t see
it coming.
 THE SECRET QUESTION
Every cleantech company justified itself with conventional truths about the
need for a cleaner world. They deluded themselves into believing that an
overwhelming social need for alternative energy solutions implied an
overwhelming business opportunity for cleantech companies of all kinds.
Consider how conventional it had become by 2006 to be bullish on solar. That
year, President George W. Bush heralded a future of “solar roofs that will
enable the American family to be able to generate their own electricity.”
Investor and cleantech executive Bill Gross declared that the “potential for solar
is enormous.” Suvi Sharma, then-CEO of solar manufacturer Solaria, admitted
that while “there is a gold rush feeling” to solar, “there’s also real gold here—
or, in our case, sunshine.” But rushing to embrace the convention sent scores of
solar panel companies—Q-Cells, Evergreen Solar, SpectraWatt, and even
Gross’s own Energy Innovations, to name just a few—from promising
beginnings to bankruptcy court very quickly. Each of the casualties had
described their bright futures using broad conventions on which everybody
agreed. Great companies have secrets: specific reasons for success that other
people don’t see.
 THE MYTH OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Cleantech entrepreneurs aimed for more than just success as most businesses
define it. The cleantech bubble was the biggest phenomenon—and the biggest
flop—in the history of “social entrepreneurship.” This philanthropic approach
to business starts with the idea that corporations and nonprofits have until now
been polar opposites: corporations have great power, but they’re shackled to the
profit motive; nonprofits pursue the public interest, but they’re weak players in
the wider economy. Social entrepreneurs aim to combine the best of both
worlds and “do well by doing good.” Usually they end up doing neither.
The ambiguity between social and financial goals doesn’t help. But the
ambiguity in the word “social” is even more of a problem: if something is
“socially good,” is it good for society, or merely seen as good by society?
Whatever is good enough to receive applause from all audiences can only be
conventional, like the general idea of green energy.
Progress isn’t held back by some difference between corporate greed and
nonprofit goodness; instead, we’re held back by the sameness of both. Just as
corporations tend to copy each other, nonprofits all tend to push the same
priorities. Cleantech shows the result: hundreds of undifferentiated products all
in the name of one overbroad goal.
Doing something different is what’s truly good for society—and it’s also what
allows a business to profit by monopolizing a new market. The best projects are
likely to be overlooked, not trumpeted by a crowd; the best problems to work on
are often the ones nobody else even tries to solve.
 TESLA: 7 FOR 7
Tesla is one of the few cleantech companies started last decade to be thriving
today. They rode the social buzz of cleantech better than anyone, but they got
the seven questions right, so their success is instructive:

TECHNOLOGY. Tesla’s technology is so good that other car companies

rely on it: Daimler uses Tesla’s battery packs; Mercedes-Benz uses a
Tesla powertrain; Toyota uses a Tesla motor. General Motors has even
created a task force to track Tesla’s next moves. But Tesla’s greatest
technological achievement isn’t any single part or component, but
rather its ability to integrate many components into one superior
product. The Tesla Model S sedan, elegantly designed from end to
end, is more than the sum of its parts: Consumer Reports rated it
higher than any other car ever reviewed, and both Motor Trend and
Automobile magazines named it their 2013 Car of the Year.

TIMING. In 2009, it was easy to think that the government would

continue to support cleantech: “green jobs” were a political priority,
federal funds were already earmarked, and Congress even seemed
likely to pass cap-and-trade legislation. But where others saw
generous subsidies that could flow indefinitely, Tesla CEO Elon Musk
rightly saw a one-time-only opportunity. In January 2010—about a
year and a half before Solyndra imploded under the Obama
administration and politicized the subsidy question—Tesla secured a
$465 million loan from the U.S. Department of Energy. A half-
billion-dollar subsidy was unthinkable in the mid-2000s. It’s
unthinkable today. There was only one moment where that was
possible, and Tesla played it perfectly.

MONOPOLY. Tesla started with a tiny submarket that it could

dominate: the market for high-end electric sports cars. Since the first
Roadster rolled off the production line in 2008, Tesla’s sold only about
3,000 of them, but at $109,000 apiece that’s not trivial. Starting small
allowed Tesla to undertake the necessary R&D to build the slightly
less expensive Model S, and now Tesla owns the luxury electric sedan
market, too. They sold more than 20,000 sedans in 2013 and now
Tesla is in prime position to expand to broader markets in the future.

TEAM. Tesla’s CEO is the consummate engineer and salesman, so it’s

not surprising that he’s assembled a team that’s very good at both.
Elon describes his staff this way: “If you’re at Tesla, you’re choosing
to be at the equivalent of Special Forces. There’s the regular army,
and that’s fine, but if you are working at Tesla, you’re choosing to
step up your game.”

DISTRIBUTION. Most companies underestimate distribution, but Tesla

took it so seriously that it decided to own the entire distribution
chain. Other car companies are beholden to independent dealerships:
Ford and Hyundai make cars, but they rely on other people to sell
them. Tesla sells and services its vehicles in its own stores. The up-
front costs of Tesla’s approach are much higher than traditional
dealership distribution, but it affords control over the customer
experience, strengthens Tesla’s brand, and saves the company money
in the long run.

DURABILITY. Tesla has a head start and it’s moving faster than
anyone else—and that combination means its lead is set to widen in
the years ahead. A coveted brand is the clearest sign of Tesla’s
breakthrough: a car is one of the biggest purchasing decisions that
people ever make, and consumers’ trust in that category is hard to
win. And unlike every other car company, at Tesla the founder is still
in charge, so it’s not going to ease off anytime soon.

SECRETS. Tesla knew that fashion drove interest in cleantech. Rich

people especially wanted to appear “green,” even if it meant driving
a boxy Prius or clunky Honda Insight. Those cars only made drivers
look cool by association with the famous eco-conscious movie stars
who owned them as well. So Tesla decided to build cars that made
drivers look cool, period—Leonardo DiCaprio even ditched his Prius
for an expensive (and expensive-looking) Tesla Roadster. While
generic cleantech companies struggled to differentiate themselves,
Tesla built a unique brand around the secret that cleantech was even
more of a social phenomenon than an environmental imperative.
 ENERGY 2.0
Tesla’s success proves that there was nothing inherently wrong with cleantech.
The biggest idea behind it is right: the world really will need new sources of
energy. Energy is the master resource: it’s how we feed ourselves, build shelter,
and make everything we need to live comfortably. Most of the world dreams of
living as comfortably as Americans do today, and globalization will cause
increasingly severe energy challenges unless we build new technology. There
simply aren’t enough resources in the world to replicate old approaches or
redistribute our way to prosperity.
Cleantech gave people a way to be optimistic about the future of energy. But
when indefinitely optimistic investors betting on the general idea of green
energy funded cleantech companies that lacked specific business plans, the
result was a bubble. Plot the valuation of alternative energy firms in the 2000s
alongside the NASDAQ’s rise and fall a decade before, and you see the same
shape:
 The 1990s had one big idea: the internet is going to be big. But too many
internet companies had exactly that same idea and no others. An entrepreneur
can’t benefit from macro-scale insight unless his own plans begin at the micro-
scale. Cleantech companies faced the same problem: no matter how much the
world needs energy, only a firm that offers a superior solution for a specific
energy problem can make money. No sector will ever be so important that
merely participating in it will be enough to build a great company.
The tech bubble was far bigger than cleantech and the crash even more
painful. But the dream of the ’90s turned out to be right: skeptics who doubted
that the internet would fundamentally change publishing or retail sales or
everyday social life looked prescient in 2001, but they seem comically foolish
today. Could successful energy startups be founded after the cleantech crash just
as Web 2.0 startups successfully launched amid the debris of the dot-coms? The
macro need for energy solutions is still real. But a valuable business must start
by finding a niche and dominating a small market. Facebook started as a service
for just one university campus before it spread to other schools and then the
entire world. Finding small markets for energy solutions will be tricky—you
could aim to replace diesel as a power source for remote islands, or maybe build
modular reactors for quick deployment at military installations in hostile
territories. Paradoxically, the challenge for the entrepreneurs who will create
Energy 2.0 is to think small.
14
 THE FOUNDER’S PARADOX

O F THE SIX PEOPLE who started PayPal, four had built bombs in high school.
Five were just 23 years old—or younger. Four of us had been born
outside the United States. Three had escaped here from communist countries:
Yu Pan from China, Luke Nosek from Poland, and Max Levchin from Soviet
Ukraine. Building bombs was not what kids normally did in those countries at
that time.
The six of us could have been seen as eccentric. My first-ever conversation
with Luke was about how he’d just signed up for cryonics, to be frozen upon
death in hope of medical resurrection. Max claimed to be without a country
and proud of it: his family was put into diplomatic limbo when the USSR
collapsed while they were escaping to the U.S. Russ Simmons had escaped from
a trailer park to the top math and science magnet school in Illinois. Only Ken
Howery fit the stereotype of a privileged American childhood: he was PayPal’s
sole Eagle Scout. But Kenny’s peers thought he was crazy to join the rest of us
and make just one-third of the salary he had been offered by a big bank. So
even he wasn’t entirely normal.
 The PayPal Team in 1999

Are all founders unusual people? Or do we just tend to remember and

exaggerate whatever is most unusual about them? More important, which
personal traits actually matter in a founder? This chapter is about why it’s more
powerful but at the same time more dangerous for a company to be led by a
distinctive individual instead of an interchangeable manager.
 THE DIFFERENCE ENGINE
Some people are strong, some are weak, some are geniuses, some are dullards—
but most people are in the middle. Plot where everyone falls and you’ll see a
bell curve:

Since so many founders seem to have extreme traits, you might guess that a
plot showing only founders’ traits would have fatter tails with more people at
either end.
 But that doesn’t capture the strangest thing about founders. Normally we
expect opposite traits to be mutually exclusive: a normal person can’t be both
rich and poor at the same time, for instance. But it happens all the time to
founders: startup CEOs can be cash poor but millionaires on paper. They may
oscillate between sullen jerkiness and appealing charisma. Almost all successful
entrepreneurs are simultaneously insiders and outsiders. And when they do
succeed, they attract both fame and infamy. When you plot them out, founders’
traits appear to follow an inverse normal distribution:
 Where does this strange and extreme combination of traits come from? They
could be present from birth (nature) or acquired from an individual’s
environment (nurture). But perhaps founders aren’t really as extreme as they
appear. Might they strategically exaggerate certain qualities? Or is it possible
that everyone else exaggerates them? All of these effects can be present at the
same time, and whenever present they powerfully reinforce each other. The
cycle usually starts with unusual people and ends with them acting and
seeming even more unusual:
 As an example, take Sir Richard Branson, the billionaire founder of the
Virgin Group. He could be described as a natural entrepreneur: Branson started
his first business at age 16, and at just 22 he founded Virgin Records. But other
aspects of his renown—the trademark lion’s mane hairstyle, for example—are
less natural: one suspects he wasn’t born with that exact look. As Branson has
cultivated his other extreme traits (Is kiteboarding with naked supermodels a
PR stunt? Just a guy having fun? Both?), the media has eagerly enthroned him:
Branson is “The Virgin King,” “The Undisputed King of PR,” “The King of
Branding,” and “The King of the Desert and Space.” When Virgin Atlantic
Airways began serving passengers drinks with ice cubes shaped like Branson’s
face, he became “The Ice King.”
Is Branson just a normal businessman who happens to be lionized by the
media with the help of a good PR team? Or is he himself a born branding
genius rightly singled out by the journalists he is so good at manipulating? It’s
hard to tell—maybe he’s both.
 Another example is Sean Parker, who started out with the ultimate outsider
status: criminal. Sean was a careful hacker in high school. But his father
decided that Sean was spending too much time on the computer for a 16-year-
old, so one day he took away Sean’s keyboard mid-hack. Sean couldn’t log out;
the FBI noticed; soon federal agents were placing him under arrest.
Sean got off easy since he was a minor; if anything, the episode emboldened
him. Three years later, he co-founded Napster. The peer-to-peer file sharing
service amassed 10 million users in its first year, making it one of the fastest-
growing businesses of all time. But the record companies sued and a federal
judge ordered it shut down 20 months after opening. After a whirlwind period
at the center, Sean was back to being an outsider again.
Then came Facebook. Sean met Mark Zuckerberg in 2004, helped negotiate
Facebook’s first funding, and became the company’s founding president. He had
to step down in 2005 amid allegations of drug use, but this only enhanced his
notoriety. Ever since Justin Timberlake portrayed him in The Social Network,
Sean has been perceived as one of the coolest people in America. JT is still more
famous, but when he visits Silicon Valley, people ask if he’s Sean Parker.
 The most famous people in the world are founders, too: instead of a company,
every celebrity founds and cultivates a personal brand. Lady Gaga, for example,
became one of the most influential living people. But is she even a real person?
Her real name isn’t a secret, but almost no one knows or cares what it is. She
wears costumes so bizarre as to put any other wearer at risk of an involuntary
psychiatric hold. Gaga would have you believe that she was “born this way”—
the title of both her second album and its lead track. But no one is born looking
like a zombie with horns coming out of her head: Gaga must therefore be a self-
manufactured myth. Then again, what kind of person would do this to herself ?
Certainly nobody normal. So perhaps Gaga really was born that way.
 WHERE KINGS COME FROM
Extreme founder figures are not new in human affairs. Classical mythology is
full of them. Oedipus is the paradigmatic insider/outsider: he was abandoned as
an infant and ended up in a foreign land, but he was a brilliant king and smart
enough to solve the riddle of the Sphinx.
Romulus and Remus were born of royal blood and abandoned as orphans.
When they discovered their pedigree, they decided to found a city. But they
couldn’t agree on where to put it. When Remus crossed the boundary that
Romulus had decided was the edge of Rome, Romulus killed him, declaring:
“So perish every one that shall hereafter leap over my wall.” Law-maker and
law-breaker, criminal outlaw and king who defined Rome, Romulus was a self-
contradictory insider/outsider.
Normal people aren’t like Oedipus or Romulus. Whatever those individuals
were actually like in life, the mythologized versions of them remember only the
extremes. But why was it so important for archaic cultures to remember
extraordinary people?
The famous and infamous have always served as vessels for public sentiment:
they’re praised amid prosperity and blamed for misfortune. Primitive societies
faced one fundamental problem above all: they would be torn apart by conflict
if they didn’t have a way to stop it. So whenever plagues, disasters, or violent
rivalries threatened the peace, it was beneficial for the society to place the
entire blame on a single person, someone everybody could agree on: a
scapegoat.
Who makes an effective scapegoat? Like founders, scapegoats are extreme
and contradictory figures. On the one hand, a scapegoat is necessarily weak; he
is powerless to stop his own victimization. On the other hand, as the one who
can defuse conflict by taking the blame, he is the most powerful member of the
community.
Before execution, scapegoats were often worshipped like deities. The Aztecs
considered their victims to be earthly forms of the gods to whom they were
sacrificed. You would be dressed in fine clothes and feast royally until your brief
reign ended and they cut your heart out. These are the roots of monarchy: every
king was a living god, and every god a murdered king. Perhaps every modern
king is just a scapegoat who has managed to delay his own execution.
 AMERICAN ROYALTY
Celebrities are supposedly “American royalty.” We even grant titles to our
favorite performers: Elvis Presley was the king of rock. Michael Jackson was the
king of pop. Britney Spears was the pop princess.

Until they weren’t. Elvis self-destructed in the ’70s and died alone,
overweight, sitting on his toilet. Today, his impersonators are fat and sketchy,
not lean and cool. Michael Jackson went from beloved child star to an erratic,
physically repulsive, drug-addicted shell of his former self; the world reveled in
the details of his trials. Britney’s story is the most dramatic of all. We created
her from nothing, elevating her to superstardom as a teenager. But then
everything fell off the tracks: witness the shaved head, the over- and under-
eating scandals, and the highly publicized court case to take away her children.
Was she always a little bit crazy? Did the publicity just get to her? Or did she do
it all to get more?
 For some fallen stars, death brings resurrection. So many popular musicians
have died at age 27—Janis Joplin, Jimi Hendrix, Jim Morrison, and Kurt
Cobain, for example—that this set has become immortalized as the “27 Club.”
Before she joined the club in 2011, Amy Winehouse sang: “They tried to make
me go to rehab, but I said, ‘No, no, no.’ ” Maybe rehab seemed so unattractive
because it blocked the path to immortality. Perhaps the only way to be a rock
god forever is to die an early death.

We alternately worship and despise technology founders just as we do

celebrities. Howard Hughes’s arc from fame to pity is the most dramatic of any
20th-century tech founder. He was born wealthy, but he was always more
interested in engineering than luxury. He built Houston’s first radio transmitter
at the age of 11. The year after that he built the city’s first motorcycle. By age
30 he’d made nine commercially successful movies at a time when Hollywood
was on the technological frontier. But Hughes was even more famous for his
parallel career in aviation. He designed planes, produced them, and piloted
them himself. Hughes set world records for top airspeed, fastest
transcontinental flight, and fastest flight around the world.
Hughes was obsessed with flying higher than everyone else. He liked to
remind people that he was a mere mortal, not a Greek god—something that
mortals say only when they want to invite comparisons to gods. Hughes was “a
man to whom you cannot apply the same standards as you can to you and me,”
his lawyer once argued in federal court. Hughes paid the lawyer to say that, but
according to the New York Times there was “no dispute on this point from
judge or jury.” When Hughes was awarded the Congressional Gold Medal in
1939 for his achievements in aviation, he didn’t even show up to claim it—years
later President Truman found it in the White House and mailed it to him.
The beginning of Hughes’s end came in 1946, when he suffered his third and
worst plane crash. Had he died then, he would have been remembered forever
as one of the most dashing and successful Americans of all time. But he
survived—barely. He became obsessive-compulsive, addicted to painkillers, and
withdrew from the public to spend the last 30 years of his life in self-imposed
solitary confinement. Hughes had always acted a little crazy, on the theory that
fewer people would want to bother a crazy person. But when his crazy act
turned into a crazy life, he became an object of pity as much as awe.
 More recently, Bill Gates has shown how highly visible success can attract
highly focused attacks. Gates embodied the founder archetype: he was
simultaneously an awkward and nerdy college-dropout outsider and the world’s
wealthiest insider. Did he choose his geeky eyeglasses strategically, to build up a
distinctive persona? Or, in his incurable nerdiness, did his geek glasses choose
him? It’s hard to know. But his dominance was undeniable: Microsoft’s
Windows claimed a 90% share of the market for operating systems in 2000.
That year Peter Jennings could plausibly ask, “Who is more important in the
world today: Bill Clinton or Bill Gates? I don’t know. It’s a good question.”
The U.S. Department of Justice didn’t limit itself to rhetorical questions; they
opened an investigation and sued Microsoft for “anticompetitive conduct.” In
June 2000 a court ordered that Microsoft be broken apart. Gates had stepped
down as CEO of Microsoft six months earlier, having been forced to spend most
of his time responding to legal threats instead of building new technology. A
court of appeals later overturned the breakup order, and Microsoft reached a
settlement with the government in 2001. But by then Gates’s enemies had
already deprived his company of the full engagement of its founder, and
Microsoft entered an era of relative stagnation. Today Gates is better known as a
philanthropist than a technologist.
 THE RETURN OF THE KING
Just as the legal attack on Microsoft was ending Bill Gates’s dominance, Steve
Jobs’s return to Apple demonstrated the irreplaceable value of a company’s
founder. In some ways, Steve Jobs and Bill Gates were opposites. Jobs was an
artist, preferred closed systems, and spent his time thinking about great
products above all else; Gates was a businessman, kept his products open, and
wanted to run the world. But both were insider/outsiders, and both pushed the
companies they started to achievements that nobody else would have been able
to match.

A college dropout who walked around barefoot and refused to shower, Jobs
was also the insider of his own personality cult. He could act charismatic or
crazy, perhaps according to his mood or perhaps according to his calculations;
it’s hard to believe that such weird practices as apple-only diets weren’t part of a
larger strategy. But all this eccentricity backfired on him in 1985: Apple’s board
effectively kicked Jobs out of his own company when he clashed with the
professional CEO brought in to provide adult supervision.
Jobs’s return to Apple 12 years later shows how the most important task in
business—the creation of new value—cannot be reduced to a formula and
applied by professionals. When he was hired as interim CEO of Apple in 1997,
the impeccably credentialed executives who preceded him had steered the
company nearly to bankruptcy. That year Michael Dell famously said of Apple,
“What would I do? I’d shut it down and give the money back to the
shareholders.” Instead Jobs introduced the iPod (2001), the iPhone (2007), and
the iPad (2010) before he had to resign in 2011 because of poor health. By the
following year Apple was the single most valuable company in the world.
Apple’s value crucially depended on the singular vision of a particular
person. This hints at the strange way in which the companies that create new
technology often resemble feudal monarchies rather than organizations that are
supposedly more “modern.” A unique founder can make authoritative decisions,
inspire strong personal loyalty, and plan ahead for decades. Paradoxically,
impersonal bureaucracies staffed by trained professionals can last longer than
any lifetime, but they usually act with short time horizons.
The lesson for business is that we need founders. If anything, we should be
more tolerant of founders who seem strange or extreme; we need unusual
individuals to lead companies beyond mere incrementalism.
The lesson for founders is that individual prominence and adulation can
never be enjoyed except on the condition that it may be exchanged for
individual notoriety and demonization at any moment—so be careful.
Above all, don’t overestimate your own power as an individual. Founders are
important not because they are the only ones whose work has value, but rather
because a great founder can bring out the best work from everybody at his
company. That we need individual founders in all their peculiarity does not
mean that we are called to worship Ayn Randian “prime movers” who claim to
be independent of everybody around them. In this respect Rand was a merely
half-great writer: her villains were real, but her heroes were fake. There is no
Galt’s Gulch. There is no secession from society. To believe yourself invested
with divine self-sufficiency is not the mark of a strong individual, but of a
person who has mistaken the crowd’s worship—or jeering—for the truth. The
single greatest danger for a founder is to become so certain of his own myth that
he loses his mind. But an equally insidious danger for every business is to lose
all sense of myth and mistake disenchantment for wisdom.
 Conclusion

STAGNATION OR SINGULARITY?

I F EVEN THE MOST FARSIGHTED founders cannot plan beyond the next 20 to 30
years, is there anything to say about the very distant future? We don’t know
anything specific, but we can make out the broad contours. Philosopher Nick
Bostrom describes four possible patterns for the future of humanity.
The ancients saw all of history as a neverending alternation between
prosperity and ruin. Only recently have people dared to hope that we might
permanently escape misfortune, and it’s still possible to wonder whether the
stability we take for granted will last.

However, we usually suppress our doubts. Conventional wisdom seems to

assume instead that the whole world will converge toward a plateau of
development similar to the life of the richest countries today. In this scenario,
the future will look a lot like the present.
 Given the interconnected geography of the contemporary world and the
unprecedented destructive power of modern weaponry, it’s hard not to ask
whether a large-scale social disaster could be contained were it to occur. This is
what fuels our fears of the third possible scenario: a collapse so devastating that
we won’t survive it.

The last of the four possibilities is the hardest one to imagine: accelerating
takeoff toward a much better future. The end result of such a breakthrough
could take a number of forms, but any one of them would be so different from
the present as to defy description.

Which of the four will it be?

Recurrent collapse seems unlikely: the knowledge underlying civilization is
so widespread today that complete annihilation would be more probable than a
long period of darkness followed by recovery. However, in case of extinction,
there is no human future of any kind to consider.
If we define the future as a time that looks different from the present, then
most people aren’t expecting any future at all; instead, they expect coming
decades to bring more globalization, convergence, and sameness. In this
scenario, poorer countries will catch up to richer countries, and the world as a
whole will reach an economic plateau. But even if a truly globalized plateau
were possible, could it last? In the best case, economic competition would be
more intense than ever before for every single person and firm on the planet.
However, when you add competition to consume scarce resources, it’s hard to
see how a global plateau could last indefinitely. Without new technology to
relieve competitive pressures, stagnation is likely to erupt into conflict. In case
of conflict on a global scale, stagnation collapses into extinction.
That leaves the fourth scenario, in which we create new technology to make
a much better future. The most dramatic version of this outcome is called the
Singularity, an attempt to name the imagined result of new technologies so
powerful as to transcend the current limits of our understanding. Ray Kurzweil,
the best-known Singularitarian, starts from Moore’s law and traces exponential
growth trends in dozens of fields, confidently projecting a future of superhuman
artificial intelligence. According to Kurzweil, “the Singularity is near,” it’s
inevitable, and all we have to do is prepare ourselves to accept it.
But no matter how many trends can be traced, the future won’t happen on its
own. What the Singularity would look like matters less than the stark choice we
face today between the two most likely scenarios: nothing or something. It’s up
to us. We cannot take for granted that the future will be better, and that means
we need to work to create it today.
Whether we achieve the Singularity on a cosmic scale is perhaps less
important than whether we seize the unique opportunities we have to do new
things in our own working lives. Everything important to us—the universe, the
planet, the country, your company, your life, and this very moment—is singular.
Our task today is to find singular ways to create the new things that will
make the future not just different, but better—to go from 0 to 1. The essential
first step is to think for yourself. Only by seeing our world anew, as fresh and
strange as it was to the ancients who saw it first, can we both re-create it and
preserve it for the future.
 Acknowledgments

Jimmy Kaltreider for helping to think this book through.

Rob Morrow, Scott Nolan, and Michael Solana for co-creating the Stanford class
from which we started.

Chris Parris-Lamb, Tina Constable, David Drake, Talia Krohn, and Jeremiah
Hall for skillfully guiding us to publication.

Everyone at Thiel Capital, Founders Fund, Mithril, and the Thiel Foundation
for working hard and smart.

Onward.
 Illustration Credits

The illustrations in this book were drawn by Matt Buck, based on the following
images:

  8.1:   Unabomber, Jeanne Boylan/FBI composite sketch

  8.1:   Hipster, Matt Buck
13.1:   Brian Harrison, Business Wire
13.1:   Elon Musk, Sebastian Blanco and Bloomberg/Getty Images
14.1:   Richard Branson, Ethan Miller/Getty Images
14.2:   Sean Parker, Aaron Fulkerson, flickr user Roebot, used under CC BY-SA
14.3:   Elvis Presley, Michael Ochs Archives/Getty Images
14.3:   Michael Jackson, Frank Edwards/Getty Images
14.3:   Britney Spears, Kevin Mazur Archive 1/WireImage
14.4:   Elvis Presley, Tom Wargacki/WireImage
14.4:   Michael Jackson, David LEFRANC/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images
14.4:   Britney Spears, New York Daily News Archive via Getty Images
14.5:   Janis Joplin, Albert B. Grossman and David Gahr/Getty Images
14.5:   Jim Morrison, Elektra Records and CBS via Getty Images
14.5:   Kurt Cobain, Frank Micelotta/Stringer/Getty Images
14.5:   Amy Winehouse, flickr user teakwood, used under CC BY-SA
14.6:   Howard Hughes, Bettmann/CORBIS
14.6:   magazine cover, TIME, a division of Time Inc.
14.7:   Bill Gates, Doug Wilson/CORBIS
14.7:   magazine cover, Newsweek
14.8:   Steve Jobs, 1984, Norman Seeff
14.8:   Steve Jobs, 2004, Contour by Getty Images
 Index

Page numbers in italics refer to illustrations.

Abound Solar
Accenture
advertising, 3.1, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3
Afghanistan
Airbnb
airline industry
Allen, Paul
Amazon, 2.1, 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, 12.1
Amundsen, Roald
Andreessen, Horowitz
Andreessen, Marc
Anna Karenina (Tolstoy)
antitrust
Apollo Program
Apple, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, 14.1
branding of
monopoly profits of
Aristotle
Army Corps of Engineers
AT&T
Aztecs

Baby Boomers
Bacon, Francis
Bangladesh
Barnes & Noble
Beijing
Bell Labs
Berlin Wall
Better Place
Bezos, Jeff, 5.1, 6.1
big data
Bill of Rights, U.S.
bin Laden, Osama
biotechnology
biotech startups, 6.1, 6.2
board of directors
Bostrom, Nick
Box, 9.1, 11.1
Boyle, Robert
branding
Branson, Richard
Brin, Sergey
bubbles
financial, 2.1, 8.1
see also specific bubbles
Buffett, Warren
bureaucracy, prf.1, 1.1, 9.1
Bush, George H. W., 2.1, 12.1
Bush, George W.
business:
Darwinian metaphors in
value of
war metaphors in

Capablanca, José Raúl

cap-and-trade legislation
capitalism, and competition, 3.1, 8.1
cash flows, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3
celebrities
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
CEO compensation
Chen, Steve
China, 1.1, 6.1, 12.1, 13.1
globalization and
cleantech
distribution question for
durability question for
engineering question for
monopoly question for
people question for
secret question for
social entrepreneurship and
timing question for
cleantech bubble, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3
clean technology
Clinton, Bill
cloud computing
Cobain, Kurt
Cohen, Stephen
companies:
value created by
 valuing of
company culture
Compaq
compensation
competition, 3.1, 5.1, 13.1, bm1.1
and capitalism, 3.1, 8.1
ideology of
imitative
lies of
as relic of history
ruthlessness in
as war
complacency
complementarity
substitution vs.
technology and
compound interest
computers, 12.1, 12.2
competition from
humans and
computer science, ideology of
Confinity
Congress, U.S., 6.1, 11.1, 13.1
Constitutional Convention
consultants
consulting
contrarian thinking
control
conventional truths, 8.1, 8.2
courage
credit card fraud
cults, 8.1, 10.1
Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC), 11.1, 11.2
Customer Lifetime Value (CLV), 11.1, 11.2

Daimler
Darwin, Charles
Deep Blue
definite optimism, 6.1, 6.2
definite pessimism, 6.1, 6.2
Dell, Michael
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)
design
DeskJet 500C
DiCaprio, Leonardo
disruption
distribution, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4
 power law of
at Tesla
Doerr, John
Doohan, James
Dorsey, Jack
dot-com crash, 4.1, 4.2
dot-com mania, 2.1, 2.2
lessons learned from
Dow Jones Industrial Average
Dunn, Patricia
Dylan, Bob

Earnhardt, Dale, Jr.

East Asian financial crises
eBay, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 9.1, 10.1, 11.1
economies of scale
educational system
efficient markets
Einstein, Albert
electric cars, 13.1, 13.2
Ellison, Larry
email
Emerson, Ralph Waldo
Empire State Building
Energy Conversion Devices
Energy Department, U.S.
Energy Innovations
Engels, Friedrich
entitlement spending
entrepreneurs, 3.1, 5.1, 6.1, 6.2, 7.1, 10.1
short-term growth focus of
entrepreneurship, serial
Epicurus
equity compensation
Eroom’s law
ethics
euro
Europe, 2.1, 6.1
European Central Bank
Evergreen Solar, 13.1, 13.2
evolution
exploration
extinction, bm1.1, bm1.2

Facebook, prf.1, 5.1, 6.1, 6.2, 7.1, 11.1, 14.1

Fairchild Semiconductor
Fanning, Shawn
Faust
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 8.1, 12.1, 14.1
Fermat, Pierre de
Fermat’s Last Theorem
finance, indefinite
financial bubbles, 2.1, 8.1
first mover advantage
flatness
Fleming, Alexander
Forbes, 12.1, 12.2
Ford
fossil fuels
foundations
co-founders
compensation structure
equity
ownership, possession and control
startups
founders, 14.1, bm1.1
origins of
traits of
Founders Fund, 7.1, 7.2, 9.1, 11.1, 13.1
Fountain of Youth
fracking
fraud detection
free marketeers
free trade
fundamentalists
future:
challenge of
controlling of
four possible patterns for

Gaga, Lady, 14.1, 14.2

Gates, Bill, prf.1, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 14.1
General Motors, 9.1, 13.1
genius
Gladwell, Malcolm, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3
globalization, 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 8.1, 12.1, bm1.1
substitution as
technology and
global warming
goals
Golden Gate Bridge
Google, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4.1, 5.1, 7.1, 10.1, 12.1, 12.2
as monopoly, 3.1, 3.2
 motto of
Google Translate
Gore, Al
government, indefinite
Great Depression
Greenspan, Alan, 2.1, 8.1
Gross, Bill
Groupon
Guardian, 12.1

Hamlet
Harrison, Brian, 13.1
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hendrix, Jimi
Hewlett, Bill
Hewlett-Packard
hipsterdom
Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, The
Hoffman, Reid
horizontal progress
housing bubble, 2.1, 8.1
Howery, Ken
HP Services
Hughes, Howard
Hurley, Chad
Hyundai

IBM, 3.1, 12.1

Igor
incentive pay
income inequality
incrementalism, 8.1, 14.1
indefinite finance
indefinite life
indefinite optimism, 6.1, 6.2
indefinite pessimism, 6.1, 6.2
India
Indonesia
information technology, 1.1, 6.1, 12.1
Informix
innovation, prf.1, 3.1
insider trading
Instagram
Intel
internet, 2.1, 2.2
internet bubble, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 8.1, 13.1
Interstate Highway System
Intuit
investment
iPad, 5.1, 14.1
iPhone, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 14.1
iPod, 6.1, 14.1
irrational exuberance
Italy
IT startups
Ivan, Hurricane

Jackson, Michael
Japan
Jennings, Ken
Jennings, Peter
Jeopardy!
Jobs, Steve, 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, 6.2, 14.1
Jones, Jim
Joplin, Janis
justice
Justice Department, U.S.

Kaczynski, Ted
Karim, Jawed
Karp, Alex, 11.1, 12.1
Kasparov, Garry
Katrina, Hurricane
Kennedy, Anthony
Kesey, Ken
Kessler, Andy
Kurzweil, Ray

last mover, 11.1, 13.1

last mover advantage
lean startup, 2.1, 6.1, 6.2
Levchin, Max, 4.1, 10.1, 12.1, 14.1
Levie, Aaron
lifespan
life tables
LinkedIn, 5.1, 10.1, 12.1
Loiseau, Bernard
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM)
Lord of the Rings (Tolkien)
luck, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4
Lucretius
Lyft
MacBook
machine learning
Madison, James
Madrigal, Alexis
Manhattan Project
Manson, Charles
manufacturing
marginal cost
marketing
Marx, Karl, 4.1, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3
Masters, Blake, prf.1, 11.1
Mayer, Marissa
Medicare
Mercedes-Benz
MiaSolé, 13.1, 13.2
Michelin
Microsoft, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4.1, 5.1, 14.1
mobile computing
mobile credit card readers
Mogadishu
monopoly, monopolies, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 5.1, 7.1, 8.1
building of
characteristics of
in cleantech
creative
dynamism of new
lies of
profits of
progress and
sales and
of Tesla
Morrison, Jim
Mosaic browser
music recording industry
Musk, Elon, 4.1, 6.1, 11.1, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3

Napster, 5.1, 14.1

NASA, 6.1, 11.1
NASDAQ, 2.1, 13.1
National Security Agency (NSA)
natural gas
natural secrets
Navigator browser
Netflix
Netscape
NetSecure
network effects, 5.1, 5.2
New Economy, 2.1, 2.2
New York Times, 13.1, 14.1
New York Times
Nietzsche, Friedrich
Nokia
nonprofits, 13.1, 13.2
Nosek, Luke, 9.1, 14.1
Nozick, Robert
nutrition

Oedipus, 14.1, 14.2

OfficeJet
OmniBook
online pet store market
Oracle
Outliers (Gladwell)
ownership

Packard, Dave
Page, Larry
Palantir, prf.1, 7.1, 10.1, 11.1, 12.1
PalmPilots, 2.1, 5.1, 11.1
Pan, Yu
Panama Canal
Pareto, Vilfredo
Pareto principle
Parker, Sean, 5.1, 14.1
Part-time employees
patents
path dependence
PayPal, prf.1, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 8.1, 9.1, 9.2, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 11.1, 11.2, 12.1, 12.2, 14.1
founders of, 14.1
future cash flows of
investors in
“PayPal Mafia”
PCs
Pearce, Dave
penicillin
perfect competition, 3.1, 3.2
equilibrium of
Perkins, Tom
perk war
Perot, Ross, 2.1, 12.1, 12.2
pessimism
Petopia.com
Pets.com, 4.1, 4.2
PetStore.com
pharmaceutical companies
philanthropy
philosophy, indefinite
physics
planning, 2.1, 6.1, 6.2
progress without
Plato
politics, 6.1, 11.1
indefinite
polling
pollsters
pollution
portfolio, diversified
possession
power law, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3
of distribution
of venture capital
Power Sellers (eBay)
Presley, Elvis
Priceline.com
Prince
Procter & Gamble
profits, 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3
progress, 6.1, 6.2
future of
without planning
proprietary technology, 5.1, 5.2, 13.1
public opinion
public relations
Pythagoras

Q-Cells

Rand, Ayn
Rawls, John, 6.1, 6.2
Reber, John
recession, of mid-1990
recruiting, 10.1, 12.1
recurrent collapse, bm1.1, bm1.2
renewable energy industrial index
research and development
resources, 12.1, bm1.1
restaurants, 3.1, 3.2, 5.1
risk
risk aversion
Romeo and Juliet (Shakespeare)
Romulus and Remus
Roosevelt, Theodore
Royal Society
Russia

Sacks, David
sales, 2.1, 11.1, 13.1
complex
as hidden
to non-customers
personal
Sandberg, Sheryl
San Francisco Bay Area
savings
scale, economies of
Scalia, Antonin
scaling up
scapegoats
Schmidt, Eric
search engines, prf.1, 3.1, 5.1
secrets, 8.1, 13.1
about people
case for
finding of
looking for
using
self-driving cars
service businesses
service economy
Shakespeare, William, 4.1, 7.1
Shark Tank
Sharma, Suvi
Shatner, William
Siebel, Tom
Siebel Systems
Silicon Valley, 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, 7.1, 10.1, 11.1
Silver, Nate
Simmons, Russel, 10.1, 14.1
singularity
smartphones, 1.1, 12.1
social entrepreneurship
Social Network, The
social networks, prf.1, 5.1
Social Security
software engineers
software startups, 5.1, 6.1
solar energy, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3, 13.4
Solaria
Solyndra, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3, 13.4, 13.5
South Korea
space shuttle
SpaceX, prf.1, 10.1, 11.1
Spears, Britney
SpectraWatt, 13.1, 13.2
Spencer, Herbert, 6.1, 6.2
Square, 4.1, 6.1
Stanford Sleep Clinic
startups, prf.1, 1.1, 5.1, 6.1, 6.2, 7.1
assigning responsibilities in
cash flow at
as cults
disruption by
during dot-com mania
economies of scale and
foundations of
founder’s paradox in
lessons of dot-com mania for
power law in
public relations in
sales and
staff of
target market for
uniform of
venture capital and
steam engine
Stoppelman, Jeremy
string theory
strong AI
substitution, complementarity vs.
Suez Canal

tablet computing
technological advance
technology, prf.1, 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3
American fear of
complementarity and
globalization and
proprietary
technology companies
terrorism
Tesla Motors, 10.1, 13.1, 13.2
Thailand
Theory of Justice, A (Rawls)
Timberlake, Justin
Time magazine
Tolkien, J.R.R.
Tolstoy, Leo
Tom Sawyer (char.)
Toyota
Tumblr
27 Club
Twitter, 5.1, 6.1

Uber
Unabomber

VCs, rules of
“veil of ignorance”
venture capital
power law in
venture fund, J-curve of successful, 7.1
vertical progress
viral marketing
Virgin Atlantic Airways
Virgin Group
Virgin Records

Wagner
Wall Street Journal
Warby Parker
Watson
web browsers
Western Union
White, Phil
Wiles, Andrew
Wilson, Andrew
Winehouse, Amy
World Wide Web

Xanadu
X.com

Yahoo!, 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 5.1, 6.1

Yammer
Yelp
YouTube, 10.1, 12.1
ZocDoc
Zuckerberg, Mark, prf.1, 5.1, 6.1, 14.1
Zynga
 About the Authors
is an entrepreneur and investor. He started PayPal in 1998, led it as
Peter Thiel
CEO, and took it public in 2002, defining a new era of fast and secure online
commerce. In 2004 he made the first outside investment in Facebook, where he
serves as a director. The same year he launched Palantir Technologies, a
software company that harnesses computers to empower human analysts in
fields like national security and global finance. He has provided early funding
for LinkedIn, Yelp, and dozens of successful technology startups, many run by
former colleagues who have been dubbed the “PayPal Mafia.” He is a partner
at Founders Fund, a Silicon Valley venture capital firm that has funded
companies like SpaceX and Airbnb. He started the Thiel Fellowship, which
ignited a national debate by encouraging young people to put learning before
schooling, and he leads the Thiel Foundation, which works to advance
technological progress and long-term thinking about the future.

was a student at Stanford Law School in 2012 when his detailed

Blake Masters
notes on Peter’s class “Computer Science 183: Startup” became an internet
sensation. He went on to co-found Judicata, a legal research technology startup.