Security Baseline Template V2.4
Security Baseline Template V2.4
The structure of the template is based on the SAP Secure Operations Map:
SAP Security Baseline Template
Change History
The change markers in the text show the difference to version 2.3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Overview, Requirements and Guidelines ........................................................ 9
1.1 Purpose of this template............................................................................................. 9
1.2 Structure ...................................................................................................................... 9
2 Regulations ...................................................................................................... 11
2.1 Environment .............................................................................................................. 12
2.1.1 Network Security ......................................................................................................... 12
2.1.2 Operating System and Database Security ................................................................... 12
2.1.3 Client Security ............................................................................................................. 12
2.2 System ....................................................................................................................... 12
2.2.1 Security Hardening ...................................................................................................... 12
2.2.1.1 CHANGE: Protect Production System against changes .............................................. 12
2.2.1.1.1 CHANGE-A: Protect Production System against changes – ABAP ........................................................ 12
1.2 Structure
This document is structured into the following chapters:
Chapter 1: Overview, Requirements and Guidelines
This chapter provides an overview of the purpose and the structure of this document
Chapter 2: Regulations
This chapter contains the requirements which have to be fulfilled by all systems governed by this
Security Baseline. It is kept as crisp as possible and limited to just name the requirements without
any further details or explanation. The idea behind this is to keep the list of all requirements as
short as possible to ease handling.
2 Regulations
This section contains the standards and regulations that are mandatory for all SAP systems.1 The
content of this chapter is restricted to focus on the requirements. Additional information on the
different requirements can be found in the “Addendum” in the “Requirements Details” chapter.
Each requirement in this chapter is marked with a unique identifier. This identifier is structured as
follows:
<Requirement identifier>-<Technology> with
• <Requirement identifier … > being a unique mnemonic identifier of the requirement
• <Technology> being selected from
“A” SAP [A]BAP Application Server
“J” SAP [J]ava Application Server
“H” SAP [H]ana
“O” [O]ther, like Web Dispatcher or SAPGUI
“P” BTP [P]latform
In addition, each requirement is marked as either [Critical], [Standard] or [Extended].
• [Critical] requirements are recommended to be included and addressed with priority, since
they relate to well-known especially critical security configurations or needs. They are
aligned with the selected set of security checks in the SAP EarlyWatch Alert Security
chapter and with those checks in the Security Optimization Service (SOS), which lead to an
overall red rating of an SOS report.
• [Standard] requirements are typical requirements that should be covered for all SAP
systems.
• [Extended] requirements go beyond the “Standard” requirements. They either extend the
security standards to higher level of protection or to additional areas. When transforming
the SAP Security Baseline template into an effective Security Baseline for a specific
organization or area, these requirements should be carefully reviewed and evaluated for
inclusion. There should be an explicit decision, which of these requirements shall be
selected for the specific Security Baseline in focus. Typically, only a subset of them will be
included.
1
Please note: The “mandatory” in this sentence is suggested for inclusion in the final organization-
specific baseline document. The SAP Security Baseline Template is not mandatory in any aspect.
2.1 Environment
In the Secure Operations Map, the “Infrastructure Security” layer is about requirements from SAP
systems and solutions to their environment. This version of the SAP Security Baseline Template
focuses on requirements towards the SAP solutions themselves. Thus, this chapter for
“Infrastructure Security” is without content for now. In a later version of the SAP Security Baseline
Template, it may get filled with requirements towards the non-SAP environment.
2.2 System
2.2.1 Security Hardening
2
Following SACF scenarios are not activated by Secure-by-Default in S/4HANA according to the
exception list in function SACF_SET_SBD: BC_GENERIC_REPORT_START,
BC_GENERIC_REPORT_START_BATCH, SACF_DEMO_SCENARIO, FIN_PARL_ACCTG_LEDGER.
2.3 Application
2.3.1 User and Identity Management
The users from the SAP ID Service are categorized in the following user classes:
P-user (public users) which can registered by persons themself
S-user (SAP Support Portal Users)
I- and D-users (internal SAP employees)
C-users (external SAP employees)
The following requirements apply to platform users of the global account, directories and multi-
environment subaccounts only.
a) The user base for platform users should be provided by the custom identity provider.
[Standard]
b) No platform user from default identity provider with external email address domain should
have viewer privileges. [Standard]
c) No platform user from default identity provider with external email address domain should
have administrative privileges. [Critical]
The following requirements apply to platform users (members) of Cloud Foundry organizations and
spaces only.
d) The user base for Cloud Foundry organization and space members should be provided by the
custom identity provider. [Standard]
e) No Cloud Foundry organization or space member from default identity provider with external
email address domain should be assigned to one of the following viewer privileges: Org
Auditor, Space Auditor [Standard]
f) No Cloud Foundry organization or space member from default identity provider with external
email address domain should be assigned to one of the following administrative privileges: Org
Manager, Space Developer, Space Manager [Critical]
The following requirements apply to platform users of Neo environment subaccounts only.
g) The user base for platform users should be provided by the custom identity provider.
[Standard]
h) No platform user from default identity provider should belong to the user classes C-, D- or I-
user. [Standard]
i) No platform user from default identity provider should be a public user (P-user). [Critical]
The following requirements apply to business users of Multi-Environment and Neo environment
subaccounts only.
j) The user base for business users should be provided by the custom identity provider.
[Standard]
k) No business user from default identity provider should belong to the user classes C-, D-, I-, or
P- user or has an external email address domain. [Critical]
ume.logon.security_policy.password_mix_case_required
ume.logon.security_policy.password_special_char_required [Extended]
d) UME property ume.logon.security_policy.password_history ≥ 5 [Extended]
e) UME property ume.logon.security_policy.password_max_idle_time between >=1
and <=180 [Extended]
d) The RFC Gateway’s default “Initial Security Environment” must be enabled by setting profile
parameter gw/acl_mode = 13 [Critical]
e) RFC Gateway monitoring must be set to “local only” by setting profile parameter
gw/monitor = 1 [Critical]
f) The simulation mode must be off by setting profile parameter gw/sim_mode = 0 [Critical]
g) Use an acceptable method to start programs via the RFC Gateway by setting profile
parameter gw/rem_start = DISABLED or SSH_SHELL. [Extended]
h) Set profile parameter gw/acl_mode_proxy = 1 and maintain the Access Control List file
prxyinfo (the file name is defined with profile parameter gw/prxy_info ) [Extended]
3
Attention! This can break communication connections, if the Gateway Access Control lists are not
existing or not linked via the profile parameters correctly!
The following requirements apply to platform users (members) of Cloud Foundry organizations and
spaces only.
c) The Cloud Foundry roles Org Manager, Space Manager and Space Developer should only
be assigned to a minimal count of members. [Standard]
The following requirements apply to Neo environment subaccounts only.
d) The default platform role Administrator containing the critical scope
manageCustomPlatformRoles should only be assigned to a minimal count of platform
users. [Standard]
e) Custom platform roles containing the critical platform scope
manageCustomPlatformRoles should only be assigned to a minimal count of platform
users. [Standard]
2.4 Process
2.4.1 Regulatory Process Compliance
Currently there are no specific regulations in this chapter.
2.5 Organization
Similar to the “Environment” layer, this “Organization” layer is also important to set the environment
for SAP systems and SAP cloud solutions. It sets the stage and gives needs and requirements as
input to be considered.
2.5.1 Awareness
Currently there are no specific regulations in this chapter.
3 Addendum
3.1 Requirements Details
3.1.1 Requirements List
Event
Filter Client User Name Audit Classes
Level
1 * * all critical
2 * SAP#* all all
SAPSUPPORT*
3 * (User IDs for SAP- all all
Support)
FF*
4 * all all
(Emergency User IDs)
5 * DDIC dialog logon, RFC logon, transaction start all
You may want to validate if critical tables are defined with active table logging (Transaction
See note 2671160 for minimal version information – you can either check the version of the
Kernel or the version of R3trans (the required version of tp is not listed in the note
anymore):
Kernel 721 patch 1112 R3trans: patch level 1119
Kernel 722 patch 625 R3trans: patch level 715
Kernel 745 patch 810 R3trans: patch level 824
Kernel 749 patch 521 R3trans: patch level 615
Kernel 753 patch 220 R3trans: patch level 312
Kernel 773 patch 220 R3trans: patch level 25
Kernel 774 patch 0 R3trans: patch level 12
7.31: In addition to the URL filter function described here the authentication handler function of
the Web Dispatcher provides a significantly more thorough security check. If you set up the
authentication handler using parameter icm/HTTP/auth_<xx> , you can deactivate both the
configuration described here and the authentication for the Web-based administration interface
(option AUTHFILE of the parameter).
7.50: This function is obsolete and should no longer be used. Instead, use authorization
handler: Profile parameter icm/HTTP/auth_<xx>.
You find more information about profile parameter service/protectedwebmethods in the next
chapter.
3.1.1.9.1 MSGSRV-A: Message Server Security (part of application server ABAP or Java or
stand-alone)
a) Currently there is no additional information for this requirement available.
b) Currently there is no additional information for this requirement available.
c) Currently there is no additional information for this requirement available.
d) Currently there is no additional information for this requirement available.
3.1.1.9.2 MSGSRV-J: Message Server Security (part of application server ABAP or Java or
stand-alone)
Currently there is no additional information for this requirement available.
If this service is used, than restrict authorizations for the corresponding authorization object
B_ALE_RECV with field EDI_MES for allowed message types.
If your SAP system is isolated by means of packet-filtering routers and you want to accept
conventional connections that are not protected with SNC parallel to SNC-protected
connections, then you must also set the appropriate parameters
(snc/accept_insecure_gui, snc/accept_insecure_rfc,
snc/accept_insecure_cpic).
Keep in mind that only profile parameters snc/only_encrypted_gui and
snc/only_encrypted_rfc would ensure that only SNC secured connections are possible –
which is beyond the scope of this security baseline (see SAP Notes 1690662 and 2122578 for
details).
The inbound RFC or GUI connections should be encrypted. Set the profile parameters
snc/accept_insecure_gui = U (or 0) and snc/accept_insecure_rfc = U (or 0) to
enable that the logon inbound connection is secured with SNC accepting user specific
exceptions.
Set the profile parameters snc/only_encrypted_gui = 1 and snc/only_encrypted_rfc
= 1 to enforce that the logon inbound connection is secured with SNC.
Set profile parameter snc/log_unencrypted_rfc = 2 to log all unencrypted RFC
connections. Use value 1 if you want to log unencrypted external RFC calls but accept
unencrypted internal RFC connections.
The Security Audit Log uses message BUJ to log such events.
Profile parameter system/secure_communication = ON (see Notes 2040644, 2362078)
Set profile parameters ssl/ciphersuites = 135:PFS:HIGH::EC_P256:EC_HIGH and
ssl/client_ciphersuites = 150:PFS:HIGH::EC_P256:EC_HIGH to provide TLSv1.2
but to allows TLSv1.0 as last-resort fallback to prevent interoperability problems (see Note
510007).
Set profile parameters ssl/ciphersuites = 801:PFS:HIGH::EC_P256:EC_HIGH and
ssl/client_ciphersuites = 816:PFS:HIGH::EC_P256:EC_HIGH for limiting protocol
versions to strict TLSv1.1 & TLSv1.2, which might create plenty of interoperability problems
with the installed base (see Note 2384290).
If a password is too short, it may be too easy to just get it. Passwords shorter than 8 characters are
no longer considered as state of the art, so we propose to enforce at least this minimum.
Initial passwords are often used to get new users on-board into a system. If they are not changed
within a reasonable time, then there are especially two risks: a) A user account is available but not
controlled by someone using it, so an attacker may take a chance on this. b) Initial passwords are
somehow communicated to the intended user. Thus, they exist somewhere outside the system –
e.g. in an e-mail, in a directory or in some note – and may be grabbed and misused from there.
Last: We know, that real and even complex passwords are misused in current cyberattacks. In a
preparation phase, attackers try to invade password-handling routines like logon-libraries on client
systems or to install key-loggers to get all keystrokes typed by the user. Once they were
successful, they grab real user-password-combinations to misuse them – often unnoticed by the
victim. Thus, passwords should have a limited life-time. We propose to set it to half-a-year, but you
may decide for a different value depending on your environment and needs.
In this sense, please use this SAP Security Baseline Template really as a template and modify it to
your needs! We can only suggest a structure and some recommended key requirements in general
and give you additional information. Only you can derive an optimized baseline for your specific
situation, environment and needs!
Password Rules
CHECK_PASSWORD_BLACKLIST n.a. Check the Password Blacklist 1
MIN_PASSWORD_DIGITS login/min_password_digits Minimum Number of Digits 0
MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH login/min_password_lng Minimum Password Length 6
MIN_PASSWORD_LETTERS login/min_password_letters Minimum Number of Letters 0
MIN_PASSWORD_LOWERCASE login/min_password_lowercase Minimum Number of Lowercase Letters 0
MIN_PASSWORD_SPECIALS login/min_password_specials Minimum Number of Special Characters 0
MIN_PASSWORD_UPPERCASE login/min_password_uppercase Minimum Number of Uppercase Letters 0
n.a. login/password_downwards_comp password downwards compatibility (8 / 40 1
atibility characters, case-sensitivity)
4
In HANA Release 1 the parameter maximum_unused_inital_password_lifetime is used
(missing “i” in “init(i)al”).
As of HANA Release 2 the parameter maximum_unused_initial_password_lifetime is
used instead.
You can review the settings in the studio at Security → tab ‘Password Policy’ or with
select * from public.m_password_policy
The password lifetime must be limited for all users. Exception: Technical users may get an
unlimited password lifetime if required.
On a 3-tier scenario typical technical application server users are SAP<SID> and DBACOCKPIT.
More users may exist appending on your scenarios.
A list of accounts with unlimited password lifetime can be found with following statement:
select user_name, password_change_time from public.users where
password_change_time is null and (not user_name = 'SYS' and not user_name
like '_SYS_%')
If the user SYSTEM is locked and the password stored in a safe place for emergency situations it
might be an option to allow an unrestricted password lifetime for SYSTEM as well.
3.1.1.15.2 Blog: RFC Gateway security, part 4 – prxyinfo ACLRFCGW-J: RFC Gateway
Security (part of application server Java)
Currently there is no additional information for this requirement available.
5
Following SACF scenarios are nor activated by Secure-by-Default in S/4HANA according to the
exception list in function SACF_SET_SBD: BC_GENERIC_REPORT_START,
BC_GENERIC_REPORT_START_BATCH, SACF_DEMO_SCENARIO, FIN_PARL_ACCTG_LEDGER.
The account sapadm is used to run the SAP Host Agent. The account sapadm must not have root
permissions. The default shell /bin/false as defined in /etc/passwd of the account sapadm
must not be changed.
Hint: When SAP Host Agent is upgraded to the latest version, the settings for sapadm are
automatically corrected to be compliant.
SAP System Security Under UNIX/LINUX - SAP Help Portal
Secure shares / exports
Shares / NFS exports must not be accessible by everyone / all domain users. Shares / NFS
exports must only be accessible from dedicated systems and/or with dedicated accounts.
Shares used by the SAP System (e.g. saploc, sapmnt) must only be accessible for SAP system
users and dedicated admin accounts (e.g. <sid>adm).
File permissions for /usr/sap must be only granted to SAP admins and SAP technical users (e.g.
<sid>adm).
The following page provides an overview on syntax rules, common check types and useful best
practices for creating policy content:
https://support.sap.com/en/alm/sap-focused-run/expert-portal/configuration-and-security-
analytics/syntax-rules-and-policy-check-examples.html
In SAP S/4HANA and SAP BW/4HANA upgrades (with SUM), security settings are not adjusted
automatically. In some cases, preparations are necessary before configurations / parameters can
be switched to secure values in upgraded systems. That’s why configurations / parameters are not
changed during the upgrade process. Though it’s recommended to also apply the updated security
settings in system which have been upgraded from older SAP S/4HANA and BW/4HANA releases.
After the upgrade is completed, use the report RSPFRECOMMENDED to compare the actual system
values with the recommended security settings for security relevant profile parameters. (You find
this report in transaction RZ11 at menu item “Goto” → “All recommended values”, too.)
For all parameters deviating from the recommended value, carry out in detail:
• Review the deviations
• Understand the impact of the profile parameters (refer to the attached spreadsheet)
• Execute the necessary preparations
• Adjust the profile parameters to the recommended security setting after preparations have
been executed.
For more details see note 2926224 - Collection Note: New security settings for SAP S/4HANA and
SAP BW/4HANA using SL Toolset and SUM
3.5.1 New secure default settings in S/4HANA 2022 and BW/4HANA 2022:
• Profile parameter gw/acl_mode_proxy = 1
Note 3224889
• Profile parameter login/ticket_only_by_https = 1
Note 1531399
• Profile parameter ssl/ciphersuites =
545:PFS:HIGH::EC_X25519:EC_P256:EC_HIGH
Note 3198351
• Profile parameter rfc/log/active = 1
Profile parameter icf/log/active = 1
SAP Help
https://help.sap.com/docs/ABAP_PLATFORM_NEW/1ca554ffe75a4d44a7bb882b5454236f
/47ee08e9109643c6a1d92397d12eb270.html
• Customizing REF_USER_CHECK = E in table PRGN_CUST
Note 513694
• Profile parameters for host agent profile:
ssl/ciphersuites = 545:PFS:HIGH::EC_X25519:EC_P256:EC_HIGH
ssl/client_ciphersuites = 150:PFS:HIGH::EC_X25519:EC_P256:EC_HIGH
ssl/client_sni_enabled = TRUE
Note 3213711
•
3.5.2 New secure default settings in S/4HANA 2021 and BW/4HANA 2021:
• Profile parameter rec/client = ALL
Note 3093760
• Transport parameter RECCLIENT = ALL
Note 84052
• Transport parameter TLOGOCHECK = TRUE
Note 2671160
• Transport parameter VERS_AT_IMP = ALWAYS
Note 1784800
• UCON HTTP allowlist for all relative path for 01 Trusted Network Zone and 03 CSS Style
Sheet and active check for 02 Clickjacking Framing Protection
Note 3083852
• Enable authorization object S_START checks for Web Dynpro Application Configuration
(WDCA) and Web Dynpro Applications (WDYA)
Note 3064888
• All SLDW scenarios are set to productive scenario as shipped by SAP. In certain cases,
additional activation of allowlist checks might be necessary (status of check is not active)
Note 1922712
• HANA auditing is enabled in TenantDB and a recommended set of HANA audit policies is
configured in TenantDB
Note 3016478
• All scenarios in Switchable Authorization Check Framework (SACF) are set to productive
scenario with active checks.
Note 2958356
4.1 Environment
The “Environment” layer looks at the non-SAP technical environment of SAP cloud offerings,
solutions and systems.
4.2 System
The “System” layer addresses the SAP platform layer which provides the foundation for all
applications operated upon it. The integrity and robustness of this platform is key to ensure that
application layer controls (e.g. the authorization systems) cannot be circumvented by lower level
vulnerabilities (e.g. SQL injections made possible via insecure code).
4.3 Application
The “Application” layer is about controls that are available in SAP standard applications and non-
standard applications built by customers. Here, protective measures are discussed on users and
privileges level as well as proper application design.
4.4 Process
The “Process” layer extends the pure security view with compliance aspects. While security
focuses on operating robust SAP applications preventing intentional and unintentional malfunctions
and compromise of confidentiality, regulatory compliance deals with the correct behavior of
applications with regards to policies and legal demands coming from the various jurisdictions SAP
systems are operated in.
4.5 Organization
4.5.1 Awareness
General security awareness is an important pre-condition to achieve security. Not everyone has to
be a security expert – but everyone needs to contribute on his part and also needs to identify when
security expertise should be called. Ignoring or even countering or circumventing security
regulations and mechanisms can endanger a whole landscape. “Awareness” thus also is directly
linked to user-friendliness and ease of handling of any security mechanisms or configuration.
https://help.sap.com/docs/Security/575a9f0e56f34c6e8138439eefc32b16/616a3c0b1cc7482
38de9c0341b15c63c.html
[11] Partner Directories
https://www.sap.com/partners/find.html
[12] Integration Scenarios
https://www.sap.com/partners/partner-program/certify-my-solution/icc-finder.html
[13] Front-End Network Requirements for mySAP Business Solutions
https://www.sap.com/about/benchmark/sizing.html
→ Sizing Guidelines
→ Solutions & Platforms
→ Frontend Network Requirements for SAP Solutions
[14] Security Whitepapers
https://support.sap.com/securitywp
Securing Remote Function Calls (RFC), November 2014
https://support.sap.com/content/dam/support/en_us/library/ssp/security-
whitepapers/securing_remote-function-calls.pdf
Secure Configuration SAP NetWeaver Application Server ABAP
https://support.sap.com/content/dam/support/en_us/library/ssp/security-whitepapers/secure-
config-netweaver-app-server-abap.pdf
[15] Blogs on SCN
Security Patch Process FAQ
https://scn.sap.com/community/security/blog/2012/03/27/security-patch-process-faq
How to get RFC call traces to build authorizations for S_RFC for free!
https://scn.sap.com/community/security/blog/2010/12/05/how-to-get-rfc-call-traces-to-build-
authorizations-for-srfc-for-free
Recommended Settings for the Security Audit Log (SM19 / RSAU_CONFIG / SM20 /
RSAU_READ_LOG)
https://blogs.sap.com/2014/12/11/analysis-and-recommended-settings-of-the-security-audit-
log-sm19-sm20/
How to remove unused clients including client 001 and 066
https://scn.sap.com/community/security/blog/2013/06/06/how-to-remove-unused-clients-
including-client-001-and-066
or SAP note 1749142
Security of the SAProuter
https://scn.sap.com/community/security/blog/2013/11/13/security-of-the-saprouter
Life (profile SAP_NEW), the Universe (role SAP_NEW) and Everything (SAP_ALL)
https://scn.sap.com/community/security/blog/2014/02/17/life-profile-sapnew-the-universe-
role-sapnew-and-everything-sapall
ABAP Development Standards concerning Security
https://scn.sap.com/community/security/blog/2010/05/28/abap-development-standards-
concerning-security
Examples:
Book Chapter Checked
2022-12
ABAP Workbench Tools ABAP Workbench Tools 7.50
Administration Manual An Overview of the Security-Related Services 7.02
Creating a New Connection Entry 7.02
IIOP Provider Service 7.02
Java Mail Client Service 7.02
JCo RFC Provider Service 7.02
P4 Provider Service 7.02
Secure Storage Service 7.02
SSL Provider Service 7.02
6 Index
Authorization objects
Public user ...................................................... 65
B_ALE_RECV ................................................50
Subaccount 17, 21, 23, 24, 31, 33, 34, 36, 44, 49
S_DATASET ...................................................15
BTP role collections
S_DEVELOP ...................................................32 Directory Administrator ..................... 33
S_PATH ..........................................................15 Global Account Administrator .......... 33
S_PROGRAM ...................................................32 Subaccount Administrator ................... 33
S_QUERY ........................................................32 BTP roles
S_RFC ...................................................... 32, 81 AccountDeveloper ............................33, 45
S_RFC_ADM ...................................................32 Administrator ...................................33, 44
S_SCR ............................................................59 BTP scopes
S_SERVICE ...................................................32 Manage Account Members ..............33, 45
S_SPO_ACT ...................................................32 Manage Audit Logs ..........................33, 45
S_START ............................................ 19, 32, 72 Manage Authorization ...................33, 45
S_TABU_DIS .......................................... 31, 32 manageCustomPlatformRoles .......33, 44
S_TABU_NAM .......................................... 31, 32 Clickjacking Framing Protection ........................ 72
S_TCODE ........................................................32 Clients
S_USER_GRP ................................................32 000 ................................................................ 22
Authorization profiles 001 ...........................................................17, 53
S_A.TMSADM ................................................22 066 .....................................................17, 22, 53
SAP_ALL ...................................... 21, 31, 43, 81 Configuration Stores
SAP_NEW ...................................... 31, 43, 46, 81 ABAP_INSTANCE_PAHI............................. 41
BTP CLIENTS ....................................................... 40
Beta features............................................. 21, 49 LOGGED_TABLES ........................................ 42
Business user...................................................23 TDDAT............................................................ 41
Cloud Connector ..................... 17, 21, 36, 75, 76 TRANSPORT_TOOL ...................................... 42
Cloud Foundry ..................................... 23, 31, 33 CSS Style Sheet .................................................. 72
Directory .........................................................23 Customizing
Global account .............................. 23, 31, 44, 64 REF_USER_CHECK .................................22, 72
Identity Provider ....................................... 23, 31 Emergency users ................................................ 38
Multi environment ..........................................24 Files
Neo environment .......................... 24, 33, 34, 44 prxyinfo ...............................................30, 58
Platform user ...................................... 23, 24, 31 reginfo ..................................................29, 79
SAP Security Baseline Template
icm/accept_forwarded_cert_via_ht login/password_compliance_to_cur
tp ................................................................14 rent_policy.........................26, 54, 56, 73
icm/HTTP/admin_<num>................... 14, 25 login/password_downwards_compati
bility.....................................25, 54, 56, 74
icm/HTTP/auth_<xx> ................................ 14, 47
login/password_expiration_time ..25, 27, 54, 56
icm/HTTP/error_templ_path....... 14, 47
login/password_hash_algorithm ..............27, 74
icm/HTTP/logging_ .........................................73
login/password_history_size ..27, 56
icm/HTTP/logging_0 .............................35
login/password_logon_usergroup 27
icm/HTTP/logging_client_...............................74
login/password_max_idle_initial
icm/HTTP/logging_client_0.............35 ............................................. 25, 27, 54, 55, 73
icm/security_log ............................ 35, 74 login/password_max_idle_producti
icm/server_port_<num> ................ 25, 52 ve ....................................................27, 55, 73
icm/SMTP/show_server_header ........13 login/show_detailed_errors................13, 47, 73
icm/trace_secured_data ....................14 login/ticket_only_by_https ....30, 71
icm/trusted_reverse_proxy_<num> login/ticket_only_to_host ............ 30
.....................................................................14 ms/acl_info ........................................15, 30
is/HTTP/show_detailed_errors13, 47 ms/admin_port ........................................ 15
is/HTTP/show_server_header ..........13 ms/HTTP/logging_ .......................................... 74
ixml/dtd_restriction.........................16 ms/HTTP/logging_0 ............................... 35
login/disable_cpic ....................... 16, 74 ms/http_logging ...............................35, 74
login/disable_password_logon ....26, ms/monitor ................................................ 15
27, 55
rdisp/gui_auto_logout ..................... 74
login/failed_user_auto_unlock ..27,
55 rdisp/msserv_internal ..................... 15
login/fails_to_user_lock ......... 27, 55 rdisp/TRACE_HIDE_SEC_DATA ............ 14
login/min_password_diff ........... 26, 55 rdisp/vbdelete .................................19, 74
login/min_password_digits....... 26, 56 rec/client ...............................12, 41, 42, 72
login/min_password_letters .... 26, 56 rfc/callback_security_method16, 74