Republic of the Philippines The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the

SUPREME COURT execution for reinstatement.

Manila
xxx xxx xxx
EN BANC
Section 17. Transitory provision. — Appeals filed on or
G.R. No. 90501 August 5, 1991 after March 21, 1989, but prior to the effectivity of these
Interim Rules must conform to the requirements as
herein set forth or as may be directed by the
ARIS (PHIL.) INC., petitioner,
Commission.
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR
ARBITER FELIPE GARDUQUE III, LEODEGARIO DE GUZMAN, The antecedent facts and proceedings which gave rise to this
LILIA PEREZ, ROBERTO BESTAMONTE, AIDA OPENA, petition are not disputed:
REYNALDO TORIADO, APOLINARIO GAGAHINA, RUFINO DE
CASTRO, FLORDELIZA RAYOS DEL SOL, STEVE SANCHO,
On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who were employees of
ESTER CAIRO, MARIETA MAGALAD, and MARY B.
petitioner, aggrieved by management's failure to attend to their
NADALA, respondents.
complaints concerning their working surroundings which had
become detrimental and hazardous, requested for a grievance
Cesar C. Cruz & Partners for petitioner. conference. As none was arranged, and believing that their appeal
Zosimo Morillo for respondent Rayos del Sol. would be fruitless, they grouped together after the end of their
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy & Associates for private work that day with other employees and marched directly to the
respondents. management's office to protest its long silence and inaction on
DAVIDE, JR., J.: their complaints.

Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the amendment On 12 April 1988, the management issued a memorandum to
introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715 to Article 223 each of the private respondents, who were identified by the
of the Labor Code of the Philippines (PD No. 442, as amended) petitioner's supervisors as the most active participants in the rally
allowing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of requiring them to explain why they should not be terminated from
a decision of a labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated the service for their conduct. Despite their explanation, private
employee and of Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals respondents were dismissed for violation of company rules and
under R.A. No. 6715 implementing the same. It also questions the regulations, more specifically of the provisions on security and
validity of the Transitory Provision (Section 17) of the said Interim public order and on inciting or participating in illegal strikes or
Rules. concerted actions.

The challenged portion of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal
which took effect on 21 March 1989, reads as follows: dismissal against petitioner and Mr. Gavino Bayan with the
regional office of the NLRC at the National Capital Region, Manila,
which was docketed therein as NLRC-NCR-00-0401630-88.
SEC 12. Article 223 of the same code is amended to
read as follows:
After due trial, Labor Arbiter Felipe Garduque III handed down on
22 June 1989 a decision' the dispositive portion of which reads:
ART. 223. Appeal.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Aris (Phils.), Inc. is hereby

xxx xxx xxx
ordered to reinstate within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof, herein complainants Leodegario de Guzman,
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter Rufino de Castro, Lilia M. Perez, Marieta Magalad,
reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, in so far Flordeliza Rayos del Sol, Reynaldo Toriado, Roberto
as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall Besmonte, Apolinario Gagahina, Aidam (sic) Opena,
immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The Steve C. Sancho Ester Cairo, and Mary B. Nadala to their
employee shall either be admitted back to work under former respective positions or any substantial equivalent
the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his positions if already filled up, without loss of seniority
dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, right and privileges but with limited backwages of six (6)
merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond months except complainant Leodegario de Guzman.
by the employer shall not stay the execution for
reinstatement provided therein.
All other claims and prayers are hereby denied for lack
of merit.
This is a new paragraph ingrafted into the Article.
SO ORDERED.
Sections 2 and 17 of the "NLRC Interim Rules On Appeals Under
R.A. No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code", which the National
On 19 July 1989, complainants (herein private respondents) filed
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) promulgated on 8 August
a Motion For Issuance of a Writ of Execution 2 pursuant to the
1989, provide as follows:
above-quoted Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715.

Section 2. Order of Reinstatement and Effect of Bond. —

On 21 July 1989, petitioner filed its Appeal.3
In so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, the
decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or
separated employee shall immediately be executory On 26 July 1989, the complainants, except Flor Rayos del Sol,
even pending appeal. The employee shall either be filed a Partial Appeal.4
admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation,
On 10 August 1989, complainant Flor Rayos del Sol filed a Partial
or, at the option of the employer, merely be reinstated
Appeal.5
in the payroll.
On 29 August 1989, petitioner filed an Opposition 6 to the motion As regards the retroactive application thereof, it maintains that
for execution alleging that Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 on being merely procedural in nature, it can apply to cases pending
execution pending appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases at the time of its effectivity on the theory that no one can claim a
pending at the time of its effectivity because it does not expressly vested right in a rule of procedure. Moreover, such a law is
provide that it shall be given retroactive effect 7 and to give compatible with the constitutional provision on protection to labor.
retroactive effect to Section 12 thereof to pending cases would
not only result in the imposition of an additional obligation on
On 11 December 1989, private respondents filed a
petitioner but would also dilute its right to appeal since it would
Manifestation14 informing the Court that they are adopting the
be burdened with the consequences of reinstatement without the
Comment filed by the Solicitor General and stressing that
benefit of a final judgment. In their Reply 8 filed on 1 September
petitioner failed to comply with the requisites for a valid petition
1989, complainants argued that R.A. No. 6715 is not sought to be
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
given retroactive effect in this case since the decision to be
executed pursuant to it was rendered after the effectivity of the
Act. The said law took effect on 21 March 1989, while the decision On 20 December 1989, petitioner filed a Rejoinder 15 to the
was rendered on 22 June 1989. Comment of the Solicitor General.

Petitioner submitted a Rejoinder to the Reply on 5 September In the resolution of 11 January 1990, 16 We considered the
1989.9 Comments as respondents' Answers, gave due course to the
petition, and directed that the case be calendared for deliberation.
On 5 October 1989, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order granting
the motion for execution and the issuance of a partial writ of In urging Us to declare as unconstitutional that portion of Section
execution10 as far as reinstatement of herein complainants is 223 of the Labor Code introduced by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715,
concerned in consonance with the provision of Section 2 of the as well as the implementing provision covered by Section 2 of the
rules particularly the last sentence thereof. NLRC Interim Rules, allowing immediate execution, even pending
appeal, of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a labor arbiter
reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, petitioner submits
In this Order, the Labor Arbiter also made reference to Section 17
that said portion violates the due process clause of the
of the NLRC Interim Rules in this wise:
Constitution in that it is oppressive and unreasonable. It argues
that a reinstatement pending appeal negates the right of the
Since Section 17 of the said rules made mention of employer to self-protection for it has been ruled that an employer
appeals filed on or after March 21, 1989, but prior to the cannot be compelled to continue in employment an employee
effectivity of these interim rules which must conform guilty of acts inimical to the interest of the employer; the right of
with the requirements as therein set forth (Section 9) or an employer to dismiss is consistent with the legal truism that the
as may be directed by the Commission, it obviously law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither the
treats of decisions of Labor Arbiters before March oppression nor the destruction of the employer. For, social justice
21,1989. With more reason these interim rules be made should be implemented not through mistaken sympathy for or
to apply to the instant case since the decision hereof misplaced antipathy against any group, but even-handedly and
(sic) was rendered thereafter.11 fairly.17

Unable to accept the above Order, petitioner filed the instant To clinch its case, petitioner tries to demonstrate the
petition on 26 October 198912 raising the issues adverted to in the oppressiveness of reinstatement pending appeal by portraying the
introductory portion of this decision under the following following consequences: (a) the employer would be compelled to
assignment of errors: hire additional employees or adjust the duties of other employees
simply to have someone watch over the reinstated employee to
prevent the commission of further acts prejudicial to the
A. THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO AND THE NLRC, IN
employer, (b) reinstatement of an undeserving, if not undesirable,
ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE PRIVATE
employee may demoralize the rank and file, and (c) it may
RESPONDENTS PENDING APPEAL AND IN PROVIDING
encourage and embolden not only the reinstated employees but
FOR SECTION 2 OF THE INTERIM RULES,
also other employees to commit similar, if not graver infractions.
RESPECTIVELY, ACTED WITHOUT AND IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION SINCE THE BASIS FOR SAID ORDER AND
INTERIM RULE, i.e., SECTION 12 OF R.A. 6715 IS These rationalizations and portrayals are misplaced and are purely
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTY OF conjectural which, unfortunately, proceed from a
DUE PROCESS IT BEING OPPRESSIVE AND misunderstanding of the nature and scope of the relief of
UNREASONABLE. execution pending appeal.

B. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE PROVISION IN(SIC) Execution pending appeal is interlinked with the right to appeal.
REINSTATEMENT PENDING APPEAL IS VALID, One cannot be divorced from the other. The latter may be availed
NONETHELESS, THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO AND THE of by the losing party or a party who is not satisfied with a
NLRC STILL ACTED IN EXCESS AND WITHOUT judgment, while the former may be applied for by the prevailing
JURISDICTION IN RETROACTIVELY APPLYING SAID party during the pendency of the appeal. The right to appeal,
PROVISION TO PENDING LABOR CASES. however, is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a
statutory privilege of statutory origin 18 and, therefore, available
only if granted or provided by statute. The law may then validly
In Our resolution of 7 March 1989, We required the respondents
provide limitations or qualifications thereto or relief to the
to comment on the petition.
prevailing party in the event an appeal is interposed by the losing
party. Execution pending appeal is one such relief long recognized
Respondent NLRC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed in this jurisdiction. The Revised Rules of Court allows execution
its Comment on 20 November 1989. 13 Meeting squarely the issues pending appeal and the grant thereof is left to the discretion of
raised by petitioner, it submits that the provision concerning the the court upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. 19
mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee whose
dismissal is found unjustified by the labor arbiter is a valid
Before its amendment by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, Article 223
exercise of the police power of the state and the contested
of the Labor Code already allowed execution of decisions of the
provision "is then a police legislation."
NLRC pending their appeal to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment.
In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement The charge then that the challenged law as well as the
aspect of a decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or implementing rule are unconstitutional is absolutely
separated employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate baseless.1âwphi1 Laws are presumed constitutional. 24 To justify
policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal
the 1987 Constitution on labor and the working-man. breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict
with the constitution is clear beyond reasonable
These provisions are the quintessence of the aspirations of the
doubt.25 In Parades, et al. vs. Executive Secretary26 We stated:
workingman for recognition of his role in the social and economic
life of the nation, for the protection of his rights, and the
promotion of his welfare. Thus, in the Article on Social Justice and 2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled
Human Rights of the Constitution, 20 which principally directs doctrine that between two possible constructions, one
Congress to give highest priority to the enactment of measures avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other
that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred. That
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove which will save, not that which will destroy, commends
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power itself for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all
for the common good, the State is mandated to afford full these years is one of validity. The onerous task of
protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and proving otherwise is on the party seeking to nullify a
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of statute. It must be proved by clear and convincing
employment opportunities for all; to guarantee the rights of all evidence that there is an infringement of a constitutional
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and provision, save in those cases where the challenged act
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right is void on its face. Absent such a showing, there can be
to strike in accordance with law, security of tenure, human no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-
conditions of work, and a living wage, to participate in policy and founded, does not suffice. Justice Malcolm's aphorism
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as is apropos: To doubt is to sustain.27
may be provided by law; and to promote the principle of shared
responsibility between workers and employers and the
The reason for this:
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes.
Incidentally, a study of the Constitutions of various nations readily
reveals that it is only our Constitution which devotes a separate ... can be traced to the doctrine of separation of powers
article on Social Justice and Human Rights. Thus, by no less than which enjoins on each department a proper respect for
its fundamental law, the Philippines has laid down the strong the acts of the other departments. ... The theory is that,
foundations of a truly just and humane society. This Article as the joint act of the legislative and executive
addresses itself to specified areas of concern labor, agrarian and authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully
natural resources reform, urban land reform and housing, health, studied and determined to be constitution before it was
working women, and people's organizations and reaches out to finally enacted. Hence, as long as there is some other
the underprivileged sector of society, for which reason the basis that can be used by the courts for its decision, the
President of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, former constitutionality of the challenged law will not be
Associate Justice of this Court Cecilia Muñoz-Palma, aptly touched upon and the case will be decided on other
describes this Article as the "heart of the new Charter." 21 available grounds.28

These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so The issue concerning Section 17 of the NLRC Interim Rules does
much to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully not deserve a measure of attention. The reference to it in the
and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and Order of the Labor Arbiter of 5 October 1989 was unnecessary
economic force, which the Constitution also expressly affirms With since the procedure of the appeal proper is not involved in this
equal intensity.22 Labor is an indispensable partner for the nation's case. Moreover, the questioned interim rules of the NLRC,
progress and stability. promulgated on 8 August 1989, can validly be given retroactive
effect. They are procedural or remedial in character, promulgated
pursuant to the authority vested upon it under Article 218(a) of
If in ordinary civil actions execution of judgment pending appeal is
the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. Settled is the rule
authorized for reasons the determination of which is merely left to
that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect. 29 There are
the discretion of the judge, We find no plausible reason to
no vested rights in rules of procedure. 30 A remedial statute may
withhold it in cases of decisions reinstating dismissed or separated
be made applicable to cases pending at the time of its
employees. In such cases, the poor employees had been deprived
enactment.31
of their only source of livelihood, their only means of support for
their family their very lifeblood. To Us, this special circumstance is
far better than any other which a judge, in his sound discretion, WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
may determine. In short, with respect to decisions reinstating Costs against petitioner.
employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently
overwhelming reason for its execution pending appeal.
SO ORDERED.

The validity of the questioned law is not only supported and

sustained by the foregoing considerations. As contended by the
Solicitor General, it is a valid exercise of the police power of the
State. Certainly, if the right of an employer to freely discharge his
employees is subject to regulation by the State, basically in the
exercise of its permanent police power on the theory that the
preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the
State, that is more vital than the preservation of corporate
profits.23 Then, by and pursuant to the same power, the State
may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of
a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since
that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the
appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing
threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed
or separated employee and its family.
 Republic of the Philippines 2. Assuming that the City of Manila had the power on 7
SUPREME COURT September 1971 to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated
Manila Development Corporation, whether the franchise granted is valied
considering that the franchise has no duration, and appears to be
granted in perpetuity.
EN BANC

3. Whether the City of Manila had the power to issue a Jai-Alai

franchise to Associated Development Corporation on 7 September
1971 in view of executive Order No. 392 dated 1 January 1951
G.R. No. 115044 January 27, 1995 which transferred from local governments to the Games and
Amusements Board the power to regulate Jai-Alai.1
HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila,
and the City of Manila, petitioners, On 15 September 1994, respondent Associated Development
vs. Corporation (ADC) filed a petition for prohibition, mandamus,
HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as Judge, branch 40, Regional injunction and damages with prayer for temporary restraining
Trial Court of Manila and ASSOCIATED order and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial
CORPORATION, respondents. Court of Manila against petitioner Guingona and then GAB
chairman Sumulong, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-71656,
seeking to prevent GAB from withdrawing the provisional
G.R. No. 117263 January 27, 1995 authority that had earlier been granted to ADC. On the same day,
the RTC of Manila, Branch 4, through presiding Judge Vetino
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR. and DOMINADOR R. Reyes, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the GAB
CEPEDA, petitioners, from withdrawing ADC's provisional authority. This temporary
vs. restraining order was converted into a writ of preliminary
HON. VETINO REYES and ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT injunction upon ADC's posting of a bond in the amount of
CORPORATION, respondents. P2,000,000.00.2
PADILLA, J.:
These two (2) cases which are inter-related actually involve Subsequently, also in G.R. No. 115044, the Republic of the
simple issues. if these issues have apparently become Philippines, through the Games and Amusements Board, filed a
complicated, it is not by reason of their nature because of the "Motion for Intervention; for Leave to File a Motion for
events and dramatis personae involved. reconsideration in Intervention; and to Refer the case to the
Court En Banc" and later a "Motion for Leave to File Supplemental
The petition in G.R. No. 115044 was dismissed by the First Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention and to Admit Attached
Division of this Court on 01 September 1994 based on a finding Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention".
that there was "no abuse of discretion, much less lack of or
excess of jurisdiction, on the part of respondent judge In an En Banc Resolution dated 20 September 1994, this Court
[Pacquing]", in issuing the questioned orders. Judge Pacquing had referred G.R. No. 115044 to the Court En Banc and required the
earlier issued in Civil Case No. 88-45660, RTC of Manila, Branch respondents therein to comment on the aforementioned motions.
40, the following orders which were assailed by the Mayor of the
City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim, in said G.R. No. 115044:
Meanwhile, Judge Reyes on 19 October 1994 issued another
order, this time, granting ADC a writ of
a. order dated 28 March 1994 directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. preliminary mandatory injunction against Guingona and GAB to
Lim to issue the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in favor of compel them to issue in favor of ADC the authority to operate jai-
Associated Development Corporation (ADC). alai.

b. order dated 11 April 1994 directing mayor Lim to explain why Guingona, as executive secretary, and Dominador Cepeda, Jr. as
he should not be cited for contempt for non-compliance with the the new GAB chairman, then filed the petition in G.R. No. 117263
order dated 28 March 1994. assailing the abovementioned orders of respondent Judge Vetino
Reyes.
c. order dated 20 April 1994 reiterating the previous order
directing Mayor Lim to immediately issue the permit/license to On 25 October 1994, in G.R. No. 117263, this Court granted
Associated Development Corporation (ADC). petitioner's motion for leave to file supplemental petition and to
admit attached supplemental petition with urgent prayer for
The order dated 28 march 1994 was in turn issued upon motion restraining order. The Court further required respondents to file
by ADC for execution of a final judgment rendered on 9 their comment on the petition and supplemental petition with
September 1988 which ordered the Manila Mayor to immediately urgent prayer for restraining order. The Court likewise set the
issue to ADC the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in Manila, case and all incidents thereof for hearing on 10 November 1994.
under Manila Ordinance No. 7065.
At the hearing on 10 November 1994, the issues to be resolved
On 13 September 1994, petitioner Guingona (as executive were formulated by the Court as follows:
secretary) issued a directive to then chairman of the Games and
Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, jr. to hold in 1. whether or not intervention by the Republic of the Philippines
abeyance the grant of authority, or if any had been issued, to at this stage of the proceedings is proper;
withdraw such grant of authority, to Associated Development
Corporation to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila, until the
following legal questions are properly resolved: 2. assuming such intervention is proper, whether or not the
Associated Development Corporation has a valid and subsisting
franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai;
1. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers
issued by local governments as of 20 August 1975 is
unconstitutional.
3. whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed ruled by this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII Section 3 of the
by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the aforementioned Constitution states:
temporary restraining order (later writ of preliminary injunction);
and
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions
4. whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed and other executive issuances not inconsistent
by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the aforementioned writ of with this Constitution shall remain operative
preliminary mandatory injunction. until amended, repealed or revoked.

On the issue of the propriety of the intervention by the Republic of There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No.
the Philippines, a question was raised during the hearing on 10 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent
November 1994 as to whether intervention in G.R. No. 115044 law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised
was the proper remedy for the national government to take in legislative powers).
questioning the existence of a valid ADC franchise to operate the
jai-alai or whether a separate action for quo warranto under
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued
Section 2, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court was the proper remedy.
existence of ADC's franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality
of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of
We need not belabor this issue since counsel for respondent ADC the Court's First Division in said case, aside from not being final,
agreed to the suggestion that this Court once and for all settle all cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as
substantive issues raised by the parties in these cases. Moreover, unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banc has that power
this Court can consider the petition filed in G.R. No. 117263 as under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution. 4
one for quo warranto which is within the original jurisdiction of the
Court under section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution. 3
And on the question of whether or not the government
is estopped from contesting ADC's possession of a valid franchise,
On the propriety of intervention by the Republic, however, it will the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by
be recalled that this Court in Director of Lands v. Court of the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents (Republic v.
Appeals (93 SCRA 238) allowed intervention even beyond the Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)
period prescribed in Section 2 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. The
Court ruled in said case that a denial of the motions for
Consequently, in the light of the foregoing expostulation, we
intervention would "lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to
conclude that the republic (in contra distinction to the City of
the movants, to their successor-in-interest and to all purchasers
Manila) may be allowed to intervene in G.R. No. 115044. The
for value and in good faith and thereby open the door to fraud,
Republic is intervening in G.R. No. 115044 in the exercise, not of
falsehood and misrepresentation, should intervenors' claim be
its business or proprietary functions, but in the exercise of its
proven to be true."
governmental functions to protect public morals and promote the
general welfare.
In the present case, the resulting injustice and injury, should the
national government's allegations be proven correct, are manifest,
II
since the latter has squarely questioned the very existence of a
valid franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai (which is a
gambling operation) in favor of ADC. As will be more extensively Anent the question of whether ADC has a valid franchise to
discussed later, the national government contends that Manila operate the Jai-Alai de Manila, a statement of the pertinent laws is
Ordinance No. 7065 which purported to grant to ADC a franchise in order.
to conduct jai-alai operations is void and ultra vires since Republic
Act No. 954, approved on 20 June 1953, or very much earlier
than said Ordinance No. 7065, the latter approved 7 September 1. The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on
1971, in Section 4 thereof, requires a legislative franchise, not a 18 June 1949. Section 18 thereof provides:
municipal franchise, for the operation of jai-alai. Additionally, the
national government argues that even assuming, arguendo, that Sec. 18. Legislative Powers. — The Municipal
the abovementioned ordinance is valid, ADC's franchise was Board shall have the following legislative
nonetheless effectively revoked by Presidential decree No. 771, powers:
issued on 20 August 1975, Sec. 3 of which expressly
revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of
gambling facilities (including the jai-alai) issued by local xxx xxx xxx
governments.
(jj) To tax, license, permit and regulate wagers
On the other hand, ADC's position is that Ordinance No. 7065 was or betting by the public on boxing, sipa,
validly enacted by the City of Manila pursuant to its delegated bowling, billiards, pools, horse and dog races,
powers under it charter, Republic Act No. 409. ADC also squarely cockpits, jai-alai, roller or ice-skating on any
assails the constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violative of the equal sporting or athletic contests, as well as grant
protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. In this exclusive rights to establishments for this
connection, counsel for ADC contends that this Court should really purpose, notwithstanding any existing law to
rule on the validity of PD No. 771 to be able to determine whether the contrary.
ADC continues to possess a valid franchise.
2. On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued
It will undoubtedly be a grave injustice to both parties in this case transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local
if this Court were to shirk from ruling on the issue of government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
constitutionality of PD No. 771. Such issue has, in our view,
become the very lis mota in resolving the present controversy, in 3. On 20 June 1953, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 954,
view of ADC's insistence that it was granted a valid and legal entitled "An Act to Prohibit With Horse Races and Basque Pelota
franchise by Ordinance No. 7065 to operate the jai-alai. Games (Jai-Alai), And To Prescribe Penalties For Its Violation".
The provisions of Republic Act No. 954 relating to jai-alai are as
The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) follows:
are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise
 Sec. 4. No person, or group of It is worthy of note that neither of the authorities relied upon by
persons other than the operator or maintainer ADC to support its alleged possession of a valid franchise, namely
of a fronton with legislative franchise to the Charter of the City of Manila (Rep. Act No. 409) and Manila
conduct basque pelota games (Jai-alai), shall Ordinance No. 7065 uses the word "franchise". Rep. Act No. 409
offer, to take or arrange bets on any basque empowers the Municipal Board of Manila to "tax, license,
pelota game or event, or maintain or use a permit and regulate wagers or betting" and to "grant
totalizator or other device, method or system exclusive rights to establishments", while Ordinance No. 7065
to bet or gamble on any basque pelota game authorized the Manila City Mayor to "allow and permit" ADC to
or event. (emphasis supplied). operate jai-alai facilities in the City of Manila.

Sec. 5. No person, operator or maintainer of a It is clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate to
fronton with legislative franchise to conduct the City of Manila the power "to franchise" wagers or betting,
basque pelota games shall offer, take, or including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such power "to
arrange bets on any basque pelota game or franchise". What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in Rep.
event, or maintain or use a totalizator or other Act No. 409, with respect to wagers or betting, was the power to
device, method or system to bet or gamble on "license, permit, or regulate" which therefore means that a license
any basque pelota game or event outside the or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate a wager or
place, enclosure, or fronton where the basque betting activity, such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted,
pelota game is held. (emphasis supplied). would not amount to something meaningful UNLESS the holder of
the permit or license was also FRANCHISED by the national
government to so operate. Moreover, even this power to license,
4. On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of
permit, or regulate wagers or betting on jai-alai was removed
Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled "An
from local governments, including the City of Manila, and
Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The
transferred to the GAB on 1 January 1951 by Executive Order No.
Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And
392. The net result is that the authority to grant franchises for the
Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And
operation of jai-alai frontons is in Congress, while the regulatory
Conditions And For Other Purposes."
function is vested in the GAB.

5. On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by

In relation, therefore, to the facts of this case, since ADC has no
then President Marcos. The decree, entitled "Revoking All Powers
franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so
and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License
operate even if its has a license or permit from the City Mayor to
or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse
operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.
And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of
Gambling", in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing
franchises and permits issued by local governments. It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the Revised Penal
Code punishes gambling and betting under Articles 195 to 199
thereof. Gambling is thus generally prohibited by law, unless
6. On 16 October 1975, Presidential Decree No. 810, entitled "An
another law is enacted by Congress expressly exempting or
Act granting The Philippine Jai-Alai And Amusement Corporation A
excluding certain forms of gambling from the reach of criminal
Franchise To Operate, Construct And Maintain A Fronton For
law. Among these form the reach of criminal law. Among these
Basque Pelota And Similar Games of Skill In THE Greater Manila
forms of gambling allowed by special law are the horse races
Area," was promulgated.
authorized by Republic Acts Nos. 309 and 983 and gambling
casinos authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1869.
7 On 08 May 1987, then President Aquino, by virtue of Article
XVIII, Section 6, of the Constitution, which allowed the incumbent
While jai-alai as a sport is not illegal per se, the accepting of bets
legislative powers until the first Congress was convened, issued
or wagers on the results of jai-alai games is undoubtedly
Executive Order No. 169 expressly repealing PD 810 and revoking
gambling and, therefore, a criminal offense punishable under
and cancelling the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and
Articles 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code, unless it is shown
Amusement Corporation.
that a later or special law had been passed allowing it. ADC has
not shown any such special law.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 117263 argue that Republic Act No. 954
effectively removed the power of the Municipal Board of Manila to
Republic Act No. 409 (the Revised Charter of the City of Manila)
grant franchises for gambling operations. It is argued that the
which was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 gave the
term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act No. 954 is used to refer to
Municipal Board certain delegated legislative powers under
franchises issued by Congress.
Section 18. A perusal of the powers enumerated under Section 18
shows that these powers are basically regulatory in nature. 5 The
On the other hand, ADC contends that Republic Act N. 409 regulatory nature of these powers finds support not only in the
(Manila Chapter) gives legislative powers to the Municipal Board plain words of the enumerations under Section 28 but also in this
to grant franchises, and since Republic Act No. 954 does not Court's ruling in People v. Vera (65 Phil. 56).
specifically qualify the word "legislative" as referring exclusively to
Congress, then Rep. Act No. 954 did not remove the power of the
In Vera, this Court declared that a law which gives the Provincial
Municipal Board under Section 18(jj) of Republic Act No. 409 and
Board the discretion to determine whether or not a law of general
consequently it was within the power of the City of Manila to allow
application (such as, the Probation law-Act No. 4221) would or
ADC to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.
would not be operative within the province, is unconstitutional for
being an undue delegation of legislative power.
On this point, the government counter-argues that the term
"legislative powers" is used in Rep. Act No. 409 merely to
From the ruling in Vera, it would be logical to conclude that, if
distinguish the powers under Section 18 of the law from the other
ADC's arguments were to prevail, this Court would likewise
powers of the Municipal Board, but that the term "legislative
declare Section 18(jj) of the Revised Charter of Manila
franchise" in Rep. Act No. 954 refers to a franchise granted solely
unconstitutional for the power it would delegate to the Municipal
by Congress.
Board of Manila would give the latter the absolute and unlimited
discretion to render the penal code provisions on gambling
Further, the government argues that Executive Order No. 392 inapplicable or inoperative to persons or entities issued permits to
dated 01 January 1951 transferred even the power to regulate operate gambling establishments in the City of Manila.
Jai-Alai from the local governments to the Games and
Amusements Board (GAB), a national government agency.
We need not go to this extent, however, since the rule is that laws In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation (20 July 1994, G.R.
must be presumed valid, constitutional and in harmony with other No. 111097), this Court stated thru Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz:
laws. Thus, the relevant provisions of Rep. Acts Nos. 409 and 954
and Ordinance No. 7065 should be taken together and it should
In the exercise of its own discretion, the
then be clear that the legislative powers of the Municipal Board
legislative power may prohibit gambling
should be understood to be regulatory in nature and that Republic
altogether or allow it without limitation or it
Act No. 954 should be understood to refer to congressional
may prohibit some forms of gambling and
franchises, as a necessity for the operation of jai-alai.
allow others for whatever reasons it may
consider sufficient. Thus, it has
We need not, however, again belabor this issue further since the prohibited jueteng and monte but permits
task at hand which will ultimately, and with finality, decide the lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In
issues in this case is to determine whether PD No. 771 validly making such choices, Congress has consulted
revoked ADC's franchise to operate the jai-alai, assuming (without its own wisdom, which this Court has no
conceding) that it indeed possessed such franchise under authority to review, much less reverse. Well
Ordinance No. 7065. has it been said that courts do not sit to
resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That
is the prerogative of the political departments.
ADC argues that PD No. 771 is unconstitutional for being violative
It is settled that questions regarding wisdom,
of the equal protection and non-impairment provisions of the
morality and practicability of statutes are not
Constitution. On the other hand, the government contends that
addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved
PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the inherent police power of the
only by the executive and legislative
State.
departments, to which the function belongs in
our scheme of government. (Emphasis
The police power has been described as the least limitable of the supplied)
inherent powers of the State. It is based on the ancient doctrine
— salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the
Talks regarding the supposed vanishing line
supreme law.) In the early case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of
between right and privilege in American constitutional law has no
Mindoro (39 Phil. 660), this Court through Mr. Justice George A.
relevance in the context of these cases since the reference there
Malcolm stated thus:
is to economic regulations. On the other hand, jai-alai is not a
mere economic activity which the law seeks to regulate. It is
The police power of the State . . . is a power essentially gambling and whether it should be permitted and, if
co-extensive with self-protection, and is not so, under what conditions are questions primarily for the
inaptly termed the "law of overruling lawmaking authority to determine, talking into account national
necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and local interests. Here, it is the police power of the State that is
and plenary power in the State which enables paramount.
it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety and welfare of society. Carried onward
ADC questions the motive for the issuance of PD Nos. 771.
by the current of legislation, the judiciary
Clearly, however, this Court cannot look into allegations that PD
rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of
No. 771 was enacted to benefit a select group which was later
legislative discretion, provided the purposes of
given authority to operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810. The
the law do not go beyond the great principles
examination of legislative motivation is generally prohibited.
that mean security for the public welfare or do
(Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438 [1971] per
not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the
Black, J.) There is, the first place, absolute lack of evidence to
individual.
support ADC's allegation of improper motivation in the issuance of
PD No. 771. In the second place, as already averred, this Court
In the matter of PD No. 771, the purpose of the law is clearly cannot go behind the expressed and proclaimed purposes of PD
stated in the "whereas clause" as follows: No. 771, which are reasonable and even laudable.

WHEREAS, it has been reported that in spite of It should also be remembered that PD No. 771 provides that
the current drive of our law enforcement the national government can subsequently grant franchises "upon
agencies against vices and illegal gambling, proper application and verification of the qualifications of the
these social ills are still prevalent in many applicant." ADC has not alleged that it filed an application for a
areas of the country; franchise with the national government subsequent to the
enactment of PD No. 771; thus, the allegations abovementioned
(of preference to a select group) are based on conjectures,
WHEREAS, there is need to consolidate all the speculations and imagined biases which do not warrant the
efforts of the government to eradicate and consideration of this Court.
minimize vices and other forms of social ills in
pursuance of the social and economic
development program under the new society; On the other hand, it is noteworthy that while then president
Aquino issued Executive Order No. 169 revoking PD No. 810
(which granted a franchise to a Marcos-crony to operate the jai-
WHEREAS, in order to effectively control and alai), she did not scrap or repeal PD No. 771 which had revoked
regulate wagers or betting by the public on all franchises to operate jai-alais issued by local governments,
horse and dog races, jai-alai and other forms thereby re-affirming the government policy that franchises to
of gambling there is a necessity to transfer the operate jai-alais are for the national government (not local
issuance of permit and/or franchise from local governments) to consider and approve.
government to the National Government.

On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal

It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of gambling do protection clauses of the Constitution, it should be remembered
not promote public morals and welfare. Gambling is essentially that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but
antagonistic and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and erodes the rather it is more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters
value of good, honest and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by which are within the government's power to regulate and even
PD No. 771, a vice and a social ill which government must prohibit through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a
minimize (if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police
development. power for the public welfare.
In RCPI v. NTC (150 SCRA 450), we held that: WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, judgment is hereby
rendered:
A franchise started out as a "royal privilege or
(a) branch of the King's prerogative, subsisting 1. allowing the Republic of the Philippines to
in the hands of a subject." This definition was intervene in G.R. No. 115044.
given by Finch, adopted by Blackstone, and
accepted by every authority since . . . Today, a
2. declaring Presidential Decree No. 771 valid
franchise being merely a privilege emanating
and constitutional.
from the sovereign power of the state and
owing its existence to a grant, is subject to
regulation by the state itself by virtue of its 3. declaring that respondent Associated
police power through its administrative Development corporation (ADC) does not
agencies. possess the required congressional franchise to
operate and conduct the jai-alai under Republic
Act No. 954 and Presidential Decree No. 771.
There is a stronger reason for holding ADC's permit to be a mere
privilege because jai-alai, when played for bets, is pure and
simple gambling. To analogize a gambling franchise for the 4. setting aside the writs of preliminary
operation of a public utility, such as public transportation injunction and preliminary mandatory
company, is to trivialize the great historic origin of this branch of injunction issued by respondent Judge Vetino
royal privilege. Reyes in civil Case No. 94-71656.

As earlier noted, ADC has not alleged ever applying for a franchise SO ORDERED.
under the provisions of PD No. 771. and yet, the purpose of PD
No. 771 is quite clear from its provisions, i.e., to give to
the national government the exclusive power to grant gambling Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo and Mendoza, JJ.,
franchises. Thus, all franchises then existing were revoked but concur.
were made subject to reissuance by the national government
upon compliance by the applicant with government-set Narvasa, C.J. and Francisco, JJ., took no part.
qualifications and requirements.

There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection

clause since the decree revoked all franchises issued by local
governments without qualification or exception. ADC cannot allege
violation of the equal protection clause simply because it was the
only one affected by the decree, for as correctly pointed out by
the government, ADC was not singled out when all jai-alai
franchises were revoked. Besides, it is too late in the day for ADC
to seek redress for alleged violation of its constitutional rights for
it could have raised these issues as early as 1975, almost twenty
920) years ago.

Finally, we do not agree that Section 3 of PD No. 771 and the

requirement of a legislative franchise in Republic Act No. 954 are
"riders" to the two 92) laws and are violative of the rule that laws
should embrace one subject which shall be expressed in the title,
as argued by ADC. In Cordero v. Cabatuando (6 SCRA 418), this
Court ruled that the requirement under the constitution that all
laws should embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title is sufficiently met if the title is comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks
to effect, without expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of the objective.

III

On the issue of whether or not there was grave abuse of

discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the
temporary restraining order (later converted to a writ of
preliminary injunction) and the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, we hold and rule there was.

Section 3, Rule 58 of the rules of Court provides for the grounds

for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. While ADC could
allege these grounds, respondent judge should have taken judicial
notice of Republic Act No. 954 and PD 771, under Section 1 rule
129 of the Rules of court. These laws negate the existence of any
legal right on the part of ADC to the reliefs it sought so as to
justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. since PD
No. 771 and Republic Act No. 954 are presumed valid and
constitutional until ruled otherwise by the Supreme Court after
due hearing, ADC was not entitled to the writs issued and
consequently there was grave abuse of discretion in issuing them.
 EN BANC Justice Circular No. 74 dated November 6, 2001 which amended
the 2000 Bail Bond Guide involving estafa under Article 315, par.
[G.R. No. 149276. September 27, 2002.] 2 (d), and qualified theft. Said Circular specifically provides as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
JOVENCIO LIM and TERESITA LIM, Petitioners, v. THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE REGIONAL TRIAL x x x
COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 217, THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, AND WILSON
CHAM, Respondents. 3) Where the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or over in which the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, bail
DECISION shall be based on reclusion temporal maximum, pursuant to Par.
CORONA, J.: 2 (a) of the 2000 Bail Bond Guide, multiplied by P2,000.00, plus
an additional of P2,000.00 for every P10,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00; Provided, however, that the total amount of bail shall
The constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which amended Article not exceed P60,000.00.
315 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties for
estafa committed by means of bouncing checks, is being In view of the aforementioned resolution, the matter concerning
challenged in this petition for certiorari, for being violative of the bail shall no longer be discussed. Thus, this decision will focus on
due process clause, the right to bail and the provision against whether or not PD 818 violates Sections 1 and 19 of Article III of
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment enshrined under the the Constitution, which respectively provide:chanrob1es virtual
Constitution.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary 1aw library

The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties’ Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
pleadings and documentary proofs, follow. without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
In December 1991, petitioner spouses issued to private
respondent two postdated checks, namely, Metrobank check no. x x x
464728 dated January 15, 1992 in the amount of P365,750 and
Metrobank check no. 464743 dated January 22, 1992 in the
amount of P429,000. Check no. 464728 was dishonored upon Section 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
presentment for having been drawn against insufficient funds degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. . . .
while check no. 464743 was not presented for payment upon
request of petitioners who promised to replace the dishonored We shall deal first with the issue of whether PD 818 was enacted
check. in contravention of Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution. In
this regard, the impugned provision of PD 818 reads as
When petitioners reneged on their promise to cover the amount of follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
check no. 464728, the private respondent filed a complaint-
affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of
charging petitioner spouses with the crime of estafa under Article false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of
315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
818. Act No. 4885, shall punished by:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On February 16, 2001, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution 1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud
finding probable cause against petitioners and recommending the is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if
filing of an information for estafa with no bail recommended. On such amount exceeds the later sum, the penalty provided in this
the same day, an information for the crime of estafa was filed paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
with Branch 217 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which
petitioners. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-01- may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such
101574. Thereafter, the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
of herein petitioners, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be
termed reclusion perpetua;
It appearing on the face of the information and from supporting
affidavit of the complaining witness and its annexes that probable 2nd. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period, if the
cause exists, that the crime charged was committed and accused amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed
is probably guilty thereof, let a warrant for the arrest of the 12,000 pesos.
accused be issued.
3rd. The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period, if such
No Bail Recommended. amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

SO ORDERED. 1 4th. By prision mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does
not exceed 200 pesos.
On July 18, 2001, petitioners filed an "Urgent Motion to Quash
Information and Warrant of Arrest" which was denied by the trial Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the amount of the subject
court. Likewise, petitioners’ motion for bail filed on July 24, 2001 check is P365,750, they can be penalized with reclusion perpetua
was denied by the trial court on the same day. Petitioner Jovencio or 30 years of imprisonment. This penalty, according to
Lim was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the petitioners, is too severe and disproportionate to the crime they
trial court and was detained at the Quezon City Jail. However, committed and infringes on the express mandate of Article III,
petitioner Teresita Lim remained at large. Section 19 of the Constitution which prohibits the infliction of
cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.
On August 22, 2001, petitioners filed the instant petition
for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not
lower court and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the offense
arguing that PD 818 violates the constitutional provisions on due unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly
process, bail and imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the
punishment. moral sense of the community. It takes more than merely being
harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a penalty to be
In a resolution dated February 26, 2002, this Court granted the obnoxious to the Constitution. 2 Based on this principle, the Court
petition of Jovencio Lim to post bail pursuant to Department of has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the
penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
is cruel and degrading.
Puno, J., took no part due to relation to counsel.
In People v. Tongko, 3 this Court held that the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed at the form or Mendoza, J., on leave.
character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of
its duration or amount, and applies to punishments which never
existed in America or which public sentiment regards as cruel or
obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at the
whipping post or in the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking
on the wheel, disemboweling and the like. The fact that the
penalty is severe provides insufficient basis to declare a law
unconstitutional and does not, by that circumstance alone, make
it cruel and inhuman.

Petitioners also argue that while PD 818 increased the imposable

penalties for estafa committed under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the
Revised Penal Code, it did not increase the amounts
corresponding to the said new penalties. Thus, the original
amounts provided for in the Revised Penal Code have remained
the same notwithstanding that they have become negligible and
insignificant compared to the present value of the peso.

This argument is without merit. The primary purpose of PD 818 is

emphatically and categorically stated in the following:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

WHEREAS, reports received of late indicate an upsurge of estafa

(swindling) cases committed by means of bouncing checks;

WHEREAS, if not checked at once, these criminal acts would erode

the people’s confidence in the use of negotiable instruments as a
medium of commercial transaction and consequently result in the
retardation of trade and commerce and the undermining of the
banking system of the country;

WHEREAS, it is vitally necessary to arrest and curb the rise in this

kind of estafa cases by increasing the existing penalties provided
therefor.

Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and
degrading, was motivated by a laudable purpose, namely, to
effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the country’s
commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a necessary
precaution to deter people from issuing bouncing checks. The fact
that PD 818 did not increase the amounts corresponding to the
new penalties only proves that the amount is immaterial and
inconsequential. What the law sought to avert was the
proliferation of estafa cases committed by means of bouncing
checks. Taking into account the salutary purpose for which said
law was decreed, we conclude that PD 818 does not violate
Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution.

Moreover, when a law is questioned before the Court, the

presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. To justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 4 The burden
of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it.
In this case, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing
proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of PD 818.

With respect to the issue of whether PD 818 infringes on Section 1

of Article III of the Constitution, petitioners claim that PD 818 is
violative of the due process clause of the Constitution as it was
not published in the Official Gazette. This claim is incorrect and
must be rejected. Publication, being an indispensable part of due
process, is imperative to the validity of laws, presidential decrees
and executive orders. 5 PD 818 was published in the Official
Gazette on December 1, 1975. 6

With the foregoing considerations in mind, this Court upholds the

constitutionality of PD 818.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
 Republic of the Philippines Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items:
SUPREME COURT 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303,
Manila US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso
Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking Corp.,
US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money
EN BANC
(P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy
Bear) used in seducing the complainant.
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G.
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Condaya filed against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for
Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804,
SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners, and 805 for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners
vs. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING 3214 for damages with preliminary attachment against Greg
CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y Bartelli. On February 24, 1989, the day there was a scheduled
NORTHCOTT, respondents. hearing for Bartelli's petition for bail the latter escaped from jail.

TORRES, JR., J.: On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscal's Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Hold
Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the accused Greg Bartelli y
In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, Northcott, the criminal cases were archived in an Order dated
courts become the unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Ligle do we February 28, 1989.
realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of
compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise
vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order
our day. dated February 22, 1989 granting the application of herein
petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment.
After petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU Insurance
The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following Corporation in the amount of P100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary
reliefs: Attachment was issued by the trial court on February 28, 1989.

a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of
restraining the respondents from applying and enforcing Section Garnishment on China Banking Corporation. In a letter dated
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960; March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking
Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the
b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered: notice of garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy
Sheriff of Makati Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China
Banking Corporation saying that the garnishment did not violate
1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely
respondents; incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of
a court order which has placed the subject deposits in custodia
2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as legis. In answer to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff of Makati,
contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, hence void; China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989,
because its provision that "Foreign currency deposits shall be invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or that the dollar deposits or defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of
administrative body whatsoever any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body, whatsoever.

i.) has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank
deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with
the judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of the Central Bank in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether
substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution; Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether
said section has been repealed or amended since said section has
rendered nugatory the substantive right of the plaintiff to have
ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way
class privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted to the plaintiff
Constitution; under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Central Bank
responded as follows:
iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein
respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape May 26, 1989
civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their
money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign
currency deposit account with an authorized bank. Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino
12 Pres. Osmena Avenue
South Admiral Village
The antecedent facts: Paranaque, Metro Manila

On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American Dear Ms. Carolino:

tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12
years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli
detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 This is in reply to your letter dated April 25,
and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three 1989 regarding your inquiry on Section 113,
times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, CB Circular No. 960 (1983).
1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen,
Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal
 The cited provision is absolute in application. It certain Joseph Aguilar and a certain Liberato Madulio, who gave
does not admit of any exception, nor has the the following testimony:
same been repealed nor amended.
Karen took her first year high school in St. Mary's Academy in
The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar Pasay City but has recently transferred to Arellano University for
accounts within the country's banking system her second year.
which would help in the development of the
economy. There is no intention to render futile
In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair
the basic rights of a person as was suggested
Makati Cinema Square, with her friend Edna Tangile whiling away
in your subject letter. The law may be harsh as
her free time. At about 3:30 p.m. while she was finishing her
some perceive it, but it is still the law.
snack on a concrete bench in front of Plaza Fair, an American
Compliance is, therefore, enjoined.
approached her. She was then alone because Edna Tangile had
already left, and she was about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989,
Very truly yours, pp. 2 to 5)

(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg
Director1 Bartelli. He sat beside her when he talked to her. He said he was
a Math teacher and told her that he has a sister who is a nurse in
New York. His sister allegedly has a daughter who is about
Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners'
Karen's age and who was with him in his house along Kalayaan
motion for leave to serve summons by publication in the Civil
Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5)
Case No. 89-3214 entitled "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg
Bartelli y Northcott." Summons with the complaint was a
published in the Manila Times once a week for three consecutive The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she
weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file his answer to the complaint and told him it's Pilipino. He then invited her to go with him to his
was declared in default on August 7, 1989. After hearing the case house where she could teach Pilipino to his niece. He even gave
ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners on her a stuffed toy to persuade her to teach his niece. (Id., pp. 5-6)
March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs reach the defendant's house along Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p. 6)
and against defendant, ordering the latter:
When they reached the apartment house, Karen noticed that
1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 defendant's alleged niece was not outside the house but
as moral damages; defendant told her maybe his niece was inside. When Karen did
not see the alleged niece inside the house, defendant told her
maybe his niece was upstairs, and invited Karen to go upstairs.
2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion,
(Id., p. 7)
Jr., and Evelina E. Salvacion the amount of P150,000.00 each or a
total of P300,000.00 for both of them;
Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door.
Karen became nervous because his niece was not there.
3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and
Defendant got a piece of cotton cord and tied Karen's hands with
it, and then he undressed her. Karen cried for help but defendant
4. To pay attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the strangled her. He took a packing tape and he covered her mouth
total amount of damages herein awarded; with it and he circled it around her head. (Id., p. 7)

5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which
was just near the door. He tied her feet and hands spread apart
to the bed posts. He knelt in front of her and inserted his finger in
6. Costs of the suit. her sex organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to shout but no
sound could come out because there were tapes on her mouth.
SO ORDERED. When defendant withdrew his finger it was full of blood and Karen
felt more pain after the withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p. 8)

The heinous acts of respondent Greg Bartelli which gave rise to

the award were related in graphic detail by the trial court in its He then got a Johnson's Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex
decision as follows: organ as well as to her sex organ. After that he forced his sex
organ into her but he was not able to do so. While he was doing
it, Karen found it difficult to breathe and she perspired a lot while
The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal feeling severe pain. She merely presumed that he was able to
jail of Makati but was able to escape therefrom on February 24, insert his sex organ a little, because she could not see. Karen
1989 as per report of the Jail Warden of Makati to the Presiding could not recall how long the defendant was in that position. (Id.
Judge, Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the Regional Trial Court of pp. 8-9)
Makati, Branch 136, where he was charged with four counts of
Rape and Serious Illegal Detention (Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805).
Accordingly, upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel, summons After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He
was served upon defendant by publication in the Manila Times, a also told Karen to take a shower and he untied her hands. Karen
newspaper of general circulation as attested by the Advertising could only hear the sound of the water while the defendant, she
Manager of the Metro Media Times, Inc., the publisher of the said presumed, was in the bathroom washing his sex organ. When she
newspaper. Defendant, however, failed to file his answer to the took a shower more blood came out from her. In the meantime,
complaint despite the lapse of the period of sixty (60) days from defendant changed the mattress because it was full of blood. After
the last publication; hence, upon motion of the plaintiffs, through the shower, Karen was allowed by defendant to sleep. She fell
counsel, defendant was declared in default and plaintiffs were asleep because she got tired crying. The incident happened at
authorized to present their evidence ex parte. about 4:00 p.m. Karen had no way of determining the exact time
because defendant removed her watch. Defendant did not care to
give her food before she went to sleep. Karen woke up at about
In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witnesses the 8:00 o'clock the following morning. (Id., pp. 9-10)
minor Karen E. Salvacion, her father, Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., a
The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after a breakfast When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing
of biscuit and coke at about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant raped downstairs, she knocked repeatedly at the door as hard as she
Karen while she was still bleeding. For lunch, they also took could. She heard somebody going upstairs and when the door was
biscuit and coke. She was raped for the second time at about opened, she saw a policeman. The policeman asked her name and
12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In the evening, they had rice for dinner which the reason why she was there. She told him she was kidnapped.
defendant had stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice Downstairs, he saw about five policemen in uniform and the
that is why it looks like "lugaw". For the third time, Karen was defendant was talking to them. "Nakikipag-areglo po sa mga
raped again during the night. During those three times defendant pulis," Karen added. "The policeman told him to just explain at
succeeded in inserting his sex organ but she could not say the precinct. (Id., p. 20)
whether the organ was inserted wholly.
They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in
Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The front of the house. They rode the car of a certain person she
defendant did not tie her hands and feet nor put a tape on her called Kuya Boy together with defendant, the policeman, and two
mouth anymore but she did not cry for help for fear that she of her neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong Lacson and one Ate
might be killed; besides, all the windows and doors were closed. Nita. They were brought to Sub-Station I and there she was
And even if she shouted for help, nobody would hear her. She was investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her father
so afraid that if somebody would hear her and would be able to arrived, followed by her mother together with some of their
call the police, it was still possible that as she was still inside the neighbors. Then they were brought to the second floor of the
house, defendant might kill her. Besides, the defendant did not police headquarters. (Id., p. 21)
leave that Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for help. At
nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-
At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the
14)
investigator. The written statement she gave to the police was
marked as Exhibit A. Then they proceeded to the National Bureau
On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once of Investigation together with the investigator and her parents. At
in the morning for thirty minutes after a breakfast of biscuits; the NBI, a doctor, a medico-legal officer, examined her private
again in the afternoon; and again in the evening. At first, Karen parts. It was already 3:00 in the early morning of the following
did not know that there was a window because everything was day when they reached the NBI. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22) The
covered by a carpet, until defendant opened the window for findings of the medico-legal officer has been marked as Exhibit B.
around fifteen minutes or less to let some air in, and she found
that the window was covered by styrofoam and plywood. After
She was studying at the St. Mary's Academy in Pasay City at the
that, he again closed the window with a hammer and he put the
time of the incident but she subsequently transferred to Apolinario
styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)
Mabini, Arellano University, situated along Taft Avenue, because
she was ashamed to be the subject of conversation in the school.
That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, She first applied for transfer to Jose Abad Santos, Arellano
although defendant left but kept the door closed. She went to the University along Taft Avenue near the Light Rail Transit Station
bathroom and saw a small window covered by styrofoam and she but she was denied admission after she told the school the true
also spotted a small hole. She stepped on the bowl and she cried reason for her transfer. The reason for their denial was that they
for help through the hole. She cried: "Maawa no po kayo so might be implicated in the case. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 46)
akin. Tulungan n'yo akong makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako!"
Somebody heard her. It was a woman, probably a neighbor, but
xxx xxx xxx
she got angry and said she was "istorbo". Karen pleaded for help
and the woman told her to sleep and she will call the police. She
finally fell asleep but no policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play
pp. 15-16) with her brother and sister anymore, and she is always in a state
of shock; she has been absent-minded and is ashamed even to go
out of the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She appears to be
She woke up at 6:00 o'clock the following morning, and she saw
restless or sad, (Id., p. 11) The father prays for P500,000.00
defendant in bed, this time sleeping. She waited for him to wake
moral damages for Karen for this shocking experience which
up. When he woke up, he again got some food but he always kept
probably, she would always recall until she reaches old age, and
the door locked. As usual, she was merely fed with biscuit and
he is not sure if she could ever recover from this experience.
coke. On that day, February 7, 1989, she was again raped three
(TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11)
times. The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about
8:30 — 9:00, and the third was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After
he had raped her for the second time he left but only for a short Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision,
while. Upon his return, he caught her shouting for help but he did said notice was published in the Manila Bulletin once a week for
not understand what she was shouting about. After she was raped three consecutive weeks. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from
the third time, he left the house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17) the date of the last publication of the notice of judgment and the
She again went to the bathroom and shouted for help. After decision of the trial court had become final, petitioners tried to
shouting for about five minutes, she heard many voices. The execute on Bartelli's dollar deposit with China Banking
voices were asking for her name and she gave her name as Karen Corporation. Likewise, the bank invoked Section 113 of Central
Salvacion. After a while, she heard a voice of a woman saying Bank Circular No. 960.
they will just call the police. They were also telling her to change
her clothes. She went from the bathroom to the room but she did
not change her clothes being afraid that should the neighbors call Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.
for the police and the defendant see her in different clothes, he
might kill her. At that time she was wearing a T-shirt of the The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties
American because the latter washed her dress. (Id., p. 16) boil down to two:

Afterwards, defendant arrived and he opened the door. He asked May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that
her if she had asked for help because there were many policemen original jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the
outside and she denied it. He told her to change her clothes, and lower court? Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
she did change to the one she was wearing on Saturday. He and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise
instructed her to tell the police that she left home and willingly; known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to
then he went downstairs but he locked the door. She could hear a foreign transient?
people conversing but she could not understand what they were
saying. (Id., p. 19)
Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central from the beastly hands of Greg Bartelli; that it is only too willing
Bank Circular No. 960 providing that "Foreign currency deposits to release the dollar deposit of Bartelli which may perhaps partly
shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other mitigate the sufferings petitioner has undergone; but it is
order or process of any court, legislative body, government restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No. 6426 and Section 113
agency or any administrative body whatsoever." should be of Central Bank Circular No. 960; and that despite the harsh
adjudged as unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken effect of these laws on petitioners, CBC has no other alternative
away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of but to follow the same.
defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the
judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of substantive
This Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.
due process guaranteed by the Constitution; 2.) it has given
foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; 3.) it Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the
has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent court. But this petition for declaratory relief can only be
Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability entertained and treated as a petition for mandamus to require
for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in
foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit Civil Case No. 89-3214.
account with an authorized bank; and 4.) The Monetary Board, in
issuing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 has
exceeded its delegated quasi-legislative power when it took away: This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition
a.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the claim sought to be for declaratory relief.2 However, exceptions to this rule have been
enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications
preliminary attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the Revised and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as
Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the one for mandamus.3
judgment credit satisfied by way of the writ of execution out of
the bank deposit of the judgment debtor as granted to the Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all
judgment creditor by Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which Americans are good and in her gesture of kindness by teaching
is beyond its power to do so. his alleged niece the Filipino language as requested by the
American, trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment,
On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment and there she was raped by said American tourist Greg Bartelli.
alleges that the Monetary Board in issuing Section 113 of CB Not once, but ten times. She was detained therein for four (4)
Circular No. 960 did not exceed its power or authority because the days. This American tourist was able to escape from the jail and
subject Section is copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No. 6426 avoid punishment. On the other hand, the child, having received a
as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board favorable judgment in the Civil Case for damages in the amount
that grants exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign of more than P1,000,000.00, which amount could alleviate the
currency deposits, but the law (R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched reputation she had suffered
it does not violate the substantive due process guaranteed by the and may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing
Constitution because a.) it was based on a law; b.) the law seems that this person who had wronged her has the money, could not,
to be reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to regular methods however get the award of damages because of this unreasonable
of procedure; and d.) it applies to all members of a class. law. This questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable
judgment and award of damages that she and her parents fully
deserve. As stated by the trial court in its decision,
Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting
the foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or
any other order or process of any court, is to assure the Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes
development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit that it was undoubtedly a shocking and traumatic experience she
System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines; that had undergone which could haunt her mind for a long, long time,
another reason is to encourage the inflow of foreign currency the mere recall of which could make her feel so humiliated, as in
deposits into the banking institutions thereby placing such fact she had been actually humiliated once when she was refused
institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to admission at the Abad Santos High School, Arellano University,
loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing where she sought to transfer from another school, simply because
to the economic development of the country; that the subject the school authorities of the said High School learned about what
section is being enforced according to the regular methods of happened to her and allegedly feared that they might be
procedure; and that it applies to all foreign currency deposits implicated in the case.
made by any person and therefore does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. xxx xxx xxx

Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due
provision is needed to promote the public interest and the general to the wanton and bestial manner defendant had committed the
welfare; that the State cannot just stand idly by while a acts of rape during a period of serious illegal detention of his
considerable segment of the society suffers from economic hapless victim, the minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault was in
distress; that the State had to take some measures to encourage her being so naive and credulous to believe easily that defendant,
economic development; and that in so doing persons and property an American national, could not have such a bestial desire on her
may be subjected to some kinds of restraints or burdens to secure nor capable of committing such a heinous crime. Being only 12
the general welfare or public interest. Respondent Central Bank years old when that unfortunate incident happened, she has never
also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of heard of an old Filipino adage that in every forest there is a
Court provide that some properties are exempted from snake, . . . .4
execution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A. No.
6426 as amended is such a law, in that it specifically provides,
among others, that foreign currency deposits shall be exempted If Karen's sad fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of be difficult for him to fathom how the incentive for foreign
any court, legislative body, government agency or any currency deposit could be more important than his child's rights to
administrative body whatsoever. said award of damages; in this case, the victim's claim for
damages from this alien who had the gall to wrong a child of
tender years of a country where he is a mere visitor. This further
For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from illustrates the flaw in the questioned provisions.
giving reasons similar to that of respondent Central Bank, also
stated that respondent China Bank is not unmindful of the
inhuman sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or
at a time when the country's economy was in a shambles; when
foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the instance shall such foreign currency deposits be examined,
reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau
present times show that the country has recovered economically; or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any
and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to other entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that
due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
injustice and inequality such as the case before us. whatsoever.

It has thus been said that — The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against
attachment, garnishment and other court process to foreign
currency deposits is stated in its whereases, viz.:
But I also know,5 that laws and institutions must go hand in hand
with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more
developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by
truths are disclosed and manners and opinions change with the Presidential Decree No. 1035, certain Philippine banking
change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and institutions and branches of foreign banks are authorized to
keep pace with the times. . . We might as well require a man to accept deposits in foreign currency;
wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society
to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.
WHEREAS, under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1034
authorizing the establishment of an offshore banking system in
In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus: the Philippines, offshore banking units are also authorized to
receive foreign currency deposits in certain cases;
The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a
national to obtain redress for a wrong committed by an alien who WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and speedy growth
takes refuge under a law and regulation promulgated for a of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking
purpose which does not contemplate the application thereof System in the Philippines, certain incentives were provided for
envisaged by the alien. More specifically, the petition raises the under the two Systems such as confidentiality of deposits subject
question whether the protection against attachment, garnishment to certain exceptions and tax exemptions on the interest income
or other court process accorded to foreign currency deposits by of depositors who are nonresidents and are not engaged in trade
PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No. 960 applies when the deposit or business in the Philippines;
does not come from a lender or investor but from a mere
transient or tourist who is not expected to maintain the deposit in
WHEREAS, making absolute the protective cloak of confidentiality
the bank for long.
over such foreign currency deposits, exempting such deposits
from tax, and guaranteeing the vested rights of depositors would
The resolution of this question is important for the protection of better encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the
nationals who are victimized in the forum by foreigners who are banking institutions authorized to accept such deposits in the
merely passing through. Philippines thereby placing such institutions more in a position to
properly channel the same to loans and investments in the
Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic
xxx xxx xxx
development of the country;

. . . Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of

Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to
the Philippines refused to honor the writ of execution issued in
foreign currency deposits is "to assure the development and
Civil Case No. 89-3214 on the strength of the following provision
speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit system and the
of Central Bank Circular No. 960:
Offshore Banking in the Philippines" (3rd Whereas).

Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment. — Foreign currency

The Offshore Banking System was established by PD No. 1034. In
deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any
turn, the purposes of PD No. 1034 are as follows:
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
WHEREAS, conditions conducive to the establishment of an
offshore banking system, such as political stability, a growing
Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of
economy and adequate communication facilities, among others,
Republic Act No. 6426:
exist in the Philippines;

Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The Monetary Board of the Central

WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries to have as
Bank shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
wide access as possible to the sources of capital funds for
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act which shall take
economic development;
effect after the publication of such rules and regulations in the
Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for at
least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In case the WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the Philippines
Central Bank promulgates new rules and regulations decreasing will be advantageous and beneficial to the country by increasing
the rights of depositors, the rules and regulations at the time the our links with foreign lenders, facilitating the flow of desired
deposit was made shall govern. investments into the Philippines, creating employment
opportunities and expertise in international finance, and
contributing to the national development effort.
The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic
Act NO. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, thus:
WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and human
resources, and other positive factors provide the Philippines with
Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. — All foreign
the clear potential to develop as another financial center in Asia;
currency deposits authorized under this Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits
authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are hereby On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was
declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature created by PD. No. 1035. Its purposes are as follows:
and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no
WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking system in No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
the Philippines has been authorized under a separate decree; because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby
REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil
Case No. 89-3214, "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y
WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as depository
Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to
bank under the Foreign Currency Deposit Act (RA No. 6426), have
petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y
the resources and managerial competence to more actively
Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
engage in foreign exchange transactions and participate in the
grant of foreign currency loans to resident corporations and firms;
SO ORDERED.
WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency lending
authority of the said depository banks under RA 6426 and apply
to their transactions the same taxes as would be applicable to
transaction of the proposed offshore banking units;

It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore

Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were
designed to draw deposits from
foreign lenders and investors (Vide second Whereas of PD No.
1034; third Whereas of PD No. 1035). It is these deposits that are
induced by the two laws and given protection and incentives by
them.

Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a

tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and
1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because
such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and,
therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short
time.

Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a

transient. He deposited his dollars with respondent China Banking
Corporation only for safekeeping during his temporary stay in the
Philippines.

For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits
that the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled
to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court
processes.6

In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its

justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would
result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like
accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New
Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno
non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply
stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of
those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement
urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).

It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of

Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg
Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at
the expense of the innocent.

Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here?

Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment
of the lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the
foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a
transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim
of a crime? This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.

We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we
have served the ends of justice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular

No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A.
 Republic of the Philippines the petitioners had been purchased by them from the other. co-
SUPREME COURT heirs. Especially significant was the erection thereon of the
Manila permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which
was done without objection on her part or of any of the other co-
heirs.
EN BANC

The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct

G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
interpretation and application of the pertinent law as invoked,
interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the private
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners, respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as
vs. follows:
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA
PADUA, respondents.
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners. subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent. the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
CRUZ, J.: month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by
the vendor.
The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious
conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that
we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice the notice required by the said article was written notice and that
even against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing the same
answer is that we do neither because we are a court both of law case of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals 11 applied by the trial
and of justice. We apply the law with justice for that is our court, the respondent court held that that decision, interpreting a
mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic. This case is like rule in Article 1623, stressed the need for written notice
an illustration. although no particular form was required.

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of
parcel of land registered in 'the name of their deceased parents the Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale
under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. 1 of the property subject to redemption would satisfy the
requirement for written notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter
(i.e., the redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and the
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for redemption
undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 start running. "
by way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22, 1964,
Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same
vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking
Sale," for the sum of P 440.00. 3 through the same learned jurist, emphasized that the written
notice should be given by the vendor and not the vendees,
conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623, reading
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the as follows:
said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot,
representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently
enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not
son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing
part of the enclosed area.4 by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be.
The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property,
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his
complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an
American citizen .5 On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the
another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right adjoining owners.
of redemption claimed by her brother. 6
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article
The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice,
that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty and that notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that
days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there notice given by the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the
was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the running of the 30-day period.
sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. 7
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners
plausibly denied. The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived obviously cannot argue against the fact that there was really no
on the same lot, which consisted of only 604 square meters, written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly
including the portions sold to the petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one
who had sold her portion, was staying in the same house with her conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30 day
sister Tecla, who later claimed redemption petition. 9 Moreover, period for redemption had not begun to run, much less expired in
the petitioners and the private respondents were close friends and 1977.
neighbors whose children went to school together. 10
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results;
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule
the sales and that they thought, as they alleged, that the area that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
occupied by the petitioners had merely been mortgaged by judge should be to discover in its provisions the in tent of the
Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in
was impossible for Tecla not to know that the area occupied by such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for While we do not here declare that this period started from the
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime
justice. between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for
redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of
the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during the
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a move
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular
Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had
case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we
already been extinguished because the period for its exercise had
are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply
already expired.
them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What
we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will,
that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed. The following doctrine is also worth noting:

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should have
the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the
law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon
words import a policy that goes beyond them." 13 While we inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable
admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to with laches, the same as if he had known the facts. 15
interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the
legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why
not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the
the spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a
reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter
portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong
that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the
materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary
law maker's will.
possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act
of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts,
construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before
or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter but one of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it
although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within was already too late.
the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated
differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are
much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which
deviating from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent
is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless
court understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence.
within the intent of the lawmakers. 14
The said court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse
the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not
redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are
date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view
redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really of the peculiar circumstances of this case.
necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is
supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays,
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales
sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no
doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the
redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising
made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this
in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after exception.
the second sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to
more than a decade, assuming of course that there was a valid
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
notice that tolled the running of the period of redemption.
constant and perpetual wish to render every one his
due." 16 That wish continues to motivate this Court when it
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
to be written, would such notice be necessary in this case? decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions.
Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not in writing. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that
would there be any question that the 30-day period for will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the
redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.
1977? So we have done in this case.

In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the
respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made respondent court is REVERSED and that of the trial court is
by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so
proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious ordered.
truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus
exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera Gutierrez, Jr.,
clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly
Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ.,
notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and
concur.
sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the
sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.
Fernan and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
 Republic of the Philippines One-half of the amount the latter have paid for electric and water
SUPREME COURT bills from July to December 1992, inclusive (Rollo, p. 16).
Manila
Consequently, respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the
EN BANC President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed
for the stay of execution thereof in accordance with Section 67(b)
of the Local Government Code, which provides:
G.R. No. 112099 February 21, 1995

Administrative Appeals. — Decision in administrative cases may,

ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner,
within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the
vs.
following:
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.,
CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO
and MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, xxx xxx xxx
ALBAY, respondents.
(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the
QUIASON, J.: sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panglungsod of
highly urbanized cities and independent component cities.
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary Acting on the prayer to stay execution during the pendency of the
injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as appeal, the Office of the President issued an Order on July 28,
having been issued with grave abuses of discretion. Said Orders 1993, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
directed the stay of execution of the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan suspending the Mayor of Tiwi, Albay from office.
xxx xxx xxx

I
The stay of the execution is governed by Section 68 of R.A. No.
7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated 12
Petitioner filed two administrative cases against respondent Naomi February 1987, quoted below:
C. Corral, the incumbent Mayor of Tiwi, Albay with the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay, to wit:
Sec. 68. Execution Pending Appeal. — An appeal shall not prevent
a decision from becoming final or executory. The respondent shall
(1) Administrative Case No. 02-92 for abuse of authority and/or be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension
oppression for non-payment of accrued leave benefits due the during the pendency of an appeal in the events he wins such
petitioner amounting to P36,779.02. appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall
be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the
pendency of the appeal (R.A. No. 7160).
(2) Administrative Case No. 05-92 for dishonesty and abuse of
authority for installing a water pipeline which is being operated,
maintained and paid for by the municipality to service Sec. 6 Except as otherwise provided by special laws, the
respondent's private residence and medical clinic. execution of the decision/resolution/order appealed from is stayed
upon filing of the appeal within the period prescribed herein.
However, in all cases, at any time during the pendency of the
On July 1, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disposed the two
appeal, the Office of the President may direct or stay the
Administrative cases in the following manner:
execution of the decision/resolution/order appealed from upon
such terms and conditions as it may deem just and reasonable
(1) Administrative Case No. 02-92 (Adm. Order No. 18).

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Mayor Naomi C. Corral of Tiwi, Albay, xxx xxx xxx
is hereby ordered to pay Achilles Costo Berces, Sr. the sum of
THIRTY-SIX THOUSAND AND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE
After due consideration, and in the light of the Petition for Review
PESOS and TWO CENTAVOS (P36,779.02) per Voucher No. 352,
filed before this Office, we find that a stay of execution pending
plus legal interest due thereon from the time it was approved in
appeal would be just and reasonable to prevent undue prejudice
audit up to final payment, it being legally due the Complainant
to public interest.
representing the money value of his leave credits accruing for
services rendered in the municipality from 1988 to 1992 as a duly
elected Municipal Councilor. IN ADDITION, respondent Mayor WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office hereby orders the
NAOMI C. CORRAL is hereby ordered SUSPENDED from office as suspension/stay of execution of:
Municipal Mayor of Tiwi, Albay, for a period of two (2) months,
effective upon receipt hereof for her blatant abuse of authority
a) the Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay in
coupled with oppression as a public example to deter others
Administrative Case No. 02-92 dated 1 July 1993 suspending
similarly inclined from using public office as a tool for personal
Mayor Naomi C. Corral from office for a period of two (2) months,
vengeance, vindictiveness and oppression at the expense of the
and
Taxpayer (Rollo, p. 14).

b) the Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay in

(2) Administrative Case No. 05-92
Administrative Case. No. 05-92 dated 5 July 1993 suspending
Mayor Naomi C. Corral from office for a period of three (3)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Mayor NAOMI C. months (Rollo, pp. 55-56).
CORRAL of Tiwi, Albay, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of SUSPENSION from office as Municipal Mayor thereof for a
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the
period of THREE (3) MONTHS beginning after her service of the
aforesaid Order of the Office of the President.
first penalty of suspension ordered in Administrative Case No. 02-
92. She is likewise ordered to reimburse the Municipality of Tiwi
On September 13, 1990, the Motion for Reconsideration was The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory
denied. depending upon a consideration of the entire provisions in which it
is found, its object and the consequences that would follow from
construing it one way or the other (cf. De Mesa v. Mencias, 18
Hence, this petition.
SCRA 533 [1966]). In the case at bench, there is no basis to
justify the construction of the word as mandatory.
II
The Office of the President made a finding that the execution of
Petitioner claims that the governing law in the instant case is R.A. the decision of the Sagguniang Panlalawigan suspending
No. 7160, which contains a mandatory provision that an appeal respondent Mayor from office might be prejudicial to the public
"shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory." interest. Thus, in order not to disrupt the rendition of service by
He argues that administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, the mayor to the public, a stay of the execution of the decision is
1987, (entitle "Prescribing the Rules and Regulations Governing in order.
Appeals to Office the President") authorizing the President to stay
the execution of the appealed decision at any time during the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
pendency of the appeal, was repealed by R.A. No. 7160, which
took effect on January 1, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 5-6).
SO ORDERED.
The petition is devoid of merit.

Petitioner invokes the repealing clause of Section 530 (f), R.A. No.
7160, which provides:

All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,

executive orders, administrative regulations, part or parts thereof,
which are incosistent with any of the provisions of this Code, are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

The aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of Section 6

of Administrative Order No. 18 because it failed to identify or
designate the laws or executive orders that are intended to be
repealed (cf. I Sutherland, Statutory Construction 467 [1943]).

If there is any repeal of Administrative Order No. 18 by R.A. No.

7160, it is through implication though such kind of repeal is not
favored (The Philippine American Management Co., Inc. v. The
Philippine American Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA
194 [1973]). There is even a presumption against implied repeal.

An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the

condition that a substantial conflict must be found between the
new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law
unless an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the
terms of the new and old laws (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965]). The two laws
must be absolutely incompatible (Compania General de Tabacos
v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8 [1924]). There must be such a
repugnancy between the laws that they cannot be made to stand
together (Crawford, Construction of Statutes 631 [1940]).

We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and

Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcillably
inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read
together.

The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal

shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory." As
worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving
discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the
appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the
reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of
the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal
Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more
direct language expressive of such intention.

The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in the

absence of a clear legislative intent to remove from the reviewing
officials the authority to order a stay of execution, such authority
can provided in the rules and regulations governing the appeals of
elective officials in administrative cases.
 Republic of the Philippines Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary Drilon, for
SUPREME COURT brevity) stating that "the issuance of the Administrative Code did
Manila not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the
latter".
EN BANC

On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th Indorsement

G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992
transmitted anew Mecano's claim to then Undersecretary Bello for
favorable consideration. Under a 6th Indorsement, dated July 2,
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner, 1991, Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner's claim to the COA
vs. Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent. Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January 16, 1992,
however, denied petitioner's claim on the ground that Section 699
of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of
CAMPOS, JR., J.: 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated
nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He
Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the
nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA, for brevity) Employees' Compensation Commission, considering that the
embodied in its 7th Indorsement, dated January 16, 1992, illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the
denying his claim for reimbursement under Section 699 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended, in the total
amount of P40,831.00. Eventually, petitioner's claim was returned by Undersecretary of
Justice Eduardo Montenegro to Director Lim under a 9th
Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation Indorsement dated February 7, 1992, with the advice that
(NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 petitioner "elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so
to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and desires".
hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming
from the COA. On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative Code of
1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC, this petition
On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo was brought for the consideration of this Court.
S. Lim (Director Lim, for brevity), he requested reimbursement for
his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC, as
under Section 6991 of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which amended, and on the aforementioned Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of
read: Secretary Drilon. He further maintains that in the event that a
claim is filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission, as
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred suggested by respondent, he would still not be barred from filing
in performance of duty. — When a person in the service of the a claim under the subject section. Thus, the resolution of whether
national government of a province, city, municipality or municipal or not there was a repeal of the Revised Administrative Code of
district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby to 1917 would decide the fate of petitioner's claim for
receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of reimbursement.
Department may direct that absence during any period of
disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the
than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion also enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No.
authorize the payment of the medical attendance, necessary 292) operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the Revised
transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured Administrative Code of 1917. The COA claims that from the
person. Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged first "whereas" clauses of the new Administrative Code, it can be
against vacation leave, if any there be. gleaned that it was the intent of the legislature to repeal the old
Code. Moreover, the COA questions the applicability of the
xxx xxx xxx aforesaid opinion of the Secretary of Justice in deciding the
matter. Lastly, the COA contends that employment-related
sickness, injury or death is adequately covered by the Employees'
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the Compensation Program under P.D. 626, such that to allow
performance of some act in the line of duty, the Department head simultaneous recovery of benefits under both laws on account of
may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary the same contingency would be unfair and unjust to the
hospital fees. Government.

Director Lim then forwarded petitioner's claim, in a 1st The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not
Indorsement dated June 22, 1990, to the Secretary of Justice, by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The
along with the comment, bearing the same date, of Gerarda lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a
Galang, Chief, LED of the NBI, "recommending favorable action repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the
thereof". Finding petitioner's illness to be service-connected, the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to
Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice be repealed.3 A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing
favorably recommended the payment of petitioner's claim. clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number
or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, in a repeals.4
4th Indorsement dated November 21, 1990, returned petitioner's
claim to Director Lim, having considered the statements of the In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the
Chairman of the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 19 September ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the
1990, to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly
by the Administrative Code of 1987. depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code.
This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions)
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:
of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 2 dated April 26, 1991 of then
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject
regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to
hereby repealed or modified accordingly. cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute
may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old
one. 12 What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this
purpose to repeal.13
repealing clause? It is certainly not an express repealing clause
because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are
intended to be repealed.5 Rather, it is an example of a general We come now to the second category of repeal — the enactment
repealing provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a of a statute revising or codifying the former laws on the whole
clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition subject matter. This is only possible if the revised statute or code
that substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. was intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete and
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the perfect system in itself. It is the rule that a subsequent statute is
intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole
inconcistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and subject matter of the former statute. 14 When both intent and
old laws.6 This latter situation falls under the category of an scope clearly evidence the idea of a repeal, then all parts and
implied repeal. provisions of the prior act that are omitted from the revised act
are deemed repealed.15 Furthermore, before there can be an
implied repeal under this category, it must be the clear intent of
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a
the legislature that the later act be the substitute to the prior
statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the
act.16
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention
must be given effect.7 Hence, before there can be a repeal, there
must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice,
intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The what appears clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of
intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; 8 otherwise, at government that pertain to administration, organization and
least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a procedure, understandably because of the many changes that
continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the
continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the RAC decades of years ago. The COA challenges the weight that
first enactment.9 this opinion carries in the determination of this controversy
inasmuch as the body which had been entrusted with the
implementation of this particular provision has already rendered
There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is
its decision. The COA relied on the rule in administrative law
where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are
enunciated in the case of Sison vs. Pangramuyen17 that in the
in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the
absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion, the Court
conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The
would be loathe to substitute its own judgment for that of the
second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier
administrative agency entrusted with the enforcement and
one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to
implementation of the law. This will not hold water. This principle
repeal the earlier law.10
is subject to limitations. Administrative decisions may be reviewed
by the courts upon a showing that the decision is vitiated by
Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when fraud, imposition or mistake.18 It has been held that Opinions of
the two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice are material in the
clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they construction of statutes in pari materia.19
cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given
effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that
the other.11
repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. 20 The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject
not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. 21
Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are
not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries
This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows:
public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military
"Repeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed
reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and
unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are
still others.
presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all
existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or
the two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are in an abrogate any former law relating to some matter, unless the
irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also
because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language
claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the
Code of 1987. However, the COA would have Us consider that the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond
fact that Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative Code peradventure renewed. Hence, every effort must be used to make
of 1987 meant that the same section had been repealed. It all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be
further maintained that to allow the particular provisions not reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the
restated in the new Code to continue in force argues against the earlier.22
Code itself. The COA anchored this argument on the whereas
clause of the 1987 Code, which states:
Regarding respondent's contention that recovery under this
subject section shall bar the recovery of benefits under the
WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced Employees' Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld.
by a new Administrative Code which incorporate in a unified The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on
document the major structural, functional and procedural Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of
principles and rules of governance; and the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides
that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar
the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the
xxx xxx xxx Revised Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered
by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the
It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code — government."
the Administrative Code of 1987. This contention is untenable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT
the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to give due course to
petitioner's claim for benefits. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION Seven Hundred Fifty and 50/100 Pesos (P1,190,750.50)
to the National Telecommunications Commission.
G.R. No. 141667 July 17, 2006
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by NATIONAL
ELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), petitioner, In time, ICC moved for a reconsideration. This time, the CA, in its
vs. Amended Decision dated September 30, 1999, reversed itself, to
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION wit:
(ICC), respondent.
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is
DECISION hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated 29
January 1999 including the imposition by the public
respondent of permit fees with respect to [ICC’s]
GARCIA, J.:
international leased circuit service is hereby REVERSED.
Judgment is hereby rendered, setting aside the
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, questioned orders dated 04 June 1996 and 25 June
petitioner Republic, through the National Telecommunications 1997, insofar as they impose upon petitioner ICC the
Commission (NTC), seeks the annulment and setting aside of payment of the amount of One Million One Hundred
the Amended Decision1 dated September 30, 1999 of the Court Ninety Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty and Fifty Centavos
of Appeals (CA), setting aside the orders dated June 4, 1996 and (P1,190,750.50) by way of permit fees as a condition for
June 25, 1997 of the NTC insofar as said orders required the grant of a provisional authority to operate an
respondent International Communications Corporation (ICC) to International Leased Circuit Service. No costs.
pay the amount of P1,190,750.50 by way of permit fee as a
condition for the grant of a provisional authority to operate an
SO ORDERED. (Word in bracket added).
international telecommunications leased circuit service, and the
Resolution2 dated January 24, 2000, denying NTC's motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner NTC filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion
was denied by the CA in its equally challenged Resolution dated
January 24, 2000. Hence, NTC's present recourse claiming that
There is no dispute as to the facts:
the CA erred in ruling that:

On April 4, 1995, respondent ICC, holder of a legislative franchise

1. NTC has arrogated upon itself the power to tax an
under Republic Act (RA) No. 7633 to operate domestic
entity;
telecommunications, filed with the NTC an application for a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to install, operate,
and maintain an international telecommunications leased circuit 2. Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act has been
service between the Philippines and other countries, and to amended by Section 5(g) of R.A. 7925;6
charge rates therefor, with provisional authority for the purpose.
3. The imposition of permit fees is no longer authorized
In an Order3 dated June 4, 1996, the NTC approved the by R.A. 7925; and
application for a provisional authority subject, among others, to
the condition:
4. The imposed permit fee in the amount of
P1,190,750.50 for respondent's provisional authority is
2. That applicant [ICC] shall pay a permit fee in the exorbitant.
amount of P1,190,750.00, in accordance with section
40(g) of the Public Service Act,4 as amended;
Before addressing the issues raised, we shall first dwell on the
procedural matter raised by respondent ICC, namely, that the
Respondent ICC filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the present petition should be dismissed outright for having been filed
Order insofar as the same required the payment of a permit fee. out of time. It is respondent's posture that petitioner's motion for
In a subsequent Order dated June 25, 1997, the NTC denied the reconsideration filed with the CA vis-a-vis the latter's Amended
motion. Decision is a pro forma motion and, therefore, did not toll the
running of the reglementary period to come to this Court via this
petition for review.
Therefrom, ICC went to the CA on a petition for certiorari with
prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, questioning the NTC's imposition against it Under Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a recourse to
of a permit fee of P1,190,750.50 as a condition for the grant of this Court by way of a petition for review must be filed within
the provisional authority applied for. fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's
motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
In its original decision5 dated January 29, 1999, the CA ruled in
notice of the judgment. While a motion for reconsideration
favor of the NTC whose challenged orders were sustained, and
ordinarily tolls the period for appeal, one that fails to point out the
accordingly denied ICC's certiorari petition, thus:
findings or conclusions which were supposedly contrary to law or
the evidence does not have such an effect on the reglementary
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. In period as it is merely a pro forma motion.7
view thereof, the assailed orders dated 4 June 1996 and
25 June 1997, requiring the payment of permit fees in
In arguing for the outright dismissal of this petition, respondent
the amount of One Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand
ICC claims that the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Seven Hundred Fifty and 50/100 Pesos (P1,190,750.50)
NTC in connection with the CA’s Amended Decision failed to point
as a condition for the grant of a Provisional Authority to
out specifically the findings or conclusions of the CA which were
operate an International Circuit service, are hereby
supposedly contrary to law. Respondent contends that the issues
AFFIRMED. ACCORDINGLY, the International
raised by the petitioner in its motion for reconsideration were
Communications Corporation is hereby ordered to pay
mere reiterations of the same issues which had already been
the amount of One Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand
considered and passed upon by the CA when it promulgated its
Amended Decision. On this premise, respondent maintains that Sec. 5. Responsibilities of the National
petitioner’s aforementioned motion for reconsideration is a mere Telecommunications Commission. - The National
pro forma motion that did not toll the period for filing the present Telecommunications Commission (Commission) shall be
petition. the principal administrator of this Act and as such shall
take the necessary measures to implement the policies
and objectives set forth in this Act. Accordingly, in
Under established jurisprudence, the mere fact that a motion for
addition to its existing functions, the Commission shall
reconsideration reiterates issues already passed upon by the court
be responsible for the following:
does not, by itself, make it a pro forma motion.8 Among the ends
to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed is precisely to
convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, xxx xxx xxx
contrary to the law or evidence; and in so doing, the movant has
to dwell of necessity on issues already passed upon. If a motion
g) In the exercise of its regulatory powers, continue to
for reconsideration may not discuss those issues, the consequence
impose such fees and charges as may be
would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would
necessary to cover reasonable costs and expenses
be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial. 9
for the regulation and supervision of the
operations of telecommunications entities.
Where there is no apparent intent to employ dilatory tactics, (Emphasis supplied)
courts should be slow in declaring outright a motion for
reconsideration as pro forma. The doctrine relating to pro
The CA ratiocinated that while Section 40(g) of the Public Service
forma motions has a direct bearing upon the movant's valuable
Act (CA 146, as amended), supra, allowed NTC to impose fees as
right to appeal. Hence, if petitioner's motion for reconsideration
reimbursement of its expenses related to, among other things,
was indeed pro forma, it would still be in the interest of justice to
the "authorization" of public services, Section 5(g), above, of R.A.
review the Amended Decision a quo on the merits, rather than to
No. 7921 no longer speaks of "authorization" but only of
abort the appeal due to a technicality, especially where, as here,
"regulation" and "supervision." To the CA, the omission by Section
the industry involved (telecommunications) is vested with public
5(g) of R.A. No. 7921 of the word "authorization" found in Section
interest. All the more so given that the instant petition raises
40(g) of the Public Service Act, as amended, meant that the fees
some arguments that are well-worth resolving for future
which NTC may impose are only for reimbursement of its
reference.
expenses for regulation and supervision but no longer for
authorization purposes.
This brings us to the substantive merits of the petition.
We find, however, that NTC is correct in saying that there is no
In its Amended Decision, the CA ruled that petitioner NTC had showing of legislative intent to repeal, even impliedly, Section
arrogated upon itself the power to tax an entity, which it is not 40(g), supra, of the Public Service Act, as amended. An implied
authorized to do. Petitioner disagreed, contending the fee in repeal is predicated on a substantial conflict between the new and
question is not in the nature of a tax, but is merely a regulatory prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law
measure. cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of
the new and old laws.11 The two laws must be absolutely
Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act provides:
incompatible such that they cannot be made to stand together. 12

Sec. 40. The Commission is authorized and ordered to

Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting
charge and collect from any public service or applicant,
statutes or provisions, should endeavor to reconcile the same
as the case may be, the following fees
instead of declaring outright the validity of one as against the
as reimbursement of its expenses in the
other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy is for the
authorization, supervision and/or regulation of
judge to harmonize such statutes or provisions if this is possible,
the public services:
bearing in mind that they are equally the handiwork of the same
legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same time also
xxx xxx xxx according due respect to a coordinate department of the
government. It is this policy the Court will apply in arriving at the
interpretation of the laws and the conclusions that should follow
g) For each permit, authorizing the increase in therefrom.13
equipment, the installation of new units or authorizing
the increase of capacity, or the extension of means or
general extensions in the services, twenty centavos for It is a rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication
each one hundred pesos or fraction of the additional are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is
capital necessary to carry out the permit. (Emphasis convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws
supplied) are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent with each other
that they cannot co-exist. This is based on the rationale that the
will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function
Clearly, Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act is not a tax of construction and interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of
measure but a simple regulatory provision for the collection of Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to
fees imposed pursuant to the exercise of the State’s police power. harmonize, as much as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws and
A tax is imposed under the taxing power of government resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence. 14
principally for the purpose of raising revenues. The law in
question, however, merely authorizes and requires the collection
of fees for the reimbursement of the Commission's expenses in Here, there does not even appear to be a conflict between Section
the authorization, supervision and/or regulation of public services. 40(g) of the Public Service Act, as amended, and Section 5(g) of
There can be no doubt then that petitioner NTC is authorized to R.A. 7925. In fact, the latter provision directs petitioner NTC to
collect such fees. However, the amount thereof must be "continue to impose such fees and charges as may be
reasonably related to the cost of such supervision and/or necessary to cover reasonable costs and expenses for the
regulation.10 regulation and supervision of telecommunications entities." The
absence alone of the word "authorization" in Section 5(g) of R.A.
No. 7921 cannot be construed to mean that petitioner NTC had
Petitioner NTC also assails the CA's ruling that Section 40(g) of thus been deprived of the power to collect such fees. As pointed
the Public Service Act had been amended by Section 5(g) of R.A. out by the petitioner, the words "authorization, supervision and/or
No. 7925, which reads: regulation" used in Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act are not
distinct and completely separable concepts which may be taken
singly or piecemeal. Taken in their entirety, they are the WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
quintessence of the Commission's regulatory functions, and must Amended Decision and Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.
go hand-in-hand with one another. In petitioner's own words,
"[t]he Commission authorizes, supervises and regulates
SO ORDERED.
telecommunications entities and these functions... cannot be
considered singly without destroying the whole concept of the
Commission's regulatory functions." 15 Hence, petitioner NTC is Puno, Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna,
correct in asserting that the passage of R.A. 7925 did not bring J.J., concur.
with it the abolition of permit fees.

However, while petitioner had made some valid points of

argument, its position must, of necessity, crumble on the fourth
issue raised in its petition. Petitioner itself admits that the fees
imposed are precisely regulatory and supervision fees,
and not taxes. This necessarily implies, however, that such fees
must be commensurate to the costs and expenses involved in
discharging its supervisory and regulatory functions. In the words
of Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act itself, the fees and
charges which petitioner NTC is authorized to collect from any
public service or applicant are limited to the "reimbursement of its
expenses in the authorization, supervision and/or regulation of
public services." It is difficult to comprehend how the cost of
licensing, regulating, and surveillance could amount
to P1,190,750.50. The CA was correct in finding the amount
imposed as permit fee exorbitant and in complete disregard of the
basic limitation that the fee should be at least approximately
commensurate to the expense. Petitioner itself admits that it had
imposed the maximum amount possible under the Public Service
Act, as amended. That is hardly taking into consideration the
actual costs of fulfilling its regulatory and supervisory functions.

Independent of the above, there is one basic consideration for the

dismissal of this petition, about which petitioner NTC did not
bother to comment at all. We refer to the fact that, as respondent
ICC aptly observed, the principal ground given by the CA in
striking down the imposition of the P1,190,750.50 fee is that
respondent ICC is entitled to the benefits of the so-called "parity
clause" embodied in Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925, to wit:

Section 23. Equality of Treatment in the

Telecommunications Industry. - Any advantage, favor,
privilege, exemption, or immunity granted under
existing franchises, or may hereafter be granted, shall
ipso facto become part of previously granted
telecommunications franchises and shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such
franchises x x x.

In this connection, it is significant to note that the subsequent

congressional franchise granted to the Domestic Satellite
Corporation under Presidential Decree No. 947, states:

Section 6. In consideration of the franchise and rights

hereby granted, the grantee shall pay to the Republic of
the Philippines during the life of this franchise a tax of
one-half percent of gross earnings derived by the
grantee from its operation under this franchise and
which originate from the Philippines. Such tax shall be
due and payable annually within ten days after the audit
and approval of the accounts by the Commission on
Audit as prescribed in Section 11 hereof and shall be in
lieu of all taxes, assessments, charges, fees, or
levies of any kind, nature, or description levied,
established or collected by any municipal,
provincial, or national authority x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

The CA was correct in ruling that the above-quoted provision is,

by law, considered as ipso facto part of ICC's franchise due to the
"parity clause" embodied in Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925.
Accordingly, respondent ICC cannot be made subject to the
payment of the subject fees because its payment of the franchise
tax is "in lieu" of all other taxes and fees.
 SECOND DIVISION fees. Accordingly, the lost copy of the subject title is hereby
declared as NULL and VOID.4
G.R. No. 147192 June 27, 2006
On the other hand, RTC Branch 31 also issued an order, dated
November 8, 1994, in the other (unnumbered) cadastral case, the
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,
dispositive portion of which read:
vs.
THE CITY ASSESSOR OF ILOILO CITY, THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF ILOILO CITY and ROSALINA FRANCISCO, WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the Register of Deeds, City of Iloilo is
represented by her attorney-in-fact, SALVADOR PAJA hereby directed to issue a new owner’s duplicate certificate of
I,* Respondents. Title No. T-48580 in the name of the G.S.I.S. C/O RODOLFO
CERES, the registered owner, basing the same on the Original
Certificate of Title found intact and existing in the Office of the
DECISION
Register of Deeds and the latter to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-48580 together with the encumbrances therein and to
CORONA, J.: issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of ROSALINA
FRANCISCO of legal age, single, Filipino Citizen and resident of
Brgy. Tacas, Jaro, Iloilo City, Philippines. The owner’s duplicate
Assailed in this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the certificate of title No. T-48580 which was not surrendered is
Rules of Court are the decision 1 and resolution2 of the Court of hereby declared null and void.5
Appeals (CA) dismissing a petition for annulment of
judgment3 filed by petitioner, the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), in Cadastral Case No. 84 and another No appeal was made from both orders of the courts a quo, hence,
unnumbered cadastral case decided by the Regional Trial Court they became final and executory.
(RTC), Branches 36 and 31, of Iloilo City, respectively.
In a petition to annul the judgment of the trial court, petitioner,
In the two cadastral cases, private respondent Rosalina Francisco as the alleged previous owner of the parcels of land sold at public
petitioned for the issuance of new transfer certificates of title auction, assailed the orders of the RTCs of Iloilo City before the
(TCTs) in her name over two parcels of land, to wit: CA. It claimed that the assessment of real property taxes on it
(GSIS) was void since, under its charter (RA 8291), it was exempt
from all forms of taxes (including real property taxes on the
TCT No. 41681 properties held by it) that were due to the local governments
where such properties were located. Furthermore, it claimed that
A parcel of land known as Lot No. 6, Block 2, of the Subdivision the proceedings in the assessment and levy of said taxes, as well
Plan (LRC) Psd-184005 being a portion of Lot 2214-B, Jaro as the sale of the properties at public auction, were held without
Cadastre, LRC (GLRO) Record No. 8 situated in the District of notice to it, hence, its right to due process was violated.
Jaro, Iloilo City, Island of Panay, registered in the name of GSIS
c/o Baldomero Dagdag, of legal age, Filipino citizen and resident The appellate court gave no credence to the arguments of
of Jaro, Iloilo City, Philippines on June 28, 1991. petitioner and dismissed its petition. According to the CA, the
exemption of GSIS under its charter was not applicable pursuant
TCT No. 48580 to Section 234(a) of RA 7160, otherwise known as The Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC). Under that law, the tax-exempt
status of GSIS cannot be invoked where the actual use or
A parcel of land known as Lot No. 22, Block 2, of the Subdivision beneficial ownership of the properties under its title has been
Record No. 8 situated in the District of Jaro, Iloilo City, Island of conveyed to another person.6 The CA added that there was also
Panay, registered in the name of GSIS c/o Rodolfo Ceres, of legal no basis for GSIS’s claim that it was denied due process. 7
age, Filipino Citizen and a resident of Iloilo City, Philippines, with
an area of Two Hundred Ninety Four (294) square meters, more
or less. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by
the CA, hence, it brought this case to us via a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Private respondent Francisco purchased the subject properties in
the auction sales held for the satisfaction of delinquent real
property taxes. After the lapse of the one-year redemption period In this petition, petitioner essentially faults the CA for ruling that
and the failure of the registered owner or any interested person to its properties were not exempt from all forms of taxes under its
redeem the properties, the Iloilo City Treasurer issued the charter (RA 8291) and that the proceedings on the assessment
corresponding final bill of sale to private respondent. The sales and levy of its properties were legal.
were later on duly annotated on the certificates of title on file with
the Register of Deeds. However, the final bill of sale could not be In support of its position, petitioner points to Section 39 of RA
registered because the owner’s duplicate certificate of title was 8291 which reads:
unavailable at that time.

Section 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. –

To effect registration in her name, private respondent instituted It is hereby declared that the actuarial solvency of the funds of
separate petitions for the entry of title in her name over the two the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times and that
lots with the RTCs of Iloilo City. Both petitions were unopposed. the contribution rates are necessary to sustain the benefits under
this Act shall be kept low as possible in order not to burden the
Finding merit in her petitions, the RTCs, in separate orders issued member of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on the
on separate dates, directed the issuance of new duplicate TCTs. GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and
The dispositive portion of the April 29, 1993 order of RTC Branch increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of
36 in Cadastral Case No. 84 read: this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary,
the GSIS, its assets, revenues, including all accruals thereto, and
benefits paid shall be exempt from all taxes, assessment fees,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Register of Deeds of the charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue
City of Iloilo is hereby ordered to issue new owner’s duplicate unless expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment
copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-41681 in the name of against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby
GSIS c/o Baldomero Dagdag, upon payment of the required legal considered paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations,
issuances, opinions, or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation known existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and conflicting laws.15 Thus, the legislature cannot be presumed to
rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect. have intended Section 234 (a) to run counter to Section 39 of RA
8291.
xxx xxx xxx
This conclusion is buttressed by the Court’s 2003 decision
in National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan 16 where we
The funds and/or properties referred to herein as well as the
declared that the tax provisions of the LGC were the most
benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this
significant provisions therein insofar as they removed the blanket
Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution,
exclusion of instrumentalities and agencies of the national
levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial
government (like petitioner) from the coverage of local taxation.
agencies or administrative bodies including the Commission on
In that case, petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) claimed
Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the
that it was an instrumentality of the government exempt under its
members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or
charter from paying franchise tax. The Court overruled NPC and
caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official
upheld the right of respondent city government to impose the
functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with
franchise tax on its privilege to transact business in its area.
his position or otherwise, is in favor of GSIS.8 (italics supplied)

Again, in the 2004 case of Rubia v. Government Service

We find no reversible error in the decision and resolution of the
Insurance System,17 the Court declared that any interpretation
CA.
that gave Section 39 an expansive construction to exempt all
GSIS assets and properties from legal processes was
Even if the charter of the GSIS generally exempts it from tax unwarranted. These processes included the levy and garnishment
liabilities, the prescription is not so encompassing as to make the of its assets for taxes or claims enforced against it. The Court
tax exemption applicable to the properties in dispute here. there ruled that the exemption under Section 39 of the GSIS
Charter should be read consistently with its avowed purpose – the
maintenance of its actuarial solvency to finance the retirement,
In the early case of City of Baguio v. Busuego,9 we held that the disability and life insurance benefits of its members. The Court
tax-exempt status of the GSIS could not prevent the accrual of meant that the tax-exempt properties and assets of GSIS referred
the real estate tax liability on properties transferred by it to a to those that remained at its disposal and use, either for
private buyer through a contract to sell. In the present case, GSIS investment or for income-generating purposes. Properties whose
had already conveyed the properties to private persons thus actual and beneficial use had been transferred to private taxable
making them subject to assessment and payment of real property persons, for consideration or otherwise, were excluded and were
taxes.10 The alienation of the properties sold by GSIS was the thus taxable.
proximate cause and necessary consequence of the delinquent
taxes due.
In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos,18 the
Court ruled that the exemption of a government-owned or
The doctrine laid down in City of Baguio is reflected in Section 234 controlled corporation from taxes and other charges was not
(a) of the LGC,11 which states: absolute and could be withdrawn, as in fact certain provisions of
the LGC, including Section 234 (a), were deemed to have
Section 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. — The expressly withdrawn the tax-exempt privilege of petitioner as a
following are exempted from payment of the real property government-owned corporation.
tax:
Lastly, even if we were to construe that RA 8291 abrogated
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any Section 234(a) of the LGC, still it cannot be made to apply
of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use retroactively without impairing the vested rights of private
thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, respondent. The appellate court thus correctly stated:
to a taxable person. (emphasis supplied)
xxx it has been the courts’ consistent ruling that a repealing
Petitioner, however, claims that RA 8291, which took effect in statute must not interfere with vested rights or impair the
1997, abrogated Section 234 (a) of the LGC of 1991. obligation of contracts; that if any other construction is possible,
the act should not be construed so as to affect rights which have
vested under the old law. Private respondent[s], we reiterate,
We disagree. have become the private owner[s] of the properties in question in
the regular course of proceedings established by law, and after
The abrogation or repeal of a law cannot be assumed; the the decisions granting such rights have become final and
intention to revoke must be clear and manifest. 12 RA 8291 made executory. The enactment of the new GSIS Charter cannot be
no express repeal or abrogation of the provisions of RA 7160, applied in a retroactive manner as to divest the private
particularly Section 234 (a) thereof. respondent[s] of [their] ownership.19 (citations omitted)

Repeal by implication in this case is not at all convincing either. To WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
bring about an implied repeal, the two laws must be absolutely
incompatible. They must be clearly repugnant in a way that the No costs.
later law (RA 8291) cannot exist without nullifying the prior law
(RA 7160).13
SO ORDERED.

Indeed, there is nothing in RA 8291 which abrogates, expressly or

impliedly, that particular provision of the LGC. The two statutes
are not inconsistent on that specific point, let alone so
irreconcilable as to compel us to uphold one and strike down the
other.

The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought

into accord with other laws in a way that will form a uniform
system of jurisprudence.14 The legislature is presumed to have
 Republic of the Philippines The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of
SUPREME COURT violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. He
Manila was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1)
day of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4)
years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all the
FIRST DIVISION
accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay a fine of
P4,000.00 plus costs.
G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
BELLOSILLO, J.: petitioner but modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate
term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum
and a fine of P5,000.00.
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he
amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as "An Act to reasserts his innocence. He contends that he has not violated C.A.
Regulate the Use of Aliases". 1 No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used
any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez" his alias. An alias,
according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and
another name by which a person is also known. He claims that he
Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9
has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he only used
May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the
such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of
Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on
Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an essential
a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving
requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by
of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the
R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the prosecution
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint
failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his
was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato
registered name in the Registry of Births. He further argues that
through a resolution advising the Governor to report the
the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory
involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of
that he was charged under the wrong law. 5
mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area. 2

Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed

On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner,
in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to
wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that
be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its
he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty.
enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be
Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to
construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. 6 The
the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger,
court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a
Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or
proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to
would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.7
Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask
for the document since he was one of the respondents before the
Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as
could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to amended, which was allegedly violated by petitioner, and the
acknowledge receipt of the complaint. 3 surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the
pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes
are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao
November 1936, and before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085, is
City he was instructed by the security officer to register in the
entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as
visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner
follows:
wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed
to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he
needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person
Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him shall use any name different from the one with which he was
a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or
writing the name "Oscar Perez."4 such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name
and one or two surnames.
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an
acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same office.
They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply
the person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to
petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate
gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition
Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly shall set forth the original name and the alias or aliases for the
charged. use of which judicial authority has been, obtained, specifying the
proceedings and the date on which such authority was granted.
Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the
proper civil register . . . .
presentation of its evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed
a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution
to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085,
name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now
argued that no document from the local civil registry was reads:
presented to show the registered name of accused which
according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema,
his conviction.
television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic
events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted that he had encountered certain difficulties in his transactions
practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with government offices which required him to explain why he
with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner
registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in could easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking
case of all alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of only to his real name "Yu Kheng Chiau."
immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have
been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons
The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the
whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry
Philippines, as shown by his having filed a petition for
and who have not been baptized, have one year from the
naturalization in Branch V of the above-mentioned court, argues
approval of this act within which to register their names in the
the more against the grant of his petition, because if naturalized
civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the
as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no necessity for his
patronymic name and one or two surnames.
further using said alias, as it would be contrary to the usual
Filipino way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for well as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly
authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to observed, if he believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be
obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall better for him to write his name following the Occidental method,
be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than "he can easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of
one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's the name "Yu Kheng Chian," he can, abandoning the same, ask
baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil for authority to adopt the name Kheng Chiau Young."
registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his
pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that
name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The
petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable
judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the
grounds under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act
alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil
No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his
registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than
petition for the use of an alias name.
his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded
in the proper local civil registry.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or
intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in
The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and
business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is
basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business
registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the
authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the
Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in
sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his
its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for
fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is
other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and
known by several different names and these are known
amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. 8 The
as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different
pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow —
name belonging to another person in a single instance without
any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall
written or printed receipt including receipt for tax or business or within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This
any written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or is so in the case at bench.
on any written or printed evidence of any agreement or business
transactions, any name used in connection with his business other
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of
than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view
the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the
in or at the place where his business is conducted, if he is
messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to
engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm name or
that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while
business name or style without first registering such other name,
merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the
or such firm name, or business name or style in the Bureau of
complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no
Commerce together with his true name and that of any other
question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of
person having a joint or common interest with him in such
petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was
contract, agreement, business transaction, or business . . . .
intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his
real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally
was made primarily to curb the common practice among the required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified
Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would
created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right,
practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because
which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection
against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.
possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus
penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of
duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the
law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of
civil register.9
C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The
confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here
the meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of an alias within as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those
the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled — contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as
amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use
that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is
of alias "Kheng Chiau Young" in addition to his real name "Yu
favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
Cheng Chiau" would add to more confusion. That he is known in
indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious
his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former
consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it
name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all,
should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the
petitioner admitted that he is known to his associates by both
accused. 13 The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the
names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a
law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a
customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact
certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and
the discretion of the court limited. 14 Indeed, our mind cannot rest Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the
easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a Movement for People's Initiative,6 a group of citizens desirous to
law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him. avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that
he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers
intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals
the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is
Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is
proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC;
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. SO ORDERED.
that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature
stations shall be established all over the country, with the
assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the
signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the
Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is
Republic of the Philippines necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the
SUPREME COURT purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC;
Manila and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process
involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as
EN BANC the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published
in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control
and supervision of the COMELEC.
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, 7 Section 4 of Article
MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, VII,8 and Section 8 of Article X9 of the Constitution. Attached to
vs. the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments which
PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the
founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, provisions concerning term limits, and with the following
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents. proposition:

SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL
ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE
FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF
(MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987
and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be

DAVIDE, JR., J.: submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve
per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given
through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its
the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause the
attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for
of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars, before the Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal,
drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and
Commission itself, through the original proponent 1 and the main the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general
sponsor2 of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996;
the Constitution, characterized this system as and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at
"innovative".3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 10:00 a.m.
Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or
revision of, the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by
Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the
by a constitutional convention. 4 For this and the other reasons following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra;
hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
petition. Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator
Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and
representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon
filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong
COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a
Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not
Petition)5 wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and
country; the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the
attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam
newspapers of general and local circulation; Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin —
filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the arguments:
Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the
purpose.
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE
Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.
Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No.
1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL
Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator
GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF
Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the
RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE
Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.
GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT
DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC.
initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE
on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND
initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of
people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON
future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this
THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY
deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the
BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS
Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that law which can
"INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE
be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional
COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE
initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been obviously left
CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC,
to a separate law.
ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;

(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE
after publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers
ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE
only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter
INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.
take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.
SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A
DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 ACT NO. 6735;
to govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and
initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY
vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE
concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and
HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the
DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to
AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE
pass the implementing law.
HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."
limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of
the people's initiative.
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO.
1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS
initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other government AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS
department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose. ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E,
PETITION);
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for
prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the COMELEC 7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF
grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987
PIRMA would entail expenses to the national treasury for general CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT
re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN
mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE
be incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION
transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT
issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992,
promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's
suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
behalf a Comment 16 which starts off with an assertion that the
instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed
comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory
days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to
effective immediately and continuing until further orders, start the signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put
enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and
Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin
Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to maintains as follows:
amend the Constitution.
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, No. 6735, which governs the conduct of initiative to amend the
filed their Comment 15 on the petition. They argue therein that: Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is
not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or
sufficiency of laws.
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE
NATIONAL TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
proposition in an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for
the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a
effective as of the day of the plebiscite. Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition
in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended Petition
in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is
contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer (1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to,
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, but a revision of, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr.
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve a change from a political
R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an
purposes of the Act. isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on
synchronization of elections and on the State policy of
guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but
prohibiting political dynasties. 19 A revision cannot be done
mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks to alter
by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article
only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more
XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to
reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the
limits provided for all other national and local elective officials are
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin
based on the philosophy of governance, "to open up the political
considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for
arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the
only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will
demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and
be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay
economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective
Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a
proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-
priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of
making for the common good"; hence, to remove the term limits
the sovereign power of the people.
is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.

In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also

(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative,
on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General contends
particularly in a conflict-of-interest situation. Initiative is intended
that:
as a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if
they are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to officials, but not as a premium for good performance. 20
amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement of Policy
explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called
Section 3, which enumerates the three systems of initiative,
the enabling law that implements the people's initiative on
includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as the
amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper
power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its
parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency
Section 5 repeatedly mentions initiative on the Constitution.
before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the
petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per
necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being national in scope, that legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or
system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the
Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the sufficiency
overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC,
nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution. (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds
for such people's initiative. Accordingly, there being no enabling
law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material
proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal with initiative on the
Constitution. (5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or
remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is
without authority to legislate the procedure for a
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere people's initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
amendment to the Constitution, not a revision thereof. Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress.
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus Election for a valid delegation of power.
Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the
provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC. Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law
that implements the people's right to initiate constitutional
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and
temporary restraining order; (b) noted the aforementioned House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even
Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that
filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law to
latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he
respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction
he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its
Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading
allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and
January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the
1997 at 9:30 a.m. COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a
petition for initiative which is signed by the required number of
registered voters. He also submits that the proponents of a
constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and 5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance
resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
number of signatures, as the COMELEC's role in an initiative on
the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to
of the initiative petition and the call and supervision of a
submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within twenty
plebiscite, if warranted.
days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of
the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which wherein it adopts the allegations and arguments in the main
it attached a Petition in Intervention raising the following Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have
arguments: dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause
of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do so
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under
jurisdiction.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of

(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the
both the Journal and the Record of the House of Representatives
required implementing law on the initiative to amend the
relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as
Constitution.
the transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the
Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee on Suffrage and
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and
does not have the required number of signatures. Senate Bill No. 17.

(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their
which can be proposed only by Congress or a constitutional Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention of
convention. 22 Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter
filed, in due time, their separate memoranda. 24
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting
the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to
the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by this special civil action.
LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK
and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall
of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a
first take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a prejudicial
nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated Comments on
procedural question.
the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to
file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of
three days from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon I
within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said
Petition in Intervention.
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE
PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN PETITION.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued
on the following pivotal issues, which the Court formulated in light
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no
of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far
serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for
filed:
this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when
there is a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor,
was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately
petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This being so, it
covers such initiative.
becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any
further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the
Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing
Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior
Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People
v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse
officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the environmental consequences on the body politic of the questioned
1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and
amendment to, the Constitution. political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.

4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has 30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is
jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order (a) threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the Supreme
fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing Court
municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of
volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or the Constitution. 25
causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed
Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a
motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the
petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus,
because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of
oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last
to submit within five days their memoranda or analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December
1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose
ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative
with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and
would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until
the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The
Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while
COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its
the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people
insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the
cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not
instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
provide for its implementation.
which provides:

This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the

Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings of any
draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the
tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising
Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986
functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or
Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
(Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That section reads as follows:
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the be proposed:
defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or
matter specified therein.
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its members; or
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the
said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of (b) by a constitutional convention; or
signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the (c) directly by the people themselves thru
Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of initiative as provided for in Article___ Section
signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise ___of the Constitution. 31
be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
After several interpellations, but before the period of
amendments, the Committee submitted a new
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his formulation of the concept of initiative which it
Memorandum, this Court may brush aside technicalities of denominated as Section 2; thus:
procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28 MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully
call attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to
the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed
which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered
the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the
Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
the transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. The people may, after five years from the date of the last
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution
thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the
II registered voters.

R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee
INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, Report No. 7. 32
UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides: carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at questions.
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at
under this section shall be authorized within five years following least 10 percent, there are no details in the provision on how to
the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving
five years thereafter. this matter to the legislature?

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
of this right.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin long as the legislature does not pass the necessary implementing
Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated: law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the It was made clear during the interpellations that the
committee hearing, especially with respect to the budget aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND — not
appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the to REVISE — the Constitution; thus:
plebiscite could be called. We deemed it best that this matter be
left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that
envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative can be
this matter of initiative, which came about because of the
called until after five years from the date of the ratification of this
extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from
Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be
the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied
proposed through the exercise of this initiative power would be
in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of
after five years. It is reasonably expected that within that five-
initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire
year period, the National Assembly can come up with the
Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of
appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.
the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. 34

FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature — the

xxx xxx xxx
details on how this is to be carried out — is it possible that, in
effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification is the
work of the legislature rather than of the people? Does this MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing
provision exclude that possibility? this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another
the legislature itself as a body could propose that amendment,
separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-
fourths vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly
and submit that proposal to the people for ratification through the MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified
process of an initiative. a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
xxx xxx xxx
sense that was conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention

MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to
in the proposal is to vest constituent power in the people to
distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to
amend the Constitution?
include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation
to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President. amendments?

MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in
proposal in terms of institutionalizing popular participation in the the Committee. 35
drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I
would have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter
Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in
introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the
the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy
Committee accepted. Thus:
over all other legal mandates?

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute

MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
the entire Section 2 with the following:

MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed
hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution is source of all legal
amendment after taking into account the modifications submitted
mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of
by the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners
circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the
Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The
Constitution?
modified amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will
now read as follows: "SECTION 2. — AMENDMENTS TO THIS
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable. CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE
PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST
TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of REGISTERED
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of
VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
constituent power we have a separate article in the constitution
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
that would specifically cover the process and the modes of
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS
amending the Constitution?
SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President. OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE
are drafted now, to again concede to the legislature the process IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
or the requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the
Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed
amendment is reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed
placed in the hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can amendment. 36
incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would
adequately cover all the conceivable situations. 33
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified
amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a legislative
act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to
possible for the legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry amendments, and the final version, which the Commission
out the initiative. . .? approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:

MR. DAVIDE. It can. MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as
amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE
xxx xxx xxx
PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST
TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
prevent the legislature from asking another body to set the REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
proposition in proper form. REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS
SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
implementation of this particular right would be subject to
legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore
the percentage of the requirement. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of
the proper form for submission to the people, may be subject to The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was
legislation. approved on second reading on 9 July 1986. 41 Thereafter, upon
his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed
to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again approved on
initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42
the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded
here.
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the
approved Section 2 be amended by changing "percent" to "per
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by
procedures which I have discussed be legislated? law" in the second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The
Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37 this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of the
present second paragraph of Section 2.

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified

amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to — NOT The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of
REVISION of — the Constitution. Thus: initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution is not self-executory.

MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.

Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of
this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us
proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it R.A. No. 6735.
not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla
when he made the distinction between the words "amendments"
and "revision"? There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to
implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a
statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to
"revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then
is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision." 38 reading:

Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the
proposing amendments through initiative must be more rigorous exercise of this right.
and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:

with
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this
proposal, what is involved is an amendment to the Constitution.
To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise
the National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a of this right.
constitutional convention would require a higher number.
Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a constitutional This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a
convention, a majority of the National Assembly is required, the power to provide for the rules implementing the exercise of the
import being that the process of amendment must be made more right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be
rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary carried out." 46
legislation or putting an end to a law proposed by the National
Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the
requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended
because it would require another voting by the Committee, and to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.
the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill
Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage
amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on and Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the
the Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39 basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No.
497, 47 which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b)
House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with the subject matter of
House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided
under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and initiative therein;
provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution.
Senate Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered
concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units.
voters; and
The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No.
17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was
subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50 and by c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not
the House of Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. more than one hundred (100) words which
6735. shall be legibly written or printed at the top of
every page of the petition. (Emphasis
supplied).
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of
Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of the
right?" The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed"
only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC,
Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and
to the Constitution. The said section reads:
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply
system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a
recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied). subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the
primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed
important than the initiative on national and local laws.
afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said
section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on
national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments
section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National
out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our
proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and
"directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for
the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the
do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is "national
initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this
initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law,
section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which
ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
referendum and appropriately used the phrases "propose and
municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of
enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52
initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of
the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act
defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and
Sec. 3. Definition of terms —
mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that
Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements
as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the xxx xxx xxx
proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative,
the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c)
requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law
sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers
repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the to a petition proposing amendments to the
contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought Constitution;
to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said
paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a
petition proposing to enact a national
(c) The petition shall state the following: legislation; and

c.1 contents or text of the proposed a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to
law sought to be enacted, approved or a petition proposing to enact a regional,
rejected, amended or repealed, as the case provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,
may be; resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).

c.2 the proposition; Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should
have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. 53
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;

A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is

not accurate. Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body
(b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads: concerned;

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the (c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act
Constitution approved by the majority of the thereon, and the invocation of the power of initiative as a
votes cast in the plebiscite shall become consequence thereof;
effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(c) A national or local initiative proposition
approved by majority of the votes cast in an
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
election called for the purpose shall become
effective fifteen (15) days after certification
and proclamation of the Commission. (f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(Emphasis supplied).
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to official in the local government unit concerned as to whether the
indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local governments; required number of signatures have been obtained;
thus:
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's the proposition to the registered voters for their approval, which
organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect must be within the period specified therein;
initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative
bodies. . . .
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;

and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the

COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the (j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for
both national and local initiative and referendum. (k) The limitations on local initiative; and

Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under (l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56

subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is

misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both national
and local initiative and referendum. It reads: Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections,
merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b)
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the
or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in
Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by
enact the said measure. the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to
the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e)
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
care in providing for the details in the implementation of initiative
and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more
them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on important or the paramount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735
the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on
the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant
following: lip service. 57

(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is
petition and the contents of the petition; incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative; is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and
cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the purposes of [the] Act. 58
required number of votes for its approval;
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari
proposition; potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
and
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55
Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following: (3) Delegation to the people at large;

(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of (4) Delegation to local governments; and
registered voters for the petition;
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60
stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the
signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters'
affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising
preceding election. 66
quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a
form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above.
However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A.
showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) respondent Commission must have known that the petition does
fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the
and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for
performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number.
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the
effected. 62 Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996,
and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely
concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both
wasted its time, energy, and resources.
requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the
power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of
whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and
III
local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the
Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES
RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON
CONCLUSION
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be

It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of
rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the
any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
through the system of initiative. It does not have that power
implementation of the system.
under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under
Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for
the laws and regulations referred to therein are those We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the
of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength.
authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the
"sufficient standard" tests. constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the
right of the people under that system.
IV
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. a) GRANTING the instant petition;

Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of
compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed
initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
entertaining the Delfin Petition.
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS
5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution
the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered
voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least
3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is
contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is
himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that LIFTED as against private respondents.
the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his
drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the
petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative SO ORDERED.

only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading.
Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan,
banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of
the petition; 63 (2) to issue through its Election Records and
Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered Padilla, J., took no part.
voters in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its
election registrars, in the establishment of signature
 Republic of the Philippines The respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal, affirmed the
SUPREME COURT decision of the HSRC and denied the subsequent Motion for
Manila Reconsideration for lack of merit and for having been filed out of
time. Petitioner has now filed this Petition for review before the
Supreme Court.
THIRD DIVISION

Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, "appeals from

G.R. No. 109404 January 22, 1996
judgments or final orders of the . . . Office of the President . . .
may be taken to the Court of Appeals . . . " However, in order to
FLORENCIO EUGENIO, doing business under the name E & hasten the resolution of this case, which was deemed submitted
S Delta Village, petitioner, for decision one and a half years ago, the Court resolved to make
vs. an exception to the said Circular in the interest of speedy justice.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HOUSING
AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB) AND
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner avers that the
PROSPERO PALMIANO, respondents.
Executive Secretary erred in applying P.D. 957 and in concluding
that the non-development of the E & S Delta Village justified
RESOLUTION private respondent's non-payment of his amortizations. Petitioner
avers that inasmuch as the land purchase agreements were
entered into in 1972, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976,
PANGANIBAN, J.: said law cannot govern the transaction.

Did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal We hold otherwise, and herewith rule that respondent Executive
justification for the non-payment of amortizations by a buyer on Secretary did not abuse his discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be
installment under land purchase agreements entered into prior given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts
to the enactment of P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
Buyers' Protective Decree"? This is the major question raised in
the instant Petition seeking to set aside the Decision of the
respondent Executive Secretary dated March 10, 1992 in O.P. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety,
Case No. 3761, which affirmed the order of the respondent HLURB but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of
dated September 1, 1987. the law.

On May 10, 1972, private respondent purchased on installment The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the
basis from petitioner and his co-owner/developer Fermin Salazar, situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must
two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City. be enforced. On this point, a leading authority on statutory
construction stressed:
Acting on complaints for non-development docketed as NHA Cases
Nos. 2619 and 2620 filed by the Delta Village Homeowners' The intent of a statute is the law. . . . The intent is the
Association, Inc., the National Housing Authority rendered a vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule
resolution on January 17, 1979 inter alia ordering petitioner to of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
cease and desist from making further sales of lots in said village intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law
or in any project owned by him. is the law itself, and must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the
strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the
While NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 were still pending, private letter of a statute when it leads away from the true
respondent filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions
Affairs (OAALA) of the Human Settlements Regulatory inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. . . . In
Commission (HSRC), a complaint (Case No. 80-589) against construing statutes the proper course is to start out and
petitioner and spouses Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo alleging that, follow the trite intent of the legislature and to adopt that
in view of the above NHA resolution, he suspended payment of his sense which harmonizes best with the context and
amortizations, but that petitioner resold one of the two lots to the promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and
said spouses Relevo, in whose favor title to the said property was objects of the legislature.1 (emphasis supplied.)
registered. Private respondent further alleged that he suspended
his payments because of petitioner's failure to develop the village.
It goes without saying that, as an instrument of social justice, the
law must favor the weak and the disadvantaged, including, in this
Private respondent prayed for the annulment of the sale to the instance, small lot buyers and aspiring homeowners. P.D. 957 was
Relevo spouses and for reconveyance of the lot to him. enacted with no other end in view than to provide a protective
mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the
On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding manipulations and machinations of "unscrupulous subdivision and
the right of petitioner to cancel the contract with private condominium sellers", and such intent is nowhere expressed more
respondent and dismissed private respondent's complaint. clearly than in its preamble, pertinent portions of which read as
follows:

On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the

OAALA and, applying P.D. 957, ordered petitioner to complete the WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its
subdivision development and to reinstate private respondent's inhabitants the requirements of decent human
purchase contract over one lot, and as to the other, "it appearing settlement and to provide them with ample opportunities
that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 269546 has been issued for improving their quality of life;
to . . . spouses Rodolfo and Ad(e)lina Relevo . . . , the
management of E & S Delta Village is hereby ordered to WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real
immediately refund to the complainant-appellant (herein private estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or
respondent) all payments made thereon, plus interests computed sellers have reneged on their representations and
at legal rates from date of receipt hereof until fully paid." obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision
roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting
systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus
 endangering the health and safety of home and lot On the other hand, as argued by the respondent Executive
buyers; Secretary, the application of P.D. 957 to the contracts in question
will be consistent with paragraph 4 of the contracts themselves,
which expressly provides:
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show
cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and (4) The party of the First Part hereby binds himself to
condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to subdivide, develop and improve the entire area covered
deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 168119 of which the
encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and parcels of lands subject of this contract is a part in
fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different accordance with the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance
innocent purchasers for value;2 (emphasis supplied.) No. 6561, S-66 and the Party of the First Part further
binds himself to comply with and abide by all laws, rules
and regulations respecting the subdivision and
From a dedicated reading of the preamble, it is manifest and
development of lots for residential purposes as may be
unarguable that the legislative intent must have been to remedy
presently in force or may hereafter be required by laws
the alarming situation by having P.D. 957 operate retrospectively
passed by the Congress of the Philippines or required by
even upon contracts already in existence at the time of its
regulations of the Bureau of Lands, the General
enactment. Indeed, a strictly prospective application of the
Registration Office and other government
statute will effectively emasculate it, for then the State will not be
agencies. (emphasis supplied)
able to exercise its regulatory functions and curb fraudulent
schemes and practices perpetrated under or in connection with
those contracts and transactions which happen to have been Moreover, as P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in
entered into prior to P.D. 957, despite obvious prejudice to the question, it follows that Section 23 thereof had been properly
very subdivision lot buyers sought to be protected by said law. It invoked by private respondent when he desisted from making
is hardly conceivable that the legislative authority intended to further payment to petitioner due to petitioner's failure to develop
permit such a loophole to remain and continue to be a source of the subdivision project according to the approved plans and within
misery for subdivision lot buyers well into the future. the time limit for complying with the same. (Such incomplete
development of the subdivision and non-performance of specific
contractual and statutory obligations on the part of the
Adding force to the arguments for the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as
subdivision-owner had been established in the findings of the
a whole are certain of its provisions, viz., Sections 20, 21 and 23
HLURB which in turn were confirmed by the respondent Executive
thereof, which by their very terms have retroactive effect and will
Secretary in his assailed Decision.) Furthermore, respondent
impact upon even those contracts and transactions entered into
Executive Secretary also gave due weight to the following
prior to P.D. 957's enactment:
matters: although private respondent started to default on
amortization payments beginning May 1975, so that by the end of
Sec. 20. Time of Completion. — Every owner or July 1975 he had already incurred three consecutive arrearages in
developer shall construct and provide the facilities, payments, nevertheless, the petitioner, who had the cancellation
improvements, infrastructures and other forms of option available to him under the contract, did not exercise or
development, including water supply and lighting utilize the same in timely fashion but delayed until May 1979
facilities, which are offered and indicated in the when he finally made up his mind to cancel the contracts. But by
approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures, that time the land purchase agreements had already been
prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of overtaken by the provisions of P.D. 957, promulgated on July 12,
advertisement, within one year from the date of the 1976. (In any event, as pointed out by respondent HLURB and
issuance of the license for the subdivision or seconded by the Solicitor General, the defaults in amortization
condominium project or such other period of time as payments incurred by private respondent had been effectively
may be fixed by the Authority. condoned by the petitioner, by reason of the latter's tolerance of
the defaults for a long period of time.)
Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. — In cases of subdivision
lots or condominium units sold or disposed of prior to Likewise, there is no merit in petitioner's contention that
the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon respondent Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering the
the owner or developer of the subdivision or refund of private respondent's payments on Lot 12 although
condominium project to complete compliance with his or (according to petitioner) only Lot 13 was the subject of the
its obligations as provided in the preceding section complaint. Respondent Secretary duly noted that the supporting
within two years from the date of this Decree unless documents submitted substantiating the claim of non-
otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an development justified such order inasmuch as such claim was also
adequate performance bond is filed in accordance with the basis for non-payment of amortizations on said Lot 12.
Section 6 hereof.
Finally, since petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
Failure of the owner or, developer to comply with the (Executive Secretary's) Decision dated March 10, 1992 was filed
obligations under this and the preceding provisions shall only on the 21st day from receipt thereof, said decision had
constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and become final and executory, pursuant to Section 7 of
39 of this Decree. Administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, which
provides that "(d)ecisions/ resolutions/orders of the Office of the
President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws,
Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. — No installment become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or copy thereof . . . , unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is
condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to filed within such period."
buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer,
when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or
developer, desists from further payment due to the WHEREFORE, there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion,
failure of the owner or developer to develop the the petition is DENIED due course and is hereby DISMISSED. No
subdivision or condominium project according to the costs.
approved plans and within the time limit for complying
with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be
SO ORDERED.
reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization
interests but excluding delinquency interests, with
interest thereon at the legal rate. (emphasis supplied) Narvasa, C.J., Davide Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines On March 1, 1962, respondent appealed the ruling of the Collector
SUPREME COURT of Customs to the Commissioner of Customs who, on March 19,
Manila 1965, affirmed the decision of said Collector of Customs.3

FIRST DIVISION On July 2, 1965, respondent ESSO filed a petition with the Court
of Tax Appeals for review of the decision of the Commissioner of
Customs.
G.R. No. L-28329 August 17, 1975

The Court of Tax Appeals, on September 30, 1967, reversed the

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner,
decision of herein petitioner Commissioner of Customs and
vs.
ordered refund of the amount of P775.62 to respondent ESSO
ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., (Formerly: Standard-
which the latter had paid under protest.4
Vacuum Refining Corp. (Phil.), respondent.

This decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is now before this Court
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant
for review.
Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Antonio M.
Martinez for petitioner.
Petitioner contends that the special import tax under Republic Act
No. 1394 is separate and distinct from the customs duty
Carlos J. Valdez & Associates for respondent.
prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code, and that the
exemption enjoyed by respondent ESSO from the payment of
ESGUERRA, J.: customs duties under the Petroleum net of 1949 does not include
exemption from the payment of the special import tax provided in
R.A. No. 1394.5
Appeal from the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals reversing the
Commissioner of Customs' decision holding respondent ESSO
Standard Eastern, Inc., (formerly the Standard-Vacuum Refining For its stand petitioner puts forward this rationale:
Corporation (Phil.) and hereinafter referred to as ESSO) liable in
the total sum of P775.62 as special import tax on certain articles
A perusal of the provisions of R.A. No. 1394 will show that the
imported by the latter under Republic Act No. 387, otherwise
legislature considered the special import tax as a tax distinct from
known as the Petroleum Act of 1949.
customs duties as witness the fact that Section 2(a) of the said
law made separate mention of customs duties and special import
Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession No. 2, tax when it provided that ... if as a result of the application of the
issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on schedule therein, the total revenue derived from the customs
December 9, 1957, and operates a petroleum refining plant in duties and from the special import tax on goods, ... imported from
Limay Bataan. Under Article 103 of Republic Act No. 387 which the United States is less in any calendar year than the proceeds
provides: "During the five years following the granting of any from the exchange tax imposed under Republic Act Numbered Six
concession, the concessionaire may import free of customs duty, Hundred and One, as amended, on such goods, articles or
all equipment, machinery, material, instruments, supplies and products during the calendar year 1955, the President may, by
accessories," respondent imported and was assessed the special proclamation, suspend the reduction of the special import tax for
import tax (which it paid under protest) on the following separate the next succeeding calendar year ....
importations:
If it were the intention of Congress to exempt the holders of
1) One carton, scientific instruments with C & F value of assessed petroleum refinery concessions like the protestant (respondent
a special import tax in the amount of P31.98 (Airport Protest No. herein), such exemption should have been clearly stated in the
10); statute. Exemptions are never presumed. They must be
expressed in the clearest and most unambiguous language and
not left to mere implication.6
2) One carton of recorder parts with C & F value of $221.56;
assessed special import tax in the amount of P43.82 (Airport
Protest No. 11); Specifically, petitioner in his brief submitted two assignment of
errors allegedly committed by the Court of Tax Appeals in the
controverted decision, to wit:
3) One carton of valves with C & F value of $310.58; assessed
special import tax in the amount of P60.72 (Airport Protest No.
12); 1st assignment of error:

4) One box of parts for Conversion boilers and Auxiliary THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
Equipment with C & F value of $2,389.69; assessed special import TERM "CUSTOMS DUTY" IN ARTICLE 103 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
tax in the amount of P467.00 (Airport Protest No. 15); 387 INCLUDES THE SPECIAL IMPORT TAX IMPOSED BY REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 1394;
5) One carton of X-ray films with C & F value of $132.80;
assessed special import tax in the amount of P26.00 (Airport 2nd assignment of error:
Protest No. 16); and
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
6) One carton of recorder parts with C & F value of $750.39; EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF CUSTOMS DUTIES UNDER
assessed special import tax in the amount of P147.00 (Airport REPUBLIC ACT NO. 387 INCLUDES EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT
Protest No. 17).1 OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT TAX.

The Collector of Customs on February 16, 1962, held that On the other hand, the Court of Tax Appeals rationalized the
respondent ESSO was subject to the payment of the special ground for its ruling thus:
import tax provided in Republic Act No. 1394, as amended by R.A.
No. 2352, and dismissed the protest.2
If we are to adhere, as we should, to the plain and obvious
meaning of words in consonance with settled rules of
interpretation, it seems clear that the special import tax is an reduction of the special import tax for the next succeeding
impost or a charge on the importation or bringing into the calendar year ...
Philippines of all goods, articles or products subject thereto, for
the phrase "import tax on all goods, articles or products imported
Petitioner further argues:
or brought into the Philippines" in explicit and unambiguous terms
simply means customs duties. It is hardly necessary to add that
"customs duties" are simply taxes assessed on merchandise Customs duties are prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code,
imported from, or exported to a foreign country. while the special import tax is provided for by Republic Act No.
1394. If our legislature had intended to classify the special import
tax as customs duty, the said Art would not have expressly
And being a charge upon importation, the special import tax is
exempted from payment of the special Import tax importations of
essentially a customs duty, or at least partakes of the character
machinery, equipment, accessories, and spare parts for use of
thereof.
industries, without distinguishing whether the industries referred
to are the industries exempt from the payment of Customs duties
Citing numberous American decisions and definitions of terms or the non-exempt ones (Sec. 6). It is sufficient that the imported
"customs duties," "duties," "imposts," "levies," "tax," and "tolls," machinery, etc., is for the use of any industry. 11
and their distinctions, including some pronouncements of this
Court on the subject, the Court of Tax Appeals in its decision,
A study of petitioner's two assignments of errors shows that one
went to great lengths to show that the term "special import tax"
is anchored on practically the same ground as the other: both
as used in R.A. No. 1394 includes customs duties. It sees the
involve the interpretation of R.A. No. 387 (The Petroleum Act of
special import tax as nothing but an impost or a charge on the
1949) in relation with R.A. No. 1394 (The Special Import Tax
importation or bringing into the Philippines of goods, articles or
Law).
products.7

While the petitioner harps on particular clauses and phrases found

To clinch its theory the Court of Tax Appeals cited the similarity in
in the two cited laws, which in a way was likewise resorted to by
the basis of computation of the customs duty as well as the
the respondent ESSO, it would do Us well to restate the
similarity in the phraseology of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 1394
fundamental rule in the construction of a statute.
(which established the special import tax) and Section 9-01 of the
Tariff & Customs code (the basic law providing for and regulating
the imposition of customs duties and imposts on importations). 8 In order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the
particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken
as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
For its part, private respondent, ESSO, in its answer to the
part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
petition, leaned heavily on the same arguments as those given by
parts. In fact every statute should receive such construction as
the Tax Court, the burden of which is that the special import tax
will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body of laws.
law is a customs law. 9
Antagonism between the Act to be interpreted and existing or
previous laws is to be avoided, unless it was clearly the intention
It is clear that the only issue involved in this case is whether or of the legislature that such antagonism should arise and one
not the exemption enjoyed by herein private respondent ESSO amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by implication.
Standard Eastern, Inc. from customs duties granted by Republic
Act No. 387, or the Petroleum Act of 1949, should embrace or
Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take
include the special import tax imposed by R.A. No. 1394, or the
judicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes which they
Special Import Tax Law.
are called upon to construe and administer, and of facts which
affect their derivation, validity and operation. 12
We have examined the records of this case thoroughly and
carefully considered the arguments presented by both parties and
Applying the above stated rules and principles, let us consider the
We are convinced that the only thing left to this Court to do is to
history, the purpose and objectives of Republic Act No. 387 as it
determine the intention of the legislature through interpretation of
relates to Republic Act No. 1394 and other laws passed by the
the two statutes involved, i.e., Republic Act No. 1394 and
Congress of the Philippines insofar as they relate to each other.
Republic Act No. 387.

Republic Act No. 387, the Petroleum Act of 1949, has this for its
It is a well accepted principle that where a statute is ambiguous,
title, to wit:
as Republic Act No. 1394 appears to be, courts may examine both
the printed pages of the published Act as well as those extrinsic
matters that may aid in construing the meaning of the statute, AN ACT TO PROMOTE THE EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT,
such as the history of its enactment, the reasons for the passage EXPLOITATION, AND UTILIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM
of the bill and purposes to be accomplished by the measure. 10 RESOURCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; TO ENCOURAGE THE
CONSERVATION OF SUCH PETROLEUM RESOURCES; TO
AUTHORIZE THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
Petitioner in the first assignment of error took exception to the
RESOURCES TO CREATE AN ADMINISTRATION UNIT AND A
finding of the Court of Tax Appeals that "The language of Republic
TECHNICAL BOARD IN THE BUREAU OF MINES; TO APPROPRIATE
Act No. 1394 seems to leave no room for doubt that the law
FUNDS THEREFORE; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
intends that the phrase 'Special import tax' is taken to include
customs duties" and countered with the argument that "An
examination of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1394 will Art. 103 of said Act reads:
indubitably reveal that Congress considered the special import tax
as a tax different from customs duties, as may be seen from the
fact that Section 2(a) of said law made separate mention of ART. 103. Customs duties. — During the five years following the
customs duties and special import tax ..." Thus: granting of any concessions, the concessionaire may import free
of customs duty, all equipment, machinery, material, instruments,
supplies and accessories.
... if as a result of the application of the schedule therein the total
revenue derived from the customs duties and from the special
import tax on goods, ... imported from the United States is less in xxx xxx xxx
any calendar year than the proceeds from the exchange tax
imposed under Republic Act Numbered Six Hundred and One, as Art. 102 of the Same law insofar as pertinent, provides:
amended, on such goods, articles or products during the calendar
year 1955, the President may, by proclamation, suspend the
ART. 102. Work obligations, taxes, royalties not to be charged. A. No. 901 and a long list of other goods, articles, machinery,
— ...; nor shall any other special taxes or levies be applied to equipment, accessories and others.
such concessions, nor shall concessionaires under this Act be
subjected to any provincial, municipal, or other local taxes or
We shall now examine the six statutes repealed by R.A. No. 1394,
levies; nor shall any sales tax be charged on any petroleum
namely:
produced from the concession or portion thereof, manufactured
by the concessionaire and used in the working of his
concession. .... R.A. No. 601 is an Act imposing a special excise tax of 17% on
foreign exchange sold by the Central Bank or its agents. This is
known as the Exchange Tax Law;
Art. 104, still of the same Act, reads:

R.A. No. 814 amended Sections one, two and five and repealed
ART. 104. No export to be imposed. — No export tax shall be
Sections three and four of R.A. No. 601;
levied upon petroleum produced from concessions granted under
this Act.
R.A. No. 871 amended Sections one and two of R.A. No. 601, as
amended earlier by R.A. No. 814;
The title of Republic Act No. 387 and the provisions of its three
articles just cited give a clue to the intent of the Philippine
legislature, which is to encourage the exploitation and R.A. No. 1175 amended further Sections one and two of R.A. No.
development of the petroleum resources of the country. Through 601, as amended;
the instrumentality of said law, it declared in no uncertain terms
that the intensification of the exploration for petroleum must be
carried on unflinchingly even if, for the time being, no taxes, both R.A. No. 1197 amended furthermore R.A. No. 601 as amended
national and local, may be collected from the industry. This is the previously by R.A. No. 1175;
unequivocal intention of the Philippine Congress when the
language of the Petroleum Act is examined. Until this law or any R.A. No. 1375 amended Sections one and two of R.A. No. 601 as
substantial portion thereof is clearly amended or repealed by amended by R.A. Nos. 1175 and 1197.
subsequent statutes, the intention of the legislature must be
upheld.
As can be seen from the foregoing, in one fell swoop, Republic Act
No. 1394 repealed and revoked six earlier statutes which had
Against this unambiguous language of R.A. No. 387, there is the something to do with the imposition of special levies and/or
subsequent legislation, R.A. No. 1394, the Special Import Tax exemption of certain importations from the burden of the special
Law, which, according to the herein petitioner, shows that the import taxes or levies. On the other hand, it is apparent that R.A.
legislature considered the special import tax as a tax distinct from No. 387, the Petroleum Act, had been spared from the pruning
customs duties. knife of Congress, although this latter law had granted more
concessions and tax exemption privileges than any of the statutes
Republic Act No. 1394, otherwise known as the Special Import that were amended, repealed or revoked by R.A. No. 1394. The
Tax Law, is entitled as follows: answer must be that the Congress of the Philippine saw fit to
preserve the privileges granted under the Petroleum Law of 1949
in order to keep the door open to the exploitation and
AN ACT TO IMPOSE A SPECIAL IMPORT TAX ON ALL GOODS, development of the petroleum resources of the country with such
ARTICLES OR PRODUCTS IMPORTED OR BROUGHT INTO THE incentives as are given under that law.
PHILIPPINES, AND TO REPEAL REPUBLIC ACTS NUMBERED SIX
HUNDRED AND ONE, EIGHT HUNDRED AND FOURTEEN, EIGHT
HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-ONE, ELEVEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY- This ascertained will and intention of the legislature finds a
FIVE. ELEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVEN AND THIRTEEN parallelism in a case brought earlier before this Court.
HUNDRED AND SEVENTY FIVE.
A fishpond owner was slapped with taxes as a "merchant" by the
The title indicates unmistakably that it is repealing six prior Collector of Internal Revenue. He paid under protest and filed an
statutes. As will be seen later, all these laws dealt with the action to recover the taxes paid, claiming that he was an
imposition of a special excise tax on foreign exchange or other agriculturist and not a merchant. When this Court was called upon
form of levy on importation of goods into the country. to interpret the provisions of the Internal Revenue Law on
whether fish is an agricultural product which falls under the
exemption provisions of said law, it inquired into the purpose of
Section I of Republic Act No. 1394 reads as follows: the legislature in establishing the exemption for agricultural
products. We held:
SECTION 1. Except as herein otherwise
provided, there shall be levied, collected and The first inquiry, therefore, must relate to the purpose the
paid as special import tax on all goods, articles legislature had in mind in establishing the exemption contained in
or products imported or brought into the the clause now under consideration. It seems reasonable to
Philippines, irrespective of source, during the assume that it was due to the belief on the part of the law-making
period and in accordance with the rates body that by exempting agricultural products from this tax the
provided for in the following schedule: farming industry would be favored and the development of the
resources of the country encouraged. .... 13
xxx xxx xxx
Having this in mind, particularly the manner in which extrinsic
aids the history of the enactment of the statute and purpose of
It would appear that by the provision of Section 1 of this Act, the
the legislature in employing a clause or provision in the law had
pertinent provision of the Petroleum Law, for which there appears
been applied in determining the true intent of the lawmaking
to be no proviso to the contrary has been modified or altered.
body, We are convinced that R.A. No. 387, The Petroleum Act of
1949, was intended to encourage the exploitation, exploration and
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394 declares that the tax provided development of the petroleum resources of the country by giving
for in its Section I shall not be imposed against importation into it the necessary incentive in the form of tax exemptions. This is
the Philippines of machinery and/or raw materials to be used by the raison d etre for the generous grant of tax exemptions to
new and necessary industries as determined in accordance with R those who would invest their financial resources towards the
achievement of this national economic goal.
On the contention of herein petitioner that the exemptions
enjoyed by respondent ESSO under R.A. No. 387 have been
abrogated by R.A. No. 1394, We hold that repeal by implication is
not favored unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended.
As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full
knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is logical to
conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere
with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter,
unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable
but also clear and convincing as a result of the language used, or
unless the latter act fully embraces the subject matter of the
earlier. 14

As observed earlier, Congress lined up for revocation by Republic

Act No. 1394 six statutes dealing with the imposition of special
imposts or levies or the granting of exemptions from special
import taxes. Yet, considering the tremendous amount of
revenues it was losing under the Petroleum Law of 1949, it failed
to include the latter statute among those it chose to bury by the
Special Import Taw Law. The reason for this is very clear: The
legislature wanted to continue the incentives for the continuing
development of the petroleum industry.

It is not amiss to mention herein passing that contrary to the

theory of the herein petitioner, R.A. No. 387 had not been
repealed by R.A. No. 2352 which expressly abrogated Section 6 of
R.A. No. 1394 but did not repeal any part of R.A. No. 387.
Therefore, the exemption granted by Republic Act No. 387 still
stands.

WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the weight given by this

Court to the findings and conclusions of the Court of Tax Appeals
on a matter it is well-equipped to handle, which findings and
conclusions We find no reason to overturn, the petition of the
Commissioner of Customs to reverse the decision of the Court of
Tax Appeals should be, as it is hereby, denied.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines only as there is developed a. stable structure of law and order in
SUPREME COURT the productive sector."10 That objective is best attained in a
Manila collective bargaining regime, which is a manifestation of industrial
SECOND DIVISION democracy at work, if there be no undue obstacles placed in the
G.R. No. L-43760 August 21, 1976 way of the choice of a bargaining representative. To insist on the
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS absolute majority where there are various unions and where the
(PAFLU), petitioner possibility of invalid ballots may not be ruled out, would be to
vs. frustrate that goal. For the probability of a long drawn-out,
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HONORABLE CARMELO C. protracted process is not easy to dismiss. That is not unlikely
NORIEL, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS given the intensity of rivalry among unions capable of enlisting
(NAFLU), and PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., the allegiance of a group of workers. It is to avoid such a
INC., respondents. contingency that there is this explicit pronouncement in the
FERNANDO, Acting C.J.: implementing rule. It speaks categorically. It must be obeyed.
That was what respondent Director did.
A certification by respondent Director of Labor Relations, Carmelo
C. Noriel, that respondent National Federation of Free Labor 3. Nor can fault of a grave and serious character be imputed to
Unions (NAFLU) as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the respondent Director presumably because of failure to abide by the
employees in the Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc. doctrine or pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Allied
disregarding the objection raised by petitioner, the Philippine Workers Association case. The reliance is on this excerpt from the
Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), is assailed in this opinion: "However, spoiled ballots, i.e., those which are defaced,
certiorari proceeding. Admittedly, in the certification election held torn or marked (Rules for Certification Elections, Rule II, sec. 2[j])
on February 27, 1976, respondent Union obtained 429 votes as should be counted in determining the majority since they are
against 414 of petitioner Union. Again, admittedly, under the nevertheless votes cast by those who are qualified to do so." 11
Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code, a Nothing can be clearer than that its basis is a paragraph in a
majority of the valid votes cast suffices for certification of the section of the then applicable rules for certification
victorious labor union as the sole and exclusive bargaining elections. 12 They were promulgated under the authority of the
agent.1 There were four votes cast by employees who did not then prevailing Industrial Peace Act. That Legislation is no
13

want any union. 2 On its face therefore, respondent Union ought longer in force, having been superseded by the present Labor
to have been certified in accordance with the above applicable Code which took effect on November 1, 1974. This certification
rule. Petitioner, undeterred, would seize upon the doctrine election is governed therefore, as was made clear, by the present
announced in the case of Allied Workers Association of the Labor Code and the Rules issued thereunder. Absent a showing
Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations 3 that spoiled ballots that such rules and regulations -are violative of the Code, this
should be counted in determining the valid votes cast. Court cannot ignore their existence. When, as should be the case,
Considering there were seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the a public official acts in accordance with a norm therein contained,
submission that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part no infraction of the law is committed. Respondent Director did, as
of respondent Director. Implicit in the comment of respondent he ought to, comply with its terms. He took into consideration
Director of Labor Relations, 4 considered as an answer, is the only the "valid votes" as was required by the Rules. He had no
controlling weight to be accorded the implementing rule above- choice as long as they remain in force. In a proper showing, the
cited, no inconsistency being shown between such rule and the judiciary can nullify any rule it found in conflict with the governing
present Labor Code. Under such a view, the ruling in the Allied statute. 14 That was not even attempted here. All that petitioner
Workers Association case that arose during the period when it was did was to set forth in two separate paragraphs the applicable rule
the Industrial Peace Act 5, that was in effect and not the present followed by respondent Director 15 and the governing article. 16 It
law, no longer possesses relevance. It cannot and should not be did not even bother to discuss why such rule was in conflict with
applied. It is not controlling. There was no abuse of discretion the present Labor Code. It failed to point out any repugnancy.
then, much less a grave one. Such being the case, respondent Director must be upheld.

This Court is in agreement. The law is on the side of respondent 4. The conclusion reached by us derives further support from the
Director, not to mention the decisive fact appearing in the Petition deservedly high repute attached to the construction placed by the
itself that at most, only ten of the spoiled ballots "were intended executive officials entrusted with the responsibility of applying a
for the petitioner Union,"6 thus rendering clear that it would on its statute. The Rules and Regulations implementing the present
own showing obtain only 424 votes as against 429 for respondent Labor Code were issued by Secretary Blas Ople of the Department
Union. certiorari does not lie. of Labor and took effect on February 3, 1975, the present Labor
Code having been made known to the public as far back as May 1,
1974, although its date of effectivity was postponed to November
1. What is of the essence of the certification process, as noted
1, 1974, although its date of effectivity was postponed to
in Lakas Ng Manggagawang Pilipino v. Benguet Consolidated,
November 1, 1974. It would appear then that there was more
Inc.7 "is that every labor organization be given the opportunity in
than enough time for a really serious and careful study of such
a free and honest election to make good its claim that it should be
suppletory rules and regulations to avoid any inconsistency with
the exclusive collective bargaining representative." 8 Petitioner
the Code. This Court certainly cannot ignore the interpretation
cannot complain. It was given that opportunity. It lost in a fair
thereafter embodied in the Rules. As far back as In re Allen," 17 a
election. It came out second best. The implementing rule favors,
1903 decision, Justice McDonough, as ponente, cited this excerpt
as it should, respondent Union, It obtained a majority of the valid
from the leading American case of Pennoyer v. McConnaughy,
votes cast. So our law Prescribes. It is equally the case in the
decided in 1891: "The principle that the contemporaneous
United States as this excerpt from the work of Cox and Bok
construction of a statute by the executive officers of the
makes clear: "It is a well-settled rule that a representative will he
government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great
certified even though less than a majority of all the employees in
respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the
the unit cast ballots in favor of the union. It is enough that the
statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence
union be designated by a majority of the valid ballots, and this is
that no authorities need be cited to support it." 18 There was a
so even though only a small proportion of the eligible voters
paraphrase by Justice Malcolm of such a pronouncement in Molina
participates. Following the analogy of political elections, the courts
v. Rafferty," 19 a 1918 decision: "Courts will and should respect
have approved this practice of the Board."9
the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the
executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such
2. There is this policy consideration. The country is at present interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled
embarked on a wide-scale industrialization project. As a matter of thereby." 20 Since then, such a doctrine has been reiterated in
fact, respondent firm is engaged in such activity. Industrialization, numerous decisions . 21 As was emphasized by Chief Justice
as noted by Professor Smith, Merrifield and Rothschild, "can thrive Castro, "the construction placed by the office charged with
implementing and enforcing the provisions of a Code should he In a Resolution dated October 4, 2004, the Court required
given controlling weight. " 22 petitioners and the NTC to file their respective comments on the
motion.3
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against
petitioner Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions Subsequently, in its Manifestation/Comment filed on January 11,
(PAFLU).Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur. 2005, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in behalf of the
NTC, likewise referred to the same letter of OIC Heceta and
declared that it fully agrees with respondent that the escrow
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
deposit and performance bond are not required in subsequent
authorizations for additional/new areas outside its original roll-out
[G.R. NO. 135992 - January 31, 2006] obligation under the Service Area Scheme of E.O. No. 109.

EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC. and Petitioners did not file any comment and it was only after the
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, Court issued a show cause and compliance Resolution on October
INC., Petitioners, v. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 19, 2005 that petitioners manifested in their Entry of Special
CORPORATION, Respondent. Appearance, Manifestation and Compliance dated November 25,
2005 that they have no further comments on respondent's motion
for partial reconsideration.4
AMENDED DECISION

The Court has observed in its Decision that Section 27 of NTC MC

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: No. 11-9-93 is silent as to whether the posting of an escrow
deposit and performance bond is a condition sine qua non for the
On July 23, 2004, the Court promulgated its Decision in the grant of a provisional authority. The NTC, through the OSG,
above-captioned case with the following dispositive portion: explicitly clarified, which was not disputed by petitioners, that the
escrow deposit and performance bond are not required in
subsequent authorizations for additional/new areas outside its
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is PARTIALLY original roll-out obligation under E.O. No. 109. The OSG agreed
GRANTED. The Order of the National Telecommunications with respondent's stance that since the provisional authority in
Commissions dated November 10, 1997 in NTC Case No. 96-195 this case involves a voluntary application not covered by the
is AFFIRMED with the following modifications: original service areas created by the NTC under E.O. No. 109,
then it is not subject to the posting of an escrow deposit and
Respondent International Communication Corporation, in performance bond as required by E.O. No. 109, but only to the
accordance with Section 27 of NTC MC No. 11-9-93, is required conditions provided in the provisional authority. Further, the OSG
to: adapted the ratiocination of the Court of Appeals on this matter,
i.e., respondent was not subjected to the foregoing escrow
deposit and performance bond requirement because the landline
(1) Deposit in escrow in a reputable bank 20% of the investment obligation is already outside its original roll-out commitment
required for the first two years of the implementation of the under E.O. No. 109.5
proposed project; andcralawlibrary

The NTC, being the government agency entrusted with the

(2) Post a performance bond equivalent to 10% of the investment regulation of activities coming under its special and technical
required for the first two years of the approved project but not to forte, and possessing the necessary rule-making power to
exceed P500 Million. implement its objectives,6 is in the best position to interpret its
own rules, regulations and guidelines. The Court has consistently
within such period to be determined by the National yielded and accorded great respect to the interpretation by
Telecommunications Commission. administrative agencies of their own rules unless there is an error
of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law. 7
No pronouncement as to costs.

In City Government of Makati v. Civil Service Commission, 8 the

SO ORDERED.1 Court cited cases where the interpretation of a particular
administrative agency of a certain rule was adhered to, viz.:
Respondent now seeks a partial reconsideration of the portion of
the Court's decision requiring it to make a 20% escrow deposit As properly noted, CSC was only interpreting its own rules on
and to post a 10% performance bond. Respondent claims that leave of absence and not a statutory provision in coming up with
Section 27 of NTC MC No. 11-9-93, which required the foregoing this uniform rule. Undoubtedly, the CSC like any other
amounts, pertains only to applications filed under Executive Order agency has the power to interpret its own rules and any
No. 109 (E.O. No. 109) and not to applications voluntarily filed. In phrase contained in them with its interpretation
its Manifestation in support of the motion for partial significantly becoming part of the rules themselves. As
reconsideration, respondent attached a letter from Deputy observed in West Texas Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Panhandle
Commissioner and Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Kathleen G. Heceta, of & S.F. Railing Co. -
the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), stating thus:

xxx
xxx

This principle is not new to us. In Geukeko v. Araneta this Court

Please be informed that the escrow deposit and performance bond upheld the interpretation of the Department of Agriculture and
were required to public telecommunications entities to ensure that Commerce of its own rules of procedure in suspending the period
the mandated installation of local exchange lines are installed of appeal even if such action was nowhere stated therein. We said
within three (3) years pursuant to EO 109 and RA 7925. Since -
your company has already complied with its obligation by the
installation of more than 300,000 lines in Quezon City, Malabon
City and Valenzuela City in the National Capital Region and Region xxx
V in early 1997, the escrow deposit and performance bond were
not required in your subsequent authorizations. 2
x x x It must be remembered that Lands Administrative Order No.
6 is in the nature of procedural rules promulgated by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the
power bestowed on said administrative agency to promulgate
rules and regulations necessary for the proper discharge and
management of the functions imposed by law upon said office. x x
x x Recognizing the existence of such rule-making authority, what
is the weight of an interpretation given by an administrative
agency to its own rules or regulations? Authorities sustain the
doctrine that the interpretation given to a rule or
regulation by those charged with its execution is entitled to
the greatest weight by the Court construing such rule or
regulation, and such interpretation will be followed unless
it appears to be clearly unreasonable or arbitrary (42 Am.
Jur. 431). It has also been said that:

xxx

The same precept was enunciated in Bagatsing v. Committee on

Privatization where we upheld the action of the Commission on
Audit (COA) in validating the sale of Petron Corporation to Aramco
Overseas Corporation on the basis of COA's interpretation of its
own circular that set bidding and audit guidelines on the disposal
of government assets'

The COA itself, the agency that adopted the rules on bidding
procedure to be followed by government offices and corporations,
had upheld the validity and legality of the questioned
bidding. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules
should be given more weight than the interpretation by
that agency of the law it is merely tasked to
administer (underscoring supplied).

Given the greater weight accorded to an agency's interpretation of

its own rules than to its understanding of the statute it seeks to
implement, we simply cannot set aside the former on the same
grounds as we would overturn the latter. More specifically, in
cases where the dispute concerns the interpretation by an agency
of its own rules, we should apply only these standards: "Whether
the delegation of power was valid; whether the regulation was
within that delegation; and if so, whether it was a reasonable
regulation under a due process test." An affirmative answer in
each of these questions should caution us from discarding the
agency's interpretation of its own rules. (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary

Thus, the Court holds that the interpretation of the NTC that
Section 27 of NTC MC No. 11-9-93 regarding the escrow deposit
and performance bond shall pertain only to a local exchange
operator's original roll-out obligation under E.O. No. 109, and not
to roll-out obligations made under subsequent or voluntary
applications outside E.O. No. 109, should be sustained.

IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent's Motion for Partial

Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Court's Decision dated July 23,
2004 is AMENDED, the dispositive portion of which should read
as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The

Order of the National Telecommunications Commission dated
November 10, 1997 in NTC Case No. 96-195 is AFFIRMED.

thereby deleting the order requiring respondent to make a 20%

escrow deposit and to post a 10% performance bond.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines c) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third
SUPREME COURT year of the effectivity of this Act.
Manila
d) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the fourth
EN BANC year of the effectivity of this Act.

G.R. No. 106724 February 9, 1994 It is the submission of respondents that the term "INP" includes
both the former members of the Philippine Constabulary and the
local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated
THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, represented by its
National Police (INP) by virtue of PD 765 in 1975.
Acting Chairman, Cesar Sarino, Teodolo C. Natividad, Vice-
Chairman and Executive Officer, Brig. Gen. Virgilio H.
David, Edgar Dula Torre, Guillermo P. Enriquez, On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year
Commissioners, and Chief Supt. Levy D. Macasiano Director transition period provided in Section 89 applies only to the local
for Personnel, petitioners, police forces who previously retire, compulsorily, at age sixty (60)
vs. for those in the ranks of Police/Fire Lieutenant or higher (Sec. 33,
Honorable Judge Salvador de Guzman, Jr., Chief Supt. PD 1184); while the retirement age for the PC had already been
Norberto M. Lina, Chief Supt. Ricardo Trinidad, Jr., Sr. Supt. set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law.
Manuel Suarez, Supt. Justito B. Tagum, Sr. Supt.
Tranquilino Aspiras, Sr., Supt. Ramon I. Navarro,
On December 23, 1991, respondent judge issued a restraining
Sr. Supt. Ramon I. Navarro, Sr. Supt. Jose P. Suria, Sr.
order followed by a writ of injunction on January 8, 1992 upon
Supt. Agaton Abiera, Chief Insp. Bienvenido Torres, and the
posting of a P100,000.00 bond by private respondents.
National (ROTC) Alumni Association Inc. (NARRA),
represented by its President Col. Benjamin Gundran, and
Director Hermogenes Peralta, Jr., respondents. After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings, the
case was submitted for resolution and on August 14, 1992, the
respondent judge rendered the assailed decision, the decretal
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
portion of which reads:
Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.
Diosdado P. Peralta for respondent-intervenor.
WHEREFORE, the court hereby declares that the term "INP" in
Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the present
BIDIN, J.:
Philippine National Police, irrespective of the original status of the
present members of the Philippine National Police before its
The case at bar had its origin in the implementation of the creation and establishment, and that Section 39 thereof shall
compulsory retirement of PNP officers as mandated in Sec. 39, RA become operative after the lapse of the four-year transition
6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing the Philippine period.
National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the Interior
and Local Government", which took effect on
The preliminary injunction issued is made permanent.
January 2, 1991. Among others, RA 6975 provides for a uniform
retirement system for PNP members. Section 39 thereof reads:
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 29-30)
Sec. 39. Compulsory Retirement. — Compulsory retirement, for
officer and non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of age fifty- Petitioners filed the instant petition on October 8, 1992 seeking
six (56); Provided, That, in case of any officer with the rank of the reversal of the above judgment. On January 12, 1993, the
chief superintendent, director or deputy director general, the Court resolved to treat the respondents' Comment as Answer and
Commission may allow his retention in the service for an gave due course to the petition.
unextendible period of one (1) year.
In ruling in favor of private respondents, respondent judge
Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of observed, among others, that:
retirement to private respondents who are all members of the
defunct Philippine Constabulary and have reached the age of fifty-
six (56). It may have been the intention of Congress to refer to the local
police forces as the "INP" but the PNP Law failed to define who or
what constituted the INP. The natural recourse of the court is to
In response, private respondents filed a complaint on December trace the source of the "INP" as courts are permitted to look to
19, 1991 for declaratory relief with prayer for the issuance of prior laws on the same subject and to investigate the antecedents
an ex parte restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as Civil involved. There is nothing extant in the statute books except that
Case No. 91-3498) before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which was created and established under
Branch 142. In their complaint, respondents aver that the age of PD 765 pursuant to the mandate of Article XV of the 1973
retirement set at fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of RA 6975 cannot Constitution providing that the "State shall establish and maintain
be applied to them since they are also covered by Sec. 89 thereof an integrated national police force whose organization,
which provides: administration and operation shall be provided by law."
Heretofore, INP was unknown. And the said law categorically
declared the PC "as the principal component of the Integrated
Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and within
National Police" (Sec. 5, PD 765).
the transition period of four (4) years following the effectivity of
this Act, the following members of the INP shall be considered
compulsorily retired: The court was supplied by respondents (petitioners herein) with
excerpts taken from the discussion amongst the members of
Congress concerning the particular provision of Section 89. The
a) Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on the first year of
court is not persuaded by said discussion; it was a simple matter
the effectivity of this Act.
for the members of the legislature to state precisely in clear and
unequivocal terms their meaning, such as "integrated police" as
b) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the second used in PD 765. Instead, they employed "INP", a generic term
year of the effectivity of this Act. that includes the PC as the principal component of the
INP, supra. In failing to categorically restrict the application of
Section 89 as the members of legislature are said to have Phase I — Exercise of option by the uniformed members of the
intended, it gave rise to the presumption that it has not limited Philippine Constabulary, the PC elements assigned with the
nor intended to limit the meaning of the word when the bill was Narcotics Command, CIS, and the personnel of the technical
finally passed into law. It is not difficult for the court to also services of the AFP assigned with the PC to include the regular
presume that in drafting the wording of the PNP Law, the CIS investigating agents and the operatives and agents of the
legislators were aware of the historical legislative origin of the NAPOLCOM Inspection, Investigation and Intelligence Branch, and
"INP". the personnel of the absorbed National Action Committee on Anti-
Hijacking (NACAH) of the Department of National Defense, to be
completed within six (6) months from the date of the effectivity of
xxx xxx xxx
this Act. At the end of this phase, all personnel from the INP, PC,
technical Services, NACAH, and NAPOLCOM Inspection,
The court takes particular note of the fact that Section 89 is found Investigation and Intelligence Branch shall have been covered by
in the Transitory Provisions of the law which do not provide for official orders assigning them to the PNP . . .
any distinction between the former PC officers and those
belonging to the civilian police forces. These provision are
xxx xxx xxx
specifically enacted to regulate the period covering the dissolution
of the PC and the creation of the PNP, a period that necessarily
would be attended by imbalances and or confusion occasioned by . . . Any PC-INP officer or enlisted personnel may, within the
the wholesale and mass integration. In fact, the retirement twelve-month period from the effectivity of this Act, retire . . .
payment scheme of the INP is still to be formulated, leaving the
impression that nothing is really settled until after the transition
Phase III — . . . To accomplish the tasks of Phase III, the
of four years has lapsed. Section 89 therefore prevails over
Commission shall create a Board of Officers composed of the
Section 39 up to the year 1995 when the retirement age for the
following: NAPOLCOM Commissioner as Chairman and one (1)
members of the PNP shall then be age 56; after the year 1995,
representative each from the PC, INP, Civil Service Commission
Section 39 shall then be the applicable law on retirement of PNP
and the Department of Budget and Management.
members. (Rollo, pp. 27-28; emphasis supplied)

Section 86 of the same law further provides:

Petitioners disagree and claim that the use of the term INP in Sec.
89 does not imply the same meaning contemplated under PD 765
wherein it is provided: Sec. 86. Assumption by the PNP of Police Functions. — The PNP
shall absorb the functions of the PC, the INP and the Narcotics
Command upon the effectivity of this Act.
Sec. 1. Constitution of the Integrated National Police. — There is
hereby established and constituted the Integrated National Police
(INP) which shall be composed of the Philippine Constabulary as From a careful perusal of the above provisions, it appears
the nucleus, and the integrated police forces as established by therefore that the use of the term INP is not synonymous with the
Presidential Decrees PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just made a
Nos. 421, 482, 531, 585 and 641, as components, under the uniform reference to the members of the whole Philippine National
Department of National Defense. Police (PNP) for retirement purposes and not just the INP. The law
itself distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed
that "INP" as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC.
On the other hand, private respondents assert that being the
nucleus of the Integrated National Police (INP) under PD 765,
former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) should not be And contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge that the
discriminated against from the coverage of the term "INP" in Sec. law failed to define who constitutes the INP, Sec. 90 of RA 6975
89, RA 6975. Clearly, it is argued, the term "INP" found in Section has in fact defined the same. Thus,
89 of RA 6975 refers to the INP in PD 765. Thus, where the law
does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
Sec. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. — Upon the
effectivity of this Act, the present National Police Commission and
Does the law, RA 6975, distinguish INP from the PC? Petitioners the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police shall cease
submit that it does and cite Sections 23 and 85 to stress the to exist. The Philippine Constabulary, which is the nucleus of the
point, viz.: Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police shall cease to
be a major service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The
Integrated National Police, which is the civilian component of the
Sec. 23. Composition. — Subject to the limitations provided for in
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police, shall cease to
this Act, the Philippine National Police, hereinafter referred to as
be the national police force and lieu thereof, a new police force
the PNP, is hereby established, initially consisting of the members
shall be established and constituted pursuant to this Act.
of the police forces who were integrated into the Integrated
(emphasis supplied)
National Police (INP) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 765, and
the officers and enlisted personnel of the Philippine Constabulary
(PC). . . It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature
failed to define who the members of the INP are. In this regard, it
is of no moment that the legislature failed to categorically restrict
xxx xxx xxx
the application of the transition period in Sec. 89 specifically in
favor of the local police forces for it would be a mere superfluity
The permanent civilian employees of the present PC, INP, as the PC component of the INP was already retirable at age fifty-
Narcotics Command, CIS and the technical command of the AFP six (56).
assigned with the PC, including NAPOLCOM hearing officers
holding regular items as such, shall be absorbed by the
Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not have
Department as employees thereof, subject to existing laws and
belabored on the supposed dubious meaning of the term.
regulations.
Nonetheless, if confronted with such a situation, courts are not
without recourse in determining the construction of the statute
xxx xxx xxx with doubtful meaning for they may avail themselves of the actual
proceedings of the legislative body. In case of doubt as to what a
provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision
Sec. 85. Phase of Implementation. — The implementation of this
during the legislative deliberations may be adopted (De Villa v.
Act shall be undertaken in three (3) phases, to wit:
Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 722 [1991] citing Palanca v. City of
Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]; Arenas v. City of San Carlos, 82 THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Walang problema dito sa
SCRA 318 [1978]). transition ng pulis, acceptable ito, eh.

Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter of the THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. COJUANGCO). Sa PC?
law if it runs counter to the legislative intent (Yellow Taxi and
Pasay Transportation Workers' Association v. Manila Yellow Taxi
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). PC, walang mawawala sa
Cab. Co., 80 Phil. 83 [1948]).
kanila, 56 ang retirement age nilang talaga, eh. Kaya ayaw ko
ngang dagdagan 'yung 56 nila at 'yon din ang sa Armed Forces,
Examining the records of the Bicameral Conference Committee, 56. (Ibid., May 22, 1990)
we find that the legislature did intent to exclude the members of
the PC from the coverage of Sec. 89 insofar as the retirement age
In applying the provisions of Sec. 89 in favor of the local police
is concerned, thus:
force as established in PD 765, the Court does not, in any
manner, give any
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Well, it seems what people undue preferential treatment in favor of the other group. On the
really want is one common rule, so if it is fifty-six, fifty-six; of contrary, the Court is merely giving life to the real intent of the
course, the PC wants sixty for everybody. Of course, it is not legislators based on the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference
acceptable to us in the sense that we tied this up really to the Committee that preceded the enactment of RA 6975.
question of: If you are lax in allowing their (the PC) entry into the
PNP, then tighten up the retirement. If we will be strict in, like
The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that
requiring examinations and other conditions for their original
Section 89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the local police force is
entry, then since we have sifted out a certain amount of
clear. The question now is whether the classification is valid. The
undesirables, then we can allow a longer retirement age. That was
test for this is reasonableness such that it must conform to the
the rationale, that was the tie-up. Since we are relaxing the entry,
following requirements: (1) It must be based upon substantial
we should speed up . . .
distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) It must
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). Exit. apply equally to all members of the same class (People vs. Cayat,
68 Phil. 12 [1939]).
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA) . . . the retirement, the exit.
The classification is based upon substantial distinctions. The PC,
before the effectivity of the law (RA 6975), were already retirable
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). So let me get it very clear, Mr.
at age 56 while the local police force were retirable at 60, and
Chairman. Fifty-six, let's say, that will not make any adjustment
governed by different laws (P.D. 1184, Sec. 33 and Sec. 50). The
in the PC because there (they) are (retirable at age) fifty-six.
distinction is relevant for the purpose of the statute, which is to
enable the local police force to plan for their retirement which
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Kaya nga, wala na silang would be earlier than usual because of the new law. Section 89 is
masasabi. merely transitory, remedial in nature, and loses its force and
effect once the four-year transitory period has elapsed. Finally, it
applies not only to some but to all local police officers.
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). In the case of the Police, since
they are retireable now at sixty, for the officers, it will be
applicable to them on a one-year every year basis for a total It may be appropriate to state at this point that it seems absurd
period of four years transition. (Bicameral Conference Committee that a law will grant an extension to PC officers' retirable age from
on National Defense, March 12, 1990) 56 to 60 and then gradually lower it back to 56 without any
cogent reason at all. Why should the retirement age of PC officers
be increased during the transitory period to the exclusion of other
REP. GUTANG. On the first year of effectivity, the police will retire PC officers who would retire at age 56 after such period? Such
at 60 years. absurdity was never contemplated by the law and would defeat its
purpose of providing a uniform retirement age for PNP members.
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Sixty.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of injunction
REP. GUTANG. On the second year, 59. issued on January 8, 1992 is hereby LIFTED and the assailed
decision of respondent judge is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Oo.

SO ORDERED.

REP. GUTANG. On the third year, 58.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ.,
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Fifty-eight. So 'yung 55, on the concur.
third year, 58, doon siya re-retire.

Nocon, J., is on leave.

REP. GUTANG. Oo.

SEN. SAGUISAG. So kung 55, when the law becomes

effective . . .

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). He will retire at 58, doon siya

aabot.

REP. UNICO. Pwede.

SEN. SAGUISAG. Dahil 'yon, may time to . . .

 Republic of the Philippines XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of
SUPREME COURT plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
Manila exclusive use of end-users.

EN BANC Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the

foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
G.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered
by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General
in this provision should be construed as "urea and formaldehyde"
of the Philippines,
(emphasis supplied) and that respondents herein, the Auditor
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the
General and the Auditor of the Central Bank, have erred in holding
Central Bank, respondents.
otherwise. In this connection, it should be noted that, whereas
"urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the
Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner. manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the National Institute of
Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents. Science and Technology has expressed, through its
Commissioner, the view that:
CONCEPCION, J.:
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the
synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under
denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and
Co., Inc. time of reaction. This produce when applied in water
solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes
The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of
Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange plywood.
Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July
1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is
on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the patently distinct and different from urea" and "formaldehyde", as
Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said known as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however,
fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
November and December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde",
Chemical Co., Inc. — which is engaged in the manufacture of and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and
synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the
plywood and hardwood producers — bought foreign exchange for manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea"
the importation of urea and formaldehyde — which are the main formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in
raw materials in the production of said glues — and paid therefor support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by
1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange and members thereof. But, said individual statements do not
paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor. necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615; Mayon
P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-
Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the 15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games &
separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 29, 1960]). Furthermore,
said fee. Soon after the last importation of these products, it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea
petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is
P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central Bank conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of passed by Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs.
said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1;
approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If
granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate there has been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was
importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609. Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by
petition for review. amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

The only question for determination in this case is whether or not WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
"urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
of the aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2609 reads: Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant
to the provision of section one hereof shall not be
imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the
importation of the following:.

xxx xxx xxx