Reasoned Decision

I. Introduction to Reasoned Decision

Historically, giving reasons for state action is a relational enterprise. 1 It encompasses the
relationship between executive authorities and the general public. In classic common law,
there was no obligatory demand on the administrative authorities to provide reasons for their
decisions. However, in the contemporary period, with evolution in constitutional and
administrative jurisprudence, reasoned decision making for administrative authorities has
come out to be a judge –made law. 2 A.V. Dicey, an English jurist, expounded three principles
for a rule of law society where absence of wide discretionary power in the hands of the
authorities was the cornerstone of a rule of law society. Furthermore, it was Lord Acton who
editorialized that every power corrupts and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely. In its
substance, the main idea of standing order lies in reducing the social cost which the
society/individualities have to bear as a result of state action. Thus, the definitive target is to
provide natural justice to all, avoid arbitrariness/illegality/irrationality and form a civilized
society.

II. Perception of US Courts of Reasoned Decision

In the USA, courts have claimed upon the recording of reasons for its decision by an
administrative authority on the premise that it should give clear indication that it has
exercised the discretion with which it has been empowered.3

The Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 4 is a federal statute also referred to as the
Constitution of the U.S. administrative law. It contains an express provision in Section 8(b)
that all decisions must indicate a statement of findings and conclusions as well as reasons or
basis for them upon all the material issues of fact, law or discretion presented on the record.

1
R. Chetan, ‘Exploring the Right to Reasoned Decision Making in the Indian Context’ (2021) I Vishwakarma
University Law Journal <https://vulj.vupune.ac.in/archives/9.pdf> accessed 17 October 2023.
2
Abanti Bose, Principle of Natural Justice: Reasoned Decision (Lexlife India, 13 May 2020),
<https://lexlife.in/2020/05/13/principle-of-natural-justice-reasoned-decision/> accessed 17 October 2023.
3
V.S. Chauhan, ‘Reasoned Decision: A Principle of Natural Justice’ (1995) 37 Journal of Indian Law
Institute <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43951591> accessed 15 October 2023.

4
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act 1946, s 8(b).
The same is in s.557(c) of Title 5 of US Code 1982 5. This act extends inversely to both quasi-
judicial and non-judicial administrative bodies.6

In the case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation 7, it was held,
“Where a decision is subject to judicial review, the courts cannot exercise their duty of
review unless informed of the considerations underpinning the action under review and that
the orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the
administrative agency acted be easily bared and adequately sustained.”

III. Position in UK on Reasoned Decision

In the United Kingdom, the position of common law is that there is no requirement of reasons
for its decision by the administrative authority. There are, however, compliances in some
judgements with the significance of reasons. Lord Denning M.R. has observed, “The giving
of reasons is one of the fundamentals of a good administration.” 8 Farther, Sir John
Donaldson, as President of the National Industrial Relations Court, stated, “Failure to give
reasons amounts to a denial of justice.”9

The Committee on Ministers Powers (Donoughmore Committee) 1932 recommended that the
affected party should be informed of the reasons on which the decision is grounded. Such a
decision should be in a form of a reasoned document available to the parties affected.
Supplementing the former, the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (1957)
(Franks Committee) suggested, “Decisions of tribunals should be reasoned and as full as
possible.” This ultimately led to the enactment of Tribunals and Enquiries Act of 1971 10.
Section 12 (1) imposes to give reasons only where a party requests it on or before the giving
of notification of the decision.

IV. Outlook of Australian Courts on Reasoned Decision

The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Osmond v. Public Service
Board of New South Wales11 held, “The common law requires those entrusted by an
enactment with the discretionary power to make decisions which will affect other persons to

5
The U.S. Code 1982, s 557(c).
6
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 463 U.S. 29.
7
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
8
Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union 1971 2QB 175
9
Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree, (1974 LCR 120).
10
The Tribunals and Enquiries Act 1977, s 12(1).
11
Public Service Board (NSW) v. Osmond, (1986) 159 CLR 656.
act fairly in performance of their statutory functions and typically will bear the obligation to
state the reasons.” The same was overruled in appeal where, “There is no general rule of the
common law, or principles of natural justice, that requires reasons to be given for
administrative decisions.”

Currently the position has been altered by Section 13 of the Commonwealth Administrative
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 197712. It enables a person entitled to apply for review of the
decision before the Federal Court to request the decision maker to furnish him with a
statement in writing setting out the findings on material questions of fact, about substantiation
or other material on which those decisions were grounded. Here, the decision maker is bound
to furnish similar details within 28 days.

V. Perception of Canadian Courts on Reasoned Decision

The law in Canada appears to be same as in the UK. Where a minister decides in his
discretion, he is not by law to give any reasons for it. 13 In some recent decisions, however,
courts have recognised that in certain situations, there would be an inferred duty to state the
whys and wherefores for decisions given.

In Ontario, the Statutory Powers and Procedures Act 1971 14 handed that a tribunal shall give
its final decision in any proceeding in writing and shall give reasons in writing therefor if
requested by a party.

VI. Stance in India on Reasoned Decision

In India, the question of integrating a provision for administrative decisions to be

companioned by reasons was considered by the Law Commission15. It recommended:

In administrative decisions, provisions should be made that decisions be accompanied by

reasons. The ins and outs will make it possible to test the cogency of these decisions by the
machinery of appropriate writs. Unfortunately, no law has been enacted in the undertaking of
such recommendations. Thus, in India, in the absence of any particular statutory
requirements, there is no broad-spectrum prerequisite for the administrative agencies to give
reasons for their decisions. If the statute under which the agency is functioning requires
reasoned decisions, courts find it binding for the agency to give reasons, which should not be
12
The Commonwealth Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, s 13.
13
Pure Spring Co. Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue,[1947] 1 DLR 501.
14
The Statutory Powers and Procedures Act 1971.
15
Law Commission of India, 14th Report on Reform of Judicial Administration (Law Com No 14, 1958).
merely ‘rubber stamp’ reasons but a brief and clear version providing the link between the
material on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusion. 16;17

In cases where the statute does not provide for speaking orders, courts in India are still in the
process of developing effective strictures between the claims of individual justice and
administrative flexibility.18 It is worthwhile to recollect that India is a party to the
recommendations of the 1959 Delhi Congress of the International Commission of Jurists
which alluded:

It will further the Rule of Law if the executive is required to formulate its reasons while
reaching its decisions of a judicial or administrative character and affecting the rights of the
individuals and at the request of a party concerned to communicate them to him.19

1. Reasons may be commanded by the Constitution. In case of legislative stillness, a

reasoned decision may be a constitutional requirement.

In Anumati Sadhukhan v. A.K. Chatterjee20, the Calcutta High Court allowed the challenge to
the validity of a law which did not require a speaking order on the ground of unreasonable
restriction on the exercise of Fundamental Rights. In this case, Clauses 9 and 13 of the West
Bengal Rice Mills Control Order, 1949- which authorised the turndown to issue or regenerate
a license or for suspension or abortion of a license already issued ‘without assigning any
reasons’- were held as assessing unreasonable circumscriptions on the petitioner’s right to
trade and business guaranteed under Art 19 (1) (g), of the Constitution, hence
unconstitutional. The Madras and Andhra Pradesh High Courts have reiterated the same
proposition and held that a law which does not require a reasoned decision constitutes an
unreasonable restriction on the abecedarian birth rights guaranteed under Article 19, clauses
(2) to (6).

However, a further complete compass than in article 19 lies in article 14. It has recently
emerged as one of the most robust munitions in the grasp of the courts to control any
arbitrariness in state action that adversely affects the rights of the individuals. Bhagwati J.
16
Union of India v. ML Capoor, AIR 1974 S.C. 87
17
Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab, (1979) 2 SCC 368.
18
C.K. Takwani, Lectures on Administrative Law (7th edn, EBC 2021) 225,227

19
M.P. Singh, ‘DUTY TO GIVE REASONS FOR QUASI-JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS’ (1979) 21 Journal of the Indian Law Institute <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43950620> accessed
17 October 2023.
20
Anumati Sadhukhan v. A.K. Chatterjee , AIR 1951 Cal 90.
editorialized that equivalency is a dynamic conception with many aspects and dimensions and
it cannot be cribbed, cabined and confined with traditional and doctrinaire limits 21. From a
positivistic point of view, equality is antithetical to arbitrariness. Where an act is arbitrary, it
is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and
therefore unconstitutional.22

2. Reasoned decisions involve a question of procedural fairness.

A law which allows any administrative authority to make a decision affecting the rights of the
people without assigning any reason cannot be accepted as it would violate Articles 14 and
21 of the Constitution. The main objective is to lay down a procedure which is fair, just and
reasonable. These words of Bhagwati J. in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India 23 hold that the
Central government was wholly unjustified in withholding the reasons for impounding the
petitioner’s passport. Not only did a statutory duty breach occur, but it also amounted to the
denial of hearing the petitioner. Further any state action or procedure which isn’t right, just
and fair is arbitrary, fanciful and oppressive.

In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration24, the Supreme Court read in Sec 56 of the Prisons Act,
1894 an implied duty on the Jail Superintendent to give reasons for putting fetters on a
prisoner. Failure to do so would invite unjustifiability under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Apart from Articles 14, 19 and 21, courts read the requirement of reasoned decision in Article
136. Here, the Supreme Court vide its SLP may hear appeals from the decisions of any
tribunal except the Armed Forces Tribunal. Articles 226 and 227 give to the High Courts the
power to issue writs and have superintendence over the subordinate courts and tribunals. The
courts hold such powers would be defeated unless the tribunals are to give reasons for their
decisions. Since the grounds for appeal under Article 136 are same as under the writ of
certiorari, an appeal under that article shall also be allowed for non-observance of the
requirement of reasons.

3. Reasons may be mandated by law.

21
EP Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 S.C. 555
22
I.P. Massey, Administrative Law (10th edn, EBC 2022) 236-239
23
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
24
Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 3 SCC 488.
Where there is a statutory duty to speak, silence is a lethal sin. 25Reasons are mandatory where
required by law. There are a plethora of laws which mandate reasons for an administrative
action. E.g. -Sec 31 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 mandates reason to be
provided by the arbitrator for an award. It vitiates an administrative action if reasons aren’t
mandated by law.

4. Reasons may be mandated by the principles of natural justice.

In Dev Dutta v. Union of India 26, the Supreme Court opined that besides the two principles of
natural justice, the third principle is transparency and good governance, which mandates a
duty to give reasons when a person suffers a prejudice, even in the face of contrary
instructions. In this case, a person was not promoted even though he had a ‘good entry’ in his
confidential record because others’ were better. However this good entry had not been
communicated to him as office instruction provided that only adverse entries had to be. Court
held that even a good entry has to be if a person suffers prejudice. It is the duty of the
authority which gives entry to give reasons. If reasons are not given, it would make the action
arbitrary and in violation of Art 14 of the Constitution, which is a constitutional niche of the
principles of natural justice. Thus, even in the face of legislative silence, reasons may be
mandated by the principles of natural justice. In all disciplinary matters, reasons are
mandatory.

5. Reasons may be mandated by the nature of functions which an administrative

authority exercises.

Where the authority is exercising quasi-judicial functions, or where there is a provision for
repeal or revision of the decision, it must give reasons for its decision.

In Mahabir Prasad v. State of U.P.27, the court punctuated that if a quasi-judicial order is
subject to appeal or revision, authority must give reasons even though not mandated by the
statute. Unless giving of the reasons has been barred by law, either expressly or by necessary
implication in the public interest, the authority exercising quasi-judicial powers, which is
subject to appeal or revision by higher administrative authority, must give reasons for the
decision as without reasons appellate or revision powers cannot be exercised28.

25
State of UP v. Lalai Singh Yadav,1977 AIR 202.
26
Dev Dutta v. Union of India, (2008) 8 SCC 725.
27
Mahabir Prasad v. State of U.P, (1970) 1 SCC 764.
28
S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India , (1990) 4 SCC 594.
Recognising the efficacy of reasons as a deterrent against abuse of power by an
administrative authority, court in Bhagat Ram Patanga v. State of Punjab29, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court refocused that even if no appeal or revision, an administrative authority
exercising quasi-judicial powers must give reasons for its decision. While exercising the
appellate or revision powers, the higher administrative authority may adopt any of the three
options:

 It may confirm the order of the lower forum.

 It may reverse the order of the lower forum.
 It may vary the order of the lower forum.

In exercise of the second and third options, the law is that the appellate administrative
authority must give reasons for their decision. However, with the first option, courts were
constantly changing their views. To bring uniformity, the Honourable Supreme Court in Divl.
Forest Officer v. Madhususdhan Rao30 held that a revision authority is not required to give
detailed reasons for confirming the order of a lower forum, but in the interest of justice, some
brief reasons should be indicated even in an order affirming the decision of the lower forum.
It will guard against non-application of mind.

6. Reasons are required to be recorded when it affects the public interest.

In Maharashtra SRTC v. B.R.M. Service31, the Apex Court laid down that even in cases where
reasons are, the reasons must not invariably be in jotting and outfitted to the parties
incontinently. A vocal pronouncement of reasons in the presence of and their posterior
recording on file to the party’s knowledge would be sufficient compliance with the demand.

For the first time in Siemens Engg.32, the Supreme Court held a rule requiring reasons to be
recorded by quasi-judicial authorities in support of the orders passed by them must be held to
be a tenet of natural justice. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati J observed that the rule
requiring reasons of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a tenet of natural
justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process. This rule is to be in its proper spirit
and bare pretension of compliance with it would not satiate the conditions of law.

7. Non-existence and non-communication of reasons-

29
Bhagat Ram Patanga v. State of Punjab, (1972) 2 SCC 170.
30
Divl. Forest Officer v. Madhususdhan Rao, (2008) 3 SCC 469.
31
Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, (1969) 1 SCR 808.
32
Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 981.
In a society governed by the rule of law, action can’t be without existence of reasons therefor.
Ordinarily, those reasons are communicated to the aggrieved party. In Mohd. Jafar v. Union
of India33, the Honourable Supreme Court held that reasons aren’t merely to be stated in file
but communicated for the displeased party’s benefit who could challenge the decision.
However, there is no universal principle that whenever there is requirement to record reasons,
it is complied with.34

VII. Conclusion

It is observable in a series of corner opinions such as Express Newspapers v. Union of India35,

Harinagar Sugar Mills ltd. V. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala 36 and in Govindrao v. State of
Madhya Pradesh37, the Honourable Apex Court has time and again reiterated that
administrative authorities should give reasons for all quasi-judicial decisions. Incipiently, is
Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank v. P.C. Kakkar 38 where the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held, “The ‘right to reasons’ is an indispensible part of a sound
judicial system and one of the statutory requirements of natural justice.”

33
Mohd. Jafar v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (2) SCC I, 7-8.
34
Biswanath Bhattacharya v. Union of India, (2014) 4 SCC 392.
35
Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, 1959 SCR 12.
36
Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala, (1962) 2 SCR 339.
37
Govindrao v. State of Madhya Pradesh , AIR 1965 SC 1222.
38
Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank v. P.C. Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364.