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Socialism Betrayed: Behind the Collapse of the Soviet Union
"A fresh multi-faceted look at the overthrow of the Soviet State, the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, and the campaign to introduce capitalism from above. Roger Keeran and Thomas Kenny have given us a clear and powerful Marxist analysis of the momentous events which most directly shaped world politics today, the destruction of the USSR, the 'Superpower' of socialism."
-Norman Markowitz, author of The Rise and Fall of the People's Century "I have not read anything else with such detailed and intimate knowledge of what took place. This manuscript is the most important contribution I have read."
-Phillip Bonosky, author of Afghanistan-Washington's Secret War "A well-researched work containing a great deal of useful historical information. Everyone will benefit greatly from the mass of historical data and the thought-provoking arguments contained in the book."
-Bahman Azad, author of Heroic Struggle Bitter Factors Contributing to the Dismantling of the Socialist State in the USSR
-Norman Markowitz, author of The Rise and Fall of the People's Century "I have not read anything else with such detailed and intimate knowledge of what took place. This manuscript is the most important contribution I have read."
-Phillip Bonosky, author of Afghanistan-Washington's Secret War "A well-researched work containing a great deal of useful historical information. Everyone will benefit greatly from the mass of historical data and the thought-provoking arguments contained in the book."
-Bahman Azad, author of Heroic Struggle Bitter Factors Contributing to the Dismantling of the Socialist State in the USSR
230 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 2004
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About the author
Roger Keeran
4 books15 followersRoger Keeran (or Roger Roy Keeran / Roger R. Keeran) is an American historian and university professor who taught successively at Cornell, Princeton, Rutgers and the New York State University (SUNY). A specialist of Labor and Policy studies, he published, in 1980, The Communist Party and the Auto Workers' Unions and, in 2004, with co-author Thomas Kenny, Socialism Betrayed: Behind the Collapse of the Soviet Union (a book translated into several languages), as well as various articles in history or sociology journals. He is now Professor Emeritus of the Empire State College at SUNY after retiring in 2013.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 72 reviews
September 1, 2020
I have not read Les Miserables yet, but I doubt it can possibly be more emotionally painful than this book.
September 15, 2019
I cannot recommend this book highly enough, an honest and critical account of the end of the Soviet Union that eschews the orientalist, imperialist and trotskyist nonsense typically written about it. A must-read for communists and those just interested in the Soviet Union alike.
January 11, 2011
This excellent account of the collapse of the Soviet Union is both written in an accessible and compelling style.
The two authors argue that a "second economy," founded by the peasantry then developing under Khrushchev and Gorbachev, was the main motive force for a burgeoning petit bourgeois stratum that fed social democratic and counterrevolutionary movements to infect the CPSU with perestroika, glasnost, and the 1989-1991 counterrevolutions. It is a solid Marxist interpretation of the counterrevolution with plenty of evidence and insights.
This is a sad story of one of the greatest achievements and tragedies of mankind.
The only criticisms: I would have enjoyed a solid analysis of the base/superstructure and how it relates to the material forces of revisionism. Also, from a Marxist perspective, I would've enjoyed a more thorough critique of how Mao's idea of "continuous revolution" would renew proletarian democracy in socialist parties and states, or not (but then again, this book isn't about China but the USSR!). Basically, how to prevent stagnation and ossification of the party and other organizations as they did under Brezhnev.
The two authors argue that a "second economy," founded by the peasantry then developing under Khrushchev and Gorbachev, was the main motive force for a burgeoning petit bourgeois stratum that fed social democratic and counterrevolutionary movements to infect the CPSU with perestroika, glasnost, and the 1989-1991 counterrevolutions. It is a solid Marxist interpretation of the counterrevolution with plenty of evidence and insights.
This is a sad story of one of the greatest achievements and tragedies of mankind.
The only criticisms: I would have enjoyed a solid analysis of the base/superstructure and how it relates to the material forces of revisionism. Also, from a Marxist perspective, I would've enjoyed a more thorough critique of how Mao's idea of "continuous revolution" would renew proletarian democracy in socialist parties and states, or not (but then again, this book isn't about China but the USSR!). Basically, how to prevent stagnation and ossification of the party and other organizations as they did under Brezhnev.
October 24, 2025
This is an indispensable study for any serious socialist or student of history seeking to understand the collapse of the Soviet Union. The authors move beyond the superficial explanations of Western liberal historiography and ground their analysis in a materialist understanding of class struggle within the socialist state itself. By identifying the ideological and political deviations that culminated in the counterrevolution of 1991, they offer not only a history but a warning, making this book a scientific investigation of errors to prevent their future recurrence.
Keeran and Kenny demonstrate that the fall of the USSR was not inevitable, nor the result of “totalitarianism” or economic collapse. The roots of defeat lay in the gradual reintroduction of market mechanisms and the retreat from Marxism-Leninism that began under Khrushchev and ended with Gorbachev’s open revisionism. The reappearance of Bukharinist tendencies undermined socialist planning and proletarian dictatorship, corroding the class character of the Party and replacing revolutionary vigilance with bureaucratic complacency. Their analysis, grounded in dialectical materialism, shows how revisionism is not a theoretical mistake but a process of class transformation inside the socialist state.
The book’s strength lies equally in its defense of massive Soviet achievements. Under Lenin, Stalin, and their successors up to the mid-1950s, the USSR built a planned economy that achieved unparalleled industrial, scientific, and social progress. These successes, often dismissed or distorted by anti-communist historians, are restored here as proof of socialism’s viability when guided by consistent Marxist-Leninist principles. Far from being a failed experiment, the Soviet experience stands as evidence of what disciplined theory and proletarian power can achieve.
Keeran and Kenny trace the post-Stalin leadership’s role in the unraveling of socialism with clarity and precision. Khrushchev’s 1956 “secret speech” began the ideological assault on the foundations of Marxism-Leninism, replacing class struggle with “peaceful coexistence” and the illusion of a “party of the whole people.” Brezhnev continued this revisionist course, consolidating a privileged bureaucracy and allowing the “second economy” to expand—a shadow network of private trade, speculation, and corruption that grew into a material base for capitalist restoration. Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost were the culmination of this long decay. His reforms sanctified the market, dismantled Party leadership, and transformed internal contradiction into counterrevolution. In that light, the authors make clear that Gorbachev did not inherit a collapsing system. The Soviet economy of the early 1980s was stable, growing, and far from the crises that had defined capitalist nations in the 1920s and 1930s. What failed was not socialism but those who betrayed it. The “second economy” and the reforms that legitimized it formed a dialectic of betrayal, producing material counterrevolution.
This internal decay unfolded alongside intensifying imperialist aggression. Under the Reagan administration, the United States launched a coordinated campaign of technological and economic warfare. The Strategic Defense Initiative sought to drain Soviet resources through a militarized arms race, while Washington conspired with OPEC monarchies to flood global oil markets and undercut the USSR’s foreign earnings. These measures were designed to strain and isolate the socialist system. Yet, as Keeran and Kenny make clear, such pressure could only succeed because revisionism had already weakened the ideological and political foundations of the Soviet state. A Party guided by Leninist discipline could have withstood imperialist encirclement; one corrupted by market ideology capitulated. The dialectic of collapse was complete: imperialism exploited internal betrayal, and betrayal opened the door to imperialist victory.
The book also sheds light on the theoretical disputes within the Communist Party, particularly over the national question. Lenin understood that national liberation movements could serve as revolutionary allies of the proletariat when led by a communist vanguard. Stalin developed this understanding into a full theory of socialist federalism, recognizing that equality among nations was the condition for genuine unity. Bukharin, by contrast, refused to confront bourgeois nationalist forces that resisted socialist development, a position rooted in petty-bourgeois fear of struggle. Later revisionists repeated this error, allowing nationalism to grow unchecked until it tore the Union apart. The lesson is clear: the national question cannot be evaded; it must be resolved through class struggle under proletarian leadership.
Socialism Betrayed is not simply a history of defeat. It is a call to theoretical and political renewal. It demands that communists study the Soviet experience with scientific rigor, reject revisionism in all its forms, and reaffirm the dictatorship of the proletariat as the indispensable foundation of socialism. For those who understand that the Soviet Union’s fall was not the failure of socialism but the victory of revisionism, this book is essential reading. Its lessons are urgent to ensure that future socialist revolutions endure.
Keeran and Kenny demonstrate that the fall of the USSR was not inevitable, nor the result of “totalitarianism” or economic collapse. The roots of defeat lay in the gradual reintroduction of market mechanisms and the retreat from Marxism-Leninism that began under Khrushchev and ended with Gorbachev’s open revisionism. The reappearance of Bukharinist tendencies undermined socialist planning and proletarian dictatorship, corroding the class character of the Party and replacing revolutionary vigilance with bureaucratic complacency. Their analysis, grounded in dialectical materialism, shows how revisionism is not a theoretical mistake but a process of class transformation inside the socialist state.
The book’s strength lies equally in its defense of massive Soviet achievements. Under Lenin, Stalin, and their successors up to the mid-1950s, the USSR built a planned economy that achieved unparalleled industrial, scientific, and social progress. These successes, often dismissed or distorted by anti-communist historians, are restored here as proof of socialism’s viability when guided by consistent Marxist-Leninist principles. Far from being a failed experiment, the Soviet experience stands as evidence of what disciplined theory and proletarian power can achieve.
Keeran and Kenny trace the post-Stalin leadership’s role in the unraveling of socialism with clarity and precision. Khrushchev’s 1956 “secret speech” began the ideological assault on the foundations of Marxism-Leninism, replacing class struggle with “peaceful coexistence” and the illusion of a “party of the whole people.” Brezhnev continued this revisionist course, consolidating a privileged bureaucracy and allowing the “second economy” to expand—a shadow network of private trade, speculation, and corruption that grew into a material base for capitalist restoration. Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost were the culmination of this long decay. His reforms sanctified the market, dismantled Party leadership, and transformed internal contradiction into counterrevolution. In that light, the authors make clear that Gorbachev did not inherit a collapsing system. The Soviet economy of the early 1980s was stable, growing, and far from the crises that had defined capitalist nations in the 1920s and 1930s. What failed was not socialism but those who betrayed it. The “second economy” and the reforms that legitimized it formed a dialectic of betrayal, producing material counterrevolution.
This internal decay unfolded alongside intensifying imperialist aggression. Under the Reagan administration, the United States launched a coordinated campaign of technological and economic warfare. The Strategic Defense Initiative sought to drain Soviet resources through a militarized arms race, while Washington conspired with OPEC monarchies to flood global oil markets and undercut the USSR’s foreign earnings. These measures were designed to strain and isolate the socialist system. Yet, as Keeran and Kenny make clear, such pressure could only succeed because revisionism had already weakened the ideological and political foundations of the Soviet state. A Party guided by Leninist discipline could have withstood imperialist encirclement; one corrupted by market ideology capitulated. The dialectic of collapse was complete: imperialism exploited internal betrayal, and betrayal opened the door to imperialist victory.
The book also sheds light on the theoretical disputes within the Communist Party, particularly over the national question. Lenin understood that national liberation movements could serve as revolutionary allies of the proletariat when led by a communist vanguard. Stalin developed this understanding into a full theory of socialist federalism, recognizing that equality among nations was the condition for genuine unity. Bukharin, by contrast, refused to confront bourgeois nationalist forces that resisted socialist development, a position rooted in petty-bourgeois fear of struggle. Later revisionists repeated this error, allowing nationalism to grow unchecked until it tore the Union apart. The lesson is clear: the national question cannot be evaded; it must be resolved through class struggle under proletarian leadership.
Socialism Betrayed is not simply a history of defeat. It is a call to theoretical and political renewal. It demands that communists study the Soviet experience with scientific rigor, reject revisionism in all its forms, and reaffirm the dictatorship of the proletariat as the indispensable foundation of socialism. For those who understand that the Soviet Union’s fall was not the failure of socialism but the victory of revisionism, this book is essential reading. Its lessons are urgent to ensure that future socialist revolutions endure.
April 22, 2016
Fascinating account of the final years of the Soviet Union, providing some interesting foreshadowing of Gorbachev by examining earlier modernisers such as Bukharin and Khruschev, and also recounting the tragedy of Andropov's early death. The book tries hard to put the changes made by Gorbachev into the context of the times (Reagan, Thatcher, etc), and this works for the early years of 1985-87; after that, however, Gorbachev seemed to be determined on a planned demolition of the planned economy of an entire nation. At one point he was writing letters to George H. W. Bush asking the American President (and ex-CIA director) what kind of Soviet Union America would like. The Americans, of course, wanted the USSR gone, and Gorbachev's begging letters went unanswered.
In retrospect it's obvious that Gorbachev had been either bought or turned. His disastrous leadership resembled an old five-year-plan - five years, that is, to collapse the USSR through the kind of economic shock doctrines innovated by Pinochet in Chile, aided by a media which had been thoroughly infiltrated. The resulting human tragedy was nothing less than a neo-liberal holocaust and market-led famine, as millions died of hunger, cold, disease and neglect. In the West we are very good at believing our own lies; it was the Soviet Union's misfortune to have in Gorbachev a leader who believed them too.
In retrospect it's obvious that Gorbachev had been either bought or turned. His disastrous leadership resembled an old five-year-plan - five years, that is, to collapse the USSR through the kind of economic shock doctrines innovated by Pinochet in Chile, aided by a media which had been thoroughly infiltrated. The resulting human tragedy was nothing less than a neo-liberal holocaust and market-led famine, as millions died of hunger, cold, disease and neglect. In the West we are very good at believing our own lies; it was the Soviet Union's misfortune to have in Gorbachev a leader who believed them too.
April 27, 2020
Fantastic account of the USSR from the end of Stalin to Yeltsin. A must read. Changed my perspective of economic and societal organization.
August 10, 2019
Toplumsal sistemler arasındaki rekabetin yaşam hedefleri değil, tüketim düzeyine indirgenmesinin, insanlığın büyük kaybını tetikleyen temel unsurlardan biri olması çok incitici, ABD'li iki yazar bunu müthiş bir soğukkanlılık ve somut verilerle anlatıyor. UNESCO verilerinin işaret ettiği üzere, dünyadaki herkesten daha fazla kitap okuyan, film izleyen, operaya giden insanların yaşadığı bir ülke, o ülke sınırları dışındaki insanların da nefes almasını sağlıyor, iyilik/refah sınırın ötesine sıçrıyordu. Bu kitabı okuyunca, sosyalizmin yeniden inşaasını bir kez daha şiddetle diledim. SSCB deneyi, yeni bir toplumun görkemli habercisi olarak sonsuza dek yüceltilmeyi hak ediyor.
July 30, 2020
Un buen ensayo acerca las verdaderas razones que condujeron a la URSS a su caída, relatadas des de casi el inicio de su existencia.
Muy buen trabajo
Muy buen trabajo
April 14, 2020
Sovyetlerin yıkılışının, birçoklarının iddia ettiğinin aksine "kaçınılmaz son" olmadığını ikna edici bir biçimde savunan, bunu yaparken ülkenin siyasi ve ekonomik tarihini bütünlüklü bir çerçevede okura sunarak ufuk genişleten bir kitap.
October 14, 2019
Tekrarlar çok ama yazarın değindiği konular ilgi çekici.
January 5, 2017
havent read it yet. i have a feeling its revisionist who did it though
edit: it was.
edit: it was.
March 5, 2013
This is a very thoroughly-researched book and the wealth of data used makes it a worthwhile resource to anyone studying the reasons for the fall of the USSR. Although readers who do not subscribe to Marxism-Leninism (and even many who do) will likely take issue with some of the analyses made and conclusions drawn by the authors, this by no means should discredit the work as a valuable source of information. Keeran & Kenny demonstrate how economic conditions throughout the USSR's history created various classes of people with a vested interest in anti-socialist policies, and show that these classes grew substantially in size and influence towards the end of the Soviet Union's existence - this provides a good historical-materialist basis for their analysis that should satisfy most Marxists. Their focus on Gorbachev's personal character flaws (as well as the extolment of the virtues of figures like Yuri Andropov) may occasionally veer too close to the Great Man Theory for comfort, but one of the strong points of this book is that the wealth of information provides the reader with a big enough picture to conduct their own analysis of events.
I wouldn't say that this is the only book you'll ever need to read about the collapse of the Soviet Union, but I think it should definitely be one of them.
I wouldn't say that this is the only book you'll ever need to read about the collapse of the Soviet Union, but I think it should definitely be one of them.
December 3, 2020
I found this to be a very interesting and readable take on the fall of the USSR. It was a refreshing change of pace when compared with the popular narratives surrounding the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
So much of the coverage of this subject in Western liberal media treats the Soviet project as inevitably doomed to fail -- whether it be due to a "lack of democracy" in the Soviet system, overwhelming US military spending, or the supposed inherent flaws in the socialist project. Keeran and Kenny make a convincing case that social democratic/capital-friendly tendencies within the Soviet Union existing since its inception, rising and falling in prominence & power throughout its history.
So much of the coverage of this subject in Western liberal media treats the Soviet project as inevitably doomed to fail -- whether it be due to a "lack of democracy" in the Soviet system, overwhelming US military spending, or the supposed inherent flaws in the socialist project. Keeran and Kenny make a convincing case that social democratic/capital-friendly tendencies within the Soviet Union existing since its inception, rising and falling in prominence & power throughout its history.
April 27, 2019
The authors make pretty good arguments from the Marxist perspective that the collapse of the USSR was mainly driven by the rise of a new class of petit bourgeoisie tied to the rise of the black market, and that Gorbachev's elevation and subsequent destructive liberalizing policies were a result of this class infiltrating the party.
April 25, 2021
Excellent overview of some factors that contributed to soviet collapse, mainly focused on Gorbachev, but in the end no one can actually pinpoint the exact reason.
September 1, 2020
Okay. This is somewhat of a "cult" book, representing the current more-or less consensus accepted by Marxist-Leninist parties on the fall of the Soviet Union, its causes and consequences. I'd start that the book is relatively well written, intelligible and somewhat true. However, it starts off the wrong premises. The authors intentionally avoid the 1917-1956 era as "non-revisionist" and claim that the problems which lead to the collapse : the black market, corruption, hidden currents within the party, consumer goods , were not there before and during the Stalin tenure. Corroborate this with archival historical analyses and you will see a different picture. Yes, the black market, corruption, fraud, bureaucracy and ideological stiffness were there before Khrushchev. Nay, the chaotic Stalin regime fostered these defects unintentionally. During those tougher times, tremendous force was required to keep things somewhat stable but the system was built to collapse from the civil war onwards. As such the book intentionally circumvents the following aspects :
1) The banning of factions which lead to a dictatorship of the proletariat from "above"
2) The Soviet Democracy becoming preclusive to anyone outside the party and its adjacent tentacles also controlled from above. Thus, through purges, blackmail and control the voting system became a mere formality as an expression of ideological puppets who agreed with the "new world"
3) The clumsy ideological stiffness which lead to a bureaucracy based on clans, "blat", corruption, confusion and chaos
4) The abandoning of the world revolution by poppa Stalin and the internal "back-to -the-good-ole-empire" mob whom he represented.
5) The dance of the "workers' state" with Western imperialism and the world's division into spheres of influence which led to a pathetic inward, nationalist fragmentation of all socialist countries that ultimately conspired, kept secrecy and strained economic and political relations against each other .
6) The paranoid and overzealous purges which depleted the party of competent cadres both internally and internationally.
7) The disastrous lack of consumer goods, breadlines, scarcity and access hierarchies through special stores, relations, corruption which amounted for some horrible internal crises.
I could go on, but by simply avoiding the Stalin period completely, the work seeks to enforce a rather ideological perspectivism against all other "revisionists" who took power in the aftermath of Koba's demise. The issues of the USSR expounded here have roots in the Stalinist regime just as much as the "revisionist" period. At the same time, the work is somewhat saved by a detailed and fascinating characterization of Gorbachev and his era. This latter, is blamed for all the evils of the demise but the root of the problem which was Soviet isolationism and its consequent perversions are intentionally circumvented. If you read the work, make sure one gets other material on the Stalin era with its ups and downs as well. Otherwise this remains an interesting piece of ideological work.
1) The banning of factions which lead to a dictatorship of the proletariat from "above"
2) The Soviet Democracy becoming preclusive to anyone outside the party and its adjacent tentacles also controlled from above. Thus, through purges, blackmail and control the voting system became a mere formality as an expression of ideological puppets who agreed with the "new world"
3) The clumsy ideological stiffness which lead to a bureaucracy based on clans, "blat", corruption, confusion and chaos
4) The abandoning of the world revolution by poppa Stalin and the internal "back-to -the-good-ole-empire" mob whom he represented.
5) The dance of the "workers' state" with Western imperialism and the world's division into spheres of influence which led to a pathetic inward, nationalist fragmentation of all socialist countries that ultimately conspired, kept secrecy and strained economic and political relations against each other .
6) The paranoid and overzealous purges which depleted the party of competent cadres both internally and internationally.
7) The disastrous lack of consumer goods, breadlines, scarcity and access hierarchies through special stores, relations, corruption which amounted for some horrible internal crises.
I could go on, but by simply avoiding the Stalin period completely, the work seeks to enforce a rather ideological perspectivism against all other "revisionists" who took power in the aftermath of Koba's demise. The issues of the USSR expounded here have roots in the Stalinist regime just as much as the "revisionist" period. At the same time, the work is somewhat saved by a detailed and fascinating characterization of Gorbachev and his era. This latter, is blamed for all the evils of the demise but the root of the problem which was Soviet isolationism and its consequent perversions are intentionally circumvented. If you read the work, make sure one gets other material on the Stalin era with its ups and downs as well. Otherwise this remains an interesting piece of ideological work.
November 6, 2019
History Repeats.
May 25, 2023
Incredibly comprehensive analysis of a complex topic! Easily the most nuanced and systematic examination of the watershed event that has dogged the global socialist movement and sapped its morale ever since.
Showcasing the advantage of historical materialism, this text is not starry-eyed about Soviet socialism, nor is it defeatist (explicitly rejecting ideas of inevitability).
"Though Gorbachev’s revisionism had a long gestation in CPSU politics and in Soviet society, the Soviet collapse was not foreordained. There were many points in the previous thirty- five years where developments could have headed in another direction." (p. 228)
The text traces an, ahem, 'red thread' from bungled Khrushchevite reforms, through to Brezhnev's cautionary (some say inert) approach, finally to Gorbachev and ultimately Yeltsin. Not to suggest that it was a decades-long conspiracy, but that repeated right-opportunist retreats became the reference-point for "reform" in the absence of sufficient capability to adopt a more imaginative approach. It was a matter of trying to use the old to plug the gaps in the new, to the point that a rotten, festering old overtook the new system.
"The 'democrat' opposition that arose after 1985 had forerunners in the Khrushchev “Thaw” years, 1953 to 1964. Khrushchev had tolerated liberal intellectuals. After 1964, when Brezhnev became less tolerant, part of the intelligentsia created a dissident movement. The dissidents were the heirs of the Bukharin-Khrushchev tradition. The dissidents influenced Gorbachev." (p. 194)
Reforms that unraveled the system were misleadingly identified with the socialist system itself, to the extent that discontent was misdirected. It's rather ironic that the letter of ostensibly "Stalinist" Nina Andreyeva became a pretext, as the author notes, to muzzle and remove from power critics of so-called perestroika.
Genuine flaws existed, of course. There are revelatory statistics, citing the late Gregory Grossman, showing just how vast the "second economy" of legal and illegal private activity went: by 1977, it was up to 65% the size of the official economy in Armenia, 40% in Belorussia, Moldavia, and Ukraine, and 30% in Russia. (74)
The point is not that heavy-handed centralism is an inherent good, but that reform should be tactical, not opportunistic.
Right-opportunist retreats were political, as well as economic. Keeran outlines how Brezhnev, wary of Western influence driven by detente and the consumer demand stoked by Khrushchev's policies and rhetoric, tolerated Russian nationalism as a strategic ideological bulwark against that Western influence. Unfortunately, this reflected a continuity of neglect of the "national question", in spite of earlier genuine Soviet efforts to support national minorities. This fomented and foreshadowed later nationalist movements.
In the Epilogue, the author addresses six theses on the fall of the USSR:
1. Flaws of socialism
2. Popular opposition
3. External factors
4. Bureaucratic counter-revolution
5. Lack of democracy and over-centralization, and
6. The Gorbachev factor
...and ultimately reaffirms the above conclusion: Gorbachev may have been an instigator, but in a myopic right-opportunist fashion rather than some long-term Grand Plan for capitalist restoration.
Because "the Party lacked the vigilance and will to suppress the second economy [black market] and attendant Party and government corruption," (p. 230) right-opportunism took hold until the 'society of the spectacle' disguising liberal reforms as ostensibly socialist broke down in the outbreak of full-on reaction.
"Lenin had defined the essence of right opportunism as sacrificing fundamental principles, particularly the principle of class struggle, for immediate gain and as making unnecessary compromises with the class enemy in hopes of finding a quick and easy advance toward socialism." (p. 130)
The author's mentions of a Maoist critique are cursory and dismissive (notwithstanding that critique's own vacillations in practice), but its play-by-play account of actual bureaucratic maneuvers and events makes it worth letting that slide in engaging with this work.
By way of alternatives, Keeran points approvingly to "what-ifs" around Yuri Andropov. It's an ever-frustrating pattern on the left, of course, to lionize the short-lived leaderships in a hopeless romantic pursuit of inspiration. Still, the author makes a solid case:
"According to Andropov, poor planning and outmoded management, the failure to utilize scientific and technological innovations, reliance on extensive rather than intensive methods of production, and the lack of labor discipline caused the economic shortcomings. Andropov called for the “acceleration [uskorenie] of scientific and technological progress.” Andropov visualized a modernization of production through the application of computer technology." (p. 52)
Where his program would have led, if fully implemented, we'll never know...but this does echo plenty of "cybersocialist" manifestos.
===
A couple of excerpts that really boil it down:
"The betrayal of the Soviet Union consisted of the overthrow of socialism and the splintering of the Union state. This resulted directly from five concrete processes: Party liquidation, the media handover to anti-socialist forces, privatizing and marketizing the planned, publicly owned economy, unleashing separatism, and surrendering to U.S. imperialism." (p. 236)
In the end the story of the Soviet collapse was not the inevitable unfolding of a tragedy rooted in the impossibility of socialism. Nor was it a defeat brought about by popular opposition or foreign enemies. Nor was it due to Soviet socialism’s failure to match up to some ideal of socialism that embodied liberal democracy and a mixed economy. Nor was it primarily the story of the conscious betrayal of one man. Rather, it was the story of a triumph of a certain tendency within the revolution itself. It was a tendency rooted at first in the peasant nature of the country and later in a second economy, a sector that flourished because of consumer demands unsatisfied by the first economy and because of the failure of authorities to appreciate the danger it represented and to enforce the law against it. It was a tendency that had manifested itself in Bukharin and Khrushchev before Gorbachev...Some adherents of this tendency believed they were true socialists, though they allied themselves with others whose true sympathies were with money-making and private property. Not until Gorbachev had this tendency in the revolution held full sway and been carried to its logical conclusion. (p. 274-275)
==
Why is all of this still relevant?
"the likelihood of revolutions in isolated countries remains, and revolutionaries in the 21st century will face a challenge similar to those in the last, having to build socialism alone or almost alone in the cauldron of imperialist pressures." (p. 253)
This text was first published in 2004. So, the sense of American exceptionalist invulnerability and the "end of history" had given way, by time of publication, to the "War on Terror"/"clash of civilizations". However, much had yet to unfold, from the Great Recession to COVID-19. Point being, it's worth revisiting and pondering the above excerpt in light of more recent talk of a multipolar world, and asking what that means for such movements to build socialism.
Showcasing the advantage of historical materialism, this text is not starry-eyed about Soviet socialism, nor is it defeatist (explicitly rejecting ideas of inevitability).
"Though Gorbachev’s revisionism had a long gestation in CPSU politics and in Soviet society, the Soviet collapse was not foreordained. There were many points in the previous thirty- five years where developments could have headed in another direction." (p. 228)
The text traces an, ahem, 'red thread' from bungled Khrushchevite reforms, through to Brezhnev's cautionary (some say inert) approach, finally to Gorbachev and ultimately Yeltsin. Not to suggest that it was a decades-long conspiracy, but that repeated right-opportunist retreats became the reference-point for "reform" in the absence of sufficient capability to adopt a more imaginative approach. It was a matter of trying to use the old to plug the gaps in the new, to the point that a rotten, festering old overtook the new system.
"The 'democrat' opposition that arose after 1985 had forerunners in the Khrushchev “Thaw” years, 1953 to 1964. Khrushchev had tolerated liberal intellectuals. After 1964, when Brezhnev became less tolerant, part of the intelligentsia created a dissident movement. The dissidents were the heirs of the Bukharin-Khrushchev tradition. The dissidents influenced Gorbachev." (p. 194)
Reforms that unraveled the system were misleadingly identified with the socialist system itself, to the extent that discontent was misdirected. It's rather ironic that the letter of ostensibly "Stalinist" Nina Andreyeva became a pretext, as the author notes, to muzzle and remove from power critics of so-called perestroika.
Genuine flaws existed, of course. There are revelatory statistics, citing the late Gregory Grossman, showing just how vast the "second economy" of legal and illegal private activity went: by 1977, it was up to 65% the size of the official economy in Armenia, 40% in Belorussia, Moldavia, and Ukraine, and 30% in Russia. (74)
The point is not that heavy-handed centralism is an inherent good, but that reform should be tactical, not opportunistic.
Right-opportunist retreats were political, as well as economic. Keeran outlines how Brezhnev, wary of Western influence driven by detente and the consumer demand stoked by Khrushchev's policies and rhetoric, tolerated Russian nationalism as a strategic ideological bulwark against that Western influence. Unfortunately, this reflected a continuity of neglect of the "national question", in spite of earlier genuine Soviet efforts to support national minorities. This fomented and foreshadowed later nationalist movements.
In the Epilogue, the author addresses six theses on the fall of the USSR:
1. Flaws of socialism
2. Popular opposition
3. External factors
4. Bureaucratic counter-revolution
5. Lack of democracy and over-centralization, and
6. The Gorbachev factor
...and ultimately reaffirms the above conclusion: Gorbachev may have been an instigator, but in a myopic right-opportunist fashion rather than some long-term Grand Plan for capitalist restoration.
Because "the Party lacked the vigilance and will to suppress the second economy [black market] and attendant Party and government corruption," (p. 230) right-opportunism took hold until the 'society of the spectacle' disguising liberal reforms as ostensibly socialist broke down in the outbreak of full-on reaction.
"Lenin had defined the essence of right opportunism as sacrificing fundamental principles, particularly the principle of class struggle, for immediate gain and as making unnecessary compromises with the class enemy in hopes of finding a quick and easy advance toward socialism." (p. 130)
The author's mentions of a Maoist critique are cursory and dismissive (notwithstanding that critique's own vacillations in practice), but its play-by-play account of actual bureaucratic maneuvers and events makes it worth letting that slide in engaging with this work.
By way of alternatives, Keeran points approvingly to "what-ifs" around Yuri Andropov. It's an ever-frustrating pattern on the left, of course, to lionize the short-lived leaderships in a hopeless romantic pursuit of inspiration. Still, the author makes a solid case:
"According to Andropov, poor planning and outmoded management, the failure to utilize scientific and technological innovations, reliance on extensive rather than intensive methods of production, and the lack of labor discipline caused the economic shortcomings. Andropov called for the “acceleration [uskorenie] of scientific and technological progress.” Andropov visualized a modernization of production through the application of computer technology." (p. 52)
Where his program would have led, if fully implemented, we'll never know...but this does echo plenty of "cybersocialist" manifestos.
===
A couple of excerpts that really boil it down:
"The betrayal of the Soviet Union consisted of the overthrow of socialism and the splintering of the Union state. This resulted directly from five concrete processes: Party liquidation, the media handover to anti-socialist forces, privatizing and marketizing the planned, publicly owned economy, unleashing separatism, and surrendering to U.S. imperialism." (p. 236)
In the end the story of the Soviet collapse was not the inevitable unfolding of a tragedy rooted in the impossibility of socialism. Nor was it a defeat brought about by popular opposition or foreign enemies. Nor was it due to Soviet socialism’s failure to match up to some ideal of socialism that embodied liberal democracy and a mixed economy. Nor was it primarily the story of the conscious betrayal of one man. Rather, it was the story of a triumph of a certain tendency within the revolution itself. It was a tendency rooted at first in the peasant nature of the country and later in a second economy, a sector that flourished because of consumer demands unsatisfied by the first economy and because of the failure of authorities to appreciate the danger it represented and to enforce the law against it. It was a tendency that had manifested itself in Bukharin and Khrushchev before Gorbachev...Some adherents of this tendency believed they were true socialists, though they allied themselves with others whose true sympathies were with money-making and private property. Not until Gorbachev had this tendency in the revolution held full sway and been carried to its logical conclusion. (p. 274-275)
==
Why is all of this still relevant?
"the likelihood of revolutions in isolated countries remains, and revolutionaries in the 21st century will face a challenge similar to those in the last, having to build socialism alone or almost alone in the cauldron of imperialist pressures." (p. 253)
This text was first published in 2004. So, the sense of American exceptionalist invulnerability and the "end of history" had given way, by time of publication, to the "War on Terror"/"clash of civilizations". However, much had yet to unfold, from the Great Recession to COVID-19. Point being, it's worth revisiting and pondering the above excerpt in light of more recent talk of a multipolar world, and asking what that means for such movements to build socialism.
August 10, 2019
Sad try of supporting a totalitarian, undemocratic and imperialist Soviet Union that killed millions of their own citizens. Read instead the book Collapse of an Empire by Jegor Gaidar. It states clearly with highest possible references that the reasons for the collapse of Soviet Union were basically ideological and economical. The road to the collapse started way before Gorbachev and the seeds were sown already by Lenin and Stalin.
January 9, 2022
If you want a truly terrible piece of scholarship on the decline of the USSR, I highly recommend it. If you want to know anything about the decline of the USSR, go for Mosher Lewin or Ronald Grigor Suny
February 4, 2025
When I began reading this book I thought that the analysis and argument which was being built was both interesting and convincing. The authors attempt to set up their analysis of the collapse through a broad and long term approach, linking the collapse to a revisionist line within the CPSU beginning with Bukharin, continuing with Khrushchev and ending with Gorbachev. While I do think that in terms of the purely historical information presented in this book (i.e the context of and the events leading up to the collapse), it is a worthwhile read, I would hesitate to recommend it on terms of its actual analysis and conclusion. The weight placed on individuals such as Khrushchev and Gorbachev as deciding factors in the collapse, and the comparatively little attention payed to weaknesses within the Party and Soviet society itself (aside from mentions of the 'second economy') and how these weaknesses gave rise to such leaders was frustrating as it became obvious that the author's sympathy for the USSR was essentially undermining their argument. While the authors suggest that the large opposition to Gorbachev was weak and unable to oppose him, thus his powerful position, they do little to elucidate why that was the case and what systemic issues allowed the CPSU to degenerate in such a way. The authors' wholesale rejection of the criticism of the CPSU by the CPC was another factor that deeply frustrated me. Chinese criticism of Khrushchev is written off as 'crude' 'dogmatic' and 'lacking credibility', while Chinese opinion on Gorbachev's revisionism and the collapse is entirely ignored. In fact, the authors instead lambast the Chinese for the reforms of the Deng era, claiming that they were essentially a NEP-inspired program bound to fail. Given this assertion, Zhang Weiwei's comments are worth considering:
Why are Western Marxist scholars so bent on discrediting the very much still in existence Communist China while continuing to romanticise the veritably collapsed USSR, even when the publication in question is considering that collapse?
He (Deng) believed that copying the Western model and placing political reform on the top of the agenda, like the Soviets were doing at the time, was utterly foolish. In fact, that was exactly Deng’s comment on Gorbachev after their meeting: 'This man may look smart but in fact is stupid.'
Why are Western Marxist scholars so bent on discrediting the very much still in existence Communist China while continuing to romanticise the veritably collapsed USSR, even when the publication in question is considering that collapse?
May 25, 2019
A few decades ago another breed of Socialists was building up the same conspiracy story: how the workers were stabbed in the back by the elites. Myself, I would have appreciated some originality, but it is the same discourse with a few names changed.
Read
December 25, 2023এই বইয়ের নামকরণের পেছনে ট্রটস্কির "The Revolution Betrayed" এর সম্পর্ক আছে বলেই মনে হয়। সেখানে স্তালিনই ছিলেন বিশ্বাসঘাতক। এই বই যেন বিশ্বাসঘাতকতার প্রশ্নের ভিন্ন এক উত্তর আমাদের সামনে প্রতিষ্ঠিত করে।
লেখক গিল্ট ট্র্যাপে পা দিতে নারাজ। সোভিয়েত ইউনিয়নকে ফেইল্ড স্টেট ধরে নিলে সোশ্যালিজমই প্রশ্নবিদ্ধ হয়ে যায় - অনেকটা এরকম এক বার্তা দিয়েই বইটা শুরু হইসে। ট্রোটস্কাইস্টরা লেনিন পরবর্তী সোভিয়েত ইউনিয়নকে আদর্শ মানে না, এই স্ট্যান্ডটা অনেকক্ষেত্রেই তাদের ইম্পেরিয়ালিস্টদের পাতানো ফাঁদে পা দেওয়ার সমতুল্য মনে করেন লেখক। আবার ট্রটস্কি গদিতে বসলে কি হতে পারত, সেই আলাপে যেতেও নারাজ। সেটা শুরুতেই পরিষ্কার করে দেওয়া হইসে।
ক্রুশ্চেভকে কঠিন সমালোচনা করা হইসে এই বইয়ে। ক্রুশ্চেভের এন্টি-স্তালিন নানা স্ট্যান্ড এইক্ষেত্রে নানা ভূমিকা রাখতে পারে। ম্যালা সমালোচনা করলেও ক্রুশ্চেভের সময়েও ইউনিয়নের ইকোনমিক গ্রোথ থেমে থাকে নাই। সেটার কৃতিত্ব অবশ্য ক্রুশ্চেভকে না দিয়ে সোশ্যালিজমকেই দিসেন লেখক। এই মতামতে তার স্তালিনিস্ট ভাবধারার প্রভাব থাকতেই পারে।
গর্বাচভকে 'জাতভেদে' সবাই ঘৃণা করে। তাই ওই অংশ নিয়ে আমার তেমন একটা আগ্রহ ছিল না।
ট্রোটস্কাইস্টরা এই বই পছন্দ করবেন বলে মনে হয় না। তবে স্তালিন-পরবর্তী সোভিয়েত ইউনিয়নের যে চিত্র লেখক তুলে ধরসেন, তা আপনাদের কাছে গুরুত্বপূর্ণ মনে হইতে পারে। সেজন্য একটু নেড়েচেড়ে দেখতেও পারেন।
লেখক গিল্ট ট্র্যাপে পা দিতে নারাজ। সোভিয়েত ইউনিয়নকে ফেইল্ড স্টেট ধরে নিলে সোশ্যালিজমই প্রশ্নবিদ্ধ হয়ে যায় - অনেকটা এরকম এক বার্তা দিয়েই বইটা শুরু হইসে। ট্রোটস্কাইস্টরা লেনিন পরবর্তী সোভিয়েত ইউনিয়নকে আদর্শ মানে না, এই স্ট্যান্ডটা অনেকক্ষেত্রেই তাদের ইম্পেরিয়ালিস্টদের পাতানো ফাঁদে পা দেওয়ার সমতুল্য মনে করেন লেখক। আবার ট্রটস্কি গদিতে বসলে কি হতে পারত, সেই আলাপে যেতেও নারাজ। সেটা শুরুতেই পরিষ্কার করে দেওয়া হইসে।
ক্রুশ্চেভকে কঠিন সমালোচনা করা হইসে এই বইয়ে। ক্রুশ্চেভের এন্টি-স্তালিন নানা স্ট্যান্ড এইক্ষেত্রে নানা ভূমিকা রাখতে পারে। ম্যালা সমালোচনা করলেও ক্রুশ্চেভের সময়েও ইউনিয়নের ইকোনমিক গ্রোথ থেমে থাকে নাই। সেটার কৃতিত্ব অবশ্য ক্রুশ্চেভকে না দিয়ে সোশ্যালিজমকেই দিসেন লেখক। এই মতামতে তার স্তালিনিস্ট ভাবধারার প্রভাব থাকতেই পারে।
গর্বাচভকে 'জাতভেদে' সবাই ঘৃণা করে। তাই ওই অংশ নিয়ে আমার তেমন একটা আগ্রহ ছিল না।
ট্রোটস্কাইস্টরা এই বই পছন্দ করবেন বলে মনে হয় না। তবে স্তালিন-পরবর্তী সোভিয়েত ইউনিয়নের যে চিত্র লেখক তুলে ধরসেন, তা আপনাদের কাছে গুরুত্বপূর্ণ মনে হইতে পারে। সেজন্য একটু নেড়েচেড়ে দেখতেও পারেন।
July 19, 2024
Ótima leitura.
A URSS dos anos 80 tava com várias dificuldades como os gastos militares se elevando (em resposta à pressão estadunidense do Reagan que tinha justamente o objetivo de "falir" os soviéticos), queda do preço do petróleo (parte essencial da receita soviética), bem como algumas ineficiências nas quantidades e qualidade de bens de consumo, em razão de descompassos e falhas nos mecanismos de incentivo da planificação Estatal.
Mas os autores pontuam muito bem que ainda que graves e reconhecidos esses problemas (tanto pela população quanto pelo Partido), nada disso era digno de uma crise sistêmica e irrecuperável. E mesmo até o fim, a população se manteve fiel à ideia de controle de preços, união das repúblicas socialistas.
A URSS era um Estado funcional, capaz de prover e atender às necessidades da população, os gastos militares e gastos com ajuda à luta anticolonial mundo afora. Não tinha data marcada pra nada cair, em que peses os problemas.
Os autores explicam como a ruína da URSS não se deu em função de suspostos "Vícios do socialismo"; nem de oposição popular (pelo contrário, o partido gozava de prestígio e foi isso que pavimentou o caminho e desorientou as bases na hora em que começou a traição); nem tampouco apenas Fatores Externos (como os já mencionados acima); também não foi nenhuma "contrarrevolução burocrática" de um estamento ossificado no poder há décadas, até porque várias medidas do Gorbatchov/Iakolév visavam enfraquecer o partido justamente pra abrir caminho para mais e mais desintegração; Também não foi culpa da suposta "falta de democracia", uma vez que houve greves, revoltas e oposição à algumas medidas, em que pese o problema de a destruição das instituições a partir de dentro apresentar um problema não resolvido.
Por fim o fator Gorbatchov: Em que pese todo ser humano decente tenha o dever moral de odiar esse homem e cuspir em qualquer imagem dele, é impensável que qualquer sistema complexo do tamanho de uma URSS caísse apenas pela ação de um homem. Sim, ele era um vendido, inepto, sem disciplina intelectual ou conteúdo na cabeça, sim ele era dissimulado e muito versado no jargão marxista-leninista pra passar as traições nos Congressos com linguajar palatável. Mas nada disso passaria se o Partido estivesse forte e firme nas disposições Comunistas. O Kruschev tinha caído por muito menos, pois o partido, na ocasião, tava em melhores condições político-ideológicas pra cortar o barato de revisionismos e aberturas excessivas à mercados.
O que os autores demonstram (numa análise digna do marxismo) é justamente o caminho intelectual (as históricas tendências dentro do Partido, que se resumiria simploriamente em Lenin, Stalin, Andropov de um lado e um Bukharin, Kruschev e Gorbatchov do outro) e as bases materiais que permitiram esse descalabro. Dão um destaque especial à chamada "Segunda Economia", que seria toda economia por fora da planificação (seja a legal ou ilegal). Essa economia paralela forneceu historicamente o substrato pra que essa tendência oportunista de direita fincasse raízes no partido. Por um lado intelectualmente, nas tendências revisionistas, por outro lado, de uma maneira mais insidiosa, corrompendo (no sentido usual da palavra) os dirigentes em todos os níveis. No final do período Gorbatchov, essa corrupção tava incontrolável, dado o incentivo dado pelo último à Segunda Economia.
Então, não foi apenas uma traição desprezível, mas o resultado de uma longa marcha de acontecimentos, problemas teóricos e ideológicos essenciais dentro do partido que não foram resolvidos, problemas econômicos cujas lacunas da planificação permitiram o fortalecimento da Segunda Economia e posterior entranhamento desta no seio da direção partidária. Tudo isso culminou no cara errado na hora errada (pois se diz que fosse o Andropov mais jovem, a URSS estaria aí até hoje, pois as reformas dele teriam tido tempo de ser levadas às consequências socialistas adequadas). Isso pra não falar na cegueira e inconsequência da trupe Gorbatchov quanto à questão nacional. A União das Repúblicas e o caráter Socialista desses Estados não eram duas coisas soldadas uma na outra. Foi preciso uma inépcia/imbecilidade especial pra permitir que os nacionalismos ficassem descontrolados como ficaram ao mesmo tempo que se destruíam os mecanismos de controle do partido-estado e a capacidade de planejar a economia.
Daria pra falar de tantas outras coisas boas do livro, que jogam uma luz não fatalista nesse processo.
Como nota sobre a tradução, meu palpite é que eles beberam PERIGOSAMENTE da edição de Portugal. Considerando que dos três atribuídos como tradutores eu sei garantidamente que um não é tradutor de ofício, mas militante do PCB (mérito, não demérito), eu atribuo aos outros dois a mesma categoria. A questão que me chamou atenção é que existe uma edição desse livro (que é a que consta aqui no Goodreads) da Editora Avante, de 2008, que aparentemente é a Editora do Partido Comunista de Portugal (não achei nomes responsáveis por aquela tradução). Depois da terceira passagem onde a palavra "registro" era grafada como REGISTO (o que me fez pesquisar e ver que é uma grafia possível para o português de Portugal) e de umas três passagens onde a capital da Islândia é grafada como Reiquiavique, em vez do nosso usual Reykjavik (do PT-BR), eu percebi que tinha algo de estranho... Mas tudo bem, não é o fim da história.
A URSS dos anos 80 tava com várias dificuldades como os gastos militares se elevando (em resposta à pressão estadunidense do Reagan que tinha justamente o objetivo de "falir" os soviéticos), queda do preço do petróleo (parte essencial da receita soviética), bem como algumas ineficiências nas quantidades e qualidade de bens de consumo, em razão de descompassos e falhas nos mecanismos de incentivo da planificação Estatal.
Mas os autores pontuam muito bem que ainda que graves e reconhecidos esses problemas (tanto pela população quanto pelo Partido), nada disso era digno de uma crise sistêmica e irrecuperável. E mesmo até o fim, a população se manteve fiel à ideia de controle de preços, união das repúblicas socialistas.
A URSS era um Estado funcional, capaz de prover e atender às necessidades da população, os gastos militares e gastos com ajuda à luta anticolonial mundo afora. Não tinha data marcada pra nada cair, em que peses os problemas.
Os autores explicam como a ruína da URSS não se deu em função de suspostos "Vícios do socialismo"; nem de oposição popular (pelo contrário, o partido gozava de prestígio e foi isso que pavimentou o caminho e desorientou as bases na hora em que começou a traição); nem tampouco apenas Fatores Externos (como os já mencionados acima); também não foi nenhuma "contrarrevolução burocrática" de um estamento ossificado no poder há décadas, até porque várias medidas do Gorbatchov/Iakolév visavam enfraquecer o partido justamente pra abrir caminho para mais e mais desintegração; Também não foi culpa da suposta "falta de democracia", uma vez que houve greves, revoltas e oposição à algumas medidas, em que pese o problema de a destruição das instituições a partir de dentro apresentar um problema não resolvido.
Por fim o fator Gorbatchov: Em que pese todo ser humano decente tenha o dever moral de odiar esse homem e cuspir em qualquer imagem dele, é impensável que qualquer sistema complexo do tamanho de uma URSS caísse apenas pela ação de um homem. Sim, ele era um vendido, inepto, sem disciplina intelectual ou conteúdo na cabeça, sim ele era dissimulado e muito versado no jargão marxista-leninista pra passar as traições nos Congressos com linguajar palatável. Mas nada disso passaria se o Partido estivesse forte e firme nas disposições Comunistas. O Kruschev tinha caído por muito menos, pois o partido, na ocasião, tava em melhores condições político-ideológicas pra cortar o barato de revisionismos e aberturas excessivas à mercados.
O que os autores demonstram (numa análise digna do marxismo) é justamente o caminho intelectual (as históricas tendências dentro do Partido, que se resumiria simploriamente em Lenin, Stalin, Andropov de um lado e um Bukharin, Kruschev e Gorbatchov do outro) e as bases materiais que permitiram esse descalabro. Dão um destaque especial à chamada "Segunda Economia", que seria toda economia por fora da planificação (seja a legal ou ilegal). Essa economia paralela forneceu historicamente o substrato pra que essa tendência oportunista de direita fincasse raízes no partido. Por um lado intelectualmente, nas tendências revisionistas, por outro lado, de uma maneira mais insidiosa, corrompendo (no sentido usual da palavra) os dirigentes em todos os níveis. No final do período Gorbatchov, essa corrupção tava incontrolável, dado o incentivo dado pelo último à Segunda Economia.
Então, não foi apenas uma traição desprezível, mas o resultado de uma longa marcha de acontecimentos, problemas teóricos e ideológicos essenciais dentro do partido que não foram resolvidos, problemas econômicos cujas lacunas da planificação permitiram o fortalecimento da Segunda Economia e posterior entranhamento desta no seio da direção partidária. Tudo isso culminou no cara errado na hora errada (pois se diz que fosse o Andropov mais jovem, a URSS estaria aí até hoje, pois as reformas dele teriam tido tempo de ser levadas às consequências socialistas adequadas). Isso pra não falar na cegueira e inconsequência da trupe Gorbatchov quanto à questão nacional. A União das Repúblicas e o caráter Socialista desses Estados não eram duas coisas soldadas uma na outra. Foi preciso uma inépcia/imbecilidade especial pra permitir que os nacionalismos ficassem descontrolados como ficaram ao mesmo tempo que se destruíam os mecanismos de controle do partido-estado e a capacidade de planejar a economia.
Daria pra falar de tantas outras coisas boas do livro, que jogam uma luz não fatalista nesse processo.
Como nota sobre a tradução, meu palpite é que eles beberam PERIGOSAMENTE da edição de Portugal. Considerando que dos três atribuídos como tradutores eu sei garantidamente que um não é tradutor de ofício, mas militante do PCB (mérito, não demérito), eu atribuo aos outros dois a mesma categoria. A questão que me chamou atenção é que existe uma edição desse livro (que é a que consta aqui no Goodreads) da Editora Avante, de 2008, que aparentemente é a Editora do Partido Comunista de Portugal (não achei nomes responsáveis por aquela tradução). Depois da terceira passagem onde a palavra "registro" era grafada como REGISTO (o que me fez pesquisar e ver que é uma grafia possível para o português de Portugal) e de umas três passagens onde a capital da Islândia é grafada como Reiquiavique, em vez do nosso usual Reykjavik (do PT-BR), eu percebi que tinha algo de estranho... Mas tudo bem, não é o fim da história.
November 13, 2021
Overall a useful and interesting read. The authors succeed in drawing a line of anti-socialist policies from Bukharin to Khrushchev and ultimately Gorbachev. They also highlight the role that the second or shadow economy played in the Soviet Union and how this both undermined Socialism as well as provided a class basis for Gorbachev. However, the book lacks theoretical depth and does not provide with a satisfying Marxist answer to the shortcomings of Soviet Socialism. In that it might sim treeply reflect the overall low level of theoretical discussion Marxists in the US. Still, this book is a must read for anyone trying to learn form the experiences of the first socialist country.
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April 30, 2012For a supposedly Marxist-Leninist analysis, Keeran and Kenny certainly give a lot of weight to the individual. "We're not saying it's Gorbachev, but it's Gorbachev."
January 12, 2026
This book is an extremely detailed analysis of the reasons leading to the collapse of the USSR.
The authors stress how history is full of nuances and make an honest effort to provide most accurate possible portrait of the USSR society, depicting the social, political, and economic realities of the post-Stalin USSR, and making compelling arguments supported by extensive research.
I particularly enjoyed the conclusions in the last chapter where the authors reflect on the main issues of the Soviet society and what they teach us about class struggle and building socialism.
I highly recommend this book to anyone looking for an unbiased and impartial view on the socialist project of the USSR.
The authors stress how history is full of nuances and make an honest effort to provide most accurate possible portrait of the USSR society, depicting the social, political, and economic realities of the post-Stalin USSR, and making compelling arguments supported by extensive research.
I particularly enjoyed the conclusions in the last chapter where the authors reflect on the main issues of the Soviet society and what they teach us about class struggle and building socialism.
I highly recommend this book to anyone looking for an unbiased and impartial view on the socialist project of the USSR.
August 5, 2025
Don't feel qualified to give a real rating of this book because it was my first introduction to the historical subject matter. This 'review' is therefore just a collection of my main takeaways/thoughts.
Why did the ussr collapse?
1. Large black market ‘second economy’ (made up a relevant percentage of economic activity) that was obviously not taxed but also caused discontent and brought about a sort of petty-bourgeoisie class (included non-illegal things such as repairs etc, and illegal things such as subletting apartments privately etc. (made up 20% of all housing at some point?!), drug trades etc.
2. Some lack of worker productivity? Drunkenness and lack of ambition etc… not sure how relevant this really is…
3. On that point, too much wage equalization between ordinary and skilled labor (e.g. professions like doctors not being paid enough, causing lack of ambition among people)
4. Deaths of many communists in WW2.
5. Also large-scale theft in the workplace (from ordinary workers, to sell or use on the black market) and corruption of cadres (local level)
6. Emphasis on hard vs soft industry at the wrong times
7. Most politburo members not ‘aging out’ and instead staying in power even while elderly
8. Bad agricultural policy. E.g. focusing on using ‘virgin lands’ instead of maximizing productivity on existing farmland
9. Just bad policy after Krushchev onwards. Liberalization, free market reforms, not enough crackdowns on black market crime rings, etc. After Stalin and after most proper marxists died in WW2, the liberals started to come out of the woodworks. Not solely Gorbachev’s fault or something because he was allowed to come into power and all the revisionists before him were too
10. External interference from US - e.g. US conspiring with OPEC to drive down oil prices astronomically which benefitted the US and greatly harmed the USSR (who were reliant on oil exports to Europe)
11. Note: yes of course the US is also at fault but they are the manifestation of capitalism and imperialism in this world and therefore act accordingly, dedicated by their material conditions. The Soviet leadership knew this and didn’t combat it. The fall of the USSR is most due to faults of leadership (revisionism)
Criticisms: maybe the book places a little too much emphasis on reformists within the party (great-man-theory-esque), not always fully convincing. Could’ve done with a little more elaboration on the crises that the USSR faced in its final years (their economic realities for the population etc). This was somewhat glossed over - the ‘crises’ and the miner’s strikers were mentioned frequently but not elaborated on.
Why did the ussr collapse?
1. Large black market ‘second economy’ (made up a relevant percentage of economic activity) that was obviously not taxed but also caused discontent and brought about a sort of petty-bourgeoisie class (included non-illegal things such as repairs etc, and illegal things such as subletting apartments privately etc. (made up 20% of all housing at some point?!), drug trades etc.
2. Some lack of worker productivity? Drunkenness and lack of ambition etc… not sure how relevant this really is…
3. On that point, too much wage equalization between ordinary and skilled labor (e.g. professions like doctors not being paid enough, causing lack of ambition among people)
4. Deaths of many communists in WW2.
5. Also large-scale theft in the workplace (from ordinary workers, to sell or use on the black market) and corruption of cadres (local level)
6. Emphasis on hard vs soft industry at the wrong times
7. Most politburo members not ‘aging out’ and instead staying in power even while elderly
8. Bad agricultural policy. E.g. focusing on using ‘virgin lands’ instead of maximizing productivity on existing farmland
9. Just bad policy after Krushchev onwards. Liberalization, free market reforms, not enough crackdowns on black market crime rings, etc. After Stalin and after most proper marxists died in WW2, the liberals started to come out of the woodworks. Not solely Gorbachev’s fault or something because he was allowed to come into power and all the revisionists before him were too
10. External interference from US - e.g. US conspiring with OPEC to drive down oil prices astronomically which benefitted the US and greatly harmed the USSR (who were reliant on oil exports to Europe)
11. Note: yes of course the US is also at fault but they are the manifestation of capitalism and imperialism in this world and therefore act accordingly, dedicated by their material conditions. The Soviet leadership knew this and didn’t combat it. The fall of the USSR is most due to faults of leadership (revisionism)
Criticisms: maybe the book places a little too much emphasis on reformists within the party (great-man-theory-esque), not always fully convincing. Could’ve done with a little more elaboration on the crises that the USSR faced in its final years (their economic realities for the population etc). This was somewhat glossed over - the ‘crises’ and the miner’s strikers were mentioned frequently but not elaborated on.
September 18, 2024
A fantastic and far reaching Marxist analysis of the events and policy changes that led to the dismantling of the Soviet Union. Rooted in the material conditions and ideological trends with in the Communist party of the Soviet Union. A must read for those on the left and history buffs alike
January 5, 2025
AaaaaaAaaaa this book is fantastic. You don't get a lot of books like this in English. It analyzes the fall of the USSR using a historical materialist framework. It's so refreshing (and not to mention, extremely useful) to have a book able to examine the conditions and faults that led to the demise of Soviet socialism and the disintegration of the union from a position sympathetic to the Marxist view of things; this is super important for giving modern-day Marxists a tool for truly understanding what did go wrong with the USSR (because, clearly, something DID go wrong, or we'd still have it exist as a socialist state today) and make sure we steer the ship differently the next time around.
Importantly, this book actually gives thorough sourcing for everything; the footnotes have nearly 700 references to various texts, speeches, interviews, etc. A lot of books sympathetic to Marxism, sadly, seem to neglect this basic prerequisite for any credible work of history, so I'm super happy to see it here (and it gives me a lot works to jump into in the future!).
Overall, this is the best work of Marxist historiography I've read since Black Against Empire. It's really necessary reading for any socialist.
Importantly, this book actually gives thorough sourcing for everything; the footnotes have nearly 700 references to various texts, speeches, interviews, etc. A lot of books sympathetic to Marxism, sadly, seem to neglect this basic prerequisite for any credible work of history, so I'm super happy to see it here (and it gives me a lot works to jump into in the future!).
Overall, this is the best work of Marxist historiography I've read since Black Against Empire. It's really necessary reading for any socialist.
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