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An Introduction to
Mathematical Proofs
An Introduction to
Mathematical Proofs

Nicholas A. Loehr
CRC Press
Taylor & Francis Group
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Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742

c 2020 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

CRC Press is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business

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Printed on acid-free paper

International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-367-33823-7 (Hardback)

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This book is dedicated to my father Frank.
Contents

Preface ix

1 Logic 1
1.1 Propositions, Logical Connectives, and Truth Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Logical Equivalences and IF-Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 IF, IFF, Tautologies, and Contradictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4 Tautologies, Quantifiers, and Universes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.5 Quantifier Properties and Useful Denials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.6 Denial Practice and Uniqueness Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

2 Proofs 47
2.1 Definitions, Axioms, Theorems, and Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.2 Proving Existence Statements and IF Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.3 Contrapositive Proofs and IFF Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.4 Proofs by Contradiction and Proofs of OR-Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.5 Proofs by Cases and Disproofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.6 Proving Quantified Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.7 More Quantifier Properties and Proofs (Optional) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Review of Logic and Proofs 97

3 Sets 103
3.1 Set Operations and Subset Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.2 Subset Proofs and Set Equality Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.3 Set Equality Proofs, Circle Proofs, and Chain Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.4 Small Sets and Power Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.5 Ordered Pairs and Product Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.6 General Unions and Intersections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
3.7 Axiomatic Set Theory (Optional) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

4 Integers 159
4.1 Recursive Definitions and Proofs by Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
4.2 Induction Starting Anywhere and Backwards Induction . . . . . . . . . . . 166
4.3 Strong Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
4.4 Prime Numbers and Integer Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
4.5 Greatest Common Divisors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
4.6 GCDs and Uniqueness of Prime Factorizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
4.7 Consequences of Prime Factorization (Optional) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

vii
viii Contents

Review of Set Theory and Integers 203

5 Relations and Functions 211

5.1 Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
5.2 Inverses, Identity, and Composition of Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
5.3 Properties of Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
5.4 Definition of Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
5.5 Examples of Functions and Function Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
5.6 Composition, Restriction, and Gluing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
5.7 Direct Images and Preimages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
5.8 Injective, Surjective, and Bijective Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
5.9 Inverse Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268

6 Equivalence Relations and Partial Orders 275

6.1 Reflexive, Symmetric, and Transitive Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
6.2 Equivalence Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
6.3 Equivalence Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
6.4 Set Partitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
6.5 Partially Ordered Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
6.6 Equivalence Relations and Algebraic Structures (Optional) . . . . . . . . . 308

7 Cardinality 315
7.1 Finite Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
7.2 Countably Infinite Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
7.3 Countable Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
7.4 Uncountable Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332

Review of Functions, Relations, and Cardinality 339

8 Real Numbers (Optional) 349

8.1 Axioms for R and Properties of Addition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
8.2 Algebraic Properties of Real Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
8.3 Natural Numbers, Integers, and Rational Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
8.4 Ordering, Absolute Value, and Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
8.5 Greatest Elements, Least Upper Bounds, and Completeness . . . . . . . . . 375

Suggestions for Further Reading 383

Index 385
Preface

This book contains an introduction to mathematical proofs, including fundamental material

on logic, proof methods, set theory, number theory, relations, functions, cardinality, and the
real number system. The book can serve as the main text for a proofs course taken by
undergraduate mathematics majors. No specific prerequisites are needed beyond familiarity
with high school algebra. Most readers are likely to be college sophomores or juniors who
have taken calculus and perhaps some linear algebra, but we do not assume any knowledge
of these subjects. Anyone interested in learning advanced mathematics could use this text
for self-study.

Structure of the Book

This book evolved from classes given by the author over many years to students at the
College of William & Mary, Virginia Tech, and the United States Naval Academy. I have
divided the book into 8 chapters and 54 sections, including three review sections. Each
section corresponds very closely to the material I cover in a single 50-minute lecture. Sections
are further divided into many short subsections, so that my suggested pacing can readily
be adapted for classes that meet for 75 minutes, 80 minutes, or other time intervals. If the
instructor omits all sections and topics designated as “optional,” it should be just possible
to finish all of the core material in a semester class that meets for 2250 minutes (typically
forty-five 50-minute meetings or thirty 75-minute meetings). More suggestions for possible
course designs appear below.
I have tried to capture the best features of live mathematics lectures in the pages of this
book. New material is presented to beginning students in small chunks that are easier to
digest in a single reading or class meeting. The book maintains the friendly conversational
style of a classroom presentation, without relinquishing the necessary level of precision and
rigor. Throughout this text, you will find the personal pronouns “I” (the author), “you”
(the reader), and “we” (the author and the reader, working together), reminding us that
teaching and learning are fundamentally human activities. Teaching this material effectively
can be as difficult as learning it, and new instructors are often unsure how much time to
spend on the fundamentals of logic and proof techniques. The organization of this book
shows at a glance how one experienced teacher of proofs allocates time among the various
core topics. The text develops mathematical ideas through a continual cycle of examples,
theorems, proofs, summaries, and reviews. A new concept may be introduced briefly via
an example near the end of one section, then examined in detail in the next section, then
recalled as needed in later sections. Every section ends with an immediate review of the
key points just covered, and three review sections give detailed summaries of each major
section of the book. The essential core material is supplemented by more advanced topics
that appear in clearly labeled optional sections.

ix
x Preface

Contents of the Book

Here is a detailed list of the topics covered in each chapter of the book:
1. Logic: propositions, logical connectives (NOT, AND, OR, XOR, IF, IFF), truth ta-
bles, logical equivalence, tautologies, contradictions, universal and existential quanti-
fiers, translating and denying complex logical statements, uniqueness.
2. Proofs: ingredients in mathematical theories (definitions, axioms, inference rules, theo-
rems, proofs), proof by example, direct proof, contrapositive proof, contradiction proof,
proof by cases, generic-element proofs, proofs involving multiple quantifiers.
3. Set Theory: set operations (union, intersection, set difference), subset proofs, set equal-
ity proofs, circle proofs, chain proofs, power sets, ordered pairs, product sets, unions and
intersections of indexed collections.
4. Integers: recursive definitions, ordinary induction proofs, induction starting anywhere,
backwards induction, strong induction, integer division with remainder, greatest com-
mon divisors, Euclid’s GCD algorithm, primes, existence and uniqueness of prime fac-
torizations.
5. Relations and Functions: relations, images, inverse of a relation, identity relation,
composition of relations, formal definition of a function, function equality, operations
on functions (pointwise operations, composition, restriction), direct images, preimages,
injections, surjections, bijections, inverse functions.
6. Equivalence Relations and Partial Orders: reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity,
equivalence relations, congruence modulo n, equivalence classes, set partitions, anti-
symmetry, partial orders, well-ordered sets.
7. Cardinality: finite sets, basic counting rules, countably infinite sets, countable sets,
theorems on countability, uncountable sets, Cantor’s Theorem.
8. Real Numbers (Optional): ordered field axioms for R, algebraic properties, formal
definition of N and Z and Q, ordering properties, absolute value, distance, Least Upper
Bound Axiom and its consequences (Archimedean ordering of R, density of Q in R,
existence of real square roots, Nested Interval Theorem).

Possible Course Designs

A standard three-credit (2250 minute) proofs class could cover most of the topics in Chapters
1 through 7, which are essential for further study of advanced mathematics. When pressed
for time, I have sometimes omitted or condensed the material on cardinality (Chapter 7)
or prime factorizations (last half of Chapter 4). Many variations of the standard course are
also feasible. Instructors wishing to preview ideas from abstract algebra could supplement
the standard core with the following optional topics:
• the group axioms (end of Section 2.1);
• unique factorization properties for Z and Q (last four sections of Chapter 4);
• formal construction of the integers mod n and the rational numbers using equivalence
relations (Section 6.6);
• algebraic properties of R developed from the ordered field axioms (Sections 8.1, 8.2, 8.3,
and possibly 8.4).
Preface xi

A course introducing ideas from advanced calculus could include these topics:

• how to prove statements containing multiple quantifiers (Sections 2.6 and 2.7);
• general unions and intersections (Section 3.6);
• properties of preimages of sets under functions (Section 5.7);

• countable and uncountable sets (Sections 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4);

• rigorous development of the real numbers (and related number systems) from the ordered
field axioms (Chapter 8).
A quarter-long (1500 minute) course focusing on basic proof methods might only cover
Chapter 1, Chapter 2, and the early sections in Chapters 3 through 6. A quarter course on
set theory, aimed at students with some prior familiarity with logic and proofs, might cover
all of Chapters 3, 5, 6, and 7.
Topics can also be studied in several different orders. Chapter 1 on logic must come
first, and Chapter 2 on proof methods must come second. Thereafter, some flexibility is
possible. Chapter 4 (on induction and basic number theory) can be covered before Chapter
3 (on sets) or omitted entirely. Chapter 6 (on equivalence relations) can be covered before
the last five sections of Chapter 5 (on functions). Chapter 7 (on cardinality) requires ma-
terial from Chapter 5 on bijections, but it does not rely heavily on Chapter 6. Finally, the
optional Chapter 8 (axiomatic development of the real numbers) could be covered anytime
after Chapter 2, with minor adjustments to avoid explicit mention of functions and rela-
tions. However, Chapter 8 is more challenging than it may appear at first glance. We are
all so familiar with basic arithmetic and algebraic facts about real numbers that it requires
considerable intellectual discipline to deduce these facts from the axioms without acciden-
tally using a property not yet proved. Nevertheless, it is rewarding and instructive (albeit
somewhat tedious) to work through this logical development of R if time permits.

Book’s Approach to Key Topics

This book adopts a methodical, detailed, and highly structured approach to teaching proof
techniques and related mathematical topics. We start with basic logical building blocks and
gradually assemble these ingredients to build more complex concepts. To give you a flavor
of the teaching philosophy used here, the next few paragraphs describe my approach to
explaining four key topics: proof-writing, functions, multiple quantifiers, and induction.

Skills for Writing Proofs

Like any other complex task, the process of writing a proof requires the synthesis of many
small atomic skills. Every good proofs textbook develops the fundamental skill of breaking
down a statement to be proved into its individual logical constituents, each of which con-
tributes certain structure to the proof. For example, to begin a direct proof of a conditional
statement “If P , then Q,” we write: “Assume P is true; we must prove Q is true.” I ex-
plain this particular skill in great detail in this text, introducing explicit proof templates for
dealing with each of the logical operators.
But there are other equally crucial skills in proof-writing: memorizing and expanding
definitions; forming useful denials of complex statements; identifying the logical status of
each statement and variable in a proof via appropriate status words; using known universal
and existential statements in the correct way; memorizing and using previously proved
theorems; and so on. I cover each of these skills on its own, in meticulous detail, before
xii Preface

assembling the skills to build increasingly complex proofs. Remarkably, this reduces the
task of writing many basic proofs into an almost completely automatic process. It is very
rewarding to see students gain confidence and ability as they master the basic skills one at
a time and thereby develop proficiency in proof-writing.
Here is an example to make the preceding ideas concrete. Consider a typical practice
problem for beginning proof-writers: prove that for all integers x, if x is odd, then x + 5 is
even. In the proof below, I have annotated each line with the basic skill needed to produce
that line.
Line in Proof Skill Needed
1. Let x0 be a fixed, arbitrary integer. Prove ∀ statement using generic element.
2. Assume x0 is odd; prove x0 + 5 is even. Prove an IF statement by direct proof.
3. We assumed there is k ∈ Z with x0 = 2k + 1. Expand a memorized definition.
4. We will prove there is m ∈ Z with x0 + 5 = 2m. Expand a memorized definition.
5. Doing algebra on the assumption gives: Use logical status words.
6. x0 + 5 = (2k + 1) + 5 = 2k + 6 = 2(k + 3). Do basic algebraic manipulations.
7. Choose m = k + 3, so x0 + 5 = 2m holds. Prove ∃ statement by giving an example.
8. Note m is in Z, being the sum of two integers. Verify a variable is in the required set.

Virtually every line in this proof is generated automatically using memorized skills; only
the manipulation in line 6 requires a bit of creativity to produce the multiple of 2. Now,
while many texts present a proof like this one, we seldom see a careful explanation of how the
proof uses an assumed existential statement (line 3) to prove another existential statement
(line 4) by constructing an example (lines 6 and 7) depending on the variable k in the
assumption. This explanation may seem unnecessary in such a simple setting. But it is a
crucial ingredient in understanding harder proofs in advanced calculus involving limits and
continuity. There we frequently need to use an assumed multiply-quantified IF-statement
to prove another multiply-quantified IF-statement. These proofs become much easier for
students if they have already practiced the skill of using one quantified statement to prove
another quantified statement in more elementary cases.
Similarly, there is not always enough prior coverage of the skill of memorizing and
expanding definitions (needed to generate lines 3 and 4). This may seem to be a minor
point, but it is in fact essential. Before writing this proof, students must have memorized
the definition stating that “x is even” means “there exists k ∈ Z with x = 2k.” But to
generate line 4 from this definition, k must be replaced by a new variable m (since k was
already given a different meaning in line 3), and x must be replaced by the expression x0 +5.
I devote many pages to in-depth coverage of these separate issues, before integrating these
skills into full proofs starting in Section 2.2.

Functions
A key topic in a proofs course is the rigorous definition of a function. A function is often
defined to be a set of ordered pairs no two of which have the same first component. This
definition is logically acceptable, but it causes difficulties later when studying concepts
involving the codomain (set of possible outputs) for a function. Since the codomain cannot
be deduced from the set of ordered pairs, great care is needed when talking about concepts
that depend on the codomain (like surjectivity or the existence of a two-sided inverse).
Furthermore, students accustomed to using the function notation y = f (x) find the ordered
pair notation (x, y) ∈ f jarring and unpalatable. My approach includes the domain and
codomain as part of the technical definition of a function; the set of ordered pairs by itself
is called the graph of the function. This terminology better reflects the way most of us
conceptualize functions and their graphs. The formal definition in Section 5.4 is preceded
by carefully chosen examples (involving arrow diagrams, graphs in the Cartesian plane, and
Preface xiii

formulas) to motivate and explain the key elements of the technical definition. We introduce
the standard function notations y = f (x) and f : X → Y without delay, so students do not
get bogged down with ordered triples and ordered pairs. Then we describe exactly what
must be checked when a new function is introduced: single-valuedness and the fact that
every x in the domain X has an associated output in the claimed codomain Y . We conclude
with examples of formulas that do or do not give well-defined functions.

Multiple Quantifiers
A hallmark of this book is its extremely careful and explicit treatment of logical quantifiers:
∀ (“for all”) and ∃ (“there exists”). The placement and relative ordering of these quantifiers
has a big impact on the meaning of a logical statement. For example, the true statement
∀x ∈ Z, ∃y ∈ Z, y > x (“for every integer x there is a larger integer y”) asserts something
very different from the false statement ∃y ∈ Z, ∀x ∈ Z, y > x (“there exists an integer y
larger than every integer x”). However, these doubly quantified examples do not reveal the
full complexity of statements with three or more nested quantifiers. Such statements are
quite common in advanced calculus, as mentioned earlier.
I give a very detailed explanation of multiple quantifiers in Sections 2.6 and 2.7. After
examining many statements containing two quantifiers, I introduce more complicated state-
ments with as many as six quantifiers, focusing on the structural outline of proofs of such
statements. Using these big examples is the best way to explain the main point: an existen-
tially quantified variable may only depend on quantified variables preceding it in the given
statement. Other examples examine disproofs of multiply quantified statements, where the
proof-writer must first form a useful denial of the given statement (which interchanges ex-
istential and universal quantifiers). Many exercises develop these themes using important
definitions from advanced calculus such as continuity, uniform continuity, convergence of
sequences, and least upper bounds.

Induction
Another vital topic in a proofs course is mathematical induction. Induction proofs are needed
when working with recursively defined entities such as summations, factorials, powers, and
sequences specified by a recursive formula. I discuss recursive definitions immediately before
induction, and I carefully draw attention to the steps in an induction proof that rely on these
definitions. Many expositions of induction do not make this connection explicit, causing
some students to stumble at the point inPthe proof requiring the expansion of a recursive
n+1 Pn
definition (for example, replacing a sum k=1 xk by [ k=1 xk ] + xn+1 ).
Induction proofs are often formulated in terms of inductive sets: sets containing 1 that
are closed under adding 1. Students are told to prove a statement ∀n ∈ Z≥0 , P (n) by
forming the set S = {n ∈ Z≥0 : P (n) is true} and checking that S is inductive. This
extra layer of translation confuses many students and is not necessary. Inductive sets do
serve an important technical purpose: they provide a rigorous construction of the set of
natural numbers as the intersection of all inductive subsets of R. I discuss this advanced
topic in the optional final chapter on real numbers (see Section 8.3), but I avoid mentioning
inductive sets in the initial treatment of induction. Instead, induction proofs are based on
the Induction Axiom, which says that the statements P (1) and ∀n ∈ Z≥0 , P (n) ⇒ P (n + 1)
suffice to prove ∀n ∈ Z≥0 , P (n). This axiom is carefully motivated both with the visual
metaphor of a chain of falling dominos and a more formal comparison to previously discussed
logical inference rules.
xiv Preface

Additional Pedagogical Features

(a) Section Summaries and Global Reviews. Every section ends with a concise recap of the
key points just covered. Each major part of the text (logic and proofs; sets and integers;
relations, functions, and cardinality) ends with a global review summarizing the material
covered in that part. These reviews assemble many definitions, theorem statements, and
proof techniques in one place, facilitating memorization and mastery of this vast amount of
information.
(b) Avoiding Logical Jargon. This text avoids ponderous terminology from classical logic
(such as conjunction, disjunction, modus ponens, modus tollens, modus tollendo ponens,
hypothetical syllogism, constructive dilemma, universal instantiation, and existential in-
stantiation). I use only those terms from logic that are essential for mathematical work
(such as tautology, converse, contrapositive, and quantifier). My exposition replaces anti-
quated Latin phrases like “modus ponens” by more memorable English names such as “the
Inference Rule for IF.” Similarly, I refer to the hypothesis P and the conclusion Q of the
IF-statement P ⇒ Q, rather than calling P the antecedent and Q the consequent of this
statement.
(c) Finding Useful Denials. This is one of the most crucial skills students learn in a proofs
course. Every good textbook states the basic denial rules, but students do not always realize
(and texts do not always emphasize) that the rules must be applied recursively to find a
denial of a complex statement. I describe this recursive process explicitly in Section 1.5
(see especially the table on page 35). Section 1.6 reinforces this key skill with many solved
sample problems and exercises.
(d) Annotated Proofs. Advanced mathematics texts often consist of a series of definitions,
theorems, and proofs with little explanation given for how the author found the proofs. This
text is filled with explicit annotations showing the reader how we are generating the lines of
a proof, why we are proceeding in a certain way, and what the common pitfalls are. These
annotations are clearly delineated from the official proof by enclosing them in square brack-
ets. Many sample proofs are followed by commentary discussing important logical points
revealed by the proof.
(e) Disproofs Contrasted with Proofs by Contradiction. A very common student mistake is
to confuse the disproof of a false statement P with a proof by contradiction of a true state-
ment Q. This mistake occurs because of inattention to logical status words: the disproof of
P begins with the goal of proving a denial of P , whereas a proof of Q by contradiction begins
by assuming the denial of Q. We explicitly warn readers about this issue in Remark 2.60.
(f) Set Definitions. New sets and set operations are often defined using set-builder notation.
For example, the union of sets S and T is defined by writing S ∪ T = {x : x ∈ S or x ∈ T }.
This book presents these definitions in a format more closely matching how they arise
in proofs, by explicitly stating what membership in the new set means. For instance, my
definition of set union says that for all sets S and T and all objects x, the defined term
x ∈ S ∪ T can be replaced by the definition text x ∈ S or x ∈ T at any point in a proof.
This is exactly what the previous definition means, of course, but the extra layer of trans-
lation inherent in the set-builder notation causes trouble for many beginning students.
(g) Careful Organization of Optional Material. Advanced material and additional topics
appear in clearly labeled optional sections. This organization provides maximum flexibility
to instructors who want to supplement the material in the standard core, while signaling
to readers what material may be safely skipped.
Preface xv

Exercises, Errata, and Feedback

The book contains more than 1000 exercises of varying scope and difficulty, which may be
assigned as graded homework or used for self-study or review. I welcome your feedback about
any aspect of this book, most particularly corrections of any errors that may be lurking in
the following pages. Please send such communications to me by email at [email protected]. I
will post errata and other pertinent information on the book’s website.

Words of Thanks
Some pedagogical elements of this book were suggested by the exposition in A Transition
to Advanced Mathematics by Smith, Eggen, and St. Andre. My debt to this excellent text
will be evident to anyone familiar with it. My development as a mathematician and a writer
has also been deeply influenced by the superb works of James Munkres, Joseph Rotman,
J. Donald Monk, and the other authors listed in the Suggestions for Further Reading (see
page 383). I thank all the editorial staff at CRC Press, especially Bob Ross and Jose Soto,
and the anonymous reviewers whose comments greatly improved the quality of my original
manuscript.
I am grateful to many students, colleagues, friends, and family members who supported
me during the preparation of this book. I especially thank my father Frank Loehr, my
mother Linda Lopez, my stepfather Peter Lopez, Ken Zeger, Elizabeth Niese, Bill Floyd,
Leslie Kay, and the students who took proofs classes from me over the years. Words cannot
express how much I learned about teaching proofs from my students. Thank you all!

Very respectfully,
Nicholas A. Loehr
1
Logic

1.1 Propositions, Logical Connectives, and Truth Tables

Many people despise mathematics, believing it to be nothing more than a confusing jumble
of arcane formulas and mind-numbing computations. This depressing view of the subject is
understandable, when we consider how math is presented in grade school and many calculus
classes. But in truth, mathematics is a beautiful, intricately structured tower of knowledge
built up from a small collection of basic statements (called axioms) using the laws of logic.
In this book, we shall study the foundation of this tower, as shown here:
..
.
cardinality
functions
relations
integers
sets
proofs
logic

Propositions
We begin with propositional logic, which studies how the truth of a complex statement is
determined by the truth or falsehood of its parts.
1.1. Definition: Propositions. A proposition is a statement that is either true or false,
but not both.
Many things we say are not propositions, as seen in the next example.
1.2. Example. Which of these statements are propositions?
(a) 7 is positive.
(b) 1 + 1 = 7.
(c) Memorize all definitions.
(d) Okra tastes great.
(e) Is it raining?
(f) This sentence is false.
(g) Paris is a city and 2 + 2 is not 4, or Paris is not a city and 2 + 2 is 4.
Solution. Statement (a) is a true proposition. Statement (b) is a false proposition. Com-
mands, opinions, and questions do not have a truth value, so statements (c) through (e) are
not propositions. Statement (f) is an example of a paradox : if you assume this statement is
true, then the statement itself asserts that it is false. If you instead assume the statement
is false, then the statement is also true. Since propositions are not allowed to be both true

1
2 An Introduction to Mathematical Proofs

and false, statement (f) is not a proposition. Finally, statement (g) is a false proposition,
for reasons described below.

Propositional Forms
Statement (g) in the last example is a complex proposition built up from two shorter propo-
sitions using logical connective words such as AND, NOT, OR. The two shorter propositions
are “Paris is a city” and “2 + 2 is 4.” Let us abbreviate the proposition “Paris is a city”
by the letter P , and let us abbreviate the proposition “2 + 2 is 4” by the letter Q. Then
statement (g) has the form

(P AND (NOT Q)) OR ((NOT P ) AND Q).

We can create an even shorter expression to represent the logical form of statement (g)
by introducing special symbols for the logical connectives. Propositional logic uses the six
symbols shown in the following table, whose meaning is discussed in detail below.
Logical Symbol English Translation
∼P P is not true.
P ∧Q P and Q.
P ∨Q P or Q (or both).
P ⊕Q P or Q, but not both.
P ⇒Q if P , then Q.
P ⇔Q P if and only if Q.
Using these symbols, we can describe the logical form of statement (g) by the expression

(P ∧ (∼Q)) ∨ ((∼P ) ∧ Q). (1.1)

Any expression like this, which is built up by combining propositional variables (capital
letters) using logical symbols, is called a propositional form.

Definitions of NOT and AND

In logic and mathematics, language is used in a very precise way that does not always
coincide with how words are used in everyday conversation. In particular, before going
further, we need to define the exact meaning of the logical connective words NOT, AND,
OR, IF, etc. To do this, we give truth tables that show how to combine the truth values of
propositions to obtain the truth value of a new proposition built from these using a logical
connective. Here and below, italic capital letters such as P , Q, R are variables that represent
propositions. The letters T and F stand for true and false, respectively.
1.3. Definition of NOT. For any proposition P , the truth value of ∼ P (“not P ”) is
determined by the following table.
P ∼P
T F
F T
Remember this table by noting that ∼P always has the opposite truth value as P .
In our example above, where Q is the true proposition “2 + 2 is 4,” ∼Q is the false
proposition “2 + 2 is not 4.” If R is the false proposition “9 is negative,” then ∼R is the
true proposition “9 is not negative.”
Logic 3

The remaining logical connectives combine two propositions to produce a new proposi-
tion. As seen in the next definition, we need a four-row truth table to list all possible truth
values of the two propositions that we start with.
1.4. Definition of AND. For any propositions P , Q, the truth value of P ∧ Q
(“P and Q”) is determined by the following table.
P Q P ∧Q
T T T
T F F
F T F
F F F
Remember this table by noting that P ∧ Q is true only when both inputs P , Q are true;
in all other cases, P ∧ Q is false.

In our running example, where P is the true proposition “Paris is a city” and Q is the
true proposition “2 + 2 is 4,” note that P ∧ (∼Q) is false, because P is true and ∼Q is false.
Similarly, (∼P ) ∧ Q is false, because ∼P is false and Q is true. In this example, for any
proposition R, we can deduce that (∼P ) ∧ R must be false no matter what the truth value
of R is, since ∼P is already false. On the other hand, P ∧ R is true for true propositions R,
and false for false propositions R.

Definitions of OR and XOR

We now come to the mathematical definition of the word OR. In everyday English, the word
OR can be used in two different ways. In the inclusive usage of this word, “P or Q” means
that at least one of the propositions P , Q is true (possibly both). In the exclusive usage, “P
or Q” means that exactly one of the propositions P , Q is true and the other one is false. Logic
uses two different symbols for these two usages of the word OR: ∨ stands for inclusive-OR,
and ⊕ stands for exclusive-OR (which is also abbreviated XOR). Remember this convention:
in mathematics, the English word OR always means inclusive-OR, as defined by the truth
table below. If you want to use XOR in mathematical English, you must use a longer phrase
such as “P or Q, but not both.”
1.5. Definition of OR. For any propositions P , Q, the truth value of P ∨ Q (“P or Q”)
is determined by the following table.
P Q P ∨Q
T T T
T F T
F T T
F F F
Remember this table by noting that P ∨ Q is false only when both inputs P , Q are false;
in all other cases, P ∨ Q is true. To avoid confusing the symbols ∧ and ∨, it may help to
notice that ∧ (the symbol for AND) resembles the diagonal strokes in the capital letter A.
To complete our analysis of statement (g) above, recall in this example that (P ∧(∼Q)) is
false and ((∼P ) ∧ Q) is false. So the overall statement is false. On the other hand, P ∨ (∼Q),
(∼P ) ∨ Q, and P ∨ Q all stand for true propositions in this example.
1.6. Definition of XOR. For any propositions P , Q, the truth value of P ⊕ Q
(“P XOR Q”) is determined by the following table.
4 An Introduction to Mathematical Proofs

P Q P ⊕Q
T T F
T F T
F T T
F F F
Remember this table by noting that P ⊕ Q is true when the input propositions P , Q
have different truth values; P ⊕ Q is false when the input propositions P , Q have the same
truth values.

1.7. Example. Let P be the false proposition “1+1 = 3,” and let Q be the true proposition
“2 is positive.” Which propositions below are true?
(a) P ⊕ Q; (b) P ⊕ (∼Q); (c) (∼P ) ⊕ Q; (d) P ∨ Q; (e) P ∨ (∼Q); (f) (∼P ) ∨ Q.
Solution. Using the truth tables for ⊕, ∨, and ∼, we find that (a) is true, (b) is false,
(c) is false, (d) is true, (e) is false, and (f) is true. The different answers for (c) and (f)
illustrate the distinction between exclusive-OR and inclusive-OR.

Truth Tables for Propositional Forms

Given a complex propositional form built up from some variables using one or more logical
connectives, we can determine the meaning of this form by making a truth table showing
the truth value of the form for all possible combinations of truth values of the variables
appearing in the form. We construct such a truth table step-by-step, making a column for
each input variable and each smaller propositional form contained within the given form.
We complete each column by using the defining truth tables (given above for ∼, ∧, ∨, ⊕, and
given in later sections for ⇒ and ⇔) to combine the truth values in one or two previously
completed columns. We illustrate this process in the following examples.
1.8. Example: Truth Table for (P ∧ Q) ∨ (∼P ). This form has two input variables, P
and Q, so we need a four-row truth table. We make columns for P , Q, ∼P , P ∧ Q, and
(P ∧ Q) ∨ (∼P ), and fill them in as shown here:
P Q ∼P P ∧ Q (P ∧ Q) ∨ (∼P )
T T F T T
T F F F F
F T T F T
F F T F T
Note, in particular, that the final column is completed by comparing the truth values
in each row of columns 3 and 4. In row 2 (and only row 2), the two input truth values are
both false, so the output in this row is false. All other rows must have output that is true,
by definition of OR.
1.9. Example: Truth Table for P ∧ (Q ∨ (∼P )). This form looks almost identical to the
one in the last example, but the parentheses are in a different position. This changes the
structure of the truth table, as shown here:
P Q ∼P Q ∨ (∼P ) P ∧ (Q ∨ (∼P ))
T T F T T
T F F F F
F T T T F
F F T T F
We fill in column 4 by looking for two Fs in columns 2 and 3 (which happens only in
row 2), placing an F in that row, and filling the rest of column 4 with Ts. Then we fill in
Logic 5

column 5 by looking for two Ts in columns 1 and 4 (which happens in row 1 only), placing
a T in that row, and filling the rest of column 5 with Fs.
In these examples, observe that the truth tables for (P ∧ Q) ∨ (∼P ) and P ∧ (Q ∨ (∼P ))
are not identical, since the outputs in rows 3 and 4 differ in the two tables. This shows
that these two propositional forms are not logically interchangeable with one another in
all situations. More briefly, we say that the two forms are not logically equivalent. On the
other hand, if two propositional forms A and B have truth tables whose outputs agree in
every row, we say that A and B are logically equivalent and write A ≡ B. (We study logical
equivalence in detail in the next few sections.) Notice, for instance, that P ∧ (Q ∨ (∼P )) is
logically equivalent to P ∧ Q, since column 5 in the previous example agrees with the truth
table for P ∧ Q in all four rows. So we could write P ∧ (Q ∨ (∼P )) ≡ P ∧ Q, enabling us
to replace the complicated propositional form on the left by the shorter form P ∧ Q on the
right.
1.10. Example: Translation of XOR. We have noted that P ⊕ Q can be translated
as “P or Q, but not both.” This English phrase is built up using the logical connectives
OR, NOT, BUT, and BOTH (the last two words have the same meaning as AND). So
a more literal encoding of the phrase “P or Q, but not both” as a propositional form is
(P ∨ Q) ∧ (∼(P ∧ Q)). The following truth table verifies that (P ∨ Q) ∧ (∼(P ∧ Q)) ≡ P ⊕ Q.
This logical equivalence justifies the use of this phrase as a translation of XOR.
P Q P ⊕Q P ∨Q P ∧ Q ∼(P ∧ Q) (P ∨ Q) ∧ (∼(P ∧ Q))
T T F T T F F
T F T T F T T
F T T T F T T
F F F F F T F
Note that we combine columns 4 and 6 to complete column 7 using the definition of AND.
The claimed logical equivalence follows from the complete agreement of columns 3 and 7 in
every row. In contrast, since columns 3 and 4 disagree in row 1, we see that (P ⊕Q) 6≡ (P ∨Q).
In other words, inclusive-OR and exclusive-OR are not logically equivalent.

Formal Definition of Propositional Forms (Optional)

In the main text, we informally defined a propositional form to be any expression built
up by combining propositional variables using logical symbols. To give a precise, rigorous
definition of propositional forms, we need a recursive definition (definitions of this type
are studied in detail later). Specifically, propositional forms are defined recursively via the
following rules:
(a) A single capital italic letter is a propositional form.
(b) If A is any propositional form, then (∼A) is a propositional form.
(c) If A and B are any propositional forms, then (A ∧ B) is a propositional form.
(d) If A and B are any propositional forms, then (A ∨ B) is a propositional form.
(e) If A and B are any propositional forms, then (A ⊕ B) is a propositional form.
(f) If A and B are any propositional forms, then (A ⇒ B) is a propositional form.
(g) If A and B are any propositional forms, then (A ⇔ B) is a propositional form.
(h) An expression is a propositional form only if it can be formed by applying rules (a)
through (g) finitely many times.
For example, rule (a) shows that P is a propositional form, as is Q. Then rule (b) shows
that (∼P ) and (∼Q) are propositional forms. By rule (c), (P ∧ (∼Q)) and ((∼P ) ∧ Q) are
propositional forms. By rule (d),
((P ∧ (∼Q)) ∨ ((∼P ) ∧ Q)) (1.2)
6 An Introduction to Mathematical Proofs

is a propositional form, which is essentially the form studied in (1.1).

However, to be absolutely precise, the expression in (1.1) is not a propositional form.
This is because (1.1) is missing the outermost pair of parentheses, which are required to be
present when using rules (b) through (g). In practice, we often drop required parentheses
to create abbreviated versions of propositional forms that are easier to read. For instance,
we seldom write the outermost pair of parentheses. Logical equivalences called associativity
rules (discussed in the next section) allow us to drop internal parentheses in an expression
like ((P ∨ Q) ∨ R) or (P ∧ (Q ∧ R)). We can erase even more parentheses using the precedence
conventions that ∼ has highest precedence, followed by ∧, followed by ∨. For example, with
these conventions, we could drop all parentheses from (1.2) and abbreviate this form as
P ∧ ∼Q ∨ ∼P ∧ Q. However, as shown in Examples 1.8 and 1.9, the placement of parentheses
often affects the logical meaning of a propositional form (which is one reason why the official
definition requires them). In this text, we often write parentheses that could be deleted by
the precedence conventions, to reduce the chance of confusion.
1.11. Remark: Terminology for Propositional Forms. Let A and B be any propo-
sitional forms. In some logic texts, (∼ A) is called the negation of A; (A ∧ B) is called
the conjunction of A and B; (A ∨ B) is called the disjunction of A and B; (A ⇒ B) is
called an implication or conditional with hypothesis (or antecedent) A and conclusion (or
consequent) B; (A ⇔ B) is called the biconditional of A and B. We mostly avoid using
these technical terms in this text, except for the term negation. Later, we study methods
of finding propositional forms logically equivalent to (∼A), which are called denials of A.

Section Summary
1. Memorize the definitions of the logical connectives, as summarized in the following
truth table.

NOT P P AND Q P OR Q P XOR Q

P Q ∼P P ∧Q P ∨Q P ⊕Q
T T F T T F
T F F F T T
F T T F T T
F F T F F F

Note that NOT flips the truth value of the input; AND outputs true exactly when
both inputs are true; OR outputs false exactly when both inputs are false; and
XOR outputs true exactly when the two inputs differ.
2. Remember that in mathematics, “P or Q” always means P ∨ Q (inclusive-OR).
To translate P ⊕ Q (exclusive-OR) into English, you must use an explicit phrase
such as “P or Q, but not both.”
3. Two propositional forms A and B are logically equivalent, denoted A ≡ B, when
these forms have truth tables whose outputs agree in all rows of the truth table. If
there is even a single row of disagreement, the forms are not logically equivalent.
For instance, P ∨ Q 6≡ P ⊕ Q.

Exercises
1. Is each statement true, false, or not a proposition? Explain.
(a) 1 + 1 = 2 or London is a city. (b) Math is fun. (c) France is a country, and
Berlin is an ocean. (d) 0 < 1 or 1 < 0. (e) 0 < 1 or 1 < 0, but not both. (f) Chopin
Logic 7

was the greatest classical composer. (g) 2 is not even1 , or 2 is positive. (h) 15 is
odd or positive, but not both.
2. Is each statement true, false, or not a proposition? Explain.
(a) It is not the case that 2 is even or 2 is positive. (b) The following statement
R1
is a true proposition. (c) 0 x2 dx = 1/3 and 25 = 32. (d) When do fish sleep?
(e) The following statement is a true proposition. (f) The previous statement is
a false proposition. (g) I am tired.
3. Construct truth tables for the following propositional forms.
(a) (∼P ) ∧ Q (b) (P ∧ Q) ∨ ((∼P ) ∧ (∼Q)) (c) (P ∨ (∼Q)) ⊕ ((∼Q) ∨ P )
(d) (P ∧ Q) ∨ R (e) P ∧ (Q ∨ R) (f) P ∨ (Q ⊕ R)
4. (a) Is ∼(P ∨ Q) logically equivalent to (∼P ) ∨ (∼Q)? Explain with a truth table.
(b) Give English translations of the two propositional forms in (a).
5. Assume P is a true proposition, Q is a false proposition, and R is an arbitrary
proposition. Say as much as you can about the truth or falsehood of each propo-
sition below.
(a) P ∧ (∼Q) (b) (∼P ) ∨ Q (c) P ⊕ Q (d) P ⊕ (∼Q) (e) R ∨ P (f) Q ∨ R
(g) Q ⊕ R (h) R ∧ (∼R) (i) R ∨ (∼R) (j) R ⊕ R (k) R ⊕ (∼R).
6. (a) Make a truth table for the propositional form (P ∧(∼Q))∨((∼P )∧Q). Be sure
to show the columns for all intermediate forms. (b) Find a short propositional
form that is logically equivalent to the form in (a). (c) Use (b) to write an English
sentence with the same logical meaning as statement (g) in Example 1.2.
7. (a) Make a truth table for P ∧((∼Q)∨P ). (b) Make a truth table for (P ∧(∼Q))∨P .
(c) Are the propositional forms in (a) and (b) logically equivalent? Why?
(d) Find a short propositional form that is logically equivalent to the form in (a).
8. Which propositional forms (if any) are logically equivalent? Justify your answer
with truth tables. (a) P (b) ∼P (c) P ∨ P (d) P ∧ P (e) P ⊕ P (f) (P ∧ Q) ∨ P .
9. Which propositional forms (if any) are logically equivalent? Explain.
(a) P ∧ Q (b) Q ∧ P (c) (P ∧ Q) ∧ P (d) ∼(P ⊕ Q).
10. Which propositional forms (if any) are logically equivalent? Explain.
(a) ∼(P ∧ Q) (b) (∼P ) ∧ (∼Q) (c) ((∼P ) ∧ Q) ∨ (P ∧ (∼Q))
(d) P ⊕ (∼Q) (e) P ∨ (∼Q) (f) (P ∨ (∼Q)) ∧ ((∼P ) ∨ Q).
11. Which propositional forms (if any) are logically equivalent? Explain.
(a) P ∨ (Q ∨ R) (b) P ⊕ (Q ∨ R) (c) P ∨ (Q ⊕ R) (d) P ⊕ (Q ⊕ R)
(e) (P ∨ Q) ∨ R (f) (P ⊕ Q) ∨ R (g) (P ∨ Q) ⊕ R (h) (P ⊕ Q) ⊕ R.
12. Let x0 be a fixed integer. Let P be the proposition “x0 < 8,” let Q be “0 < x0 ,”
and let R be “x0 = 0.” Encode each statement as a propositional form involving
P , Q, and R.
(a) x0 is strictly positive. (b) x0 ≥ 8. (c) x0 is less than zero.
(d) x0 is nonnegative. (e) 0 < x0 < 8. (f) 0 ≤ x0 < 8. (g) |x0 − 4| ≥ 4.
13. Let P be the statement “1 + 1 = 2,” let Q be “0 = 1,” and let R be “71 is prime.”
Convert each propositional form into an English sentence without parentheses. Be
sure that the sentence has the precise logical structure encoded by the form.
(a) (P ∧ Q) ∨ R (b) P ∧ (Q ∨ R) (c) ∼(P ∧ Q) (d) (∼P ) ∧ Q
(e) (P ∧ Q) ∧ R (f) P ∧ (Q ∧ R) (g) ((∼P ) ∧ (∼Q)) ⊕ (∼R)
1 Some exercises and examples in Chapter 1 assume familiarity with even integers . . . , −4, −2, 0, 2, 4, . . .

and odd integers . . . , −5, −3, −1, 1, 3, 5, . . .. Formal definitions of even and odd appear in §2.1.
8 An Introduction to Mathematical Proofs

14. Explain why each statement is not a proposition.

(a) The last train leaves in five minutes. (b) We should raise the minimum wage.
(c) Will you marry me? (d) My father’s name is Frank. (e) She is smarter than
he is. (f) Do your homework. (g) It is cold here. (h) This statement is true.
15. Find propositional forms using only the connectives ∨, ∧, and ∼ that have the
truth tables shown below. Try to use as few connectives as possible.

P Q R (a) (b) (c) (d)

T T T F F F F
T T F T T F T
T F T T F F T
T F F T T T T
F T T F F T F
F T F T F F T
F F T T F F F
F F F T F F T

16. (a) Find a simple verbal description characterizing when ((A ⊕ B) ⊕ (C ⊕ D)) ⊕ E
is true. (b) Does your answer to (a) change if we rearrange parentheses in the
expression? What if we reorder A, B, C, D, and E?
17. Find a propositional form involving variables P , Q, R that is true precisely when
exactly one of P , Q, R is true. Try to use as few logical connectives as possible.
18. Find a propositional form involving variables P , Q, R that is true when at least
two of the inputs are true, and false otherwise. Try to use as few logical connectives
as possible.
19. (a) How many truth tables are possible for propositional forms containing two
variables P and Q? (b) For each possible truth table in (a), find a short proposi-
tional form having that truth table.
Logic 9

1.2 Logical Equivalences and IF-Statements

You have probably been using the word IF for most of your life, but do you really know
what this word means? The official answer, given in this section, may surprise you. We also
look more closely at logical equivalence, developing transformation rules for propositional
forms analogous to some basic laws of algebra. Everything is proved using our favorite proof
technique, truth tables.

Logical Equivalence
We first recall the definition of logically equivalent propositional forms from the last section.
1.12. Definition: Logically Equivalent Propositional Forms. Two propositional
forms A and B are logically equivalent when the truth tables for A and B have outputs
that agree in every row. We write A ≡ B when A and B are logically equivalent; we write
A 6≡ B when A and B are not logically equivalent.

Our first theorem lists some logical equivalences that can often be used to replace com-
plicated propositional forms by shorter ones.
1.13. Theorem on Logical Equivalence. For all propositional forms P , Q, and R, the
following logical equivalences hold:
(a) Commutative Laws: P ∧ Q ≡ Q ∧ P , P ∨ Q ≡ Q ∨ P , and P ⊕ Q ≡ Q ⊕ P .
(b) Associative Laws: P ∧ (Q ∧ R) ≡ (P ∧ Q) ∧ R, P ∨ (Q ∨ R) ≡ (P ∨ Q) ∨ R,
and P ⊕ (Q ⊕ R) ≡ (P ⊕ Q) ⊕ R.
(c) Distributive Laws: P ∧ (Q ∨ R) ≡ (P ∧ Q) ∨ (P ∧ R), P ∨ (Q ∧ R) ≡ (P ∨ Q) ∧ (P ∨ R),
and P ∧ (Q ⊕ R) ≡ (P ∧ Q) ⊕ (P ∧ R).
(d) Idempotent Laws: P ∧ P ≡ P and P ∨ P ≡ P .
(e) Absorption Laws: P ∧ (P ∨ Q) ≡ P and P ∨ (P ∧ Q) ≡ P .
(f) Negation Laws: ∼(∼P ) ≡ P , ∼(P ∧ Q) ≡ (∼P ) ∨ (∼Q), and ∼(P ∨ Q) ≡ (∼P ) ∧ (∼Q).
The names of the first three laws indicate the analogy between these logical equivalences
and certain algebraic properties of real numbers. For example, the commutative laws for
propositional forms resemble the commutative laws x + y = y + x and x · y = y · x for real
numbers x, y; similarly, observe the resemblance between the distributive laws listed above
and the algebraic distributive law x · (y + z) = (x · y) + (x · z).
All parts of this theorem are proved by constructing truth tables for the propositional
forms on each side of each equivalence, and verifying that the truth tables agree in every
row. We illustrate the technique for a few parts of the theorem, asking you to prove the
other parts in the exercises.
1.14. Proof of the Idempotent Laws. The truth table is shown here:
P P P ∧P P ∨P
T T T T
F F F F
We list the column for P twice to make it easier to compute P ∧ P and P ∨ P . We
compute the last two columns from the first two columns using the definition of AND and
10 An Introduction to Mathematical Proofs

OR, respectively. Since column 3 and column 2 agree in all rows, P ∧ P ≡ P . Since column
4 and column 2 agree in all rows, P ∨ P ≡ P .
1.15. Proof of ∼(P ∨ Q) ≡ (∼P ) ∧ (∼Q). For this equivalence, we need a four-row truth
table:
P Q P ∨ Q ∼(P ∨ Q) ∼P ∼Q (∼P ) ∧ (∼Q)
T T T F F F F
T F T F F T F
F T T F T F F
F F F T T T T
Columns 4 and 7 agree in every row, so the logical equivalence is proved. This equivalence
and its companion ∼(P ∧ Q) ≡ (∼P ) ∨ (∼Q) are called de Morgan’s laws. In words, the
law we just proved says that the negation of an OR-statement “P or Q” is equivalent to
the statement “(not P ) and (not Q),” whereas the dual law tells us that “not (P and Q)”
is logically equivalent to “(not P ) or (not Q).” For a specific example, the statement “it is
false that 10 is prime or 10 is odd” may be simplified to the statement “10 is not prime and
10 is not odd” without changing the truth value (both statements are true). Similarly, the
statement that “John has brown hair AND blue eyes” is false precisely when John’s hair is
not brown OR John’s eyes are not blue. In §1.5, we will say a lot more about simplifying
statements that begin with NOT.
1.16. Proof of Associativity of XOR. This law has three input variables, so we need
a truth table with eight rows, as shown below. One quick way to create the eight possible
input combinations is to write 4 Ts followed by 4 Fs in the column for P ; then write 2 Ts,
2 Fs, 2 Ts, 2 Fs in the column for Q; then write alternating Ts and Fs in the column for
R. This pattern extends to truth tables with even more variables. In general, if there are n
distinct input variables that stand for propositions, the truth table has 2n rows.
P Q R Q⊕R P ⊕ (Q ⊕ R) P ⊕ Q (P ⊕ Q) ⊕ R
T T T F T F T
T T F T F F F
T F T T F T F
T F F F T T T
F T T F F T F
F T F T T T T
F F T T T F T
F F F F F F F
The quickest way to fill in this truth table is to look for disagreements between the
inputs of each XOR (being sure to refer to the correct columns), writing Ts in those rows,
and writing Fs in all other rows. Columns 5 and 7 agree in all eight rows, so the associative
law for ⊕ is proved. The other associative laws and distributive laws are proved by similar
eight-row truth tables.

What IF Means
We are now ready to define the precise logical meaning of the word IF. Be warned that the
usage of IF in everyday conversational English often does not match the definition we are
about to give. Nevertheless, this definition is universally used in logic, mathematics, and all
technical communication. When discussing the statement P ⇒ Q, which is read “if P then
Q,” we call P the hypothesis and Q the conclusion of the IF-statement.
Logic 11

1.17. Definition of IF. For any propositions P and Q, the truth value of P ⇒ Q
(“if P then Q”) is determined by the following table.
P Q P ⇒Q
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
Remember this table by noting that P ⇒ Q is false only when the hypothesis P is true
and the conclusion Q is false; in all other situations, the IF-statement is true. In particular,
when P is false, the IF-statement P ⇒ Q is automatically true, whether Q is true or false;
this fact often confuses beginners.
1.18. Example. True or false?
(a) If 1 + 1 = 3, then 1 + 1 = 5.
(b) If 0 6= 0, then 0 = 0.
(c) If 3 > 2, then London is the capital of England.
(d) If 9 is odd, then 9 is even.
Solution. Statement (a) has the form P ⇒ Q, where P is the false statement “1 + 1 = 3,”
and Q is the false statement “1+1 = 5.” By definition of IF, statement (a) is true, no matter
how unintuitive this statement may sound. Statement (b) has the form (∼Q) ⇒ Q, where
Q is the true proposition “0 = 0.” Since the hypothesis ∼Q is false, we can see that (b) is
true without even reading the statement following THEN. Statement (c) is true (according
to row 1 of the truth table), even though the two parts of the statement have no causal
relation to each other. Finally, statement (d) is false because “9 is odd” is true, but “9 is
even” is false.
These examples show that we must not rely upon an intuitive impression of the content
of an IF-statement to determine its truth value; we must instead combine the truth values
of the inputs according to the defining truth table. As shown in (c), there need not be any
cause-and-effect relationship between the hypothesis and conclusion of an IF-statement.
It is fair to ask why IF is defined in such an apparently unnatural way. Most people agree
that “if true then true” should be considered true, whereas “if true then false” should be
considered false. Why, though, is “if false then anything” defined to be true? One possible
answer draws an analogy between IF-statements, as they are used in logic, and IF-statements
appearing in legal contracts or judicial proceedings. Suppose a painting company issues a
contract to a homeowner containing the statement: “if you pay us $1000 by May 1, then we
will paint your house by June 1.” Under what conditions would we say that the company
has violated this contract? For example, suppose the company does not paint the house
because it was not paid on time. Both clauses of the IF-statement are false, yet no one
would say that the company violated the contract in this situation. Similarly, supposing
that the money is paid on May 3 and the house is painted on time, the company has not
violated the contract even though the first part of the IF-statement is false.
We can give another, more mathematical motivation for the definition of IF by consider-
ing the following statement: “for all real numbers x, if x > 2 then x2 > 4.” (This statement
uses variables and quantifiers, which are discussed later.) Most people would judge this
statement to be true, on intuitive grounds, and this judgment is correct. But once you
agree this statement should be true, you are forced to agree that it should be true after
replacing each x in the statement by any specific real number. In particular, we see that
each of these statements must be true:
• “if 3 > 2 then 32 > 4” (illustrating row 1 of the truth table);
12 An Introduction to Mathematical Proofs

• “if −4 > 2 then (−4)2 > 4” (illustrating row 3 of the truth table);
• “if 0 > 2 then 02 > 4” (illustrating row 4 of the truth table).
Thus the whole truth table for IF is forced upon us, granting that row 2 of the truth table
ought to be false.
In mathematics, a statement “if P then Q” is not making any claims about the truth
of the conclusion Q in the event that the hypothesis P does not hold; so in this event, we
should not declare the IF-statement to be false. But since propositions must have some
truth value, we are forced to call the IF-statement true in such situations.

Converse and Contrapositive

Given an IF-statement P ⇒ Q, we can form two related IF-statements called the converse
and contrapositive of the original statement.
1.19. Definition: Converse and Contrapositive. For any propositional forms P and
Q: the converse of P ⇒ Q is Q ⇒ P ; the contrapositive of P ⇒ Q is (∼Q) ⇒ (∼P ) .

1.20. Example. The converse of “if 9 is negative, then 9 is odd” is “if 9 is odd, then 9
is negative.” Observe that the first statement is true, whereas the converse is false. The
contrapositive of “if 9 is negative, then 9 is odd” is “if 9 is not odd, then 9 is not negative,”
which is true.
The converse of “if 2 = 3, then 4 = 9” is “if 4 = 9, then 2 = 3.” Both the original
statement and its converse are true. The contrapositive of “if 2 = 3, then 4 = 9” is “if
4 6= 9, then 2 6= 3,” which is also true.
In both examples, the contrapositive had the same truth value as the original statement,
but this was not always the case for the converse. The next theorem explains what happens
in general.
1.21. Theorem on IF. Let P and Q be distinct propositional variables.
(a) Non-equivalence of Converse: P ⇒ Q 6≡ Q ⇒ P .
(b) Equivalence of Contrapositive: P ⇒ Q ≡ (∼Q) ⇒ (∼P ).
(c) Elimination of IF: P ⇒ Q ≡ (∼P ) ∨ Q.
(d) Denial of IF: ∼(P ⇒ Q) ≡ P ∧ (∼Q).
Part (a) says that a general IF-statement is not logically equivalent to its converse. Part
(b) says that a general IF-statement is logically equivalent to its contrapositive. Part (c) says
that IF-statements are essentially special kinds of OR-statements in which the first input
to the OR has been negated. We can use (c) to convert IF-statements to OR-statements
and vice versa. Part (d) shows that the negation of an IF-statement is logically equivalent
to an AND-statement. Parts (b), (c), and (d) hold for any propositional forms P and Q,
not just individual letters. For instance, (A ∨ B) ⇒ (C ⊕ D) ≡ (∼(A ∨ B)) ∨ (C ⊕ D)
follows by replacing P by A ∨ B and replacing Q by C ⊕ D in part (c). Memorize all parts
of this theorem, as they will be used constantly throughout our study of logic and proofs.
To prove the theorem, consider the following truth table:
P Q P ⇒Q Q⇒P ∼Q ∼P (∼Q) ⇒ (∼P ) (∼P ) ∨ Q
T T T T F F T T
T F F T T F F F
F T T F F T T T
F F T T T T T T
Another Random Scribd Document
with Unrelated Content
 “No—​fortunately.”
“Why fortunately?”
“From what I have heard about him he must have been a terrible
outsider. Was she very unhappy with him?”
“Very. They ought never to have married. Myself, I hated him. He
was so selfish, so self-satisfied, in short such a bounder. I ought not,
I suppose, to say that of a dead man, but I can’t help it. He was
odious. I know you would have thought so had you known him.”
Preston went on sucking at his pipe for some moments, without
speaking. Presently his eyes met Yootha’s. He tried to look away, but
could not. And then, all at once, the girl gave a curious little laugh. It
was so unlike her to laugh apparently at nothing, that Preston
laughed too.
“What are we both laughing at?” she exclaimed, suddenly
recovering. She had colored unexpectedly, and Preston noticed that
the hand which hung over the side of the punt trembled.
“I can’t think,” he said. “I fancy I was laughing because I feel so
happy.”
“Do you really,” she asked, and he saw that her chest rose and fell
beneath the flimsy material she wore. “I wonder why?”
“Your cigarette had gone out,” he remarked inconsequently. “Try
one of mine. I think you will like them.”
He stood up in the punt, and, balancing himself carefully, stepped
over to where she lay. Then, kneeling beside her, he held out the
case which he had produced from his pocket.
He sat close to her when he had lit her cigarette. Somehow her
proximity seemed to agitate him. He wanted to speak, to go on
conversing on ordinary topics, as they had been, but words refused
to come.
And at that instant a drop of rain splashed upon the punt. Without
their noticing it the sky had become overcast. Heavy drops followed
in quick succession, and then, without warning, a flash almost
blinded them, and on the same instant a peal of thunder crackled
overhead and all around them like rifle fire.
When they had set out, early in the afternoon, the sky had been
cloudless, so that neither had coats or wraps. Just in time Preston
snatched up his jacket and flung it over Yootha, a moment later rain
came down like a shower in the tropics.
Pulling the punt in closer under the bank to get what shelter was
obtainable, Preston looked down anxiously at his companion to
whom his thin jacket afforded but scant protection. She was smiling
up at him and looked perfectly contented, save for her anxiety about
his getting drenched.
And still the rain poured down. Judging by the sky, it was not
going to stop very soon. Flash after flash lit up the surrounding fields,
and the thunder pealed almost incessantly. And then all at once, to
add to their discomfort, wind began to rise.
That storm, as some may remember, was said to be the worst
London had known for twenty years. It lasted throughout the night
and well on into the following morning, wreaking havoc in the
metropolis and in the provinces, and particularly up the Thames
valley.
And it was a storm which Preston and Yootha Hagerston are not
likely to forget, for it broke down the barrier of reserve between them
so effectually that by the time they got home that evening in a car—​
which Preston with great difficulty succeeded in chartering—​they
were to all intents engaged.
Thinking over, next day, the events of the previous afternoon,
Preston smiled at the thought of all that had occurred. Had anybody
told him in the morning that within four-and-twenty hours he would
be engaged to be married, he could have laughed the speaker to
scorn. Yet, as so often happens, the seemingly impossible had come
about, and he began seriously to review the situation.
Yes, he was happy. Very happy. Of that he felt convinced. Often in
his time he had met a girl with whom he thought he might be happy
should she consent to become his wife, but he had never felt
sufficiently sure of himself to propose. And now he thanked heaven
for that diffidence, for he knew the only woman in the world he had
ever really wanted as a wife was Yootha Hagerston.
They did not meet again until the following afternoon. He had
telephoned about noon to ask if she would have tea with him at his
rooms in Fig Tree Court, and her reply was what might have been
expected.
“My darling,” he exclaimed, folding her in his arms and pressing
her lips to his as they met in the little passage which his servant
called “the hall.” “If you knew how happy you have made me, how I
now realize that for weeks past I have wanted you to become mine—​
mine for ever—​—”
He stopped, for she was sobbing, clinging to him as though she
could never let him go.
“What is it? What is the matter?” he exclaimed in alarm, raising
her face from his shoulder and trying to look into her eyes. “Why are
you crying, Yootha?”
And then, all at once, he realized that her tears were tears of
happiness.
“Only one thing makes me anxious, Charlie,” she said later, after
tea, “and that is that something may come between us—​and prevent
our marriage. I don’t know why, but I have a presentiment, a sort of
feeling—​oh, I can’t explain, I don’t know what it is, I hardly know
what I am saying I feel so happy, so absolutely and perfectly happy.
But can we hurry on the wedding, dearest? Couldn’t we be married
by special license, or something. I don’t want to wait a day longer,
not an hour longer than is absolutely necessary. Life is so uncertain,
you know, and such strange and unlooked-for things sometimes
happen. Tell me, Charlie, must we go to the ball Thursday night?”
“At the Albert Hall? I am afraid I must, darling, because I have
made up a party, as you know. Don’t you want to go? I thought you
were looking forward to it.”
“I was, but now I would rather not go. Still, if you must go, of
course, I’ll come with you. But I shall be glad when it is over. I can’t
think why, but the thought of that ball now seems somehow to
frighten me. It didn’t until we became engaged.”
But Preston soon dispelled her fancies. She was excited, he said,
unstrung. “What could happen to anybody at a ball at the Albert
Hall?” he exclaimed, laughing. He had been in hotter places in
France and had come through all right—​except for that bit of
shrapnel in his leg. Yes, he agreed with her that it would be best for
the news of their engagement not to be announced until her parents
had been informed.
“How do you think they will take it?” he asked. “Will they be
pleased, or not?”
“Probably not,” she answered lightly. “At least, if they are pleased,
it will be the first time they have ever approved of anything I have
done on my own initiative. And then there is the question of money. I
have a small income of my own, as you know, and lately I inherited a
comfortable little nest egg, and my stepmother naturally hopes that
in the ordinary course of events I may some day make over some of
my capital to her and to my father. Our marriage will dispel that
delusion,” and she laughed.
“You say naturally,” Preston said, “but I think it most unnatural she
should think anything of the sort.”
“Ah, you don’t know my stepmother. But let us change the
subject. Whenever I begin to think about my stepmother something
unpleasant is sure to happen. Don’t think me superstitious. I am not,
as a rule, but on that point I am extremely superstitious, because
what I say has often happened.”
As they came out into Fleet Street, a little later, they met Hopford
hurrying to his office.
“Sorry I can’t wait,” he said, “but I’ve got hold of something rather
good to-day, something which will interest you both, by the way, and
I have to write the story before seven. See you at the ball on
Thursday, I suppose?”
“You have promised to have supper with us there,” Preston said
with a laugh.
 “So I have! I shouldn’t have forgotten it on Thursday night, you
may be sure. It ought to be a festive evening.”
He raised his hat and turned down Whitefriars Street, and Preston
looked about for a taxi. But there was not one to be seen which was
disengaged.
Presently he glanced at his watch.
“I have to meet a man in Bloomsbury at six o’clock,” he said, “and
it is now half-past five. Would you care to walk that far with me,
darling?”
She answered that she would “adore to,” and so it came about
that, on turning out of Russell Square, Preston pointed out a house
to her on the opposite side of the street.
“That is a house you must often have heard about,” he said.
“They call it the house with the bronze face. It is the headquarters of
the famous Metropolitan Secret Agency.”
Yootha looked across at it with interest.
“What a horrible knocker!” she exclaimed. “Isn’t the face awful? I
have heard Cora and the others speak about the place. She went
there recently, as you know, to try to find out about Jessica, and she
expects to hear soon. She described the knocker to me then. No
wonder it has given the house a curious reputation—​I mean the
stories that are told about it. But they are all nonsense, I suppose?”
she ended, looking at Preston.
“Of course they must be, though the fact that Lord Froissart called
there on the morning of the day he committed suicide has probably
given the tales about the house a fresh lease of life. I can’t stand
superstitious people, can you? I am glad you are not superstitious,
dearest.”
Yootha laughed uneasily.
“It’s a gloomy, depressing-looking house, anyway,” she said,
changing the subject as she glanced back at the door. “And it has a
mysterious look. But I think a detective agency always sounds
mysterious.”
 “The people who run the Secret Agency must be extraordinarily
clever,” Preston said. “The number of criminals they have brought to
book is said to be very large, though the agency has not been in
existence many years. I heard a rumor some days ago that they are
now hot on the scent of the thieves who stole Mrs. Mervyn-
Robertson’s jewels out of her safe during one of her evening
parties.”
“Mr. Hopford seems to be very interested in that affair,” Yootha
observed. “Now, I wonder if he had heard anything about it when we
met him in Fleet Street? He said what he was going to write would
be of interest to us both.”
They had now arrived at the house where Preston had an
appointment. An empty taxi was passing, and he hailed it.
“Then we shall meet Thursday night,” he said, when he had
handed Yootha into the taxi and shut the door. “Cora is going to call
for me in her car at ten o’clock, and we shall pick you up on our way
to the ball.”
 CHAPTER XIII.

BOX NUMBER THIRTEEN.

Of all the balls that have been given at Albert Hall within the past
ten or twelve years, none has approached in its splendor, or in the
luxury of its appointment and setting “the pageant worthy of Ancient
Rome,” as some of the newspapers termed it, which took place in
July, 1919.
The whole of the interior of the vast building had been painted
and decorated in an amazingly artistic manner, and utterly
regardless of expense. All the seasons were presented in turn in a
gigantic panorama, which depicted also the most daring love scenes
described in the well-known classics. True, a few London journals
and many provincial papers clamored to know why so huge a sum
should have been spent on “decking out” one great ball-room, seeing
that the ball had been organized “ostensibly in aid of charity,” but the
cavillers received no answer. Heckled on the point by a
Parliamentary representative of advanced Socialistic views,
Stapleton calmly replied that “if you set out to make money you must
spend money to make it,” an argument which proved its soundness
when the accounts came to be totaled up and an enormous sum was
handed to charity.
Long before the night every ticket had been sold. Nor could
another be obtained for love or money. By midnight the immense
circle of boxes sparkled with a blaze of diamonds, worn, on that
occasion, not by decrepit dowagers, as is the case so often at the
Opera, but for the most part by young and extremely beautiful
women. Indeed, it was safe to say that literally everybody who was
anybody attended at the Albert Hall that night, though as the faces of
all were concealed by masks which they were at liberty to wear
throughout the night if so inclined, even detectives would have been
unable to say who was present and who absent had they been
ordered to make a report.
Preston’s party, which included Cora Hartsilver and Yootha
Hagerston, Harry Hopford, George Blenkiron, and about a dozen
more, occupied a box only six boxes away from Jessica Mervyn-
Robertson’s. Her party, too, numbered about a dozen, and her first
appearance in the hall created a sensation which few present that
night are likely to forget.
Her dress! In the first place, of what did it consist? Certainly of
very little, but that little—​—
A great mottled snake with enormous eyes which, as the rays of
the electroliers caught them, assumed chameleon tints, becoming
now a jet black, now a sea green blending into different shades, now
golden copper, now blood red....
That was the impression which first struck the beholder as
Jessica came towards him.
In reality the “gown” was a mottled skin which fitted like a glove,
and from a distance conveyed the impression that it was covered
with real scales. But a closer inspection showed that the skin ended
half-way up the chest and back, the “scales” design being continued
on the bare flesh and painted thereon so marvelously that where
skin ended and flesh began could be discerned only with difficulty.
The great chameleon eyes which at first riveted the attention of all
beholders were on the mask itself, which hid her face entirely, and
exactly resembled the head of a giant puff adder. Indeed, Jessica’s
costume, if costume it could be called, was by far the most bizarre in
the whole of that vast assemblage, where weird and decadent
gowns were plentiful enough.
“Who can the woman with that horrible snake costume and the
extraordinary eyes be?” Yootha said as she leaned forward in
Preston’s box and scanned the astonishing vision through her opera
glasses. “Have you ever seen anything more abominable, Charlie?”
“A good many of the dresses here are abominable, in my
opinion,” Preston answered, “and plenty of the men’s costumes
might with advantage have been scrapped. Look at that creature
over there with nothing on, apparently, but a woman’s silk swimming
suit. I wonder what he did during the war, or if he did anything?”
“You do harp on that, Charlie,” Yootha said almost impatiently.
“After all, the war is over, so what does it matter what people wear at
a costume ball, so long as their costumes are not obviously indecent
or decadent, like that woman’s snake skin. Look, she is coming
towards us.”
Escorted by male companions, the mottled snake approached.
They were close to Preston’s box now, and as they passed they
walked more slowly and stared up through their masks apparently
straight at his party. A little shudder ran through Yootha. Why, she
did not know, and as it did so the horrible chameleon eyes turned
from copper to deep crimson.
“I must, at any cost, find out who that is,” Hopford murmured. “I
already have my suspicion; the attitude that tall man with her is
standing in now is quite familiar.”
“Oh, do find out,” Yootha exclaimed. “I am dying to know. Why,
they have that box close to ours,” she added as Jessica and her
companions joined the remainder of their party. “The box attendant
will surely be able to tell you, Mr. Hopford.”
“The little man at the back is unmistakable, anyhow,” Hopford said
as he kept his eyes riveted on the party. “Twenty masks couldn’t
disguise him! It’s Levi Schomberg, the Jew moneylender, who is said
to lend thousands to all the ‘best’ people in Society, cabinet ministers
not excepted. There shouldn’t be much difficulty in finding out now,”
and rising, he excused himself and left the box.
He soon found the attendant of the box occupied by Jessica and
her party, and, having slipped some money into the man’s hand he
asked him if he would tell Mr. Levi Schomberg that he was wanted.
“And who shall I say, sir?” the attendant inquired, looking into the
eyes which fixed him through the mask.
“Say a ‘gentleman,’ and that it is important.”
 In a minute the attendant returned, accompanied by the little Jew
who, dressed as a troubadour, presented a far more grotesque figure
than he supposed.
“Yes?” he said as he came up. “You wish to speak to me? Who
are you?”
He had not removed his mask, and the little black eyes seemed to
burn with curiosity behind it.
“I am sorry to disturb you,” Hopford said, “but The Evening Herald
wants to know if it would be possible to obtain a flashlight
photograph of Mrs. Mervyn-Robertson in the striking gown she is
wearing to-night.”
Schomberg snorted.
“I am certain,” he answered, “that Mrs. Robertson would not
consent to be photographed by the Evening Herald or any other
paper, so it would be useless for me to ask her.”
He was about to turn away, when he checked himself.
“Why did you ask for me instead of for Mrs. Robertson?” he asked
sharply.
Hopford laughed.
“I leave that conundrum to you to answer,” he said. “Good night,
Mr. Schomberg,” and he went off elated at his success, while the
Jew stood looking after him with a scowl which his mask concealed.
Hopford had suspected from the first the identity of the “snake
woman,” as people now called her; the dress was being greatly
talked about. Now he would be able to enlighten Yootha Hagerston;
also in his paper next day he would, he told himself, boldly name the
wearer of the very daring costume.
As the night wore on, the noise and merriment increased.
Certainly no Albert Hall ball had ever been less decorous. The most
modern and the most peculiar dances followed one another in quick
succession. Yet though the floor looked packed it was not unduly
crowded.
 Blenkiron stood apart with his friend, Captain Preston, whose
wounded leg precluded his dancing.
“I should like to possess a sum equivalent to a year’s interest on
the value of all the diamonds and other jewelry here to-night,” he
said lightly. “It would set some of us up for life!”
“And the war was supposed to have impoverished the nation!”
Preston observed dryly. “This sort of show isn’t much in my line,
George.”
“Or in mine. But Cora is enjoying it, and Yootha too. Smart of
Hopford to have discovered the identity of the woman in the snake
costume—​eh? I bet she’ll be annoyed when she sees her name in
his paper to-morrow.”
“You think so? Why?”
“My dear fellow, would any woman with the least self-respect not
be ashamed to let it be known she wore a dress like that in public?”
“A woman with the least self-respect—​yes. But has Jessica the
least self-respect?”
“Well, we know nothing against her, do we? We only think we
have reason to suspect she may not be—​well, all she poses to be.
Queer her entertaining that Jew moneylender, don’t you think?”
“She may have a reason.”
“A woman with her income!”
“How do we know what her income is? Plenty of people with no
money at all spend recklessly. She may be up to her ears in debt,
and her friend Stapleton, too. The slim man talking to Stapleton is, I
suppose, La Planta.”
They looked in the direction where two men, masked like the rest,
were engaged in earnest conversation.
“I have not yet overcome my aversion from that young man,”
Preston said as he watched them. “Every time I speak to him I feel
he rings untrue. Ah, here come Yootha and Harry.”
 Yootha, flushed with the night’s excitement, had probably never
looked better. Her eyes shone with pleasure, for Hopford was an
excellent dancer. It was nearly two in the morning now, and the
revels were at their height.
Presently the band struck up the newest Jazz, a wild combination
of almost every sound capable of being produced by musical and
unmusical instruments, a sort of savage discord in many keys which
clashed and blared to the accompaniment of human cries and
trombone laughter. Carried away by what passed for music, the
dancers who now thronged the floor performed the strangest
evolutions. Some, locked in a close embrace, seemed oblivious of all
but their own emotions as they gyrated in never-ending circles;
others, barely touching, went through contortions which in any other
place and under any other circumstances would have shocked some
beholders, filled some with disgust, and convulsed the remainder
with amusement.
It was in the middle of this performance that a strange thing
occurred. Happening to look in the direction of Jessica’s box, now
temporarily deserted, Preston noticed two men in it. One he quickly
recognized by his costume to be Levi Schomberg; the other....
“George,” he said, turning to Blenkiron, “that thin man bending
over Levi Schomberg—​the fellow dressed as a troubadour we
decided must be Schomberg, didn’t we?—is that La Planta, do you
think?”
Blenkiron looked in the direction indicated.
“Hopford declared him to be La Planta,” he said.
“Well, what is he doing—​I mean Schomberg, the man sitting
down?”
Blenkiron watched him for some moments.
“He’s drunk, I should say,” he answered.
“Drunk! Not a bit of it. Look at his attitude.”
“It certainly is queer. Ah, La Planta has left him now. He is going
out of the box. I can see Jessica outside waiting for him.”
 As Blenkiron stopped speaking, the man whom they believed to
be La Planta, accompanied now by the mottled snake, walked
quickly into the corridor behind the boxes, and were lost to sight.
Levi Schomberg, meanwhile, remained seated in the box. Bent
forward, and resting against the velvet balustrade, he appeared to be
gazing at the crowded floor. None noticed him, apparently, but
Preston and George Blenkiron, whose complete attention he now
held.
“Strange,” Blenkiron said at last, “how motionless he is. He has
not stirred for fully five minutes.”
They went on looking. When some more minutes had passed,
and the figure still remained motionless, Preston linked his friend’s
arm in his own.
“Let us go and see if he is ill,” he said. “I am sure something is
amiss with him.”
They went up the staircase and round to the back of the boxes
until they reached the box they sought. The door was shut. After
knocking several times, and receiving no answer, they went in
search of the attendant.
“There is a gentleman alone in Box Thirteen,” Preston said, “who
appears to be ill. We have knocked repeatedly, but can get no reply.”
“A friend of yours?” the attendant inquired.
“We know him, yes.”
The Jazz band was blaring still as Preston and Blenkiron passed
into the box, closely followed by the attendant. They spoke
Schomberg’s name, but he did not reply. Then they went over to him,
and Blenkiron put a hand upon his shoulder.
Still he made no response. Now thoroughly on the alert Preston
stripped off Schomberg’s mask, then jumped back with a start.
To all it was at once obvious that the little Hebrew was dead!
 CHAPTER XIV.

CONCERNS A NECKLACE.
“Look at that drunken ass being carried out of his box.”
The speaker stood beside his partner on the floor of the hall,
fanning her with an ostrich plume.
The girl laughed.
“Why can’t you men keep sober?” she said, only partly in jest.
They remained watching Levi and those assisting him until the group
passed out of the box and was lost to sight.
Others had watched him too, and because the conclusion they
had all jumped at was that the fellow, whoever he might be, had
drunk too much, the incident of his sudden death caused no
commotion, and the ball went on as gaily as though nothing
untoward had occurred.
Stretched on a sofa in the secretary’s office, Schomberg lay
strangely stiff, seeing that he could not have been dead over half an
hour. A doctor had been discovered among the dancers, and,
dressed to resemble a well-known comedian, he presented a
ludicrous figure as he bent over the dead man, listening through his
stethoscope. Presently he straightened himself and shook his head.
“Quite dead,” he said. “Who is he? Does anybody know anything
about him?”
He looked about at the various people standing by.
“It’s Levi Schomberg,” Preston said. “He was one of Mrs. Mervyn-
Robertson’s guests. It was her box we found him in.”
“Mervyn-Robertson? You mean the woman they call Jessica?” the
doctor asked with a curious look.
 “Yes.”
“May I ask if she is a friend of yours?”
“I know her to speak to,” Preston answered, “so does my friend
here, but I can’t say she is a friend of ours. To what do you attribute
death, doctor?”
“I can’t say at off-hand. Heart, most likely; the heat and general
excitement may have induced the final attack. We must
communicate with his friends. Are they here?”
“I believe so. I don’t know Schomberg myself.”
“I thought the attendant said you were both friends of his.”
“We told the attendant we knew him, to get into the box. We could
see from the hall that something was amiss with him.”
“How could you? Hadn’t he a mask on?”
“Yes, but we had discovered his identity early in the evening.”
“Indeed? You will forgive my asking, but what made you take so
much interest in this man whom you say you knew only by sight?”
Preston hesitated. Then he said awkwardly:
“Nothing in particular.”
“Oh, come,” the doctor exclaimed, “you must have had a reason.
Nobody tries to discover who disguised people are for no reason.
You had better tell me.”
“Why do you want to know?”
“Well, as you put it that way, I had better tell you there are one or
two curious features surrounding this man’s death. On the face of it
he would appear to have died of natural causes, but certain points
tend to dispel that theory. For instance, rigor mortis would not have
set in so quickly had death been due to natural causes, such as
stoppage of the heart’s action. There will have to be an inquest.”
The authorities having been notified of the occurrence, about half
an hour later Preston and Blenkiron, accompanied by the doctor,
whose name was Johnson, returned to the hall. None of the revelers
had as yet left, apparently, for the floor was as thronged with dancers
as when they had been there last.
“Point me out the box where he was found, will you?” Johnson
said presently.
“That is the one,” Blenkiron replied, indicating it, “next to the box
with the woman with scarlet plumes.”
“There are people in it now,” Johnson observed. “Do you know
who they are? Why, one of them is that snake woman everybody has
been talking about.”
“We are under the impression, though we don’t know for certain,”
Preston replied guardedly, “that the snake woman is Mrs. Mervyn-
Robertson herself, and that the man talking to her is called
Stapleton.”
“Do you mean Aloysius Stapleton, the organizer of this ball?”
“Yes.”
“Well, if Schomberg was one of their party they apparently have
not heard what has happened, and somebody ought to tell them.”
“Hadn’t you better tell them, Doctor Johnson?”
“I suppose I must. And as you and your friend rendered ‘first aid’
you had better come with me to confirm my statements.”
Jessica and the woman and the three men with them still wore
their masks, though some of the dancers had now discarded theirs.
When Doctor Johnson and his companions were admitted to the
box, Jessica and her friends were in the highest spirits. Jessica
herself was laughing loudly, while two of the men had become
uproarious. The doctor had sent in his card and asked if he might
speak to Mrs. Mervyn-Robertson alone, but she had sent out word
that he had better come into the box.
“Mrs. Mervyn-Robertson, I believe?” he said, addressing her.
“Now, who told you that, Doctor Johnson?” she exclaimed, still
laughing, and her friends laughed too. “All night I have tried to retain
my incognita, but people one after another have penetrated it. Sit
down and have some champagne, won’t you?” and she pushed a
chair towards him. He saw at once that she herself had drunk as
much champagne as was good for her.
“Thank you very much,” he said, “but I won’t, if you will excuse
me. I would sooner have said in private, Mrs. Robertson, what I have
to tell you, but as you have insisted on my coming in I must tell it to
you here. One of your guests to-night was, I believe, a Mr.
Schomberg?”
“Yes,” she answered. “Why, what has become of him?” she
added, looking round. “We have not seen him for quite a long time.
Mr. Johnson you might introduce your friends,” as Preston and
Blenkiron still stood in the background.
“I will in a moment. But first I have some rather dreadful news to
break to you, Mrs. Robertson. You must brace yourself for a shock.
Mr. Schomberg has died suddenly. He died here, in this box, less
than an hour ago.”
At once everybody grew solemn. The party became hushed.
“Levi—​dead!” Jessica gasped after a pause. “It is impossible. He
was here only just now, and quite well!”
“An hour ago,” Johnson corrected. “I was sent for, and I found Mr.
Schomberg lying on the sofa in the secretary’s office, dead.”
“But where did he die? And who found him?”
“As I say, he died in this box, where he was found by these two
gentlemen, whom I think you know,” and he turned to the masked
figures at his elbow, “Mr. Blenkiron and Captain Preston.”
As his name was mentioned, it struck Preston that Jessica gave a
little start. He told Blenkiron afterwards, however, that he could have
sworn she did.
Jessica bowed.
“But how did you come to be in this box?” she asked, looking up
at them from where she sat.
 “I must apologize for our having intruded, Mrs. Robertson,”
Preston said, “but how it happened was this,” and he went on to
explain how he and Blenkiron, noticing that the masked man sitting
alone in her box appeared to be unwell, had obtained admittance to
the box.
“That was most kind of you,” Jessica said when he stopped
speaking. “But really this news is too terrible. I can’t realize it. Poor
Levi! And he seemed so well to-night, and in such excellent spirits.”
She stopped abruptly.
“I wonder who it was sent in to see him early in the evening?” she
said after a pause. “He seemed put out when he came back, and
didn’t volunteer to tell anybody what was amiss, so of course I
couldn’t ask him. But he got all right again a little later.”
“That would hardly have any bearing on the cause of death, Mrs.
Robertson.”
It was Johnson who spoke. He was looking hard at her through
the holes in his mask. Apparently through forgetfulness he had not
taken it off.
“No, of course it wouldn’t,” Jessica answered mechanically. Her
thoughts seemed to be far away. “Tell me, Doctor Johnson,” she said
suddenly, in a different tone, “to what cause do you attribute his
sudden death?”
“At first I attributed it to natural causes, but afterwards I changed
my opinion,” he replied in measured tones.
He was still looking hard at her.
“And what made you change your opinion?”
“One or two things which would take too long to explain. No doubt
the actual cause will be arrived at during the inquest.”
“There will be an inquest, then?”
Preston fancied her voice trembled a little.
“In the circumstances there will have to be.”
 “You mean you think he took his life—​and by poison?”
“Oh, no, Mrs. Robertson, you mistake me. But there is no need to
go further into the matter now. You would like, I dare say, to view the
body presently.”
“Must I?”
“Certainly not, unless you wish to. I thought perhaps you might
wish to.”
“I would much sooner not. The whole thing has upset me terribly,
as I am sure it has upset us all.”
She leant forward, poured herself out a glass of champagne, and
emptied the glass at a draught.
“Captain Preston and Mr. Blenkiron,” she said, “do help
yourselves, and you too, Doctor Johnson. I am sure this affair must
have given you all a shock.”
Once more Preston and his friend were mingling in the gay
throng. Doctor Johnson had left them after thanking them for their
services and saying they would no doubt be called to give evidence
at the inquest. A little group at one of the tables in the big supper-
room were talking in animated tones, and Preston happened to
overhear scraps of their conversation.
“Yes, a woman has been arrested ... was arrested ten minutes
ago ... the pearls were found in her possession. The man with her ...
became furiously indignant, declared he had been with her all the
night. Then she was confronted with the owner of the necklace, who
swore she had sat beside her at supper ... the thief, or alleged thief,
is quite a girl ... yes, I was standing by when they took her mask
off....”
“Who is she? Have you any idea?” somebody asked.
“None at all. You can stake your life though, that at a show of this
sort there are bound to be professional crooks about. Look at the
diamonds here to-night! They must run into fortunes and fortunes.
Well, here’s luck to us all, and I hope....”
 That was as much as Preston heard and it did not interest him
greatly. Since leaving Jessica’s box he had been looking for Yootha,
whom he had seen last with Cora Hartsilver. But their box was now
empty, from which he concluded they were all dancing. Hopford, too,
he had not come across for some time. Preston knew that Hopford
and Yootha were engaged for several dances.
In the crowd Preston had lost sight of Blenkiron, and he now
threaded his way alone and aimlessly through the little groups of
dancers clustered together and resting. The band had become more
riotous than ever, the dancing more extravagant and grotesque. And
all the while, as he made his way along, he kept thinking of
Schomberg and his strange death. Again he saw the masked young
man stooping over the seated figure bent forward in the box and
apparently leaning against it. The figure had not moved then, neither
had it moved during the minutes which elapsed before he and
Blenkiron had gone up to the box to ascertain if anything were
amiss. Could Schomberg already have been dead when the slim
man stood bending over him? If so, then why had the latter not sent
for a doctor, or raised the alarm?
And that slim young man, according to Hopford, had been La
Planta. Perhaps, though, Hopford had been mistaken. Then he
thought of Jessica. How surprised and distressed she had appeared
to be when Doctor Johnson had broken to her the news of
Schomberg’s death. That she should be was, of course, only natural
in the circumstances, and yet—​—
What had become of Yootha? Where in the world had she got to?
And Cora, too, and Hopford? Perhaps Hopford had gone back to the
office of his newspaper; he had said he might have to go.
In vain he watched the dancers—​swaying, revolving, always
revolving, until the scene made him dizzy. But he saw no sign of
Yootha, or of any of his party. At intervals he glanced at the box they
had occupied, but it remained empty. He was getting sick of the
whole thing, and longed to get back home. But he could not go home
without first seeing Yootha. He felt he had seen less of her that
evening than he had hoped to do; but then she loved dancing, and
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