The Geopolitics of Water: Regional

Rivals Compete for South Asia's

Rivers
Jan 24, 2025 | 17:13 GMT

The Geopolitics of Water

(Getty Images; RANE)

Editor's Note: This article is part of an ongoing RANE series on the

geopolitical impacts of water stress. The first installment of this series
provided a broad overview of how the unequal distribution of freshwater
shapes geopolitical patterns. Other installments have examined the impacts
of water stress on the global economy, Europe, China, the Sahel region of
sub-Saharan Africa, Israel, Central Asia, Chile, the Middle East, the Mekong
River region, climate investment, India, North
Africa, cyberattacks, Egypt and Brazil
South Asia will increasingly prize the Brahmaputra and Indus rivers as
demographic and economic growth heighten regional water demand and
intensify geopolitical rivalries, portending more severe diplomatic
tensions and instability in the region over the coming years. Water
insecurity remains a distinct challenge in Asia; despite the continent being
home to 60% of the global population and projected to see some two-thirds of
the world's population growth over the coming decade, it only has around
3,920 cubic meters of freshwater per person per year, less than any other
continent besides Antarctica. This issue is particularly keen in South Asia,
with the World Resources Institute categorizing 74% of the region as exposed
to "extremely high water stress," which the institute defines as countries
regularly using up almost their entire available water supply. Population
growth and economic development have only intensified regional
competition over the usage of major waterways, especially with India
experiencing years of strong economic growth and overtaking China as the
world's most populous country in 2023 — a distinction India is expected to
maintain for another quarter century. These pressures, in combination with
simmering rivalries between China and India as well as India and Pakistan,
are raising risks of water-related conflict in South Asia and the broader
region.
The Brahmaputra River is a major transboundary river in South Asia,
and India and China increasingly value it as an untapped source of
hydroelectric power and strategic advantage. Given the Brahmaputra
flows through parts of northeast India that receive some of the highest
amounts of rainfall in the world, it is only modestly important as a source of
irrigation to local communities. For India, the river's greater value lies as a
major transportation route to and from the country's northeast and its
potential as a source of hydroelectric power for northeastern states, whose
development has lagged compared with the rest of the country. In recent
years, this has driven tensions with neighboring China, which has also
increasingly valued the river's potential hydroelectric capacity, prompting
Beijing to announce in 2021 that it intended to build the world's first "super
dam" upstream at the river's Great Bend in Tibet. China has justified such
major damming projects as necessary for the country to achieve its climate
goals as a global leader in manufacturing and energy consumption. However,
China's announcement of the project came amid a major flare-up in its long-
standing territorial dispute with India, which only deepened in subsequent
years as both sides doubled down on developing military and civilian
infrastructure along their border. Thus, alongside China's capacity to harness
hydroelectric power from the Brahmaputra to support its economic growth,
India has become increasingly concerned about China's use of the planned
super dam to bolster its territorial claims in the disputed region — especially
since such projects typically require establishing or bolstering territorial
control in nearby areas to support construction.
 Though India-China relations have ebbed and
flowed amid their decades-long territorial dispute,
bilateral relations severely worsened in 2020-21
following a series of deadly border
clashes between the two countries' troops. The
most severe clash took place in June 2020 in the
Galwan River Valley, where China reportedly had
set up tents and observation posts that it claimed
aligned with its agreements with India, but which
India argued were illegally built on its side of the
de-facto border. Indian soldiers on patrol later
discovered the tents and set them on fire, which
triggered a melee involving fistfights, iron rods,
and nail- and barbed wire-laden clubs, ultimately
killing at least 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers
while wounding dozens of others.
 China's planned super dam will reportedly produce
up to 60 gigawatts of power, far overshadowing
China's Three Gorges dam, which is currently the
largest hydroelectric project in the world with an
installed capacity of 22.5 gigawatts.
Over the coming years, India and China's continuing rivalry will bolster
the Brahmaputra's importance as a source of power, while the two sides'
unresolved border dispute will increasingly situate the river as an arena
through which to legitimize and even defend territorial claims,
particularly during high bilateral tensions. The Brahmaputra's value as an
irrigation source probably will remain limited, as climate projections suggest
much of northeast India will continue to see significant rainfall, with
precipitation in parts of the region likely even intensifying. As a result, the
river will continue to grow in importance as a source of power to support
India's and China's economic development and as a place where the two
countries will strengthen their respective territorial claims. Though tensions
along the border have eased modestly since India and China signed a
breakthrough border patrolling agreement in October 2024, their mistrust for
each other remains deep, and they appear far from resolving their decades-
long territorial dispute. Beyond legitimizing territorial claims, China's
advantageous position upstream will enable it to influence the timing of water
flows, which the country may use to defend its claims by threatening or
unleashing floods on downstream northeast Indian communities during
periods of high tension or even conflict with India. China has already
triggered flood events along the Mekong River in East Asia through
unexpected releases at its Dachaoshan and Nuozhadu dams, which caused
river levels to surge and inflicted widespread damage on downstream
communities. China's planned super dam upstream of the Brahmaputra would
enable it to present a similar threat to Indian military positions along parts of
the disputed border in addition to downstream communities. The long-
standing absence of any formal transboundary water agreements and
accompanying dispute resolution mechanisms between India and China will
exacerbate the likelihood that the Brahmaputra becomes another flashpoint
for diplomatic tension and potential conflict between the two rivals.
 China's planned super dam has already driven
India to plan its own hydroelectric projects along
the Brahmaputra in its claimed territories. In July
2024, Reuters reported the country intends to
spend some $1 billion to accelerate the
construction of 12 hydropower projects in the
northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh. Months
later, in November 2024, the government formally
approved the construction of two such projects
worth around $435,000.
 Though China and India shared water data related
to the Brahmaputra from 2002-23, China
occasionally has withheld critical hydrological
information from India during periods of high
bilateral tensions, including during the 2017 and
2020 flood seasons. Though the two sides are
reportedly in the process of renewing the
agreement, reports on the progress of these efforts
have been scant.

The Indus River is another major transboundary waterway in the

region, and while the Indus Waters Treaty has facilitated decades of
relatively peaceful water-sharing between India and Pakistan,
intensifying demands for water use are threatening this stability. India
and Pakistan signed the Indus Waters Treaty in September 1960, giving India
unrestricted use of the "eastern rivers" of Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, while
granting Pakistan use of the "western rivers" of Indus, Jhelum and Chenab;
India is also allowed to use the western rivers, but for strictly limited
purposes that must not significantly disrupt or alter water flow to Pakistan.
Though the Indus Waters Treaty has successfully mitigated the threat of
India-Pakistan water conflict for decades, disagreements have arisen since the
turn of the century as both countries' populations and demand for energy and
water have grown. India has argued that the eastern rivers it controls make up
only around 20% of the total water of the Indus River system, which
alongside significant environmental, demographic and economic changes that
have transpired since the treaty's signing in 1960, warrants a renegotiation of
the treaty's terms to grant New Delhi greater flexibility in using the western
rivers. Meanwhile, Pakistan's location downstream has made it sensitive to
India's growing use of the western rivers, particularly for hydroelectric
projects. Pakistan claims some of these projects violate India's treaty
obligations to allow the western rivers to flow unimpeded, and Islamabad has
used these arguments and the treaty's dispute mechanisms to help stall India's
hydropower projects. Tensions linked to the dispute have risen in recent
years, during which India has sent Pakistan four formal requests to reassess
the treaty's obligations, marking the greatest challenge to the agreement since
its inception.
 India's efforts to modify the Indus Waters Treaty
have included making its demands through the
Permanent Indus Commission, the formal entity
tasked with implementing the treaty, in addition to
threatening to disregard rulings by arbiters
disfavorable to its interests. However, these efforts
have thus far failed to secure New Delhi the more
flexible water usage it is pursuing.

Mistrust and the challenges of renegotiating the treaty suggest neither

side will agree to modify it in the near term, and rising demand for water
will heighten bilateral tensions and fuel greater instability between India
and Pakistan over the coming years. Though India and Pakistan have
become increasingly dissatisfied with certain parts of the treaty, the two
countries' contentious history and persisting rivalry continue to incentivize
both to prioritize domestic political interests and remain uncompromising.
This suggests both sides are unlikely to agree to renegotiate their water treaty
in the near term, especially since a new bilateral agreement would probably
be less satisfactory than the current one, which for all its alleged faults has
proven to be a surprisingly resilient and stabilizing force. That India has yet
to detail the specific changes it seeks to make and that Pakistan has not
formally put forth its own request to renegotiate the treaty's terms may also
indicate some level of begrudging acceptance that suggests the treaty will
remain intact in the near term. However, demographic growth and economic
interests will continue to heighten water demand over the coming years for
such things as power generation and irrigation, particularly for India.
Eventually, the severity of these demands probably will prompt India to
undertake more assertive efforts to secure more flexible use of the western
rivers using all available dispute and mediation mechanisms linked to the
Indus Waters Treaty. Should these efforts fail or otherwise fall short of
realizing India's demands, India may consider abrogating the agreement to
secure its needs. Such an escalation would worsen bilateral relations,
threatening diplomatic spats involving punitive measures or, more severely,
the weakening of agreements like the tenuous 2021 bilateral ceasefire that for
years has limited skirmishes along the two countries' border. And though
both sides would remain incentivized to avoid outright conflict and the costs
thereof, India and Pakistan could intensify covert activity and other efforts to
destabilize each other. Such a scenario would mark a new era of Indian and
Pakistani relations in which the Indus Waters Treaty is no longer a stabilizing
force but rather another flashpoint for confrontation.
 In September 2016, after Pakistan-based militants
attacked an Indian army base in Kashmir, India
considered using its upstream advantage to
retaliate against Pakistan. Reportedly, Prime
Minister Narendra Modi told other Indian officials
that "Blood and water cannot flow
simultaneously," and officials discussed various
options for India to use as much water as it could
under the terms of the treaty at Pakistan's expense.
India ultimately opted to suspend the meetings of
the Permanent Indus Commission, which is
responsible for implementing the provisions of the
Indus Waters Treaty.